





# The Settlement of Armenian Refugees in Syria and Lebanon 1915-1939

Thomas Hugh Greenshields

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The Settlement of Armenian Refugees in Syria and Lebanon,  
1915-1939

By

Thomas Hugh Greenshields

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## Preface

After its defeat by the Allies in WWI, the Ottoman Empire was dismantled, and it disintegrated. The Allies divided Asia Minor and the adjacent territories formerly under Ottoman rule among themselves and planned to allocate homelands to the Greeks, the Armenians, the Kurds and the Turks. As for the Arabs, their territories were divided and placed under French and British mandates.

Gradually, large numbers of Armenians who had survived the Genocide perpetrated by the leadership of the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP), which ruled the Ottoman Empire, headed to French occupied Cilicia. They hoped to form an Armenian state as they constituted a significant proportion of the pre-Genocide population of the area they envisaged as an Armenian state. The Armenian Legion, established by the Allies and fighting under the Allied flag, was to become the core of its army. However, after a challenging period of reconstruction and rebuilding, which lasted between 1918 and 1920, Armenian hopes were shattered by the Franco-Turkish agreement of October 20, 1921. This agreement handed over Cilicia to the rising state of Turkey under Mustafa Kemal. Consequently, the Armenians were left with no choice but to flee the country to avoid an impending genocide and ethnic cleansing, as the policy of Kemalist Turkey was to continue on the track of the CUP and to ethnically homogenize the new state.

Indeed, no sooner had the Franco-Turkish agreement been announced than tens of thousands of Armenians left Cilicia heading for the adjacent countries, mostly going to Syria and Lebanon, and to a lesser extent to Cyprus, Greece, Palestine and Egypt. The refugees were settled in Syria and Lebanon with the help of the international community and the instrumental support of Western philanthropic organizations.

This settlement *en masse* that started at the beginning of the third decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century had to wait for over four decades before being scrutinized in an academic study, thanks to a Ph.D. candidate named Thomas Hugh Greenfields.

While some earlier studies touched on the subject, they were either partial, failed to cover the entire period extending to the late 1930s (when the Sanjak of Alexandretta was acceded to Turkey), or were episodic reports on aspects of this settlement. None of them offered a comprehensive analysis of the panorama and processes of Armenian settlements in Syria and Lebanon. Nor did anyone make a profound study of the social and career profiles of the refugees, their numbers and the places they were settled.

Thomas Greenfields was the student who undertook the challenge, delved into the archival materials of the Nansen Office for Refugees (Geneva) alongside a number of other relevant archives, as well as magazines which covered the settlement process and published pertinent news and reports and produced this

unprecedented and still unsurpassed study. Alongside the archival materials, the author managed to interview a number of figures who were either eye-witnesses, or in key positions within the Armenian refugee circles. Furthermore, the study covered an odyssey of two decades, from the early 1920s to the late 1930s.

In this regard, the book stands out as an unparalleled, unique and extensive study of human geography. It is considered an important resource for migration studies and for in-depth studies on group settlements, their integration into host societies and the diverse sociopolitical, economic and cultural challenges such processes face. It may serve as a comparative reference for both the settlement of Armenian refugees in Cyprus and Greece and the settlement of Greeks in Cyprus and Greece after the Smyrna affair in 1923, as well as for the settlement of other refugee groups in both in the Middle East and other parts of the world.

The study (# 2814679, 2 volumes), submitted to Durham University back in 1979 in fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree, was open to the public, but was never published as a book.

Recognizing its academic value, the Haigazian University-based Armenian Diaspora Research Center decided to publish the thesis in book format. This publication ensures that this seminal work, which reconstructs and validates narratives of the first two decades of the post-Genocide origins of the Armenian communities of Syria and Lebanon, is accessible to university and academic libraries worldwide.

The Center reached out to Dr. Tom Greenshields, who graciously permitted the publication of this thesis in book format by the Haigazian University Press. The PDF-format script was converted to Word, compared with the original manuscript, checked and corrected by Haigazian University students Houry Attarian, Nathalie Takadjian, and Krikor Ankeshian.

The Armenian Diaspora Research Center and the HU Press take pride in publishing this seminal work, *The Settlement of Armenian Refugees in Syria and Lebanon, 1919-1939*, authored by Dr. Tom Greenshields.

Dr. Antranik Dakessian, Director  
Armenian Diaspora Research Center

## FOREWORD

It was a great surprise to me when, 45 years after its completion, I was approached by Dr. Dakessian with a request to publish my thesis by Haigazian University Press. It took only a short time to agree, although with the reservation that I should be allowed to write a Foreword to the book, setting out what I consider to be the limitations of the work, which was, after all, my apprenticeship in research. With this proviso, I am actually both delighted and grateful that the work should now be available to Armenians locally and worldwide, and hope they will forgive me for any errors and omissions.

I had three main reservations about publication. The first, as already mentioned, was that I regarded my thesis as a learning exercise, tackling full-on research for the first time, with all the pitfalls that entails. Indeed, when I was a geography student at Oxford, intending to go on to pursue research, I distinctly remember my specialist Middle East tutor, John Wilkinson, advising me, 'Tom, never publish your thesis. You can be forgiven an article, but never a book.' I hasten to say that this was before it was even written! Some time later, and while studying at Durham, I delivered a paper to a conference in Oxford, after which I was approached by a representative of Cambridge University Press, asking if I would be interested in publishing my research. I thought about it, but remembered my former tutor's advice, and in the end, took no action. I was aware of the limitations of the work, and intending an academic career, I did not want to shoot myself in the foot. Afterwards, my career took an entirely different trajectory, and now, retired at the age of 72, publication can do me no harm at all, and if it can be of use to the Armenian community in Syria and Lebanon and Armenian Diaspora Studies, I am happy for it to go ahead.

My second reservation concerned language. Although I was able to read sources in French, I was unable to read either Armenian or Arabic. This meant that I was unable to access sources in either language, a major weakness in the study. Thus, I was unable to consult administrative records in either language, or Arabic or Armenian newspapers which might have contained useful information not just on the progress of settlement, but on relevant local attitudes and politics. There were even some letters in Armenian in the League of Nations Nansen Office archives, notably from the Armenian General Benevolent Union, which I was unable to read. To some extent, this lack of language skills was a product of disciplinary boundaries. In Britain, the study of historical events in the Middle East was generally the preserve of the Orientalist, approaching the subject after training in languages; while the study of settlement patterns was the preserve of the trained geographer. So, the Orientalist would lack the analytical geographical skills, while the geographer would lack the language. Ideally one would marry the two skills, but in the case of the geographer, this would require probably a two-year preparation to learn the language. Perhaps this should now be a mandatory requirement for English-language students approaching geographical

studies overseas. I remember at Durham, nearly 50 years ago, at least one of my fellow postgraduate students, an Arab student from Saudi Arabia, being very critical of the failure of British colleagues studying his region to learn the language. With the benefit of hindsight, I totally agree. How would we Britons regard an Armenian or Arab postgraduate student who came to England to study British population movements between the wars without a working knowledge of English? There is something arrogant, even neo-colonial, about the Englishman studying countries abroad without bothering to learn the language. I believe now that, either we should do so, or we should leave such studies to local students or academics, hoping that they have the opportunity to pursue their goals without political interference, and with the freedom of thought and expression we take for granted in U.K. I think, though, that it would be a sad day if we, in U.K., were to abandon our interest in other countries and peoples. The answer is simple to state, although more difficult in execution: learn the language first!

My third reservation concerned sources. In particular, there should now be two significant sources available which were closed to me at the time of my research. The most important of these sources should be the archives of the French High Commission in Syria and Lebanon. These papers were removed to France at the time of independence, and, at the time of my research, were held at Nantes and were closed, officially because they had not yet been sorted. Consequently, beyond the published material and the Nansen Office archives, any insights into French policy had to be gleaned from the French Foreign Affairs department records, rather than from the High Commission records themselves. "It is reasonable to assume that a more detailed, complete and nuanced record of French policy towards Armenian settlement should be available from the High Commission records, which I understand are now open to research. The second source, which should now also be open, is formed by the records of the League of Nations Nansen Office regarding the cession of the Sanjak of Alexandretta to Turkey, and the resulting exodus of Armenians."

These sources apart, I would like to suggest several new avenues of exploration.

- I was unable to consult the original Ottoman Yearbooks for their estimates of the Armenian population of the empire before the Great War, having to rely on sources such as Cuinet. Do the originals provide any clarification of apparent inconsistencies? And, in particular, is it possible to identify on what basis the stated Armenian population figures were gathered?
- I am aware that the French High Commission records from the Mandate period were taken back to France. But a feature of French rule in Syria and Lebanon was that they divided the country into several states. Were the governmental records of these states also taken to France, or did they remain in Syria and Lebanon? If so, have they survived and are they open for study? It is evident from my own work that the attitude of the individual states did affect the

policy towards Armenian settlement. So, an investigation of the local states' preferences, and the reasons for them, could provide significant insights.

- Similarly, it is evident that municipal authorities also played a role in determining urban settlement options. Do municipal records survive and are they accessible? Even records of council meetings might provide useful information.
- What records exist of land ownership and transfer? These could provide more important background to the process of urban settlement.
- Might the archives of the French High Commission provide more explanation of how the various sometimes conflicting Armenian population totals were actually derived, and thereby help one to understand and explain the conflicts?
- What Armenian church and other institutional records exist to enable an attempt to measure family composition and growth? If 'family reconstitution' is possible from parish church records for villages in 16<sup>th</sup> Century England, is it not also possible for the Armenian population of Syria and Lebanon in the Mandate period?
- I was sadly prevented by the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War from conducting a field survey of the survivors of the migrations, and, equally sadly, the only survivors now left will have been young children at the time, and perhaps even confined to those who fled the Sanjak of Alexandretta at the end of the period. Nevertheless, I believe it very likely that family tradition will have survived, recalling their origins and migration routes. Consequently, is there any mileage in a 'retrospective' survey, recording this information for as many families as possible, and thereby enabling some testing of my own conclusions?
- What relevant records survive and where, of the Armenian General Benevolent Union?
- What local newspapers survive, in Armenian or Arabic, including 'political' broadsheets, which might shed light on local Arab attitudes as well as internal Armenian attitudes, including political rivalries, which, it has been argued, could be influential?

I hope these suggestions might encourage further research, perhaps by keen young aspiring Armenian scholars. I could not be more delighted if, in taking up the challenge, a future scholar might find evidence to modify my own conclusions, for that is the way our knowledge and understanding progresses. Above all, I hope that, after all these years, this work might still be of some interest and value for the descendants of those Armenians involved in the migrations.

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17 April 2024

This publication was made possible by the donation of the  
Adalian family in memory of their mother,  
Araxy Der Boghosian Adalian,  
and  
her uncle Paul Der Boghosian,  
a student of Armenag Haigazian.

To  
Mum and Dad

## Abstract

This thesis, submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, in 1978, investigates the settlement of Armenian refugees in Syria and Lebanon between 1915 and 1939. The topic was conceived not so much as a refugee study but as a study of the processes of minority settlement in the Middle East, for while the importance of the ethnic mosaic pattern in the area has long been recognised, there have been few studies of the processes involved in the evolution of this pattern. A study of the processes of Armenian settlement would enable an assessment of the relative significance of ethnicity, economic status and political manipulation in determining the settlement pattern as well as test the writer's assumption of the interdependence of these constraints. While for purposes of analysis the principal constraints on settlement were investigated separately, and regional and urban patterns were differentiated, the object of the study was not to test individually the significance of the various constraints discussed, but to construct an overall picture of the processes in operation against which their significance could ultimately be tested. The study reveals that while economic and social constraints acted powerfully to inhibit dispersal and maintain concentration, political manipulation was less significant. In all respects, however, social, economic and political constraints were interdependent and their principal effect was to maintain a self-perpetuating process of concentration and segregation.

**Note on Standardisation of Names:** Where possible names have been standardised according to contemporary French Levant Series mapping as well as according to the Times Atlas.

**Note on the Index of Dissimilarity:** The Index of Dissimilarity, used frequently in this study, measures the percentage of Population A within a set of administrative divisions which would need to move location in order for Population A to achieve the same distribution as Population B within the same set. It is calculated by summing the differences between the percentages of Populations A and B in each administrative division and dividing by two.

For any administrative division within the set the Location Quotient is obtained by dividing the percentage of Population A contained in that administrative division by the percentage of Population B contained within the same division.

The thesis in its original format, is available at Durham E-Theses Online:  
<http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/1868/>

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## INTRODUCTION

The subject of this thesis is the settlement of Armenian refugees in Syria and Lebanon between 1915 and 1939. More specifically, the thesis investigates the extent to which the Armenians formed and maintained a particular settlement pattern, and seeks to identify the processes involved in the formation of this pattern. The following paragraphs consider how the topic was chosen, its relevance to current research frontiers, and the approach adopted. The approach adopted is considered in relation to current methodology and to the source material available which is described and assessed. The discussion concludes by introducing the chapter-plan of the thesis.

The choice of topic was rather fortuitous. When the writer began his doctoral research in October, 1973, the intention was to study the development of the urban system of Syria and Lebanon since 1800. The time-span of the study was soon narrowed down to the Mandate period, but the lack of a satisfactory data-base for the study, in particular the lack of adequate statistics to permit the relatively sophisticated statistical analysis then desired, led to a search for a more specific topic concerning urban development. One topic which seized the attention was the impact of Armenian refugee settlement on urban growth, for it was apparent from the annual reports of the Mandatory Power, which contained regular reports on the refugee situation, that most of the Armenians had settled in the cities. A visit to Geneva to investigate possible source material in the archives of the League of Nations revealed a major documentary source, the archives of the Nansen Office concerning the settlement of Armenian refugees, that would permit the establishment of a viable research project. It remained to redefine the focus of the study, switching the emphasis from the urban impact of the refugees to the processes involved in their settlement.

The existence of an adequate documentary base is not, of course, sufficient in itself to justify the launching of a costly and time-consuming research project. The project must be justified in terms of its relevance to current research frontiers. In this respect the most immediate usefulness of the project would appear to be as a geographical study of refugee settlement in the Middle East. In recent years, as in the past, there have certainly been sufficient refugee movements in the area to justify investigation.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, while the settlement of some refugees, like the Palestinians or the Balkan Turks, has been considered by a variety of scholars, geographers have been rather conspicuous by their absence.<sup>2</sup> There is no geographical model of refugee settlement in the Middle East, and the work of generalisation remains to be done. While the absence of geographical case-studies of refugee settlement in the Middle East is to be deplored, the lack of theorisation is however understandable and correct. Refugee settlement is not a problem to be considered uniquely in a Middle Eastern context, but in a world context, for the problems of refugees the world over are likely to be in many respects similar. Thus no attempt is made to use this study to build a model of

Middle Eastern refugee settlement. Indeed, while accepting its relevance as a case-study in refugee settlement, the focus of the thesis is not primarily on Armenian settlement as refugee settlement. Rather, the settlement of the Armenians is viewed as an example of minority settlement, that is as an episode in the evolution of the ethnic “mosaic” pattern of Middle East population.<sup>3</sup>

Such a mosaic has long been recognised as one of the most significant features of the Middle East population pattern.<sup>4</sup> Remarkably, however, while the existence of such a structure is recognised at both the regional and urban levels, the processes by which it was formed have received little attention from geographers. On the regional level a few studies consider the structure and evolution of minority settlement patterns, but there is little detailed examination of the processes involved.<sup>5</sup> De Planhol<sup>6</sup> has identified the tendency for minority groups to accumulate in areas far removed from the centres of urban power, or alternatively in the city itself, where they might secure their prosperity under the protection of the established power. In the present day he sees the gradual abandonment of the remote refuges with the return of security, and a tendency for minorities to be absorbed and disappear. Old “ethnic” allegiances however, have given place to new ones, and minorities based on language and culture are far from giving way:

In the grouping of peoples nationality has tended to replace religion. National minorities appear to be irreducible, whereas religious minorities either disappear entirely or else transform themselves into national minorities.<sup>7</sup>

This is certainly the experience of the Armenians. All the more surprising then, that the processes involved in the evolution of minority settlement patterns should have failed to attract sufficient attention to be able to support the generalisations put forward by De Planhol.

Similarly, urban studies have tended to attribute the ethnic “quarter” system in Middle Eastern cities not to the complex inter- and intra-urban movements of ethnic groups, but to a system of social relations based on Islam.<sup>8</sup> The explanation is conceived in static rather than dynamic terms, ignoring process. It is therefore inadequate. More recently, attention has been drawn to the need to study the processes involved in quarter formation,<sup>9</sup> and a large number of case-studies do contain relevant observations.<sup>10</sup> As yet, however, there is no theoretical consideration of these processes, and it is probably fair to say that the empirical evidence to support such theorisation is still lacking. Nevertheless, several writers have suggested a tendency to the disintegration of ethnic clusters in Middle Eastern cities. This has been identified as part of a movement towards a new social organisation based on socio-economic class structure, and has been regarded as more characteristic of the wealthier sections of the population than of the poorer.<sup>11</sup> However, in view of the continued importance of ethnicity as a factor in the sociology of the Middle East, and in view of the lack of detailed case-studies of the disintegration of ethnic quarters, there is reason to believe that this contemporary disintegration may be illusory.

There is therefore a clear need for studies which investigate the processes involved in the evolution of minority settlement patterns in the Middle East, at both the urban and regional levels. This is the principal justification for this study of Armenian refugee settlement in Syria and Lebanon. It is hoped that the processes identified at work in this empirical study will suggest profitable lines of investigation for future studies which will eventually enable some meaningful generalisations to be made about the formation of ethnic settlement patterns in the Middle East. Underlying this rationale is, of course, the assumption that the Armenians did settle in a manner comparable to that in which other groups have settled to form differential ethnic settlement patterns at other times and in other areas of the Middle East. This assumption cannot be tested in this thesis, which may reasonably claim to be a pioneering study. Future scholars, considering the processes of settlement of other ethnic groups, may care to consider the applicability of the conclusions of this thesis to their own cases.

In the analysis of processes particular attention should be given to the relationship between ethnicity and economic status in determining settlement patterns. Implicit in the argument that ethnic population patterns in the Middle East are giving way before patterns based on economic status is the assumption that these ethnic patterns were themselves established independently of economic status, that is that they were a reflection of the social organisation of ethnic groups and their social relations with their host society, in which it is stressed that the need for security was a key consideration. However, recent studies in the geography of ethnic groups outside the Middle East have suggested that ethnic population patterns may be largely determined by the economic status of the ethnic group, that is that ethnic concentration is a by-product of the concentration of persons of the same economic status.<sup>12</sup> This is not the situation towards which it has been suggested that Middle Eastern society is moving. Rather, there has been postulated a movement towards the disintegration of ethnic clustering in face of economic stratification as opposed to a redefinition of ethnic clustering on an economic base. Thus, two possible explanations of ethnic clustering exist; one based on ethnicity, the other on economic status, in their extreme forms mutually exclusive. By a detailed investigation of the processes of Armenian settlement in Syria and Lebanon, one might be able to shed light on the relative significance of ethnicity and economic status in determining the settlement pattern. In addition, in view of the complex political situation in Syria and Lebanon into which the Armenians moved, with its Franco-Arab rivalry, and the opportunity which the Armenians offered to the French Mandatory power for population juggling, it might be expected that the Armenians' population pattern would reflect political considerations. Investigation of the processes of settlement might also show to what extent these political considerations, intimately related to ethnicity, were operative. Thus, in effect one has defined three hypotheses regarding respectively ethnic, economic and political constraints on settlement to be tested through an investigation of the settlement process. In practice, it was

the writer's belief that none of the constraints indicated would on its own satisfactorily explain the pattern of Armenian settlement. Nor was it felt that they would operate independently. Indeed, had it been felt at the outset that any one constraint would be dominant, then the research could have been molded around the appropriate hypothesis, but this was not the case. The investigation of processes will therefore also test the writer's belief in the interdependence of ethnic, economic and political constraints on settlement.

What techniques should be employed in investigating processes in order to test these ideas against reality? In formulating an approach, it is necessary to consider both current methodology and the sources available, although obviously neither can be considered in isolation. In so doing, one has to accept that one is poorly served in terms of methodology by Middle Eastern studies of minorities, for as already observed, these have tended not to focus on process. For methodology one is obliged to look beyond Middle Eastern studies to the more general sphere of social geography.

Even in the sphere of social geography, little theoretical work has been produced on the processes of evolution of regional ethnic settlement patterns. While a number of studies have used statistical or cartographic techniques to describe and measure the distribution of ethnic groups,<sup>13</sup> there has been little systematic attempt to explain these patterns.<sup>14</sup> Exceptions are studies by Price and Hugo, who have investigated the chain migration process in relation to regional settlement patterns, and by Peach, who has sought to explain the distribution of West Indian immigrants in Britain by comparing their distribution statistically with that of selected ecological indicators.<sup>15</sup>

Studies on urban ethnic settlement are much more highly developed.<sup>16</sup> A variety of increasingly sophisticated indices have been used to measure ethnic population distribution and segregation,<sup>17</sup> while Boal has used activity patterns to analyse segregation, and Connell has called for the use of social-network analysis in this respect.<sup>18</sup> The explanation of these patterns and the analysis of the processes involved, however, still leaves room for improvement. As Jones and Eyles put it, "We need to know much more about process."<sup>19</sup> A number of writers, for example, have sought to relate the ethnic settlement pattern to the ecological setting by means of rather deterministic statistical analysis which omits consideration of the decision-making process.<sup>20</sup> The weakness of this approach has been pointed out by several writers,<sup>21</sup> and there has more recently been a tendency to concentrate on the use of survey techniques to analyse the decision-making process,<sup>22</sup> an approach which has in recent years formed the focus of studies in migrant-settlement as a whole.<sup>23</sup> Other writers have used simulation models to analyse ghetto expansion,<sup>24</sup> but in view of the dangers of inferring process from form it is difficult to see what these models can achieve without being based initially on a rigorous investigation of the decision-making process. More useful are the studies examining chain-migration, focusing on the processes by which members of ethnic groups concentrate together.<sup>25</sup>

It seems from this brief review of current methodology in social geography that the most profitable approach to the study of the Armenian settlement process would be to use statistical analysis to describe the patterns, then seek to explain them through the use of survey techniques designed to investigate the decision-making process of the Armenians. The surveys would in particular investigate the ideas introduced above concerning the constraints on settlement. In practice, the Armenians did not have freedom of choice in deciding their place of residence. Decisions relating to their settlement were also made by official and semi-official bodies. The decisions of these bodies could be investigated through the documentary record, but the focus of the investigation would still be the identification of the significant constraints on settlement. Thus the ideal approach would combine the study of the official records with the use of field-survey techniques to investigate the settlement process with respect to the ideas discussed above concerning the principal constraints on settlement.

In practice it was decided that the use of survey techniques would be impracticable. There were several reasons for this. Any such survey would be retrospective, seeking information in some cases fifty years old, from persons aged over seventy years, placing its reliability in question. The successful implementation of such a project would have required the co-operation of the Armenian community and the blind-eye or consent of the government authorities. Neither could be taken for granted. In practice, the writer received splendid co-operation from the Armenian community in virtually all cases. However, the eruption of the Civil War ruled a survey completely out of the question in Lebanon, and in Syria, where it was especially necessary to be discrete, it was felt that a survey would have aroused the suspicions of the authorities and possibly led to a premature curtailment of the research. The use of a survey would have extended the time necessary to complete the research in the Middle East, for it would have demanded thorough preparation, including the establishment of trust amongst the Armenian community. This would have increased the size of the travel grant demanded from the SSRC, which had to be kept to a realistic figure in view of travel grants to study the archives in Paris and Geneva. A balance in terms of time and money had to be struck between the investigation of the documentary record and field-work. Further, a survey would be far more easily carried out given a knowledge of Armenian, and in practice, it was not felt that a sufficiently strong grasp of the language could be gained in time to use it effectively in the research. (In retrospect this was probably an error.) For all these reasons it was decided not to carry through a systematic survey, but to use field-work and less systematic interviews with leading members of the community as a supplement to the study of the documentary record.

To what extent, then, do the documents available reflect accurately the decision-making process? Before answering this question, it will be appropriate to classify and describe the principal sources available. They may be broadly grouped into official documents, official archives, records of various

philanthropic organisations, and miscellaneous sources, including maps and census material.

The starting-point for the study should be the reports and documents of the two official bodies most responsible for the refugee settlement; the French Mandatory power, and the League of Nations refugees office (Nansen Office). Regular reports on the Armenian refugees are contained in the annual reports of the Mandatory power to the League, which appeared from 1922 onwards. The interest and participation of the League in the settlement work from 1925 is reflected in the documents of the Nansen Office. These are supplemented by the minutes of the Permanent Mandates Commission, which from time to time considered Armenian issues in Syria and Lebanon, and the reports of the Commission for the Protection of Women and Children in the Near East, whose Commissioner at Aleppo, Karen Jeppe, took an active interest in Armenian settlement.

The consideration of these documents leads to an investigation of the related archives. Some useful material principally on French policy rather than on the condition of the refugees is contained in the French Archives Diplomatiques, Levant series, open only up to 1929. The archives of the French High Commission in Syria and Lebanon however are held at Nantes and are in principle closed. Special application may be made to consult certain documents, but on application to consult files concerning the Armenians, the writer was refused permission. The League archives are subject to a forty-year rule, but permission to consult documents beyond 1934 was easily obtained. Only certain files concerning the Sanjak of Alexandretta remained closed. The records consulted were principally those of the Nansen Office, and provided a rich source of documentation for the thesis, though with a notable gap in the correspondence between 1931 and 1937. The archives available at Geneva are minutes of committee meetings, reports, and the Geneva files of correspondence between Geneva and the Office representative in Beirut. Together they form easily the most important source for the study, and it was the discovery of these files which suggested to the writer that a study of Armenian settlement was a viable proposition. The location of the files of the Office representative in Beirut is not known. Some were located in the hands of a Lebanese lawyer in Beirut, but the eruption of the Civil War prevented their consultation. Other government files available include the well-indexed British Foreign Office papers in the Public Record Office, open for the whole period, which, apart from providing insights into political aspects of the settlement, include other unexpected material such as reports by the Aleppo representative of the Near East Relief. These papers may be supplemented by the War Diaries of Allenby's army in the War Office papers, which contain information on the discovery of, and assistance to, Armenian deportees and refugees in 1918. The Armenian Catholicos of Sis at Antelias in Lebanon kindly made available to the writer the Armenian archives which contain some illuminating correspondence in French on the settlement question.

Most of these records are of course in Armenian, and therefore unavailable to the writer. It should be noted that the Armenian church had little time for the systematic preservation of archives in the unfortunate situation in which it found itself in Syria and Lebanon. Furthermore, the outbreak of the Civil War made it impossible to complete the examination of these records. Some additional information, on the numbers and origin of the deportees repatriated in 1918-19, comes from the archives of the Armenian National Union of Damascus.

Apart from the governments involved, a number of philanthropic organisations took an active interest in the refugee problem, and have left a record of their activities in published reports etc., and in their archives. The most useful sources bequeathed by these organisations are two journals, *Le Levant* and *The Friend of Armenia (F.A.)*, the former roughly bi-monthly, the latter quarterly, respectively the organs of the 'Action Chretienne en Orient' and the (British) 'Friends of Armenia'. Both these journals chronicle the involvement of these Protestant philarmenian organisations in relief-work, but more importantly they contain a vast number of letters from their workers in the field describing the situation of the Armenians, in addition to reports and other miscellaneous information of inestimable value. Their main weaknesses are their undoubted philarmenian bias, their exaggerated descriptions of conditions, and their excessive sentimentality. When opinion is stripped from fact, however, these sources are invaluable. The reports of the American Near East Relief provide information principally on the activities of that organisation. Correspondence and reports concerning the Armenians are also contained in the archives of the American University of Beirut (for 1920-21 ), of the American National Red Cross (who conducted relief-work between 1922 and 1925), and of the Society of Friends in London, whose missionary in Lebanon, Marshall Fox, took a special interest in the Armenians. The Society of Friends' archives proved particularly rich, yielding a missing annual report of the Nansen Office representative (for 1934), contained in an album of photographs of the Office's urban and rural settlements, which included a series of vertical photographs of the new Armenian quarters of Beirut. One should finally mention the archives of the Maison des Lazaristes at Beirut. The Lazarists' missionary, Vincent Paskes, chronicled the flight and resettlement of his flock from Ekbes in Cilicia, and his record of this movement is preserved in Beirut.

Additional information came from various reports, now filed in the Royal Institute of International Affairs library at Chatham House, compiled for Sir John Hope Simpson's 1939 survey of the Refugee Problem. Trade directories, notably *L'Indicateur Syrien* and the *Bulletin de la Chambre de Commerce d'Alep* enabled some analysis of the economic structure of the Armenian community. Several articles were written by prominent personalities involved in the settlement work contemporary with the events they describe, notably by the Jesuit priests Mécérian and Jalabert, by Mr. Burnier, the Nansen Office representative at Beirut, and by Medecin-Inspecteur Duguet of the Health Service of the French

High Commission. A remarkable collection of contemporary photographs of the Armenian quarter of Aleppo, in the possession of Dr. Jebejian, himself of Aleppo, was kindly made available to the writer for inspection and reproduction. Various maps were consulted in the course of the study at Durham, the Bodleian, London University Library, the Royal Geographical Society, and the Institut Francais de Damas. The best collection is in the library of the Royal Geographical Society. Census material, available from various sources, and in various degrees of completeness, includes the 1922 Census of Syria and Lebanon, the 1932 Census of Lebanon and the 1942 Census of Lebanon by the Office des Cereales Panifables. This is supplemented by the figures from the Civil Register reproduced at various dates in the reports of the Mandatory power. The accuracy or otherwise of this data is considered later. Here it is only necessary to point out that much of this material is grossly unreliable.

Finally, one must mention with regret those sources which it proved impossible to consult. Of these the most important are undoubtedly those in Armenian, including letters in Armenian in the archives and in particular the Armenian newspapers which are preserved for example in the Université St. Joseph, and would have provided not only a mine of additional information, but also an invaluable check on the biases in other sources. It is the writer's belief that his inability to consult Armenian sources is the greatest weakness in the present study. Other sources, including part of the Beirut end of the Nansen Office correspondence, it proved impossible to consult because of the outbreak of fighting in the Lebanon. Who knows if they still exist?

The sources contained no reliable data-base for statistical analysis. Even the basic facts of Armenian population distribution are in contention, as will emerge more fully in Chapters 2 and 3. The presentation of a case would have to depend on the painstaking correlation of information from documents in widely scattered sources. But how much reliable information would they contain on the decision making process? Here it is necessary to distinguish between the decisions made at Governmental level and the decisions made by the Armenians themselves. On the former the documentary record is, while not complete, especially with respect to French policy, at least impressive, the most important source of course being the Nansen Office archives. With respect to the unprompted settlement decisions made by the Armenians themselves, there is no corresponding documentary record, and information has to be gleaned in several ways. First, there exist, amongst the various archives, primary documents written by Armenians expressing their settlement preferences. This is not surprising for it was the duty of the Nansen Office officials to take due account of Armenian settlement preferences, and Armenians were represented on its committee. These are the most useful statements of Armenian settlement preferences, but it is necessary to point out that the statements preserved in this way reflect the points of view of the Armenian community leaders, and it is sometimes questionable to what extent these leaders were truly representative of the communities they claimed to speak

for. A second way in which Armenian preferences have been recorded is through the reports of field-workers in which Armenian opinions are given at second-hand. They are not therefore necessarily inaccurate, but they need to be treated with caution, for again the desires of the Armenians may in some cases have been deliberately misrepresented for political reasons. On the other hand, such second-hand checks on the statements made by Armenian leaders may provide useful confirmation of the opinions expressed, or call them into question. The same of course applies vice versa. Finally, the third way in which Armenian preferences can be ascertained is by inference. This is the least satisfactory method, based not on an appreciation of the decision-making process as revealed in the documents, but on the structure of observed behaviour. This method has been used extensively only in one important instance, that is in the investigation of economic constraints on settlement. Its use is an acknowledgement that the documentary record is assumed to be incomplete in the constraints it portrays through the decision-making process. One might reasonably expect the documentary record to reflect the positive settlement preferences of the decision-makers rather than the negative constraints which, imposed at the outset, constituted an accepted and unchallenged background which reduced the discussion of settlement possibilities (and consequently the record of possibilities discussed) to a limited number of options.

These then are the limitations of the sources at the writer's disposal. In principle one would wish to investigate these documents according to a well-constructed experimental design, involving the testing of the hypotheses defined above concerning the constraints perceived in the socio-economic environment. In practice, it would have proved exceedingly difficult to achieve any worthwhile results following a rigidly defined experimental design. And here it is first necessary to correct an illusion which may have been created by the foregoing discussion of all sources together. There never was a time before data-collection at which it was possible to look at all the sources together in this manner. Only at a late stage was it possible to know exactly what data was available. All the sources had to be located personally by the writer, and they were scattered in many different localities; London, Paris, Geneva, Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo. None were known at the beginning of the study. Some were discovered as the result of logical and persistent enquiry; some by chance. Some were discovered early, like the League archives; others late. The only practical way of tackling these sources, from the financial point of view, was to deal with them area by area, with little possibility of revisiting them. This meant that it was necessary to investigate some sources before others had even been discovered with little chance of revisiting the first sources should the previously "undiscovered" sources throw up new lines of approach. A fairly total coverage of each source was therefore absolutely necessary, especially at the outset. This problem, of limited finances and initially unknown and widely scattered sources, must inevitably be frequently encountered by any researchers working individually in

the history or historical geography of developing areas, where research is often at a primitive level, and where much of the administration was conducted from outside the territory. It is a problem which impinges on the entire approach to the study in view, for it renders impossible the detailed construction of an experimental design. It can only be avoided by the organisation of a more rational research structure within the discipline as a whole.

A second limitation on the usefulness of a rigid experimental design is that it is impossible to extract from documentary sources more information than they contain, and there is no point in asking questions which cannot be answered. Indeed, an inductive rather than deductive approach to documentary sources has the advantage that it imposes no pattern on the data, but allows the documents to speak for themselves. On the other hand, it has already been observed that the documentary record is incomplete in the constraints it portrays operating through the decision-making process. Therefore, a purely inductive approach is inadequate, and some initial deductive reasoning is necessary. In any case, even an essentially inductive approach to the data requires some structuring and some selectivity unless large amounts of time are to be wasted pursuing leads which are unlikely to enhance the explanation. The documents must first be approached within a broad framework, corresponding to some deductive logic. Then they generate particular lines of enquiry, thrown up inductively. In turn these lines of enquiry may be pursued within a deductive framework. The separation of the inductive from the deductive approach is artificial.

The approach adopted was to impose some order on data collection and analysis by investigating the sources for evidence of respectively economic, social and political constraints on the settlement process, an approach which was all inclusive but related to the ideas put forward above regarding constraints on settlement. As the sources were examined, research was biased towards those areas which the sources indicated had particular relevance. In adopting this framework the object was not to test one by one the significance of the various constraints discussed, but to construct an overall picture of the processes in operation against which their significance could ultimately be tested. In the analysis of process the separation of constraints was an analytical convenience. Thus, while the chapter plan of the thesis is related to the constraints examined, comment on their significance is reserved until the conclusions.

The Nansen Office archives and documents presented a special problem, for it seemed pointless initially to separate the motives behind decisions in the Nansen Office scheme when the scheme evolved over a number of years and when the final decisions made were the result of a continuous balancing of interests. The possibility of treating the scheme chronologically and separately from the main discussion was considered, so that all the decisions made could be set in context. But it was felt that such a study would in any case need to be followed by a more analytical approach to the decisions involved, for the chronological presentation of the decision-making process would be so complex

as to be obscure. Accordingly, the League archives were approached, like the other documents, from a thematic point of view, but special care was taken in separating out the motives involved in League decisions to take account of the context in which the decisions concerned were made. In fact, the League scheme, like other settlement schemes, was essentially a response to economic constraints on settlement. Thus, the scheme is sketched in its essentials in Chapter 4 of the thesis, which considers settlement schemes as a response to economic constraints. In this discussion, however, while the economic basis of the scheme is recognised and the economic constraints on its implementation are described, no attempt is made to describe the social and political constraints affecting its implementation. These are discussed separately in the following chapter.

The approach adopted treats the Armenians in principle as a homogeneous unit. In fact, the Armenians were not a homogeneous body but were divided on political and religious grounds. One would be entitled to assume at the outset that they were also divided in terms of socio-economic class status. This question, however, is difficult to resolve. Whatever the class structure of the Armenian community in the Ottoman Empire before 1915 (this is considered in the opening chapter) the refugees formed a group which had been mostly impoverished. No doubt some Armenians would retain their skills and even some of their wealth and succeed in re-establishing their position in Syria and Lebanon. Where the evidence permits such cases have been brought to light, but the documents to permit a systematic investigation of the differential settlement behaviour of different socio-economic classes, or different religious or political groups, do not exist, at least in the sources available to the writer. This is particularly unfortunate in the case of socio-economic groups in regard to which some previous writers have made interesting observations on settlement behaviour. Where evidence for such internal differences does exist, however, it is brought to light.

The main tool used in the research was a card-index system. As the documents were collected, they were cross-referenced on index-cards recording the places, personalities, organisations, and (in the case of general discussions) the motives for settlement which they indicated, or on which they shed light. The system was flexible, new cards being introduced according to the lines of enquiry thrown up by the documents. When all the data had been collected these cards then provided the key to the subsequent analysis based on the most profitable lines of inquiry thrown up during the collection process. The documentary record was supplemented by field-work in the area to check on facts revealed by the documents and to try to fill the gaps, as well as to locate the sites of the Armenian settlements. Systematic surveys having been ruled out, this took the form of personal reconnaissance and interviews with leading members of the Armenian community, to whom I remain indebted for their willingness to help. Discretion being the better part of valour, no visit was made to the former Sanjak of Alexandretta, now the Turkish province of Hatay and devoid of Armenians, where it was felt that inquiry on the matter might not be well received. Further,

the writer's visit to Beirut, where there was the greatest possibility for detailed investigation, coincided with the outbreak of the Civil War, which created an atmosphere somewhat inimical to research, and ultimately made it impossible even to visit the Armenian "quarter" of Bourj-Hammoud.

In the analysis of the settlement process, a distinction has been made between regional and urban settlement patterns. While the explanation of the regional pattern has been structured thematically, according to the constraints involved in the settlement process. However, the data on urban settlement in each town formed a fairly coherent whole involving processes which could be understood without the data being broken down further for thematic analysis. A thematic approach to urban settlement would have destroyed the unity of the data on each town, and, by demanding discussion of specific settlement schemes in all the towns simultaneously, would have led to confusion. Generalities about urban settlement are not drawn, therefore until each town has been discussed in turn, when it is possible to present, not a thematic analysis of the constraints involved, but a synthesis. Such a synthesis is of course the ultimate object of the thematic approach adopted to the regional pattern. This synthesis is reserved for the Conclusion, which brings together the various constraints on settlement at both the urban and regional levels and relates them to one another. The separation of the discussion of urban and regional settlement patterns, like the thematic discussion of constraints at the regional level, is only an analytical convenience. The goal of the study is to identify the processes involved in Armenian settlement. It will then be possible to test the ideas discussed above concerning the significance of economic, social and political constraints on settlement.

Before introducing the following chapters, it will be appropriate to recapitulate on the rationale behind the thesis. The topic was chosen rather fortuitously, following the discovery of a major documentary source, the archives of the Nansen Office with respect to the settlement of Armenian refugees in Syria and Lebanon. It was conceived not so much as a refugee study, but as a study of the processes of minority settlement in the Middle East, for while the importance of the ethnic mosaic pattern in the area has long been recognised, there have been few studies of the processes involved in the evolution of this pattern. A study of the processes of Armenian settlement would enable an assessment of the relative significance of ethnicity, economic status and political manipulation in determining the settlement pattern as well as test the writer's assumption of the interdependence of these constraints. Methodologically one is poorly served by Middle Eastern case-studies. It was necessary to look to studies in social geography to formulate an ideal framework for research based on the investigation of the decision-making process through field-survey techniques and the documentary record. However, it was judged impracticable to use survey techniques in the study, and it was necessary to rely essentially on the documentary sources, which are numerous but in some cases of doubtful reliability. Practical problems of data-collection as well as methodological

problems concerned with the study of documentary sources inhibited the formulation of a rigid experimental design. The approach adopted was therefore part deductive - part inductive, involving the investigation of the sources for respectively economic, social and political constraints on the settlement process. In this investigation the Armenians are treated as a homogeneous unit, although internal differences in settlement preferences are identified where revealed in the documents. The main tool in the research was a card-index system applied to the documentary record, which was supplemented by work in the field. While for purposes of analysis the principal constraints on settlement were investigated separately, and regional and urban patterns were differentiated, the object of the study was not to test one by one the significance of the various constraints discussed, but to construct an overall picture of the processes in operation against which their significance could ultimately be tested.

The study begins, then, with a consideration of the historical background to the problem, reviewing briefly the history of Armenia and the Armenians, the situation of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire before 1915, their situation in Syria and Lebanon before that date, and the development of the Armenian question to the massacres and deportations of 1915. The historical discussion is followed by a consideration in Chapters 2 and 3 of the figures available concerning the total number and distribution of the Armenians. The following three chapters consider settlement at the regional level. Thus, Chapter 4 considers economic constraints on settlement, Chapter 5 discusses the settlement schemes proposed or carried out in response to these constraints, and Chapter 6 considers together social and political constraints on settlement, for analysis revealed these constraints to be so closely related as to be inseparable in explanation. Urban settlement is considered in Chapters 7 to 9 which focus on Aleppo, Beirut, Damascus and Alexandretta and contain some preliminary conclusions. Finally, the conclusions of the sections on both regional and urban settlement are brought together to enable an overview of the processes operating in the formation of the Armenian settlement pattern in Syria and Lebanon, and an assessment of the significance of the constraints involved.

## ENDNOTES

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<sup>1</sup> For a general survey of the refugee problem in the Middle East, see (for the inter-war period) Simpson (1939) Chapters 2 - 4 and 18 and (for the post-war period) Holborn (1975) Pt 4, Ch. 31, pp. 804-22.

<sup>2</sup> The literature on the Palestinian refugees is enormous. For geographical studies see Blake (1972); Bopst (1968) and Hacker (1960). For geographical studies of the resettlement in Greece of "refugees" involved in the Greek-Turkish population exchange see Kolodny (1974), *Vol. 1*, pp. 201-27, and Fischer (1976). On the settlement of Balkan Turks in Turkey see the studies by Adatepe, Altug, Ari, Eren and Turgay in *Integration*, Vol. 6 (3) (1959), as well as studies by Barkan (1949-50); Kostanick (1955); Schechtman (1963) Ch. 4, pp. 54-67; Tanoglu (1955); and Tuna (1951-2).

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On the Assyrians, see Austin (1920); Bérard (1936); Cuncliffe-Owen (1922); Dodge (1940); Gracey (1935); Musry (1974); Joseph (1961); Mar Shimun (1953); Thomson (1934) and Wigram (1929). On the much earlier settlement of Andalusian refugees in North Africa see Lathan (1957).

<sup>3</sup> “Ethnicity” is a term which has been used freely by academics to embrace allegiances based on tribe, religious sect, nationality, language, region of origin, and “culture”. The term is used in the discussion in this broad sense, from which it is clear that within Syria the Armenians would form a distinct “ethnic” minority.

<sup>4</sup> Brice (1966), pp. 64-65; Clarks and Fisher (1972), pp. 22-23; Coon (1952), p. 2; De Planhol (1959), pp. 80-100.

For studies of the structure of the Middle Eastern city, see Bonine (1977); Costello (1977); De Planhol (1959), pp. 13-14; ed. Hourani & Stern (1970); ed. Lapidus (1969); Marçals (1945), p. 532; Von Grunebaum (1961), pp. 147-48.

<sup>5</sup> Clarke (1959); De Mauroy (1968) & (1973); De Planhol (1968), pp. 155-58, 257-70; De Vaumas (1955), (1959) & (1960); Drury (1972); Fisher (1972); Kolodny (1971); Latham (1957); Melamid (1956); Weulerese (1940).

<sup>6</sup> De Planhol (1959), pp. 80-100.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 100.

For further discussion of the position of minorities in the Middle East, see Hourani (1952), (1961); Baer (1964), pp. 70-118, and Harik (1972). More specifically on the Christians of the Middle East see Rondot (1955) and Betts (1975).

<sup>8</sup> See the standard studies of the Middle Eastern city, listed above under note 4.

<sup>9</sup> Hourani (1970), pp. 21-22; Aubin (1970), pp. 72-73; Lapidus (1967), p. 91.

<sup>10</sup> These studies are too numerous to mention here in toto, but those wishing to take a fresh look at the evolution of ethnic “quarters” in Middle Eastern cities could do worse than look at the following studies, some of which have been available for a good number of years; Adam (1972); Ben-Arieh (1975); Benech (n.d.); Eickelmann (1974); Flamand (n.d.); Goltein (1971), *Vol. 2*, pp. 289-93; Harrison (1967); Hill (1973); Hirschberg (1974), pp. 197-98, 204, 370-71, 389-91; Mansur (1972); Marty (1948)(1), (1948)(2), (1949); Sebag (1959); Thoumin (1931), Weulerese (1934).

<sup>11</sup> Adam (1974), pp. 219-20; Baer (1964), p. 192, (1969), pp. 216-18; Churchill (1967), p. 35; Clark & Costello (1973), p. 108; De Planhol (1959), pp. 39-40, 99-100.

<sup>12</sup> e.g. Lee (1973).

<sup>13</sup> Calef and Nelson (1956), Collins (1970), Hart (1960), Hartshorne (1938), Morrill and Donaldson (1972), Perevadentsev (1965), Poulsen, Rowland and Johnston (1975), Wheeler & Brunn (1968), Zelinsky (1961).

<sup>14</sup> Zelinsky (1961).

<sup>15</sup> Price (1963), Hugo (1975), Peach (1966).

<sup>16</sup> Jones & Kyles (1977), pp. 165-84; ed. Peach (1975).

<sup>17</sup> Beal (1969), (1970).

<sup>18</sup> Connell (1973).

<sup>19</sup> Jones & Eyles (1977), p. 177.

<sup>20</sup> e.g. Burnley (1972), Rowland (1972).

<sup>21</sup> e.g. Roseman & Knight (1975), Rowley & Tipple (1974).

<sup>22</sup> e.g. Roseman & Knight (1975), Rowley & Tipple (1974), Kearsley & Srivastava (1974).

<sup>23</sup> Ed. Jones (1975), p. 9; Kosinski & Prothero (1975), pp. 1-17.

<sup>24</sup> e.g. Morrill (1965); Rose (1970); Mansel Clark (1970).

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<sup>25</sup> e.g. Burnley (1972); Macdonald & Macdonald (1964).

## Chapter I

# THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

One should not attempt to study the processes involved in the settlement of the Armenians in Syria and Lebanon without some knowledge of the historical context of the migrations, and an appreciation of the organisation of Armenian society in the Ottoman Empire and in Syria itself before the migrations began. This chapter sketches very briefly the history of the Armenian people, and then attempts to describe the organisation of Armenian society within the Ottoman Empire on the eve of the First World War. The long-established Armenian communities in Syria itself are then described, and the chapter concludes with an account of the development of the “Armenian Question” and the traumatic events of 1915.

## ARMENIA AND THE ARMENIANS

The land which is known as Armenia today straddles the borders of the Turkish Republic and the Soviet Union. The eastern part forms the Soviet Republic of Armenia, containing a population still largely Armenian; the western part, in the Turkish Republic, is practically devoid of Armenians. The land first received the name ‘Armenia’ in a Persian inscription of about 521 B.C. The origins of its people are obscure, but it seems that by about 500 B.C., a process of ethnic mingling, associated with the infiltration into the area of new peoples from the west, had culminated in the identification of the land as ‘Armenia’, this name replacing the old designation of ‘Urartu’, the name of the kingdom formerly occupying the land which had by that time crumbled in face of the onslaught of Medes, Scythians and Cimmerians.

The history of Armenia<sup>1</sup> is one of a buffer-state or battleground, fought over almost constantly by a succession of expansionist peoples; Persians, Seleucids, Romans, Arabs, Byzantines, Seljuk-Turks. Between conquests were periods of autonomy, even brilliance. The Orontid, Artaxiad, Arsacid and Bagratid dynasties maintained Armenian autonomy in the face of constant pressure from outside, and the apogee of Armenian power was reached in the Empire of the Artaxiad Tigranes II, the Great. Under the Arsacid Tiridates II Christianity was made the state religion of Armenia, Gregory the Illuminator the first Catholicos. Ultimately, however, external pressure proved too great. Weakened by internal squabbles and hard-pressed by the Seljuk-Turks, the Armenian Bagratid kingdom passed to Byzantine control in 1045 A.D., and subsequently to the Seljuk-Turks after the Battle of Manzikert in 1071. Increasingly, in these unstable conditions, Armenians sought refuge outside their homeland. In Cilicia, recaptured by the Byzantines in 945, Armenians were appointed as governors. Gradually, these chieftains assumed hereditary status, and set up independent enclaves and baronies of their own, with only a nominal allegiance to Constantinople. As historic Armenia was annexed by Byzantium and then overrun by Seljuk-Turks,

Armenians moved en masse from their homes to Cilicia. In 1080 an Armenian Kingdom was formed there which lasted until its fall to the Egyptian Mamelukes in 1375. Armenia proper meanwhile continued to serve as a battleground. Ravaged by Mongols after 1223, and by Tamerlane between 1387 and 1404, the country was subsequently fought over by Turks and Persians. Only in 1639 was a measure of stability achieved, when Persia and Turkey made a new partition of Armenia. The plain of the Araxes, with Echmiadzin and the northern region became Persian; the rest of former Armenia passed to the Turks. This division remained in force for about 200 years until, in 1827, the fortress of Yerevan fell to the Russians, and Persian Armenia was joined to Russia. Historic Armenia was henceforth divided between the two great Empires of Russia and the Ottomans.

Throughout the long history of Armenia its people had frequently been subject to the ravages of war. Not surprisingly the population tended to emigrate, while deportations also occurred. Notable, of course, were the mass migrations to Cilicia in the eleventh century, but mass emigration also accompanied the Mongol invasions. The Armenians settled in the east in Persia, India, Indonesia and China, and in the west, in Syria, Egypt and the great ports of the Mediterranean, including Constantinople. They even reached Poland, Galicia, Moldavia, Bukovina, Transylvania, Italy and beyond. As they moved out, the country was depopulated, and whole regions lay deserted. Other peoples moved into this vacuum. While Kurdish nomads settled in the mountains, Turks, Kurds and Tartars occupied the valleys and plains. The population became very mixed and remained so until the twentieth century.

### ***The Armenians in the Ottoman Empire on the Eve of WWI***

Figures concerning the Armenian population of the Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman Empire before the First World War should be treated with considerable reserve (Table 1.1). Prejudice and distortion on a subject of such political significance make accurate statements difficult and even cautious statements vulnerable to abuse.<sup>2</sup>

	Ormanian (1912)		Cuinet (1890-5) (1896-1901)	
	Armenians	%	Armenians	%
Apostolics	1,730,000	93.6	944,525	86.0
Catholics	75,500	4.1	86,575	7.5
Protestants	42,400	2.3	75,658	6.5
Total	1,847,900	100.0	1,156,758	100.0

**Notes:** The total presented for Ormanian (1912) includes all Armenians listed in his tabulation pp. 205-209, less those in the Catholicosate of Echmiadzin, and the dioceses of Cyprus, Egypt, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Greece.

That presented for Cuinet includes all Armenians listed in the tabulations in his two works less those in the Vilayets of the Archipelago and of Crete. For some Vilayets, however, totals for Catholics or Protestants are not available.

Official Turkish estimates can expect little credence, given the absence of a census conducted according to modern techniques.<sup>3</sup> Thus, given also the language difficulties involved no attempt has been made to gather data from the Ottoman yearbooks. On the other hand, as Hovannisian concedes<sup>4</sup> with regard to figures emanating from the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople, “it is likely that the figures relating to the Armenians were exaggerated.” Thus, Ormanian’s figures must be treated with reserve. The same is true for those of Cuinet, which have been used to substantiate Turkish claims regarding the number of Armenians in the Empire. Hovannisian comments,<sup>5</sup> “The Armenians, refuting these figures, point out that Cuinet’s work is riddled with discrepancies and inconsistencies. Moreover, Cuinet himself confessed that his statistics were unreliable and complained that Ottoman officials had refused to make available much pertinent information.” Lynch also noted<sup>6</sup> how he had never found Cuinet’s figures reliable. Given the sensitive nature of this question, and the necessity for a thorough re-examination of the problem, no preference is expressed for any of the totals cited. Suffice to draw attention to the confessional composition of the Armenians. It is clear that the overwhelming majority belonged to the Armenian Apostolic (or “Gregorian”) Church, with those in the Armenian Catholic and Protestant churches forming distinct minorities.

Despite the unreliability of the figures of Cuinet and Ormanian as regards the total number of Armenians within the Empire, it is perhaps more justifiable to use them to provide a picture of the distribution of the Armenians, as here the concern is with neither the absolute total of Armenians, nor the Armenian proportion of the population. Accordingly, the figures of Cuinet and Ormanian have been mapped separately (Figs. 1.1, 1.2). As would be expected, the Armenian population appears concentrated in eastern Anatolia and Cilicia, the two historic centres of Armenian settlement, but as these two centres are adjacent to one another, the net result is a broad band of Armenian settlement from the Gulf of Alexandretta to the Russian border. Other Armenians were scattered elsewhere in the Empire with a notable concentration at Constantinople.

**Table 1.2:** Percentage of Armenians living in the administrative centres of cazas in selected provinces of the Ottoman Empire<sup>1</sup>

Interior Vilayets	%	Other Vilayets	%
Sivas	26	İzmir	84
Harput	46	Biğa	83
Van	37	Bursa	30
Diyarbakir	54	İzmit	33
Total for 4	37	Baghdad	100
		Total for 5	39

<sup>1</sup> Cuinet (1890-95), (1896-1901).

*Note:* Comparable figures for Cilicia cannot unfortunately be established. Not all administrative centres could necessarily be regarded as containing “urban” population, while not all “urban” centres were necessarily included amongst the administrative centres. The low percentages obtained for the vilayets of Bursa and İzmit, in which provinces it was expected that the Armenians would have been concentrated in the towns, cast doubt on the usefulness of the analysis. Figures are presented only for those vilayets for which Cuinet lists, without inconsistency, the Armenian population of the administrative centres of all cazas.

It is difficult to assess the rural-urban distribution of the Armenian community, given the lack of reliable statistics. The sources stress the contrast between the peasant communities of the interior and the urban community of Constantinople and other coastal settlements like Bursa and Izmir.<sup>7</sup> There were considerable peasant communities in both eastern Anatolia and Cilicia,<sup>8</sup> but the Armenians of Cilicia were probably more highly concentrated in the towns.<sup>9</sup> Atamian, after noting the absence of statistics to indicate the rural-urban ratio in the interior provinces, gives an estimate, based on interviews, of 3:1.<sup>10</sup> The balance was upset by a steady migration from the land,<sup>11</sup> notably to Constantinople, where Lynch in 1895 estimated as many as 80,000 migrants from the provincial centres of Van and Arapkir alone.<sup>12</sup> Some comparison of the relative proportion of urban-dwellers in different provinces can be made, using Cuinet’s statistics for the administrative centres of Cazas, but the results are not conclusive. (Table 1.2).




Fig. 1.1: Distribution of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire before the First World War (based on Cuinet and Huber)




Fig. 1.2: Distribution of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire before the First World War (based on the figures of Ormanian and the maps of administrative divisions by Cuinet and Huber)

The population pattern of the Armenians within the Ottoman Empire before the First World War was clearly not static. There were considerable population losses during the massacres of 1895-6 and 1909. There was also considerable migration. This took the form of the internal migration noted above, from the interior to the coastal towns, especially to Constantinople, and of emigration to Russia, Europe and America.<sup>13</sup> Migration appears to have been most marked from the interior provinces, due to the poor living conditions prevailing there, although there was certainly some migration from Constantinople and the coastal towns following the massacres of 1896.<sup>14</sup> Restrictions were placed by the authorities on the migration of Armenians in search of work, apparently following the Hamidian massacres,<sup>15</sup> but these were lifted in 1908, when not only was the migration to Russia and Constantinople resumed,<sup>16</sup> but there was also a certain reflux of refugees from Russia and America.<sup>17</sup>

Within the Empire, the Armenian community was divided on religious, social and political grounds. In the first place, the Armenians were divided between three religious communities; the Armenian Apostolic (or Gregorian) Church, the Armenian Catholic Church, and the Armenian Protestant community. The great majority of Armenians, as has been observed, belonged to the long-established Apostolic Church, which had long been recognised as having millet status. Not surprisingly, for a church enjoying such status and history, it came to be identified with the Armenian nation, and politics played an important part in its life.<sup>18</sup> During the nineteenth century it came under increasing pressure from the Catholic and Protestant movements. The history of the Armenian Catholic church is reviewed by Mécérian (1965). He observes that there had always existed Catholic Armenians, but that they had been persecuted by the Apostolic Church.

This persecution was brought to an end when in 1830 the Armenian Catholics of the Empire were constituted into a distinct community.<sup>19</sup> The Armenian Protestant community grew up as a result of American missionary activity within the Empire. Beginning in the 1830s, this was so successful that in 1847 the Protestant communities were also granted millet status.<sup>20</sup> While the Apostolic Church was strongly identified with the Armenian nation, the Catholics and Protestants adopted a more universalist outlook.<sup>21</sup> Not surprisingly there was as a result considerable mutual dislike between the churches,<sup>22</sup> the Apostolics tending to regard the other sects as renegades.<sup>23</sup> This feeling was most marked between the Apostolic and Catholic Churches,<sup>24</sup> the Protestants maintaining closer links with the Apostolic Church, and identifying more with Armenian nationalism.<sup>25</sup>

The Armenian community was no less divided socially. Not only was there a division between urban and rural Armenians, with the peasantry engaged in agriculture and the rural crafts,<sup>26</sup> but there was also considerable variation in the occupations exercised by the Armenians in the towns. Here they were almost everywhere employed in commerce and the small-trades,<sup>27</sup> excelling as metal-workers,<sup>28</sup> and they seem to have been to the forefront in spreading innovations.<sup>29</sup> They were also involved in banking and money-lending,<sup>30</sup> and to a certain extent in the professions and administration.<sup>31</sup> In the interior there were, in addition, some Armenian landowners.<sup>32</sup> The greatest fortunes, however, were possessed by those involved in banking and commerce in the capital.<sup>33</sup> The position of this Constantinople elite can be contrasted with that of the thousands of Armenian labourers, migrants from the interior, who came to the capital and coastal towns to seek their fortunes. The diversity of urban life-styles is as striking as the rural-urban contrast, which in any case was artificial, given that a certain proportion of “urban” Armenians were engaged in agriculture.<sup>34</sup>

The migration noted above, from the interior to Constantinople and the coastal cities, was related to the poor living conditions in the eastern provinces, which in the late nineteenth century were increasingly felt to be intolerable. High taxation,<sup>35</sup> coupled with corrupt officialdom,<sup>36</sup> Kurdish depredations and associated insecurity,<sup>37</sup> exacerbated by inequality of Armenians and Muslims before the law,<sup>38</sup> poor communications,<sup>39</sup> and the Armenian massacres themselves, with their toll of death, destruction of property and damage to trade,<sup>40</sup> all fell heavily on the Armenian population. The peasantry also fell victim to moneylenders, sometimes themselves Armenian.<sup>41</sup> While some of these exactions fell universally on all Armenians within the Empire, they fell most heavily on the peasantry of the eastern provinces. Likewise in the towns of the east the Armenian tradesmen and artisans were hard hit by the general economic depression which resulted. Thus, another distinction might be drawn in Armenian society, between the relatively impoverished Armenians of the interior and the relatively more prosperous Armenians elsewhere, especially in the capital and the coastal cities. To meet the crisis in the interior, labour intensive industries were introduced by

European and Armenian charitable societies,<sup>42</sup> but most Armenians saw their redemption in the emigration already noted, either temporary or seasonal to Constantinople and the coastal cities, or permanent to these destinations or abroad.<sup>43</sup> These movements were not confined to the rural peasantry: with the general depression of trade, merchants left the provinces too.<sup>44</sup> The migrations were indeed so important as an economic regulator that, when restrictions were placed on migration by the government, the economic malaise was felt all the harder by the Armenians constrained to remain in the provinces.<sup>45</sup>

It seems possible, then, to point to two fundamental divisions in Armenian society; a rural-urban division,<sup>46</sup> and a division between the Armenians of the capital and coastal cities and those in the interior provinces.<sup>47</sup> Neither of these divisions is entirely satisfactory. Rural-urban distinctions were blurred, and there was as much social variation within the cities as between town and country. Further, while most provincials, peasants and townsmen, suffered from the economic malaise in the eastern provinces, others were able to exploit it. If these divisions must therefore be rejected as simplistic, it is equally difficult to accept, without further inquiry, a simple division into social classes, as propounded by Atamian, for example, given the variations in wealth and status which could be encompassed by such terms as “artisans”, “traders” and “commerçants”. Suffice to stress the diversity of Armenian society, and to appreciate that its members might be expected to have correspondingly different opinions concerning the desirability of the preservation or destruction of the system in which they lived.

### *The Armenians in Syria*

With regard to the Armenian population in Syria before the First World War, the various figures available are presented in Table 1.3. The most useful figures are those of Cuinet, although they should not be regarded as accurate. Ormanian’s figures, as noted above, are likely to be overestimates. Little weight should be attached to the other figures. Cuinet’s figure of 26,817 Armenians represents 1.2% of the total population of Syria.

<b>Table 1.3:</b> The Armenian population of Syria before the First World War	
Estimate	Source and Observations
26,817	Cuinet (1890-5) (1896-1901). Composed of 16,657 Apostolics (58.4%) and 11,160 Catholics (41.6%). Protestants are excluded from the total, but a total of 1025 specifically Armenian Protestants are recorded in the Sanjak of Damascus. For area on which this estimate is based see Fig 1.3
44,000	Ormanian (1912, pp. 205-210). Composed of 33,000 Apostolics (75.0%), 7500 Catholics (17.1%) and 3500 Protestants (8.0%). Area concerned exceeds that above, embracing the dioceses of Jerusalem, Damascus, Beirut, Aleppo and Antioch.
35,000	Khairallah in Contenson (1913). Composed of 25,000 Apostolics (71.4%) and 10,000 Catholics (28.6%). Limits of his “Syria” unknown.
25,000	Bernard (1919, p. 851). Apostolics only. In addition, there were small groups of Catholics. Limits of his “Syria” unknown.

A notable feature of the Armenian population of Syria which emerges from the figures of both Cuinet and Ormanian is the relatively high proportion of Catholics. Ormanian's figures suggest to a relatively high proportion of Protestants. Interpretation of all these figures is obviously made more difficult by the population changes which took place as a result of the massacres of 1895-6 and 1909.

Cuinet's figures (Table 1.4, Fig. 1.3), show the Armenians to have been especially concentrated in the north-west of Syria, where they formed an extension of the Armenian Cilician population. They were found there particularly in the cazas of Aleppo, Antioch, Djisir, Alexandretta and Latakia. Elsewhere they were found notably in Beirut and Damascus cazas. There were also smaller communities in the Euphrates region (Deir el Zor caza), in the Jebel Hauran, in southern Lebanon, and in Kesrouane to the North of Beirut. Ormanian's figures add little to this picture, but further information exists concerning the Armenians in particular locations. This information, which includes data from the Ottoman provincial yearbooks (Table 1.5.), from Brézol (Table 1.6), and the additional comments of Cuinet himself, enables a more critical assessment of Cuinet's figures to be made as regards particular locations.

For Aleppo town, totals of Armenian population vary between 4000 and 20,000.<sup>48</sup> This was a long-established population which benefitted somewhat from an influx of migrants at the time of the Hamidian massacres.<sup>49</sup> For Antioch town, totals differ between higher estimates of 3000-4000 and lower estimates of 1000 or less.<sup>50</sup> In Antioch the Armenians formed their own quarter, but suffered severely during the 1909 massacres.<sup>51</sup>




Fig. 1.3: Distribution of Armenians in Syria and Lebanon by caza, after Cuinet

**Table 1.4:** Distribution of Armenians in Syria and Lebanon by caza, after Cuinet (1890-95) (1896-1901)

	Armenians			A. Caths as % A.s	As.as% tot.pop.
	Apostolics	Catholics	Total		
<b><i>Vilayet of Beirut</i></b>					
<b>Sanjak of Beirut</b>					
Beirut	200	400	600	66.7	.05
Saida	-	-	-	-	-
Tyr	-	530	530	100	3.2
Merdjayoun	201	-	201	-	1.9
<b>Sanjak of Tripoli</b>					
Tripoli	-	-	-	-	-
Sâfita	-	-	-	-	-
Akkar	-	-	-	-	-
Qalaat el Hosn	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Sanjak of Latakia</b>					
Latakia	1600	-	1600	-	4.1
Djeblé	-	-	-	-	-
Markab	-	-	-	-	-
Sahyoun	-	-	-	-	-
<b><i>Mutessarifik of Lebanon</i></b>					
Chouf	-	-	-	-	-
Meten	-	-	-	-	-
Kesrouane	-	30	30	100	0.0
Batroune	-	-	-	-	-
Jezzine	-	-	-	-	-
Zahlé	-	-	-	-	-
Koura	-	-	-	-	-
Deir el Qamar	-	-	-	-	-
<b><i>Vilayet of Syria</i></b>					
<b>Sanjak of Damascus</b>					
Damascus	900	-	900	-	0.5
Baalbek	-	-	-	-	-
Bekaa	-	-	-	-	-
Ouadi el Ajam	-	-	-	-	-
Hasbaya	-	-	-	-	-
Rashaya	-	-	-	-	-
Nebek	-	-	-	-	-
Douma	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Sanjak of Hama</b>					
Hama	-	-	-	-	-
Homs	-	-	-	-	-
Hamidiyé	-	-	-	-	-
Selemyé	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Sanjak of Hauran</b>					
Cheikh-Saad	-	-	-	-	-
Qouneitra	-	-	-	-	-
Bosra	-	-	-	-	-
Deraâ	-	-	-	-	-
Jebel Hauran	200	-	200	-	0.6

Ajlun	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Vilayet of Aleppo</b>					
<b>Sanjak of Aleppo</b>					
Aleppo	6550	3000	9550	31.4	6.0
Alexandretta	1142	1500	2642	56.8	11.3
Antioch	2084	2500	4584	54.5	7.3
Idlib	100	500	600	83.3	1.3
Harim	100	100	200	50	0.8
Djisir el Choghour	1780	1570	3350	46.9	10.2
Maarret el Nomane	100	100	200	50	1.7
Bab	170	30	200	15	1.2
Beflane	100	500	600	83.3	5.6
Jebel el Smaane	130	-	130	-	0.4
Menbidj	150	-	150	-	2.1
Raqqa	150	-	150	-	2.6
<b>Sanjak of Urfa</b>					
Sürtic	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Mutessarifik of Zor</b>					
Deir el Zor	?	400	400	100?	0.9
El Achara	-	-	-	-	-
Ras el Ain	-	-	-	-	-
Abou Kemal	-	-	-	-	-
Total	15,657	11,160	26,817	41.6	1.2

<b>Table 1.5: Distribution of Armenians in Syria according to Ottoman provincial yearbooks</b>			
<i>Beirut Vilayet</i> <sup>2</sup>	Armenian Population		
	Apostolics	Catholics	Total
<b>Cazas</b>			
Beirut	108	461	569
Tripoli	-	14	14
Latakia	-	243	243
Sahyoun	?	?	392
<i>Mutesarriflik of Lebanon</i> <sup>3</sup>	?	?	about 5
<b>Vilayet of Syria</b> <sup>4</sup>			
<b>Cazas</b>			
Damascus	257	179	436
Ouadi el Ajam	52	-	52
Rashaya	-	30	30
Hama	5	-	5

<sup>2</sup> Beyrüt vilayeti sâlnâmesi, 1326H/1908, f. p. 424.

<sup>3</sup> Cebel-i Lübnân sâlnâmesi, 1306H/1888-89, p. 92, and 1307H/1889-90, p. 100.

<sup>4</sup> Süriye vilayeti sâlnâmesi, 1318H/1900-01, pp. 364-65. All reproduced in Krikorian (1964), pp. 188-90.




Fig. 1.4: Centers of Armenian Settlement in north-west Syria before the First World War

**Table 1.6:** List of Armenian dwellings in Antioch and its region before the massacres of 1909, compiled by the Aleppo correspondent of the newspaper *Puzantion*<sup>5</sup>

	Families		Families
Antioch	110	Aramo	78
Bitias	110	Ghnémié	55
Hadji Habébli	288	Arfalié	45
Yoghoun Olouk	214	Qassab and environs	1130
Khodor Bey	310	Kara Dourane	180
Kaboussiyé	150	Alexandretta	150
Ouakef	30	Beilane	455
Yacoubié	135	Kirik Khane	50
Qenayé	130	Total	3620

To Latakia, Cuinet allocates a population of 1600 Armenians, but there is no confirmation of this high total in other sources.<sup>52</sup> In Alexandretta town, 150 families are noted by *Puzantion* (Table 1.6), while Cuinet notes 2642 Armenians in Alexandretta caza. As there existed some Armenian villages in this region, Cuinet's total cannot be taken to represent Armenian townsfolk, and further evidence is lacking. In addition to these urban centres of the north-west, there were a number of long-established villages in this area (Figs. 1.4, 1.5), but it is difficult to evaluate their population precisely from the evidence of Cuinet and other sources.<sup>53</sup> The principal centres were the Jebel Moussa and the Jebel Aqra around Qassab. Other Armenians were scattered in and around Beilane, in the Orontes Valley at Qénayé and Yacoubié, and to the east of Latakia at Ghnémié and Aramo.

<sup>5</sup> Brézol (1911), p. 370.




Fig. 1.5: Armenian dwellings in the Antioch region before 1909 (after Brézol)

Turning to the Armenians living outside the north-west, populations total for Damascus are confusing. According to Cuinet, there were 1200 Armenians there (900 Apostolics and 300 Protestants). The Ottoman provincial yearbook yields 436 in the caza of Damascus, including 179 Catholics. Eprikan<sup>54</sup> notes only about 300 persons. Despite the figures of Cuinet, there certainly was an Armenian Catholic community in the city.<sup>55</sup> The origins of the Armenian community are obscure.<sup>56</sup> Totals are less conflicting for Beirut, displaying a remarkable uniformity in varying only between 500 and 750.<sup>57</sup> The Beirut community saw its principal growth in the nineteenth century, and benefitted by the troubles of 1895-6 and 1909, but it had also gained from the movement of Armenian Catholics to Lebanon<sup>58</sup> (see below). All the Armenians of Deir el Zor lived in the town of that name, according to Cuinet. Some confirmation comes from *Murray's Handbook*,<sup>59</sup> which notes a few Armenians in the town, but no other references to this community have been found. In the Vilayet of Syria outside Damascus Cuinet lists only 200 Armenians, in the Jebel Hauran, not, apparently, living in Soueida. The provincial yearbook does not list these Armenians, but lists other communities in the Cazas of Rashaya, Ouadi el Ajam and Hama. There is no reference to these communities in any of the other sources consulted. The Armenian communities of Lebanon are better documented.<sup>60</sup> A number of Armenians had come into Mount Lebanon from the seventeenth century onwards, mostly Catholics seeking refuge from the persecution of the Apostolic Church. They settled especially in Kesrouane, notably at Bzoumar, which was for a time the centre of the Armenian Catholic Church. In fact, the Armenian Catholic population of Kesrouane noted by Cuinet were all boys at the seminary of

Bzoumar. While these Armenians in Kesrouane can thus be put in perspective, there is no corroborating evidence for the existence of the Armenian communities in Tyr and Merdjayoun listed by Cuinet, or for those in Tripoli listed by the provincial yearbook. Likewise, there is no corroborating evidence for the Armenian communities which Cuinet records scattered around Aleppo in north Syria, apart from the better documented communities of the north-west, for which the evidence has already been discussed.

Information concerning the socio-economic structure of the Armenian community in Syria is uneven. No information has been found on the communities in the cazas of northern Syria surrounding Aleppo, on the community of Deir el Zor, of Latakia, or of the Lebanon outside Beirut (with the exception of Bzoumar). In the other centres of Armenian population, for which documentation does exist, it is apparent that there existed the same distinction between peasants and townsfolk as has been observed for Armenian society in the Empire as a whole. Sanjian has described the combination of agriculture, domestic industry and rural crafts which formed the life-style for the Armenian villagers of the north-west.<sup>61</sup> In the urban centres of Aleppo, Antioch, Alexandretta, Beirut and Damascus, the Armenians were occupied, as elsewhere in the Empire, primarily in commerce and the small trades.<sup>62</sup> A few held appointments in the Ottoman administration.<sup>63</sup> At Aleppo they are several times mentioned in British Consular Reports as participating in innovatory enterprises,<sup>64</sup> and it was an Armenian who introduced photography to Aleppo,<sup>65</sup> a business which also involved Armenians in Beirut.<sup>66</sup> At Aleppo, out of six Physicians listed by Baedeker, one, Dr. Altounyan, was Armenian.<sup>67</sup> Socially and politically the Syrian Armenians appear to have shared the lot of their compatriots in the Empire. Cuinet describes how the mutual dislike which has already been noted between Apostolics and Catholics extended also to Aleppo.<sup>68</sup> The Syrian community was also unable to avoid the political repercussions which stemmed from the competition between Armenian and Turkish nationalism. In 1895-6, at the time of the Hamidian massacres, there was restlessness in Syria, but fortunately no victims.<sup>69</sup> In 1909, however, the massacres of Cilicia extended to north-west Syria, where massacres took place at Antioch and in the outlying villages.<sup>70</sup> At this time there was some emigration from the affected areas,<sup>71</sup> including Aleppo, but a considerable number of these emigrants returned. The final holocaust of 1915 did not leave the Armenians of Syria unaffected either, and it is on the background to these events that attention will now be focused.

### *The "Armenian Question"*

The future of the Armenian community in the Ottoman Empire, in Syria as much as in the eastern provinces and elsewhere, was linked unavoidably with the development of the "Armenian Question". There is a considerable literature on this subject, but a balanced assessment of its development is still lacking. The outline presented in this section is therefore extremely tentative.<sup>72</sup> The

Armenians, as observed above, had been granted millet status within the Ottoman Empire. This non-territorial recognition of group-status, while tolerant by contemporary Christian standards, disguised an actual political inequality. Given sound administration and a healthy economy it might have lasted longer, but by the nineteenth century it had come under great strain. Social conditions in the eastern provinces had become intolerable, while this decline had been paralleled by an Armenian cultural revival, exemplified by the founding of Mekhitarist communities in Venice (1717) and Vienna (1807). The result was to create specifically Armenian demands for reforms. These might have been met, in time, had not the Armenian revival coincided with a similar Turkish nationalist revival and a European desire for intervention in Ottoman affairs. The background to the development of the “Armenian Question” was then the struggle of three competing nationalisms; Armenian nationalism, Turkish nationalism, and the nationalism of the rival European powers.<sup>73</sup>

The first inscription in an international treaty of an article exclusively concerning the Armenians was in the Treaty of Berlin (1878), but no reforms followed. The Armenians began to turn to revolutionary parties. In 1893, they revolted at Sason: in September, 1895, they organised a demonstration at Constantinople. The result was the Hamidian massacres of 1895-6, and again no reforms. The Armenians continued to turn to the parties, but they were themselves split on the course of action to take. The British Consul at Erzurum divided into three political groupings the Armenian community of Asia Minor.<sup>74</sup> First, he noted the conservative and Turcophile Armenians, composed of Armenian Ottoman officials or of Armenian Catholics, having under the Turkish regime more religious liberty than they would under a Russian or Armenian Apostolic regime. Second were the moderate liberals, including the businessmen and clergy, a group which would be content with the continuation of the existing regime. Both these groups would be in favour of reforms, and they found political expression in the foundation of the Ramgavar Party in 1908. Its sympathisers were not prepared to go to the extremes of the third group, the revolutionaries, composed of young Armenians, students at European universities. The revolutionaries were themselves split between two principal parties; the Dashnaksutioun, founded in 1890 at Tiflis, and the Hentchak Party, founded in 1887 at Geneva. Both had important links with Russia, the Armenian revolutionary movement being inspired by Armenian intellectuals there. While the Hentchak Party advocated outright separation from the Empire, the Dashnaks, whilst also using terrorist techniques, favoured reform. They were therefore prepared to ally themselves with the Committee for Union and Progress and support the 1908 Turkish revolution. But Armenians were to be disappointed with the results. A Hamidian counter-revolution led to thousands of Armenian dead in Cilicia in 1909, while again no reforms came from the Young Turks once installed. The Armenians looked to European intervention, and a timely change of Russian policy in 1912 enabled the Armenian Catholicos of Echmiadzin to

petition the Tsar successfully for Russian intervention, while enjoining Boghos Nubar Pasha, of the Egyptian Armenian bourgeoisie, to form an Armenian National Delegation to tour Europe in search of support. The result of this pressure was a Russian initiative leading to the Reform Act of February, 1914, by which the Turkish government was obliged to accept the appointment of two European inspector-generals for the eastern vilayets. These provisions were never carried out, for war soon broke out, but the fact remains that in 1914 the nationalist Turks found themselves obliged to relinquish sovereignty over a large part of their territory as a result of European intervention on behalf of the Armenian minority. This is surely not without significance for what followed.

The full story of the events of 1915 has yet to be written.<sup>75</sup> In the meantime, Armenian claim and Turkish counter-claim make the task of even outlining the events difficult if not impossible, while the moral obligation to do so cannot be lightly ignored. What seems certain is that there was in 1915 and the following years, as a response to the extreme pressure under which the Turkish government found itself systematic deportation and massacre of a considerable part of the Armenian population of interior Turkey; an attempt at a “Final Solution” as understandable in its causes as horrific in its execution. The literature on the events is abundant,<sup>76</sup> but its final interpretation has not yet been made. Its reproduction here would add nothing to the ongoing debate. For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that, during the deportations, Syria acted as the receptacle for the deportees from the north.<sup>77</sup> They moved southwards, through Aleppo, to Hama, Homs, Damascus and beyond, or east, towards the Euphrates, where concentration camps were established at intervals, and where the final destination was often Deir el Zor. Many deportees died en route; many were killed. Others passed into the care of Kurds or Arabs. Their sufferings became legend. For Armenians all over the world there is only one interpretation of the meaning of these events.

## ENDNOTES

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<sup>1</sup> Nansen (1928); Lang (1970).

<sup>2</sup> Carzou (1975), p. 31; Hovannisian (1967), pp. 34-37; Sarkisian & Sahakian (1965), p. 25; Maunsell (1896), p. 229. See also in particular the discussion in Lynch (1901), *Vol. 2*, pp. 411-15.

<sup>3</sup> Lynch.

<sup>4</sup> Hovannisian.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> Lynch, *Vol. 2*, 79n.

<sup>7</sup> Garnett (1904), p. 176; Bryce (1896), pp. 463-66; *Murray's Handbook* (1895), p. 75; Carzou, pp. 34-41.

<sup>8</sup> For a description of the Armenian population of Cilicia, see especially Brézol (1911), p. 334-54.

<sup>9</sup> See e.g. Min. Guerre (1916), pp. 31-32, 210.

<sup>10</sup> Atamian (1955), p. 46.

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- <sup>11</sup> Ibid., pp. 59-60; Verney & Daubmann (1900), p. 149; Lynch, *Vol. 2*, p. 91; Macler (1911), pp. 105-7; Barkley (1891), p. 327; *Murray's Handbook* (1895), pp. 77-78; B.C.R. Erzerum (1898), p. 15, (1912), pp. 3-4.
- <sup>12</sup> Lynch, *Vol. 2*, p. 427.
- <sup>13</sup> Curtis (1911), pp. 161-62; Cholet (1892), p. 205; G.B. Foreign Office (1919), p. 43; Verney & Daubmann, pp. 18, 149; Lynch, *Vol. 2*, pp. 219, 426; B.C.R. Erzerum (1893), p. 2, (1894), p. 7.
- <sup>14</sup> Macler (1911), p. 106; Gulesian (1897), pp. 652-53, 659-60.
- <sup>15</sup> Macler (1911), p. 106; B.C.R. Erzerum (1901), p. 7, (1907), p. 10.
- <sup>16</sup> Macler (1911), p. 106; B.C.R. Erzerum (1908), p. 4, (1907), pp. 3, 4.
- <sup>17</sup> Macler (1911), p. 106; G.B. Foreign Office (1919), p. 43; B.C.R. Erzerum (1908), p. 9.
- <sup>18</sup> Chakmadjian (1965), p. 108; Hodgetts (1896), pp. 233, 238-40; Buxton & Buxton (1914), pp. 80-84; De Contenson (1901), pp. 67-68.
- <sup>19</sup> Although there already existed the Armenian Catholic Catholicosate of Cilicia, installed in Lebanon, the first specifically Armenian Catholic Catholicos being recognized by the Pope in 1742.
- <sup>20</sup> Arpee (1946) on the Armenian Protestants.
- <sup>21</sup> Buxton & Buxton, p. 81; Childs (1917), p. 120; Cuinet (1896), *Vol. 3*, p. 358; Cholet, p. 119. But note the importance of the Catholic Mekhitarists in the Armenian cultural movement (Garnett, p. 188).
- <sup>22</sup> Daniel (1970), p. 116; Barkley, p. 154; Lynch, *Vol. 2*, p. 153; Cuinet.
- <sup>23</sup> De Contenson (1901), p. 67-68; Naslian (1955), *Vol. 2*, pp. 492-96; Charmentant (1896), p. 75.
- <sup>24</sup> Cholet, pp. 60, 64.
- <sup>25</sup> Lynch, *Vol. 2*, p. 153.
- <sup>26</sup> Carzou, pp. 34-35, 39; Hodgetts, pp. 40, 116-20; Buxton & Buxton, pp. 35, 36, 64; De Contenson (1896), pp. 1048-49; Muellor-Simons & Myvernats (1892), p. 254; Maunsell, p. 229; Curtis, pp. 157-58; Barkley, pp. 262-63, 299-300; Bryce (1896), pp. 463-65; Lynch, *Vol. 2*, p. 425.
- <sup>27</sup> Caulet, pp. 64, 183, 255; De Contenson (1901), pp. 9, 53; Leart (1913), pp. 66-67; Min. Guerre (1916), p. 210; Carson, pp. 34-35, 40; Hodgetts, p. 121; Macler (1911), p. 103-5; De Contenson (1896), p. 1042; Muellor-Simons & Myvernats, p. 237; Maunsell, p. 229; Childs, pp. 14, 389-90; Hepworth (1898), pp. 285-86; Bryce (1896), pp. 465-66; Verney & Daubmann, pp. 483, 501-2; Lynch, *Vol. 2*, pp. 90, 172; Brézol, p. 338; Alishan (1899), p. 323; Cuinet (1890-95), *Vol. 1*, pp. 138, 251, *Vol. 2*, p. 357; Weakly (1911), p. 44; B.C.R. Erzerum (1898), p. 15.
- <sup>28</sup> G.B. Foreign Office (1919), p. 64; Hodgetts, p. 121; Soane (1926), pp. 56-64; Alishan, p. 323.
- <sup>29</sup> Burkley, pp. 35, 180; Weakley, pp. 69, 72. This also seems true of agriculture; Cuinet (1890-95), *Vol. 1*, p. 674, and B.C.R. Erzerum (1909), p. 5.
- <sup>30</sup> Min. Guerre (1916), pp. 31-32; Carzou, pp. 34-35; Bell (1890), p. 119; Maunsell, p. 229; *Murray's Handbook* (1895), pp. 77-78; Cuinet (1890-95), *Vol. 1*, pp. 251, 620, *Vol. 2*, pp. 530-31, *Vol. 3*, p. 357; De Contenson (1901), p. 9.
- <sup>31</sup> Carzou, pp. 21, 40-41; Macler (1911), pp. 107-8, Cuinet (1890-95), *Vol. 3*, p. 357; Krikorian (1964).
- <sup>32</sup> Carzou, pp. 34-35; De Contenson (1901), p. 53.
- <sup>33</sup> Macler (1911), pp. 105-09; Carzou, pp. 21, 40-41; *Murray's Handbook* (1895), pp. 77-78.

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- <sup>34</sup> Brézol, p. 338.
- <sup>35</sup> Carzou, p. 26; Hodgetts, p. 40; Buxton & Buxton, pp. 45-46; Bell, p. 126; G.B. Foreign Office (1919), p. 43; B.C.R. Erzerum (1894), p. 3, (1896), p. 11.
- <sup>36</sup> Carzou, p. 37; Barkley, p. 277; B.C.R. Erzerum (1894), p. 3.
- <sup>37</sup> Carzou, p. 38; Muellor-Simons & Myvernats, pp. 339, 342; Buxton & Buxton, pp. 2-22, 46-47, 112-13; Bell, pp. 117, 124; Curtis, p. 157; Barkley, pp. 277-80; Bryce (1896), p. 463; Lynch, *Vol. 2*, pp. 157-58, 420, 423; Cuinet (1890-95), *Vol. 2*, pp. 528-30, 636-40; Cholet, p. 172; G. B. Foreign Office (1919), p. 43; B.C.R. Erzerum (1894), p. 3.
- <sup>38</sup> Carzou, pp. 36-37; Buxton & Buxton, pp. 45-46.
- <sup>39</sup> Cuinet (1890-95), *Vol. 2*, pp. 242, 636; B.C.R. Erzerum (1894), p. 3.
- <sup>40</sup> Hepworth, pp. 63, 285-86; Verney & Daubmann, pp. 237, 485; Childs, pp. 365; De Contenson (1901), pp. 54, 100; B.C.R. for the eastern provinces (1895-97) and for Adana (1909).
- <sup>41</sup> Cuinet (1890-95), *Vol. 1*, pp. 154-55, 636, *Vol. 2*, pp. 336, 425, 665.
- <sup>42</sup> Weakley, pp. 44-45; B.C.R. Aleppo (1896), p. 10, (1897), p. 5, (1899), p. 11, (1903), p. 14, (1904), pp. 3-4, (1906), pp. 5-6; B.C.R. Erzerum (1896), p. 4, (1897), pp. 4, 10, (1898), p. 16.
- <sup>43</sup> Carzou, p. 38; Hodgetts, pp. 40, 63; Buxton & Buxton, p. 45; Hepworth, pp. 63, 285-86; Curtis, pp. 161-62, 166; Barkley, p. 327; Gulesian, pp. 652-53, 659-60; Verney & Daubmann, pp. 18, 149; Lynch, *Vol. 2*, pp. 91, 219, 426; Cuinet (1890-95), *Vol. 1*, pp. 155, 672, *Vol. 2*, pp. 527, 648, *Vol. 3*, p. 357, *Murray's Handbook* (1895), pp. 77-78, Bryce (1896), p. 464; Cholet, p. 205; G.B. Foreign Office (1919), pp. 43-44; Macler (1911), pp. 105-7; B.C.R. Constantinople (1909), p. 20, B.C.R. Erzerum (1893), p. 2, (1894), pp. 3, 7, (1898), p. 15.
- <sup>44</sup> *Murray's Handbook* (1895), pp. 77-78.
- <sup>45</sup> B.C.R. Erzerum (1908), p. 4, (1911), p. 4, (1901), p. 7, (1907), p. 10, (1909), p. 8.
- <sup>46</sup> See e.g. Bryce (1896), p. 463 and Cholet, p. 84.
- <sup>47</sup> See e.g. Carzou, pp. 34-35, 39-41; Garnett, pp. 176-79, 185.
- <sup>48</sup> Apart from Cuinet, other sources estimate the Armenian population as follows: 4000 (Pallis (n.d.), p. 3), 5000 (De Contenson (1901), p. 23), 10,500 (Weakley, p. 40), 15,000 (De Vaumas (1955), p. 533), 20,000 (Min. Guerre (1916), p. 205).
- <sup>49</sup> On the history of the Armenian community at Aleppo, see Sanjian (1965), pp. 46-53.
- <sup>50</sup> The higher estimates are cited by Cuinet (3784), Min. Guerre (1916), p. 201 (3-4000), and Weakley, p. 39 (3000); the lower estimates by Jacquot (1931), p. 313 (1000), and *Puzantion* (110 families: see Table 1.6).
- <sup>51</sup> Jacquot (1931), pp. 313-14; Weulerese (1934), p. 50; Brézol (1911), pp. 45-46, 133, 308-09, 356, 374, 376.
- <sup>52</sup> Sanjian, pp. 56-57.
- <sup>53</sup> See in particular Table 1.6. For the Jebel Moussa, other estimates are about 8000 inhabitants (G.B. Turkey No. 8 (1896) No. 163) and 1200 families (Bryce Report, 521). For Qassab, 700 families (*Puzantion* in Brézol, p. 54), about 3000 persons (G.B. Turkey No. 8 (1896), No. 163) and 6500 inhabitants (Naslian (1955), p. 322). For Beilane, conflicting estimates of 300-400 or 100 Armenian houses (Alishan, p. 503) and a population of 2000-5000, half-Armenian, half-Turkish (Min. Guerre (1916) p. 208). For Kirik Khane, conflicting estimates of 20-25 Armenian families and 60 Armenian houses (Brézol, pp. 54-55).
- <sup>54</sup> Eprikan, *Bnasxarhik bararan* (Armenian geographical dictionary), Venice, i, 1903-05, ii, 1907, quoted in Krikorian (1964), 191-92.

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- <sup>55</sup> Atamian (1964), p. VI.
- <sup>56</sup> Sanjian, pp. 57-59; Krikorian, pp. 191- 92, and Atamian (1964), pp. V-VI.
- <sup>57</sup> Estimates are as follows: 500 (Weakley, p. 27) 569 in caza (Table 1.5), 600 (Cuinet), 750 (Pallis, p. 3).
- <sup>58</sup> Sanjian, pp. 61-66.
- <sup>59</sup> *Murray's Handbook* (1895), p. 298.
- <sup>60</sup> Sanjian, pp. 59-66, and Varjabedian, cited in Krikorian, p. 192.
- <sup>61</sup> Sanjian, pp. 55-56.
- <sup>62</sup> Brézol, pp. 45-46; Jacquot (1931), p. 313; Sanjian, pp. 46-69; Eprikan in Krikorian, pp. 191-92.
- <sup>63</sup> Krikorian.
- <sup>64</sup> B.C.R. Aleppo (1902), p. 5, (1913), p. 7; Weakley, pp. 69, 72.
- <sup>65</sup> Sanjian, p. 52. Baedeker (1912), p. 377 notes 2 photographers in Aleppo, one of whom was Armenian.
- <sup>66</sup> Baedeker, p. 280.
- <sup>67</sup> Baedeker, p. 377.
- <sup>68</sup> Cuinet (1896), p. 128.
- <sup>69</sup> Verney & Daubmann, p. 18; Charmetant (1896), p. 31. For reports of tension in these communities, see G.B. Turkey No. 3 (1896) No. 111; Turkey No. 6 (1896) Nos. 182, 234, 356, 430, 438, 453, 500, 504; Turkey No. 2 (1896) Nos. 80, 134, 143, 172, 233, 272, 435; Turkey No. 8 (1896) Nos. 42, 118, 136, 138, 147, 163; Turkey No. 3 (1897) No. 53, and G.B. Correspondence etc., 1898, Nos. 63, 111, 234, 245.
- <sup>70</sup> Sanjian, pp. 280-81; Brézol, *passim*.
- <sup>71</sup> B.C.R. Aleppo (1909), p. 5, (1910), p. 3; Weakely, p. 10.
- <sup>72</sup> This section is largely based on Carzou, and Hovannisian, pp. 15-38.
- <sup>73</sup> On the conflict of opposing nationalisms, see Chakmadjian, pp. 95-108, and on the problems of multi-confessional societies in the Middle East see Corm (1971), especially pp. 207-30.
- <sup>74</sup> G.B. Turkey No. 6 (1896), Nos. 282, 222-24, cited in Verney & Daubmann, p. 16. On Armenian party structure, see also Mécérian (1962), pp. 42-47; Atamian (1955), pp. 97-125, and Nalbandian (1963).
- <sup>75</sup> Dyer (1976).
- <sup>76</sup> Carzou, pp. 109-56; Mécérian (1959), pp. 308-29, (1965) *passim*; Naslian, *Vol. 1*; Bryce Report, *passim*; Hovannisian, pp. 41-57; Andonian (1920); *Ararat*, 1915-18, *passim*. For a Turkish view see Ahmed Rustum Bey (1918).
- <sup>77</sup> For the movement of Armenian deportees into Syria, see Bryce Report, pp. 547-59; Naslian, *Vol. 1*, pp. 332, 409-11, 417, 421; Andonian, *passim*; Niepage (1917?) *passim*; *Ararat*, 1915-18, *passim*; Kerr (1973), pp. 24-27; Captanian (1919), pp. 95-142.

## Chapter II

# **THE REFUGEE MIGRATIONS AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE ARMENIAN POPULATION OF SYRIA AND LEBANON, 1915-1939**

The movement of the Armenian deportees to Syria was followed by a complex series of population movements which ultimately left a large refugee population in Syria and Lebanon. Repatriation of the deportees was followed by a series of refugee migrations which were supplemented by the rescue of women and children who had fallen into care of Arab and Kurdish tribes during the deportations. Subsequently the Armenian population of Syria and Lebanon decreased by emigration, but grew by natural increase. Given the complexity of the situation the total number of Armenian refugees in the region at any one time is difficult to evaluate. This chapter describes the evolution of the Armenian population of Syria and Lebanon between 1915 and 1939, considering in turn the repatriation, the refugee migrations, the rescue of women and children, naturalization, emigration and demography, before concluding with a consideration of the available estimates concerning the total Armenian refugee population in Syria and Lebanon. The paucity of statistical data will quickly become evident.

### ***Repatriation***

As the soldiers of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force advanced through Palestine into Syria, they met the survivors of the Armenian deportations. In November and December, 1918, they found the Armenians to be increasingly concentrating in the four centres of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo.<sup>1</sup> (Table 2.1). In addition, Armenians from outlying villages were constantly arriving at the principal centres, swelling the numbers. Others, women and children, were awaiting rescue from Muslim households. For example, the Kurdish and Arab sheikhs in the area Menbidj-Harran-Raqqa-Meskene declared that they had in their villages and tents 650 Armenians, mostly women and children, while they reported 800 in the tents of the tribes friendly to them to the east.<sup>2</sup> Others were rescued by the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force: in January 1919, there were 980 Armenians at Deir el Zor.<sup>3</sup> In all there were believed to be about 85,000 Armenians in the region.

Relief for the rescued Armenians was provided out of British Army funds, by Armenian and phil-Armenian societies, and by the American Red Cross and its successor in Syria, the American Committee for Relief in the Near East (Near East Relief).<sup>4</sup> At the same time a start was made on the rescue of Armenian women and children from Arab and Kurdish villages, a task undertaken by the Near East Relief. The Emir Feisal issued a proclamation that any Armenians living in Arab homes be returned to their people. By the end of September, 1919,

nearly every village within 50 miles of Aleppo had been visited, and 450 children brought in.<sup>5</sup> To co-ordinate relief work a Directorate of Relief and Repatriation was formed in February, 1919, with a British director.<sup>6</sup> Repatriation of the Armenians from the Syrian camps appears to have begun in the spring of 1919, and the bulk of the task was completed by the end of summer.<sup>7</sup> Then in October and November 6000 Armenians were repatriated rapidly from Aleppo, British officials fearing for their safety there after the withdrawal of British troops.<sup>8</sup> Some Armenians were also repatriated at this time from Damascus,<sup>9</sup> and apparently from Deir el Zor.<sup>10</sup> Official French sources report a movement in all of about 100,000 persons.<sup>11</sup> It is not clear if all the surviving deportees and refugees were repatriated. Clearly the bulk of them were, but it seems unlikely that no deportees at all remained in the country, especially as not all their home towns had been occupied by the allies. (Fig 2.1).

LOCATION	TOTAL	DATE
Damascus	30,000	Nov. 22
Homs	1500	Nov. 26
Villages around Hom	500	“
Hama	6,000	“
Villages around Hama	3-4000	“
Aleppo (non-Aleppine Armenians)	35,000	Dec. 1




Fig. 2.1: Origin of Armenian deportees repatriated from Damascus, 1919

<sup>1</sup> Sir Mark Sykes to G.O.C., G.H.Q., Egypt, W.O. 95/4372.

### ***The Indigenous Armenian Population***

The Armenian population of Syria had itself not been immune from deportation, but fortunately the process did not extend to the whole of the region.<sup>12</sup> The Armenians of Damascus, southern Syria and the Lebanon appear to have been exempt, as well as the major concentration in Aleppo in the north. The others in the north were less fortunate. While Aleppo was considered an exception, all the Armenians of Antioch, Latakia, Qassab and the other settlements of the north-west would appear to have been deported. The Armenian quarter of Antioch disappeared as a result of these deportations and the excesses of 1909. The sole compensation was the heroism of the Armenians of the Jebel Moussa who chose to resist deportation and held out in the mountain until rescued by a French cruiser and transported to safety at Port Said. 868 families (4058 persons) were rescued in this way: 332 families who chose to stay were deported. The allied occupation left the deportees free to return to their homes, but the population had been substantially reduced. Thus, in assessing the local Armenian population in 1918-19, little weight should be given to the pre-war population figures, which are in any case unreliable. The best indication of surviving indigenous Armenian population is the figure of 14,829, given in the 1922 Census of Syria and Lebanon, but this figure excludes the important Armenian population concentration in the Sanjak of Alexandretta.

### ***The Refugee Migrations***

Following the repatriation, a new series of migrations of Armenians to Syria began in 1920. The Sykes-Picot agreement had allotted to France the right to the administration of Cilicia.<sup>13</sup> At first occupied by British troops the area passed to French control by a Franco-British agreement of September 15, 1919, but the French were never able fully to enjoy their new possessions. Kemalist uprisings against their control began in January, 1920, and they began to lose their grip on the outlying towns. As the French garrisons withdrew, they were followed by streams of Armenian refugees seeking shelter from Turkish vengeance. They concentrated primarily in Adana, but a number were evacuated to Syria, to Alexandretta, Aleppo, Beirut, and also to Dortyol, just across the future border.<sup>14</sup> It is difficult to assess accurately the number of these evacuees to Syria, but it is unlikely that they numbered more than 5000 (excluding those in Dortyol). The movement effectively came to an end with the recapture of Gaziantep by French forces on February 9, 1921.

A second migration occurred at the end of 1921. By the Treaty of Sèvres, signed on August 10, 1920, France had ceded the bulk of Cilicia to Turkey, while a Tripartite Agreement between France, Britain and Italy recognised to her a zone of special interests there. This treaty was not ratified at Ankara, and a further agreement was made at London on March 9, 1921, by which France made more territorial concessions, receiving in return economic concessions in Cilicia and guarantee clauses for the rights of minorities. Again, the parliament at Ankara

refused to ratify this arrangement, and final agreement did not come until October 20, 1921 (the Ankara Agreement). Under this accord, the territorial boundaries between Turkey and Syria remained almost the same as in the earlier London agreement, but France lost her economic privileges and the guarantee clauses for minorities were weakened. France was to withdraw her troops from Cilicia within two months. Panic gripped the Christian population, which had already contemplated emigration at the time of the London agreement in March. This time they decided to flee. The more wealthy left first, and reached Cyprus and Egypt. The remainder were allowed to enter Syria. In the second half of December, 1921, 16,500 refugees were transported from Mersin to the different ports of Syria, while at the same time, 12,000 refugees came by land to Alexandretta and Aleppo. Several hundred others, voyaging under their own means, disembarked in the different ports. In a fortnight, 30,000 refugees, the majority Armenians, had arrived in French-protected territory according to French official estimates.<sup>15</sup> The exodus was completed by the transfer to Lebanon in the course of 1922 of the orphanages which the French government had left at Adana.<sup>16</sup>

Another exodus began in August, 1922, as a result of Turkish intimidation, following their success over the Greeks. The immigrants to Syria came above all to Aleppo, and the figures in the reports of the Mandatory Power and "Archives Diplomatiques" seem to refer only to recorded arrivals at Aleppo.<sup>17</sup> These record a total of 39,308 immigrants from the beginning of the new wave of migration until July 1, 1924, by which time it had largely subsided. Of these about two-thirds would have been Armenians, giving a total of about 25,000 more Armenian refugees.<sup>18</sup> This figure would omit any Armenians unrecorded at Aleppo as well as those arriving in other parts of the territory. Of these there certainly were some, 400 orphans from Cilicia reaching Beirut,<sup>19</sup> for example, and other refugees from Urfa settling in the north, outside Aleppo town.<sup>20</sup> This total must clearly be treated with considerable reserve.

A final exodus of Armenians from Turkey to Syria occurred in 1929-30, beginning as early as September, 1929, but apparently reaching its height in December. The refugees came this time from the regions of Harput and Diyarbakir, again apparently as a result of Turkish intimidation.<sup>21</sup> According to Mr. Monck-Mason, British Consul at Aleppo,

The settled policy of the Turkish Government seems to be to get rid of all Christian elements in the distant Anatolian provinces by all means short of absolute massacre..<sup>22</sup>

The number of these refugees would not appear to have exceeded 800 families, according to Armenian estimates.<sup>23</sup> This was the last large-scale migration from Turkey. Infiltration continued throughout the study period, but never on the scale of the four principal migrations. Figures are lacking for this movement.<sup>24</sup>

Although the exodus of 1929 was the last large-scale movement of Armenians from Turkey to Syria, the exodus from the Sanjak of Alexandretta in 1938 and

1939 quite equaled in scale the earlier migrations.<sup>25</sup> This exodus should perhaps be regarded as an internal rather than external migration as the Sanjak formed part of French mandated territory until its cession. The exodus began in June, 1938 after the disclosure that France had promised the Turks 22 deputies out of 40 in the Assembly of the Sanjak and had authorised the entry of Turkish troops into Alexandretta. This exodus appears to have involved about 750 families, although Burnier, the delegate of the Nansen Office, maintained only 300 to 400.<sup>26</sup> In July and August there was some reconsideration and returning to the Sanjak, but a second exodus began when, in mid-October, more Turkish officials and soldiers entered the Sanjak and a customs cordon was established along the Syrian border. This movement continued until June, 1939, by which time, according to Mécérian,<sup>27</sup> 8000 Armenians had left. Finally, following the announcement that, by the terms of the Franco-Turkish agreement signed at Ankara on June 23, 1939, the Sanjak would be ceded by France to Turkey a month later, most of the remaining Armenians were evacuated by the French authorities while others, too nervous to wait for the organised emigration, left of their own accord. This last migration involved in all about 14,000 Armenians.<sup>28</sup> With the exception of those of the Qassab district, which was detached from the Sanjak and remained part of Syria, the great majority of Armenians in the Sanjak had left.

### ***The Rescue of Women and Children***

The Armenian population in Syria and Lebanon grew not only from migration, but also as a result of the rescue of numerous women and children taken into Muslim homes during the deportations.<sup>29</sup> As already observed, this work was begun by the Near East Relief. Then, in February, 1921, the League of Nations established a commission of Enquiry on the Deportation of Women and Children in Turkey and Neighbouring Countries.<sup>30</sup> Miss Karen Jeppe, a Danish phil-Armenian philanthropist, was appointed to rescue women and children in Muslim hands, and she established a rescue-home at Aleppo. In winter, 1921, she estimated that there were from five to six thousand Armenian women and children in Muslim houses within the French zone of occupation, and in 1922 she estimated at least 30,000 in Muslim hands in the whole region accessible from Aleppo. When the League withdrew support for her work at the end of 1927, she continued to carry it on with the support of various charitable organisations. By the time her Rescue Home was finally closed at the end of 1930 she had brought in about 1900 persons. Her efforts were supplemented by those of the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU), which took over her work for the boys in 1928,<sup>31</sup> and by the Shirajian Girls' Hostel.<sup>32</sup> The total rescued was therefore rather more than 1900: indeed, some Armenians were still coming in as late as 1934.<sup>33</sup>

### *Naturalisation*

The Armenian refugees in Syria and Lebanon did not automatically become citizens of those states. Of vital importance for understanding official population figures relating to the Armenians (and of considerable political importance) is the question of naturalisation. Article 30 of the Treaty of Lausanne provided that Ottoman subjects habitually resident in the territories detached from Turkey should become subjects of the state to which the territory was transferred. In execution of this provision of the Treaty, the French High Commissioner in Syria and Lebanon issued on August 30, 1924, two decrees (Nos. 2825 & 2825 bis), by which Lebanese and Syrian nationality was conferred en bloc to all ex-Ottoman subjects resident on that day in the territories of the Lebanon and Syria. The Armenian refugees, although their establishment in the region was not of long standing, were given the benefit of this enactment. By Decree No. 15/5 of January 19, 1925, naturalisation of Armenians arriving after that date was made conditional on five years' continuous residence.<sup>34</sup>

### *Emigration*

By no means all the refugees remained in Syria and Lebanon. There are many references<sup>35</sup> to the emigration of Armenian refugees, especially to France and the Americas, but it is difficult to assess the numbers involved. The movement would appear to have been at its peak between 1921 and 1929, as there are fewer references to mass emigration in the latter part of the inter-war period. Such totals as are available<sup>36</sup> suggest a figure of the order of tens of thousands, but it is difficult to reconcile an emigration of this magnitude with the available figures for immigration and total Armenian population. Perhaps the best indicator of the volume of emigration is provided by a table in the Nansen Office archives which records a total of 652 refugees leaving Syria and Lebanon provided with a Nansen certificate in the period June, 1928 to June, 1929 (Fig 2.2), but this rate of emigration cannot necessarily be applied to other years. Much emigration was spontaneous, involving Armenians searching for better opportunities overseas, but some was organised. In particular the outplacement of NER orphans in France should be noted.<sup>37</sup> Altogether about 1400 orphans were transferred to France for employment from NER orphanages in Greece and Syria. There was a similar movement abroad from other institutions,<sup>38</sup> when girls married young Armenians resident abroad, or orphans moved abroad to live with their relations. In addition, about 200 refugees were transferred from Syria to Soviet Armenia in 1931-32.<sup>39</sup> The Nansen Office also assisted the migration of Armenians to South America<sup>40</sup> at the end of 1928, but this process seems to have involved only a few families.

## Demography


### Birth and Death-rates

A number of references suggest that the birth-rate of the Armenians in Syria and Lebanon was exceptionally high.<sup>41</sup> Alice Poulleau for example describes a visit to an Armenian refugee camp at Damascus in September, 1925.

Partout grouille déjà, 'a spawn of babies', comme dirait Kipling, et les signes de prochaine maternité apparaissent chez presque toutes les jeunes femmes. Ce peuple témoigne d'un robuste optimisme.<sup>42</sup>

Mécérian also stresses the high Armenian birth-rate, from the point of view of a Jesuit priest:

Il semble ... que, dans les masses populaires du moins, les vices anti-conceptionnels sont peu répandus. L'amour de la famille, le désir de constituer un ménage y sont encore vivaces.<sup>43</sup>



**Fig. 2.2:** Destination of refugees leaving Syria and Lebanon, June 1928-June 1929  
(Source: N.A. C1402)

He observed that amongst the Armenian Catholic population of the Beirut refugee camp there had been during the previous year (1927) an estimated birth-rate of 40%, while in the indigenous Armenian village of Bitias (in the Jebel Moussa) the figure was 63.6%. He added that the estimated rate of 40-50% therefore for the Catholics would have been about the same for the Apostolics. Liepmann, however, disputes such assertions,<sup>44</sup> arguing that:

The prolificacy of the Armenians seems to be relative only, in comparison with the very low birth-rate of the Russian refugees, not absolutely high, so as to assure 5 persons per family on the average. This impression can also be gathered from the other countries of refuge of Armenians.

Statistics are lacking to test such assertions. Virtually the only figures available are the statistics of births and deaths declared in Lebanon in 1945 and 1946. (Table 2.2), but both birth and death-rates seem so low compared with what might be expected in a developing country that these figures should perhaps be rejected. Possibly the only feature of significance which emerges from them is the higher birth-rate recorded for Armenian Catholics, which casts doubt on Mécérian's assertion regarding the equivalence of Catholic and Apostolic birth-rates.

	Birth-rate %		Death-rate %	
	1945	1946	1945	1946
Apostolics	24.4	19.6	6.9	5.6
Catholics	28.2	19.8	7.1	5.8
Apostolics & Catholics	24.9	19.5	6.9	5.6

As regards mortality-rates, overall estimates are again lacking. The Lebanese figures for 1945 and 1946 seem too low (Table 2.2). Further information comes from the monthly reports on the villages established by the Nansen Office in the Sanjak of Alexandretta. Here, the most significant feature is that children's deaths accounted for about 75% of all mortalities recorded, with children less than one year old being particularly vulnerable.<sup>45</sup> Some attempt may be made to calculate both birth- and death-rates on the basis of these figures, (Table 2.3) but the results are distorted by migration, involve small populations, and may in any case be atypical of the Armenian refugee population as a whole. Little stress should therefore be laid on the statistically convenient results for Soouk Sou, which indicate a birth-rate of 42%, and death-rate of 24%.

#### *Age-, Sex-, and Family-Structure*

According to Barton,<sup>46</sup> most of the refugees in Syria were women and children, but information on age-and sex-structure is rather scanty. It is possible to construct a composite age-sex pyramid for three Nansen settlements at December, 1927. (Fig. 2.3). The results obtained are not necessarily typical of the entire Armenian population. In particular, they yield a Male/Female ratio greater than one, the opposite of the expected balance. For Lebanon, M/F ratios based on the censuses of 1932 and 1942 again do not indicate any significant surplus of women (Table 2.4). The annual reports of the Nansen Office provide some statistics on the sex of the adult refugees settled in the Nansen Office villages and quarters (Table 2.5). The urban quarters yield values of less than one, but the villages yield values of more than one for 2 out of 5 years for which data are available. The Nansen Office figures are again not necessarily typical.

<sup>2</sup> Based on data in Conseil Supérieur des Interêts Communs, *Recueil des Statistiques etc.*, (1944), (1945-47).

<b>Table 2.3:</b> Annual Birth-and Death-rates in the Nansen Office settlements in the Sanjak of Alexandretta (Jan. 1928 – June 1929) <sup>3</sup>		
	Birth-rate %	Death-rate %
Nor Zeitoun	73.4	22.0
Soouk Sou	42.4	23.5
Kirik Khane	64.7	46.2

<b>Table 2.4:</b> M/F ratios for Lebanon, based on the censuses of 1932 and December, 1942			
1932		December 1942	
Apostolics	0.98	Armenians	1.04
Catholics	1.06		
Apostolics & Catholics	0.99		

**Note:** In the tabulation of the 1942 Census results, the figures presented concerning sex-structure are inconsistent with those presented concerning total population.

As regards age-structure, there is more support for Barton's assertion as he himself notes that about 12,000 orphans<sup>47</sup> came into the area during the principal migrations of the post-war period. Information on the age-structure of the rest of the population is scarce. The age-sex pyramid of the Nansen settlements (Fig 2.3) is probably atypical.

<b>Table 2.5:</b> M/F ratios in the Nansen Office settlements <sup>4</sup>							
	Dec. 1928	Aug. 1930	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934
<i>Rural settlements</i>							
Soouk Sou	0.93	1.43	?	1.03	?	0.96	0.74
Nor Zeitoun	1.02	1.06	?	?	?	?	0.80
Kirik Khane	1.14	1.14	?	1.00	?	?	1.00
Haiachène	0.90	1.01	?	1.00	?	0.96	0.96
Abdal Huyuk	0.95	0.95	?	1.00	?		
Massiaf	-	1.10	?	1.03	?	0.88	1.10
Bey-Seki	-	-	-	?	?	0.91	0.83
Banias	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Overall	0.96	1.10	?	1.01	?	0.94	0.95
<i>Urban Settlements</i>							
Aleppo	0.96	?	?	0.88	0.94	?	?
Kirik Khane	0.89	?	?	0.92	1.01	* <sup>5</sup>	1.00
Alexandretta	1.14	?	?	?	1.08	*	?
Beirut	?	?	?	0.95	0.96	?	?
Damascus	?	?	?	?	0.96	*	?
Rihaniyé	-	-	-	-	-	?	1.02
Overall	0.99	?	?	0.91	0.95	?	?
<i>Rural &amp; urban</i>	0.97	?	?	0.92	?	?	?


<sup>3</sup> Based on data from monthly reports contained in N.A. C1429 and C1431.

<sup>4</sup> See the annual reports on the progress of the settlement work in N.A. C1429, C1583, C1584, and for 1934 in S.F., M.S. Vol. 216.

<sup>5</sup> \* Figure identical to those of 1932.

More useful is the information from the annual Nansen Office reports (Table 2.6). Here, there is observable a constant tendency for the population of the rural settlements to become younger (Fig. 2.4).

According to Poidebard<sup>48</sup> 3 or 4 children was the normal situation for an Armenian worker, while some Nansen Office figures appear to have been calculated on the basis of 5 persons per family. Liepmann<sup>49</sup> correctly criticises this assumption not confirmed by the available evidence. Some assessment of family-structure is possible on the basis of lists of families established in the three Nansen Office settlements of Ikiz-Keupru (Nor Zeitoun), Souuk Sou and Kirik Khane.<sup>50</sup> Here the mean family-size at December, 1927 was 3.5, with modal values of 2 and 4. Families were composed mostly of husbands and wives with their children, but a number were more extended, with mother, brothers, sisters, and in-laws of the head of household. Elsewhere, a list drawn up in August, 1928,<sup>51</sup> of families wishing to migrate to Argentina yields an average of 4.9 persons per family, with a modal value of 5, but the table includes the relatives in Argentina whose families desired to migrate. These families, most of which were from Beirut, were rather more extended than those of the village lists. Other Nansen Office figures (Table 2.7) indicate an upward evolution from a mean family-size of 3.8 persons at the end of 1928 to a value of 4.6 at the end of 1931.



**Fig. 2.3:** Composite Age-sex pyramid for the three Nansen settlements of Kirik Khane, Souuk Sou and Nor-Zeitoun, December 1927<sup>6</sup>

Subsequently overall totals are lacking, but there is no conclusive evidence of a steep rise in the totals for individual locations (Tables 2.7, 2.8). In Aleppo, for example, family-size remained static at 5.0 persons between 1932 and 1936, while the rural settlements actually recorded a decrease in mean family-size between 1931 and 1937. The data further contain some anomalous figures and considerable variation between individual settlements, while significant noise is introduced into the data-set by migrations and by settlement in new quarters in the towns. Whatever may be concluded from these figures, one notable feature of


<sup>6</sup> *Source:* N.A. C1429, C1431.

Armenian demography was the process of physical “family reconstitution”, as bereaved relatives united forces to reconstitute families after the war-years. This is illustrated by the more extended families noted above in the Nansen Office lists, but was particularly the case with the orphans who were outplaced wherever possible with relatives throughout the period.<sup>52</sup> It has already been noted that this process sometimes involved emigration.

**Table 2.6:** Children as a percentage of the population of the Nansen Office settlements<sup>7</sup>

	Dec. 1928	Aug. 1930	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934
<i>Rural settlements</i>							
Soouk Sou	37.0	40.0	?	57.8	?	55.3	53.1
Nor Zeitoun	44.1	45.0	?	?	?	?	57.8
Kirik Khane	51.3	50.7	?	56.3	?	?	51.4
Haiachène	39.3	43.2	?	49.5	?	50.5	51.2
Abdal Huyuk							
Massiaf	-	35.8	?	41.2	?	47.0	45.2
Bey-Seki	-	-	?	?	?	41.7	40.5
Banias	-	-	-	-	-	?	?
<i>Overall</i>	41.4	43.2	?	49.9	?	50.5	50.6
<i>Urban Settlements</i>							
Aleppo	36.3	?	?	61.8	42.3	?	?
Kirik Khane	39.3	?	?	67.4	46.2	* <sup>8</sup>	54.1
Alexandretta	32.8	?	?	?	35.1	*	?
Beirut	?	?	?	45.5	46.1	?	?
Damascus	-	?	?	?	43.4	*	?
Rihaniyé	-	-	-	-	-	?	53.4
<i>Overall</i>	35.9	?	?	55.2	43.7	?	?
<i>Rural &amp; urban</i>	39.1	?	?	54.8	?	?	?

**Note:** It is impossible to compare these values with those of any ‘normal’ model as there is no definition of children given in the reports from which the figures are derived.



**Fig. 2.4:** Children as percentage Armenian population in the Nansen Office settlements<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup> See the annual reports on the progress of the settlement work in N.A. C1429, C1583, C1584, and for 1934 in S.F., M.S. Vol. 216.

<sup>8</sup> \* Figures identical to those of 1932.

<sup>9</sup> **Source:** N.A. C1429, C1431.

	Dec. 1928	Aug. 1930	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1937
<i>Rural settlements</i>								
Soouk Sou	3.7	4.0	4.1	5.9	?	?	?	4.8
Nor Zeitoun	3.5	3.8	3.9	?	?	?	?	2.9
Kirik Khane	4.4	4.3	4.3	4.6	?	?	?	5.1
Haiachène	3.9	3.5	3.7	3.9	?	?	?	4.3
Abdal Huyuk								
Massiaf	-	-	3.5	5.7	?	?	?	-
Bey-Seki	-	-	-	4.1	?	?	?	4.2
Banias	-	-	-	-	-	?	?	?
Overall	3.9	3.8	3.8	4.5	?	?	?	4.4
<i>Urban settlements</i>								
Aleppo	3.8	?	?	5.6	5.0	?	?	?
Kirik Khane	3.7	?	4.4	6.2	4.2	* <sup>11</sup>	?	?
Alexandretta	3.6	?	?	4.0	3.6	*	?	?
Beirut	-	?	?	3.9	3.8	3.8	4.2	?
Damascus	-	?	?	3.4	3.9	*	4.4	?
Rihaniyé	-	-	-	-	-	4.8	?	?
Overall	3.7	?	?	4.6	4.3	?	?	?
<i>Rural &amp; urban</i>	3.8	?	?	4.6	?	?	?	?

<i>Aleppo</i>		<i>Beirut</i>	
New quarters	5.0	New quarters	4.6
Huts	5.1	Huts	4.5
<i>Overall</i>	5.0	<i>Overall</i>	4.6

1936	5.4
1937	5.3

## Conclusions

It is clearly dangerous to generalise about Armenian demography, given the inadequacy of the data. It does seem possible, however, to detect a process of physical “family reconstitution” after the traumas of the war years. There is evidence of a post-war “baby-boom” as young couples founded new families, (Fig. 2.4) which receives support from the age-sex structure of the Nansen Office

<sup>10</sup> See the annual reports on the progress of the settlement work in N.A. C1429, C1583, C1584, and for 1934 in S.F., M.S. Vol. 216; report in N.A. C1598.

<sup>11</sup> \* Figures identical to those of 1932.

<sup>12</sup> Tables in N. A., C1524.

<sup>13</sup> N.A. C1598.

villages (Fig. 2.3) and from the family-size figures, which suggest an initial rise in family-size followed by a period of slower increase. Given such a process, then the number of young children in the streets in the densely-packed refugee “camps” might well have suggested an abnormally high birth-rate. It seems reasonable to envisage that this process would have more than offset mortality, concerning which information is sparse, thus providing a steady rise in Armenian population, but there is no evidence of a markedly high birth-rate beyond the observations of individuals.

### ***Population Totals***

French official estimates available include those contained in various censuses, the Civil Register, and the annual reports of the Mandatory Power. (Table 2.9). Censuses were taken in Syria and Lebanon in 1922, in Lebanon in 1932, and again in Lebanon in December, 1942. The results of the 1922 Census appear in several forms.<sup>53</sup> All are likely to be extremely inaccurate. Those presented exclude from consideration about 50,000 recent immigrants from Turkey. They also give no breakdown by confessional group for the Sanjak of Alexandretta. The total presented (14,829) therefore represents only a part of the indigenous Armenian population. The Lebanese Census of 1932 (total 31,992 Armenians) was more scientific and accurate than the earlier census and is described as undoubtedly valid by Mazure. The Census of Lebanon in December, 1942 (total 49,119 Armenians), also probably reasonably accurate, was taken by the Office des Cereales Panifiables for rationing purposes. Civil Register totals are based on the registration of births and deaths, not on migration, so give a misleading picture of population totals and distribution. Furthermore, as registration of demographic events improved progressively it is impossible to evaluate population growth using these figures. They appear to have been based initially on the 1922 Census, but registration did not become well-organised until 1930-31.<sup>54</sup> Nevertheless, they do yield a useful figure for the number of Armenians in Syria at the end of 1938, and in Syria and Lebanon combined at the end of 1943.

The annual reports of the Mandatory Power contain a series of figures concerning the Armenian refugee population which would appear to have been gathered independently of the census and Civil Register figures, but their basis and accuracy is not known. Useful estimates are also provided by the Deuxième Bureau for April, 1925 and February, 1931.

Both the Censuses and the Civil Register enable an assessment to be made of the relative importance of the Catholic Armenian population, and this appears to have declined throughout the period as the predominantly Apostolic newcomers reduced the relatively high proportion of Catholics in the area. (Table 2.10). They also reveal that the Armenians as a whole came to form around 4% of the population of Syria and Lebanon. (Table 2.11).

<b>Table 2.9: Official French estimates of the Armenian refugee population in Syria and Lebanon<sup>14</sup></b>		
Date	Estimate	Source and Observations
1922	55,000 A.	France, M.A.E., La Syrie et le Liban en 1922 (1922). Protestants excluded. Base unknown.
1923	c.45,000 A.	“Rapport” (1922-23) 22. Base unknown.
1923	14,829 A.	1922 Census results in France, Ministère du Travail (1923), pp. 71-74. Excludes about 50,000 recent immigrants from Turkey. Excludes Sanjak of Alexandretta. For the procedure followed in taking this census see Ministère du Travail (1923) and Ballita (n.d.).
1925	89,000 A.R.	“Rapport” (1924) 50. i. e. at Jan. 1, 1925.
1925	88,910 A.R.	Deuxième Bureau (1932) 10. Position in April, 1925.
1925-26	100,000 A.R.	Statements by M. Pams, French representative, to the Fifth Committee of the League Assembly, Sept. 19, 1925 and Sept. 20, 1926. (LoN., Records of the Meetings of the 5 <sup>th</sup> Committee, 1925, p. 26, and 1926, p. 31).
1926	69,112 A.	Civil Registers in “Rapport” (1926), pp. 190-94. Protestants excluded. Figures inconsistent with respect to refugees, excluded from the total for the Vilayet of Aleppo.
1927	80,000 R.	“Rapport” (1927) 66. Almost all Armenians.
1928	80,000 A.R.	Duguet (1928) 51. (This paper originally appeared in 1927). A high official of the health service, Duguet was heavily, involved in the settlement work.
1927	c. 90,000 A.R.	Statement by M. Bastid, French representative, to the League Assembly, Sept. 26, 1927. (Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Minutes_(1927) 21 <sup>st</sup> Meeting, Sept. 26, p. 190).
1928	c. 80,000 A.R.	“Rapport” (1928) 69. Based on the assumption that since 1927 there had probably been no change in the number of refugees.
1928	80,000 - 100,000 A.R.	Statement by M. De Caix, French representative to the Permanent Mandates Commission, June 25, 1928 (PMC Minutes, 13 <sup>th</sup> Sess., 20 <sup>th</sup> Meeting, June 25, 1928, pp. 164-5).
1929	c. 100,000 A.R.	Statement by M. De Caix, French representative, to the Permanent Mandates Commission, July 12, 1929 (PMC Minutes, 15 <sup>th</sup> Sess., 21 <sup>st</sup> Meeting, July 12, 1929, p. 181).
1930	c. 90,000 A.R.	“Rapport” (1930) 51. i. e. out of c.125,000 Armenians. Source not given.
1931	117,131 A.	2e Bureau (1932) 11-13. Excludes Armenians of Qassab district. A few persons in the Jebel el Druze should be added to the total.
1932	100,000 A.R.	Jude, Burnier and Lubet (1932), p. 173. Jude was director of the health service of the High Commission, Burnier the Nansen Office representative in Beirut.
1932	31,992 A.R.	Census of Lebanon, 1932 in “Rapport” (1932), pp. 138-39. Total for Lebanon only, excludes Protestants. For details of procedure and comment on accuracy see “Rapport” (1932), Mazure (1968), p. 414, and Ballita (n.d.).
1938	98,880 A.	Civil Register in “Rapport” (1938), pp. 220-21. Total excludes Lebanon and Sanjak of Alexandretta, and also Protestants.
1942	49,119 A.	O.C.P. Census of Lebanon, Dec., 1942 in Ballita (n.d.). For details of this Census see Ballita & Mazure (1968), pp. 414-15.

<sup>14</sup> Explanation: The letters following the totals indicate precisely to what the totals refer, according to the original sources, i. e. A.: Armenians; A.R.: Armenian refugees; R.: Refugees.

1943	187,169 A.	Conseil Supérieur des Intérêts Communs, <i>Recueil de Statistique</i> (1942-43) 11, 18. Information communicated by the Ministries of the Interior of both Syria and Lebanon. The Lebanese figure included all registered Armenians, including those not resident on the territory. Protestants excluded.
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	Catholics	Armenians	% Catholics
1922 Census	5672	14,829	38.25
1926 Civil Register (excluding Lebanon)	7305	36,253	20.15
1932 Census of Lebanon	5890	31,992	18.41
1938 Civil Register (excluding Lebanon)	12,137	98,880	12.27
1943 M.O.I. figures	26,659	187,169	14.24

	Total Armenians	Total population	Armenians as % of total population
1922 Census (less Sanjak of Alexandretta)	14,829	1,927,082	0.8
1926 Civil Register	69,112	2,046,920	3.4
1932 Census of Lebanon	31,992	793,396	4.0
1938 Civil Register (less Lebanon)	98,880	2,468,210	4.0
1943 Revised O.C.P. Census of Lebanon	50,403	1,047,745	4.8
1943 M.O.I. figures for both Syria and Lebanon	187,169	3,965,080	4.7

Apart from these French official sources, more or less independent estimates are available from Nansen Office sources (Table 2.12) and elsewhere (Table 2.13). All require close scrutiny. In fact, when all estimates, official and unofficial, are compared it is evident that there are marked discrepancies between them.<sup>55</sup> Not only this, but in some cases, it is not certain exactly what the figures represent; Armenian refugees alone, or the entire Armenian population. Armenian Protestants<sup>56</sup> are generally excluded from the totals derived from the censuses and the Civil Register, while delayed naturalisation makes these figures difficult to interpret in some cases. The basis and independence of the estimates is often not known. It would therefore be useful to check population totals against migration and basic demography. Accurate comparison is however clearly impossible given the inadequacy of the statistical record. Only a few tentative comparisons may be made and conclusions drawn regarding the evolution of the refugee population.

<sup>15</sup> See Table 2.9.

<sup>16</sup> See Table 2.9.

<b>Table 2.12:</b> Estimates of the Armenian refugee population in Syria and Lebanon contained in the documents and correspondence of the Nansen Office <sup>17</sup>		
Date	Estimate	Source and Observations
1925	100,000 A.	Carle Report (1925), p. 6. Reduced by death and emigration from a total “at one time” of 125,000.
1926	109,000 A.R.	Report by Burnier, representative of the Nansen Office in Beirut c. May 1926 (N.A. C1429). Apparently unrelated to Carle’s estimate.
1926	124,500 A.R.	Report by Burnier, Aug. 18, 1926 (N.A. C1429). The figure includes some indigenous Armenians. Unrelated to his earlier estimate.
1926	86,500 A.R.	Report by Major Johnson, Gen. Sec. of the Nansen Office, Dec. 18, 1926 (N.A. C1429). With the exception of the totals cited for Beirut and Aleppo, the table on which this total is based is strongly related to Burnier’s table of Aug. 18. It is also related partly to Duguet, and thus to official French estimates.
1929	85,842 A.R.	LoN Doc. A23. 1929.VII. Possibly an adjustment of Johnson.
1932	120,000 A.R.	LoN Doc. A.24. 1932. Basis unknown. Possibly Civil Register or 2e Bureau (1932).
1936	134,466 A.R.	LoN Doc. A. 23. 1936. XII. Figure supplied by the representative of the Nansen Office. Probably does not refer exclusively to refugees, as Hansson, President of the Nansen Office refers (1937) to a total of about 135,000 Armenians including indigenous Armenians. Confirmation seems to come from figures supplied by the local head of the Nansen Office to Consul-General Harvard in Beirut in 1938 (F.O. 371/21915), which cite 135,000 Armenians of whom 95,000 refugees and 40,000 indigenous.
1938	150,266 A.R.	Table in N.A. C 1524. Includes indigenous Armenians, and possibly derived from Civil Registers.
n.d. (c. 1938)	153,000 A.	Pallis (n.d.), p. 4. Figure supplied by Nansen Office.

<b>Table 2.13:</b> Estimates of the Armenian refugee population in Syria and Lebanon from unofficial sources <sup>18</sup>		
Date	Estimate	Source and Observations
1923	150,000 A.R.	Statement of Mr. Nouradounghian, President of the Armenian National Delegation to the League Council, Sept. 25, 1923 in <i>LoN. Official Journal</i> (1923), pp. 1325-27. This figure is quoted several times e.g., Mécérian (1924), p. 221.
1923	80,000 A.R.	Report of overseas observers who visited the area in 1923 in <i>NER Report for 1923</i> , p. 19. No further details.
1924	Well over 100,000 A.R.	Memorandum on the Problem of the Armenian Nation, by Basil Matthews, 1924 (S.F., F.F.M.A., Syria S/3, Armenian Problem, 1924). Basis not known.
1924	125,400 A.	Arch. A.C.C. Figure pre-dates Aug. 5, 1924.
1924	120-130,000 A.	Mécérian (1924), p. 222. Basis unknown.
1925	99,000 A.R.	Report by Joseph Burtt, who visited the area for the Society of Friends (N.A. C1425, C1428). Overall total of Armenians was 115,000.

<sup>17</sup> For explanation see Table 2.9.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*.

1926	125,000 A.R.	Khanzadian (1926), p. 44. i.e. in addition to 20,000 indigenous Armenians. There is some relation between Khanzadian's figures and those of the Catholicossate, above.
c.1929	120,000 A.	Ross, Fry & Sibley (1929), p. 264. This total conflicts with that produced by summation of Ross et al.'s table which also includes at least some indigenous Armenians and is closely related to Burnier's table of Aug., 1926.
1928	128,327 A.	Mécérian (1928)(1), p. 144. The total population within the limits of the Délégation Apostolique de Syrie. The total excludes the population of the villages in north-east Syria attached to the Délégation de Baghdad.
1929	125,000 A.R.	Charles (1929), p. 78. A rounded version of Mécérian's (1928) total, which therefore includes indigenous Armenians.
1939	120,000 A.	"a year ago". Report by Canon C. T. Bridgeman, Aug. 1, 1939 (F.O. 371/23302).
n.d. (c. 1938)	150-160,000 A.	Estimate of the Armenian Archbishop of Beirut, cited by Pallis (n.d.), p. 3.
n.d. (c. 1938)	160,000 A.	Pallis (n.d.), p. 3. To obtain this figure, Pallis took the Nansen Office total of 134,466 as representative of refugees only, and added to it an estimate of 25,000 indigenous Armenians. However, it has been observed that the Nansen office figure already includes indigenous Armenians.

Immediately striking is the deficit between the Armenian immigration recorded in the annual reports of the Mandatory Power up to July, 1924 (c. 55,500) and the various totals of Armenian refugees in Syria and Lebanon cited for that year and afterwards. Even allowing for substantial unrecorded immigration, and other population movements unrecorded in the annual reports (e.g., the 1920 migration), the figure of 55,500 is barely reconcilable with the lowest estimates of the total number of Armenian refugees. This suggests that the lower estimates may be the most accurate, and significantly, these lower estimates emanate from French official sources, and from the Johnson Report, undertaken for the Nansen Office. If the lower estimates are therefore accepted, then the figure of tens of thousands of Armenian emigrants discussed previously seems unlikely and would possibly accrue from the desire to reconcile early inaccurate estimates of the number of Armenian immigrants with later, more realistic appraisals.

It may be observed secondly that there appears to have been a steady growth of Armenian population throughout the period, possibly accelerating after the losses due to emigration which seem to have been most marked in the early part of the period. Rates of growth are impossible to establish. There is some evidence pointing to a high birth-rate, but this is not conclusive, and no confirmation can be established from the population totals available. It is worthwhile emphasising that considerable locational differentials may have operated in Armenian demography.

## ***Conclusions***

The bulk of the Armenian deportees to Syria and Lebanon were repatriated after the armistice, although it is possible that some were not. Following the repatriation, however, a new series of refugee migrations into Syria and Lebanon began in 1920, continuing in 1921, 1922-24 and 1929-30. An exodus from the Sanjak of Alexandretta to the south in 1938-39 quite equaled in scale the earlier migrations. The refugees thus admitted were supplemented by Armenian women and children rescued from the Arab and Kurdish tribes into whose care they had fallen during the deportations. Ultimately all the Armenians were accepted officially as Syrian and Lebanese citizens. An unknown number, however, subsequently emigrated. Information on the basic demography of the Armenians who settled is inadequate. It is possible to detect a process of physical family reconstitution after the traumas of the war years and there is evidence of a post-war “baby-boom” as young couples founded new families. It seems reasonable to envisage that this process would have more than offset mortality, but there is no evidence of a markedly high birth-rate beyond the observations of individuals. Estimates of the total refugee population, though abundant, are in fact difficult to interpret. Tentative comparison with the statistics concerning immigration suggests that the low estimates of refugee population (and of emigrants) are the most accurate. Subsequently there appears to have been a steady growth of Armenian population, possibly accelerating after the losses due to emigration, but providing no confirmation of a markedly high birth-rate. In the absence of reliable overall statistics, the sole means of evaluating these conclusions is to assess the growth of Armenian population in particular locations. In other words, it is only possible to assess overall population totals and growth more accurately after a consideration of population distribution.

## **ENDNOTES**

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<sup>1</sup> F.O. 328/2032, W.O. 95/4372.

<sup>2</sup> F.O. 371/3657.

<sup>3</sup> F.O. 371/4177.

<sup>4</sup> F.O. 382/2032; Arch.A.U.B. Mss MEI, File 8 Report on “The Near East Relief in Syria” (n.d.).

<sup>5</sup> Kerr, pp. 43-48.

<sup>6</sup> W.O. 95/4373.

<sup>7</sup> Du Véou (1937), pp. 22-23, 49; Naslian, *Vol. 2*, pp. 310-11, 341, 449-50, 623-28.

<sup>8</sup> F.O. 371/4183-84; Arch.Dip. S-L, Vol. 18, S-L-C, Vol. 135.

<sup>9</sup> Archives of the Armenian National Union of Damascus.

<sup>10</sup> Du Véou, p. 49.

<sup>11</sup> “Rapport” (1922), (1922-23), p. 17.

<sup>12</sup> Sanjian, pp. 284-85; Naslian, *Vol. 2*, pp. 247, 322, 345, 348, 408-9; Bryce Report, pp. 512-18, 548; Jacquot (1931), pp. 315-16, 547; Weulerese (1934), p. 50; Bernard (1932), p. 130; Atamian (1964), p. 98; Mécérian (1965), p. 107.

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- <sup>13</sup> On the French occupation and evacuation of Cilicia see Mandelstam (1926); Du Véou; De Remusat (1931); Brémond (1921); Kerr, and Naslian, *Vol. 2*.
- <sup>14</sup> A more detailed discussion of these figures is contained in the following chapter.
- <sup>15</sup> "Rapport" (1922-3), pp. 18, 19.
- <sup>16</sup> "Rapport" (1922-3), pp. 19, 20.
- <sup>17</sup> "Rapport" (1922-3), p. 20, (1923-4), p. 27; Arch.Dip., Turquie, Vols. 58, 258.
- <sup>18</sup> In "Rapport" (1922-3), p. 20, it is stated that, of the 27,308 arrivals up to July 1923, about two-thirds were Armenians, one-third Greeks, and 1000 Assyro-Chaldeans. This proportion of Armenians is confirmed by monthly figures of immigrant arrivals in Arch.Dip. Turquie, Vol. 258, which record 6472 Armenians out of a total of 9817 Christian immigrants in the period July 1923 to April 1924.
- <sup>19</sup> De Caix to M.A.E. Feb.16, 1923 (Arch.Dip., Turquie, Vol. 258).
- <sup>20</sup> Weygand to M.A.E., March 8, 1924 (Arch.Dip., Turquie, Vol. 258).
- <sup>21</sup> For the circumstances of this migration, see: Burnier to Johnson, Dec. 4 & Dec. 22, 1929 (N.A. C1428), and correspondence and reports in F.O. 371/13827. For possible political motives see Memo by M.O. Molony (N.A. C1583) and report from Sir G. Clerk, Constantinople, March 6, 1930 (F.O. 371/14567).
- <sup>22</sup> Monck-Mason to Henderson, Nov. 14, 1929 (F.O. 371/13827).
- <sup>23</sup> Statement by M. Pachalian, representative of the Comité Central des Réfugiés Arméniens to the Nansen Office Central Armenian Committee, Aug. 26, 1930 (N.A. C1586).
- <sup>24</sup> On arrivals from Anatolia in 1928, see "Rapport" (1928), p. 69. The Nansen Office assisted the transfer of a number of Armenians from Greece to Syria in 1930 and 1931, but only Armenians with relatives or sponsors in Syria were admissible (N.A. C1586). Pallis notes recent immigrants from the Caucasus who had arrived via Persia, and states that these refugees formed the bulk of 4000 refugees in Lebanon said by the Armenian Archbishop of Beirut not yet to have taken Lebanese citizenship. Liepmann (1938), after criticizing the figures of Pallis, estimates a total of 4000-6000 arrivals after 1931, from Turkey and the Caucasus, but does not give a source for these figures. In 1934, the Nansen Office representative at Beirut noted that the very poor situation and the famine prevalent in Soviet Armenia were provoking a fairly considerable emigration. At his Beirut office alone, 25 families had asked for aid. Most of these refugees were Armenians who had been transported from Greece or Bulgaria to Yerevan. This observation does not confirm a migration of the order of 4000 and it is perhaps significant that the totals cited by Pallis and Liepmann are not repeated in other sources.
- <sup>25</sup> F.O. 371/21915, F.O. 371/23281, F.O. 371/23302, N.A. R5638. See also the reports of Jacob Künzler (*F.A.* 143, Feb. 1939, p. 5), and Sisag Manougian (*F.A.* 142, Oct. 1938, p. 10); Cameron Gordon (1939), pp. 169-73; Puaux (1952), pp. 53-60; Mécérian (1965), p. 108.
- <sup>26</sup> F.O. 371/21915.
- <sup>27</sup> Mécérian (1965), p. 108.
- <sup>28</sup> F.O. 371/23302; Mécérian (1965), p. 108.
- <sup>29</sup> On the situation when the allies overran Syria, see Reports by Sir Mark Sykes, Dec. 2, 1918 (F.O. 371/3405) and by General Clayton, Dec. 30, 1918, with minute by T.E. Lawrence (F.O. 371/3657).
- <sup>30</sup> "Commission" Reports, passim, and N.A. R3017.
- <sup>31</sup> Report by Miss Jeppe, March 14, 1929 (N.A. R3017).
- <sup>32</sup> See regular reports in *F.A.*

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- <sup>33</sup> *Le Levant*, 11e ann., no. 7, juillet, 1934, p. 4.
- <sup>34</sup> Pallis, pp. 4-6; "Rapport" (1925), p. 44; Arch.Dip. Documents in course of classification.
- <sup>35</sup> References to emigration are too numerous to cite individually, but for official statements see "Rapport" (1924), p. 50, (1926), pp. 104-5, 132, (1928), p. 69.
- <sup>36</sup> Carle Report (1925), p. 6; Johnson Report, Dec. 18, 1926 (N.A. C1429); Poidebard (1926), p. 16; Duguet (1928), p. 54; Krafft-Bonnard (1926), p. 50; Shirajian Report (*F.A.*, 102, 1Q, 1927, p. 3).
- <sup>37</sup> Krafft-Bonnard (1926), pp. 43-52, N.E.R. Report (1926).
- <sup>38</sup> For outplacing from the Friends of Armenia Girls' Hostel at Aleppo and from Miss K. Frearson's orphanage at Chemlan, see regular reports in *F.A.*
- <sup>39</sup> *Massis*, Vol. 4, no. 2, Jan.-Feb., 1932, p. 26, Vol. 5, no. 1, March, 1933, p. 29; Simpson (1939), p. 38.
- <sup>40</sup> N.A. C1428.
- <sup>41</sup> Duguet (1928), p. 54. Statement by Le Nail to Central Armenian Committee, Aug. 26, 1930 (N.A. C1586).
- <sup>42</sup> Poulleau (1930), pp. 62-63.
- <sup>43</sup> Mécérian (1928)(1), p. 146.
- <sup>44</sup> Liepmann (1938).
- <sup>45</sup> This estimate is based on a summation of the mortalities noted in the monthly reports on the situation of the Nansen Office settlements in the Sanjak of Alexandretta, contained in N.A. C1429, C1431.
- <sup>46</sup> Barton (1930), p. 178.
- <sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 214.
- <sup>48</sup> Poidebard, pp. 20-21.
- <sup>49</sup> Liepmann (1938).
- <sup>50</sup> N.A. C1429, C1431.
- <sup>51</sup> N.A. C1428.
- <sup>52</sup> Barton, pp. 267-76.
- <sup>53</sup> France, Ministère du Travail (1923), "Le recensement" etc.; *Asie Française* (1924), and Recensement de la Syrie et du Liban (1921-22) établi a la date du 15 juillet 1923 (Arch.Dip., S-L, Vol 256). There are inconsistencies between these tables, but the figures presented by the Ministère du Travail and in the Arch. Dip. are identical and have been accepted in preference.
- <sup>54</sup> See the "Rapports", especially 1930 and 1931.
- <sup>55</sup> For another discussion of Armenian population totals, see Liepmann (1938).
- <sup>56</sup> D. Altounyan noted 8271 Armenian Protestants in Syria in 1927 (*F.A.* 106, 1Q, 1928, p. 7).

## Chapter III

# **THE ARMENIANS IN SYRIA AND LEBANON: POPULATION DISTRIBUTION**


In this chapter the available figures concerning Armenian population distribution are described. The initial arrival points of the refugees are described first, in relation to their origin and migration paths between 1920 and 1939. Figures concerning overall Armenian population distribution are then described, estimates from French official sources being discussed first. Estimates for particular locations and also of the distribution of orphans are related to these estimates of overall distribution. The urban-rural distribution of the Armenian population is then described, and finally some preliminary conclusions are drawn about the changing distribution of the Armenians, and conclusions about Armenian population totals are reassessed in the light of the examination of distribution.

### *Origins, Migrations and Arrival Points*

In 1920, the refugees arrived in Syria either direct from the north or by sea, from the temporary camps in Adana to which they had fled. In the north, “thousands” of refugees were reported as reaching Aleppo, but the only precise reference is to 700 from Gaziantep.<sup>1</sup> These refugees were not, apparently, originally from Gaziantep, but were deportees who had been “repatriated” there after the Armistice, most of them originally from the Sivas region. Some Gaziantep refugees were sent on to Beirut in particular the orphans in the care of Near East Relief and of Miss K. Frearson.<sup>2</sup> A second group of Armenians reached Syria by sea. These were refugees from Cilicia who had fled or been transferred to Adana and who were subsequently transferred to Alexandretta (Table 3.1). They included for example the refugees from Ekbes, whose story is told by their Lazarist missionary, Vincent Paskès. Estimates of the numbers involved vary from 1300 to 2500.<sup>3</sup> These appear to have been the only refugees who arrived in Syria at this time. However, there was also a transfer of refugees, important for the future, to Dortyol, just across the border to the north. These refugees came either direct from Hassan-Beyli (1000-1200 reported), or by sea from temporary camps in Adana (2000 reported), these latter including refugees from the regions of Marash and about 150 from Hadjin.<sup>4</sup> Many other refugees remained in the camps at Adana.<sup>5</sup>

The migration of 1921 was part spontaneous, part organised. The migrants came by three routes; by sea from Mersin to the coast of Syria, by land from Dortyol to Alexandretta, and by land from Gaziantep via Kilis to Aleppo.<sup>6</sup> (Fig. 3.1, Table 3.2). The evacuation of the refugees from Mersin by sea was organized by the French authorities, the refugees being conveyed to the various Syrian ports, especially Beirut. Estimates of the numbers carried vary somewhat,<sup>7</sup> but the total

seems to have been about 16,500. Prior to this, about a thousand refugees had arrived at Beirut using their own resources.<sup>8</sup> The migrants included the Armenian orphans from Adana.<sup>9</sup> From Dortyol the exodus was initially spontaneous, later organised by the French authorities. At least 2600 were reported to have fled from Dortyol to Alexandretta of their own accord, and about 6600 were transported by the French, a total of about 9200, all moving to nearby Alexandretta.<sup>10</sup> A number of orphans at Dortyol were taken by sea to Djounieh, and were apparently counted in the total of 16,500 above. From Gaziantep about 4500 refugees, according to official sources<sup>11</sup> (3000 according to Karen Jeppe<sup>12</sup>) made their way by their own means via Kilis to Aleppo.



**Fig. 3.1:** Migration of Christian refugees from Cilicia to Syria, Nov. 1921-Jan. 1922

750 from Ekbes
350 from Marash
150 from Fendedjak
440 from Gurumba, Diyarbakir, Sivas, Hassan-Beyli

<sup>1</sup> Du Véou (1937), p. 259.

Table 3.2: Arrival of Christian Refugees in Syria and Lebanon, Nov., 1921 to Jan. 1922 <sup>2</sup>	
	Arrivals
Aleppo	4500
Alexandretta	9200
Beirut	10,466
Djounieh	386
Latakia	2226
Saida	1895
Tripoli	1432

Following the evacuation of Cilicia, the Near East Relief decided to bring its orphans out of interior Turkey to safety in Lebanon.<sup>13</sup> Between March and September, 1922, all N. E. R. orphans, from Urfa, Mardin, Diyarbakir, Marash and Harput, were brought out. The total number of orphans moved in this way to Syria and Palestine and established there at the end of 1922 was 10,017,<sup>14</sup> the bulk being settled on the Lebanese coast. The migration overlapped with the more spontaneous flight from the same areas of interior Turkey which began in the latter months of 1922. It is therefore impossible to tell how many, if any, of these orphans were counted into the official estimates concerning the refugees of 1922-1924.





Fig. 3.2: Origin of Armenian migrants to Syria, 1922-24 & 1929-30

The influx of refugees between 1922 and 1924 was simpler in pattern than the previous migration, the refugees from Anatolia converging by land on Aleppo. The grouping in the Adana region near the coast had effectively disappeared in 1921, and the refugees now came from further east, overland to Aleppo like the earlier refugees from Gaziantep rather than by sea to Beirut<sup>15</sup> (Fig. 3.2). Not all these refugees reached as far as Aleppo, however, as a number stopped at the

<sup>2</sup> Arch.Dip., S-L-C., Vols. 139, 141, 142.


Syrian border towns en route. One convoy of Armenian Apostolic refugees, for example, left Urfa on February 20, 1924, for Aleppo via Suruc and Djerablous. At Djerablous several families remained while others left for Raqqa. The remainder made their way to Aleppo.<sup>16</sup> In 1929-30, the refugees came from still further east than in 1922-24 (Fig. 3.2). Consequently, not all made for Aleppo, but, instead, a considerable number crossed the border directly into north-east Syria. Estimates of the number of arrivals vary somewhat, but according to the AGBU out of 800 families arriving during this migration, 200 reached Aleppo, while 600 reached the Kamichliyé-Hassetché district.<sup>17</sup>



**Fig. 3.3:** Origin of Armenian refugee families in Northern Syria, 1925


Two sets of figures concerning the origin of Armenian migrants provide some confirmation of the migration history described. These are first, a set of figures from 1925 derived from files concerning economic losses suffered by Armenians emigrating from Cilicia and resident in northern Syria,<sup>18</sup> and second, figures derived from a list of Armenian refugees in Lebanon requesting naturalisation in 1932.<sup>19</sup> Both sets therefore concern only part of the migrants and their usefulness is diminished accordingly (Figs. 3.3, 3.4). The migrants in the 1925 list came especially from Dortyol, with Adana, Bahce and Hassan-Beyli providing important contingents. This is as expected for Alexandretta given that the list concerns predominantly those migrants who reached Syria in 1921. The few exceptions to this picture may be accounted for by the small number of arrivals at other times. A large proportion of refugees in the 1932 list (for whom no arrival dates are available) also originated from Cilicia, especially from Marash, Adana, Sis, and Kayseri. Again, this is as expected the bulk of migrants who came

directly to Lebanon arriving from Cilicia in 1921. However, a more substantial proportion of refugees in the 1932 than in the 1925 list originated from further afield in Anatolia, in particular from Yozgat, outside Cilicia proper. These refugees would not have arrived directly in Lebanon (unless, perhaps, orphans) according to the migration history sketched. Their presence in the Lebanon may therefore be indicative of internal migration from their points of arrival in the north.



**Fig. 3.4:** Origin of Armenian refugees in Lebanon requesting naturalisation, Feb. 1932


The flight from the Sanjak of Alexandretta in 1938-1939 took place in several stages.<sup>20</sup> The first phase, in June, 1938, involved refugees from Alexandretta town and from the Amouk plain, including the settlements of Kirik Khane, Rihaniyé and Soouk Sou. Although the total number of these refugees is in dispute, the figures obtained by Vice-Consul Catoni (Table 3.3) may reflect the proportional distribution of these refugees by origin. They fled above all to Beirut and Aleppo, while a few sought refuge in the long-established Armenian villages of the Jebel Moussa. Afterwards there was certainly some reconsideration and returning, but the migration resumed again in October, 1938, and by June 9, 1939, as many as 8000 Armenians may have left the Sanjak, again principally for Beirut and Aleppo. The final migration was part spontaneous, part organised. On their own initiative, many Armenians from the Jebel Moussa made their way to Qassab, the only district of the Sanjak to remain in French Territory, and which, like the Jebel Moussa itself, was a centre of Armenian population. Others were reported sailing to Alexandretta and Beirut. The parallel evacuation organised by the French authorities was on a much larger scale, and brought the refugees initially to three centres; Badroussié (north of Latakia and just south of the new border), Tartouss and Aleppo (Fig. 3.5).



**Fig. 3.5:** Armenian migration from the Sanjak of Alexandretta, June-July 1939

From	Families
Alexandretta	342
Kirik Khane	313
Rihaniyé	63
Soouk Sou	18
Antioch, Qassab, Bitias	12
Total	748

<sup>3</sup> Information gathered by Vice-Consul Catoni from Armenian notables (FO 371/21915).



**Fig. 3.6:** Administrative divisions of the French Mandates Levant states, Dec. 1925

Cazas of Syria and Lebanon 1925			
1 Alexandretta	2 Kirik Khane	3 Antioch	4 Kurd Dagh
5 Azaz	6 Djerablous	7 Bab	8 Menbidj
9 Harim	10 Jebel el Smaane	11 Djisr el Choghour	12 Idlib
13 Maarret el Nomane	14 Raqqa	15 Hassetché	16 Tell Cholek
17 Deir el Zor	18 Meyadine	19 Abou Kemal	20 Hama
21 Homs	22 Qariateine	23 Nebek	24 Jeroud
25 Zebdani	26 Damascus	27 Ouadi el Ajam	28 Douma
29 Qouneitra	30 Mesmiyé	31 Zaouiyé	32 Ezraa
33 Deraâ	34 Latakia	35 Haffé	36 Djeblé
37 Banias	38 Massiaf	39 Tartouss	40 Sâfita
41 Tell Kalakh	42 Tripoli	43 Batroune	44 Baalbek
45 Kesrouane	46 Meten	47 Beirut	48 Zahlé
49 Chouf	50 Saïda	51 Merdjayoun	52 Tyr

***Distribution***

A discussion of Armenian population distribution must begin with a consideration of official estimates. Before beginning, however, it will be appropriate to outline the principal administrative divisions of the country, which were somewhat complex and subject to change.<sup>21</sup> Initially the territory was divided into five States, i. e. Greater Lebanon, Aleppo, Damascus, the State of




Fig. 3.7: Administrative divisions of Syria and Lebanon, 1939

Cazas of Syria and Lebanon 1939			
1. Kurd Dagh	2. Azaz	3. Djerablous	4. Ain el Aarab
5. Bab	6. Menbidj	7. Harim	8. Jebel el Smaane
9. Djisr el Choghour	10. Idlib	11. Maarret el Nomane	12. Raqqa
13. Deir el Zor	14. Abou Kemal	15. Ras el Ain	16. Kamichliy�
17. Hassetch�	18. Tigre	19. Latakia	20. Haff�
21. Djebl�	22. Massiaf	23. Baniyas	24. Tartouss
25. S�fita	26. Tell Kalakh	27. Hama	28. Selemiy�
29. Homs	30. Palmyra	31. Nebek	32. Zebdani
33. Douma	34. Damascus	35. Ouadi el Ajam	36. Qalamoun
37. Qouneitra	38. Zaouiy�	39. Ezraa	40. Dera�
41. Chahba	42. Soueida	43. Salkhad	44. Akkar
45. Tripoli	46. Kesrouane	47. Koura	48. Zghorte
49. Batroune	50. Meten	51. Beirut	52. Baabda
53. Aley	54. Chouf	55. Hermel	56. Baalbek
57. Zahl�	58. Rashaya	59. Jezzine	60. Saida
61. Tyr	62. Merdjayoun		

the Alawis and the Jebel el Druze. Within the State of Aleppo, the Sanjak of Alexandretta was given a measure of administrative separateness. Efforts were made to incorporate the States of Aleppo, Damascus and the Alawis into a Federation from which the Lebanon and Jebel el Druze were omitted. However, the arrangement was unsatisfactory, and on January 1, 1925 a unitary State of Syria was created out of the two former States of Aleppo and Damascus. The State of the Alawis was excluded from this arrangement, thus in place of five

States there were now four (Syria, the Alawis, Lebanon and the Jebel el Druze). Alexandretta Sanjak, with its special regime now came nominally under the State of Syria. The situation at this time is represented in Fig. 3.6. Within Syria a new Sanjak of the Jezira was formed in the north-east in 1932, and within Lebanon administrative units were completely rearranged in 1930. At the beginning of 1937 the States of the Alawis and the Jebel el Druze were reattached to the State of Syria, within which they were to enjoy a special administrative regime. Lebanon, however, remained a separate entity. Thus, the number of states was reduced to two. Alexandretta Sanjak was subsequently ultimately ceded to Turkey in 1939, while in the same year fuller autonomy was restored to the Alawis and the Jebel and a special regime for the Jezira was created, with direct French control. The administrative divisions at the end of the period are shown in Fig. 3.7.

### ***French Official Estimates***


Official French estimates available are the 1922 Census, the Civil Register, the 1932 Census of Lebanon, the O. C. P. Census of Lebanon (1942), and a number of other estimates, the most important of which are those of Duguet (1927) and those in the reports of the Mandatory Power.

### ***1922 Census***

Totals available at provincial level exclude recent immigrants from Turkey (Table 3.4). They also omit from consideration the Sanjak of Alexandretta, the census of this province being still in operation at the time of publication. Figures for the Sanjak provided elsewhere to caza level include immigrants and are not directly comparable with the provincial figures (Table 3.5). Figures which include a breakdown between indigenous and immigrant Armenians are available for the State of Damascus also to caza level. (Tables 3.6-3.8) These totals are comparable with those for the Sanjak, and the two sets of figures are presented cartographically (Fig. 3.8).

The Damascus figures yield an Index of Dissimilarity of 61.1 between Armenians and others, but this was surprisingly lower for immigrants (refugees) (61.1) than for indigenous (Armenians (70.3). This unexpected result is due to the overwhelming concentration of indigenous Armenians in Damascus town, while the immigrants were concentrated not only in Damascus but also in Homs. The I.D. between indigenous and immigrant Armenians was only 21.8, a function of the concentration of both groups in Damascus, but outside the capital there was little correspondence in distribution. In particular, the concentration of immigrant Armenians at Homs was a new feature of Armenian population distribution. Homs was a centre of proportionally high Christian representation so that the immigrant Armenians were less segregated from non-Armenian Christians (I.D. = 55.7) than from non-Christians (I.D. = 64.4). The presence of immigrant Armenians in the interior State of Damascus and their concentration in the two

towns of Damascus and Homs reveals migration into the interior from arrival points.



**Fig. 3.8:** Distribution of Armenians in the State of Damascus and the Sanjak of Alexandretta according to the census of 1922

<b>Table 3.4:</b> Distribution of Armenians in Syria and Lebanon according to the Census of 1922 <sup>4</sup>					
	All Armenians	Apostolics & Prots.	Caths.	Caths. as % As	as tot. pop.
Lebanon	974	375	599	67.50	0.16
Alawi Territory	2202	1565	637	28.95	0.84
Aleppo	6657	2953	3704	55.64	1.70
Alexandretta	No totals available				
Damascus	4996	4264	732	14.65	0.84
Jebel el Druze	-	-	-	-	-
Total	14,829	9157	5672	38.25	0.77

<sup>4</sup> France, Ministère du Travail (1923), pp. 71-74.

**Table 3.5:** Distribution of Armenians in the Sanjak of Alexandretta, according to the Census of 1922<sup>5</sup>

Caza	All Armenians	Aps.	Caths.	%	Prots	%	% as in caza	% non as in caza	Loc. qu.
Alexandretta	6399	6263	136	2.13	-	-	38.634	19.57	1.974
Antioch	7713	5415	576	7.47	1722	22.33	46.568	66.971	0.695
Kirik Khane	2451	2043	408	16.65	-	-	14798	13.459	1.099
Total	16,563	13,721	1120	6.76	1722	10.4	100	100	-

**Table 3.6:** Distribution of Armenians in the State of Damascus by caza, according to the Census of 1922<sup>6</sup>

Caza	Indigenous as			Immig. A.s	Total A.s
	Apost.	Cath.	Tot.		
<b>Sanjak of Damascus</b>					
Damascus (town)	4204	704	4908	5997	10,905
Damascus (caza)	-	-	-	8	8
Ouadi el Ajam	-	-	-	51	51
Nebek	-	-	-	-	-
Jairoud	-	-	-	-	-
Qouneitra	-	9	9	-	9
Zaouiyé	-	-	-	-	-
Zebedani	11	4	15	-	15
Douma	-	-	-	17	17
Total	4215	717	4932	6073	16,005
<b>Sanjak of Hama</b>					
Hama (town)	39	11	50	5	55
Hama (caza)	-	-	-	-	-
Selemiyé	2	-	2	28	30
Total	41	11	52	33	85
<b>Sanjak of Homs</b>					
Homs (town)	8	4	12	1593	1605
Homs (caza)	-	-	-	-	-
Palmyra	-	-	-	-	-
Joubb ej Jarrâh	-	-	-	-	-
Qariateine	-	-	-	-	-
Total	8	4	12	1593	1605
<b>Sanjak of Hauran</b>					
Deraâ (town)	-	-	-	-	-
Deraâ (caza)	-	-	-	-	-
Ezraa	-	-	-	6	6
Mesmiyé	-	-	-	-	-
Total	-	-	-	6	6
Overall Total	4264	732	4996	7705	12,701

<sup>5</sup> Arch.Dip., Documents in course of classification.

<sup>6</sup> Arch.Dip., S-L., Vol. 270.

**Table 3.7:** Distribution of selected population groups in the State of Damascus, by caza, 1922<sup>7</sup>

Caza	All Armenians	Indig. As	Immig. As	Indig. A. Caths.	Non-As	Non-Chrs.	Non-A Chrs.
Damascus (caza)	85.859	98.239	77.832	96.175	27.984	26.774	26.189
Damascus (town)	0.063	-	0.104	-	7.789	9.121	1.446
Ouadi el Ajam	0.402	-	0.662	-	2.372	2.078	3.726
Qouneitra	0.071	0.180	-	1.230	2.469	2.663	1.370
Zebedani	0.118	0.300	-	0.546	2.397	2.435	2.115
Douma	0.134	-	0.221	-	5.958	6.571	5.274
Hama (town)	0.433	1.001	0.064	1.503	6.026	6.495	4.178
Selemyé	0.236	0.040	0.363	-	2.606	3.042	0.021
Homs (town)	12.637	0.240	20.675	0.546	9.437	7.383	16.962
Ezraa	0.047	-	0.078	-	4.380	4.856	2.786
Other cazas	-	-	-	-	28.582	28.581	35.933
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

**Table 3.8:** Indices of Dissimilarity between the distribution of selected population groups in the State of Damascus, 1922<sup>8</sup>

	Non-As.	Non-A. Chrs.	Non-Chrs.	Immig. As.
Armenians	61.1	59.9	64.3	-
Indigenous As.	70.3	72.1	71.5	21.8
Immigrant As.	61.1	55.7	64.4	-

The Alexandretta figures do not sub-classify immigrant and indigenous Armenians. Armenians lived in all three cazas in considerable numbers, but were especially concentrated in Alexandretta caza, largely in Alexandretta town where a separate tabulation (Table 3.9) reveals that immigrants provided the greater part of the Armenian population. The number of immigrants recorded in the town is however substantially less than it received, suggesting emigration. The Armenians in Antioch caza may be accounted for by the indigenous groups of the Jebel Moussa and Qassab, but it seems that the caza of Kirik Khane must have received some refugees. Armenian Catholics provided but a small proportion of the Armenians in the Sanjak (6.76%), being most highly represented in Kirik Khane (16.65%), least so in Alexandretta (2.13%). One might have expected low Catholic representation in Alexandretta town, dominated by refugees, although in fact the figures for the town reveal little difference between the Catholic proportions of the indigenous and immigrant Armenian population.

**Table 3.9:** Armenians in the town of Alexandretta according to the Census of 1922<sup>9</sup>

	Caths.	%	Aposts.	Total
Indigenous As.	32	2.66	1170	1202
Immigrant As.	114	2.36	4710	4824
All Armenians	146	2.4	5880	6026

<sup>7</sup> Arch.Dip., S-L., Vol. 270.

<sup>8</sup> Arch.Dip., S-L., Vol. 270.

<sup>9</sup> Arch.Dip., S-L., Vol. 268.


The relatively high Catholic representation in Kirik Khane caza, which, it has been suggested, also received refugees, is unexpected. Protestant Armenians were concentrated in Antioch caza.

The provincial figures (Table 3.4) should give an approximate picture of the distribution of the indigenous Armenian population after the war. This picture does correspond reasonably well with the pre-war situation, except for the large number of Armenians recorded in the State of Damascus, more particularly (from Table 3.6) in Damascus town. This total is contradicted in a separate tabulation of the Census results (see Table 3.52) which classifies a much greater proportion of the Damascene Armenians as immigrants. In this case, the Census could be reconciled with the pre-war estimates, but the statistical analysis above would be nullified and it would also have to be accepted that other totals in the provincial results might include immigrants. As expected, a higher proportion of the Armenians in Table 3.4 were Catholic than in the Sanjak where immigrants were included in the tabulation. Perhaps significantly the Catholic proportion was least in the State of Damascus where it has been suggested that a large number of immigrant Armenians were classified incorrectly as indigenous (though the pre-war Armenian Catholic community at Damascus does not seem to have been large).

#### *The Civil Register, 1926*

The inadequacy of the Civil Register has been noted,<sup>22</sup> but it does provide a picture of the distribution of Armenians within the whole region in 1926 (Fig. 3.9, Table 3.10). The picture is grossly distorted by the different size of administrative units involved, by the large administrative units involved in the interior, and by inconsistencies in the population represented. It is evident, comparing the Register with the 1922 Census, that while immigrants were included in the totals for the former State of Damascus and the Lebanon, for the other provinces this is more problematical. It is best therefore to examine these figures province by province.

For Lebanon, (Table 3.11) the Register total is rather higher than expected from migration history, suggesting either inadequacies in the data or internal migration. The figures reveal an I.D. between Armenians and others of 54.0, and a lower I.D. between Armenians and Christians (49.9) than between Armenians and non-Christians (63.2). Outside Beirut, the Armenians were also disproportionately concentrated in Kesrouane and Meten, two districts of the mountain to the north, Meten being adjacent to Beirut, and Kesrouane containing Djounieh, an arrival port. Both Kesrouane and Meten were areas of strong Christian representation. In fact, within the Lebanon as a whole, the Armenians seem to have been largely concentrated in the cazas to which they came initially, those settled elsewhere reflecting either the distribution of orphanages, or internal migration.



**Fig. 3.9:** Distribution of Armenians in Syria and Lebanon according to the Civil Register, 1925-1926

	Armenians			A. Caths. as	A.s as. % tot.
	Apost.s	Cath.s	Total	% tot A.s	pop.
<b>Lebanon (Districts)</b>					
Beirut			22,038		18.3
Saida			1505		3.0
Tyr			89		0.3
Merdjayoun			41		0.2
Meten			2655		7.1
Chouf			483		0.8
Kesrouane			2990		7.3
Tripoli			1335		1.5
Batroune			242		0.6
Zahlé			1459		2.7
Baalbek			22		0.1
Deir el Qamar			-		-
Total	?	?	32,859	?	5.5
<b>Alawi Territory</b>					
<i>Sanjak of Latakia (Cazas)</i>					
Latakia	985	40	1025	3.9	2.1
Haffé	299	-	299	-	0.9

<sup>10</sup> "Rapport" (1926), pp. 190-94. See note 3.22.

Djeblé	24	-	24	-	0.1
Banias	53	-	53	-	0.2
Total	1361	40	1401	2.9	0.9
<i>Sanjak of Tartouss (Cazas)</i>					
Massiaf	63	14	77	18.2	0.3
Tartouss	150	-	150	-	0.5
Tell Kalakh	-	-	-	-	-
Sâfita	30	-	30	-	0.1
Total	243	14	257	5.5	0.2
<i>Total Alawi Territory</i>	<i>1604</i>	<i>54</i>	<i>1658</i>	<i>3.3</i>	<i>0.6</i>
<i>State of Syria</i>					
<i>Former State of Aleppo (Sanjaks)</i>					
Aleppo	5048	4131	9178	45.0	2.4
Deir el Zor	413	488	901	54.2	4.1
Alexandretta	9128	1407	10,535	13.4	8.4
Total	14,589	6026	20,615	29.2	3.8
<i>Former State of Damascus (Sanjaks)</i>					
Damascus	12,026	1127	13,153	8.6	3.8
Hauran	97	38	135	28.2	0.2
Homs	564	57	621	9.2	0.6
Hama	68	3	71	4.2	0.1
Total	12,755	1225	13,980	8.8	2.4
<i>Total State of Syria</i>	<i>27,344</i>	<i>7251</i>	<i>34,595</i>	<i>21.0</i>	<i>3.1</i>
<i>Jebel el Druze</i>	-	-	-	-	-
<i>Total Levant States less Lebanon</i>	<i>28.948</i>	<i>7305</i>	<i>36,253</i>	<i>20.2</i>	
<i>Total Levant States</i>	<i>?</i>	<i>?</i>	<i>69,112</i>	<i>?</i>	<i>3.4</i>

The Register figures for the former State of Damascus may be compared with those of the 1922 Census (Table 3.12). Here the Armenian proportion of the population increased slightly from 2.1% to 2.4%. Comparison reveals an absolute and proportional increase of Armenian population in Damascus sanjak and a large absolute and proportional decrease in Homs, suggesting some movement from Homs to Damascus. There also appears to have been a small dispersal of Armenians to the Hauran. Catholics formed only 8.8% of the Armenian population, compared with 14.65% of the indigenous Armenian population in 1922, an expected decrease. Catholic representation seems to have been particularly high among the refugees dispersed to the Hauran.

Caza	(A) % Armenians	(B)% Non-A.s	(C) % Chrs.	(D) % Non-Chrs.	A/B	A/C	A/D	C/D
Beirut	67.068	17.383	17.188	17.594	3.858	3.902	3.812	0.977
Saida	47.580	8.551	6.059	11.256	0.536	0.756	0.407	0.538
Tyr	0.271	6.106	1.865	10.709	0.044	0.145	0.025	0.174

<sup>11</sup> "Rapport" (1926), pp. 190-94. See note 3.22.

Merdjayoun	0.125	4.355	2.851	5.988	0.029	0.044	0.021	0.476
Meten	8.080	6.131	9.689	2.269	1.318	0.834	3.561	4.270
Chouf	1.470	10.512	8.924	12.236	0.140	0.165	0.120	0.729
Kesrouane	9.099	6.695	11.797	1.158	1.359	0.771	7.858	10.187
Tripoli	4.063	15.250	12.850	17.855	0.266	0.316	0.228	0.720
Batroune	0.736	7.620	13.971	0.726	0.097	0.053	1.014	19.244
Zahlé	4.440	9.480	10.244	8.652	0.468	0.433	0.513	1.184
Baalbek	0.067	7.272	3.381	11.496	0.009	0.020	0.006	0.294
Deir el Qamar	-	0.643	1.179	0.061	-	-	-	19.328
Total	100	100	100	100	-	-	-	-

**Table 3.12:** Comparison between the distribution of Armenians in the former State of Damascus in 1922 and 1926<sup>12</sup>

Sanjak	Total Armenians		% A.s in Sanjak		A.s as % tot. pop.	
	1922	1926	1922	1926	1922	1926
Damascus	11,005	13,153	86.647	94.084	3.09	3.83
Hauran	6	135	0.047	0.966	0.01	0.21
Homs	1605	621	12.637	4.442	1.50	0.63
Hama	85	71	0.669	0.508	0.11	0.09
Total	12,701	13,980	100	100	2.12	2.40

For the former State of Aleppo (less the Sanjak of Alexandretta) the difference in Armenian population between the 1922 and 1926 estimates is too small to include the majority of immigrants. Without substantial emigration the Register totals could be explained either as a revision of the 1922 figure for indigenous Armenians, or as including in addition only those refugees formally registered as Syrian citizens following the settlement of the naturalisation issue. The latter explanation would account for the decrease in the proportion of Catholics from 55.6% to 45.8%. The figures reveal a strongly Catholic community in Deir el Zor sanjak.

In the Sanjak of Alexandretta, compared with the 1922 Census, Armenians registered decreased absolutely and proportionally. Migration may have been responsible, but alternatively immigrants not yet registered as Syrian citizens may have been excluded from the Register. The Catholic proportion of the population increased from 6.8% to 13.4%, tending to confirm this hypothesis.

In Alawi Territory, (Table 3.13) there was also an absolute and proportional decrease in those recorded between 1922 and 1926, surprising as it had been assumed that the 1922 Census counted only indigenous Armenians. This decrease however, concerned only Catholic Armenians. It might be explained by migration, tabulation error, the inclusion of immigrants in the 1922 Census, or the exclusion of officially unnaturalised Armenians from the Register. The Armenians were largely concentrated in Latakia caza, but were also strongly represented in Haffé caza, where there were several long-established settlements.

<sup>12</sup> Census of 1922 as Table 3.4, Civil Register as Table 3.10.

Otherwise, the presence of Armenians outside Latakia caza might indicate some dispersal of refugees. Certainly, the Register's total for Latakia caza is substantially less than the number of immigrants who arrived at that port (see Table 3.2).

**Table 3.13:** Distribution of Armenians in Alawi Territory, according to the Civil Register, 1926<sup>13</sup>

Caza	Total A.s	% As in caza (A)	% others in caza (B)	A/B
Latakia	1025	61.821	17.465	3.540
Haffé'	299	18.034	12.074	1.494
Djeblé	24	1.448	15.443	0.094
Banias	53	3.197	7.954	0.402
Massiaf	77	4.644	10.416	0.446
Tartouss	150	9.047	10.980	0.824
Tell Kalakh	-	-	11.057	-
Sâfita	30	1.809	14.612	0.124
Total	1658	100	100	-

**Table 3.14:** The refugee population of Lebanon, March 21, 1929<sup>14</sup>

Refugees considered Lebanese citizens ("Refugees A"):	
Armenian Apostolics	26,786
Armenian Catholics	5570
Armenian Protestants	3368
Total	35,724
Refugees considered without nationality:	
Total	1736

**Table 3.15:** The refugee population of Lebanon, Dec. 31, 1930<sup>15</sup>

Refugees "A"	37,878
Refugees without nationality	5023


*The Civil Register for Lebanon, 1929 and 1930*

Tables drawn up on March 21, 1929 and December 31, 1939 apparently represent the latest state of the Civil Register in Lebanon (Tables 3.14, 3.15). They yield figures for refugees only (not necessarily all Armenian), the indigenous Armenians being entered under the heading, "Diverse". More Armenians are recorded than in 1926, but the order of the earlier total is confirmed. The 1929 figures fortunately give an idea of the total Protestant Armenian refugee population in Lebanon. As regards Catholics, their proportion of the refugee population in 1929 was, as expected, much less than the Catholic proportion of the indigenous Armenian population in 1922.

<sup>13</sup> "Rapport" (1926), pp. 190-94. See note 3.22.

<sup>14</sup> Arch.Dip., Documents in course of classification.

<sup>15</sup> Arch.Dip., Documents in course of classification.



**Fig. 3.10:** Distribution of Armenians in Lebanon, 1932

*1932 Census of Lebanon (Fig. 3.10, Tables 3.16-3.18)*

The Census yields an I.D. between Armenians and others of 67.8, but as in 1926, segregation was less between Armenians and Christians (I.D. = 65.3) than between Armenians and non-Christians (I.D. = 73.3). The total number of Armenians (i.e., Apostolics plus Catholics) recorded, which excludes those who had not yet acquired Lebanese nationality, was actually less than in 1926 or 1929. The diminution may be explained by migration, but given the inconsistencies of the figures this cannot be assumed. The Census shows the Armenians to have been disproportionately concentrated only in Beirut and Meten, which to anticipate by then included the growing new Armenian quarter outside Beirut in Bourj-Hammoud. While changes in administrative divisions forbid detailed comparisons with the situation in 1926, there was in 1932 certainly a higher proportion of Armenians in Beirut and Meten, representing together increased concentration in the capital. This was no doubt partly responsible for the apparent increase in segregation since 1926, although this may also reflect the increase in the number of administrative units used in the analysis. Outside Beirut and Meten the Armenians lived in the cazas neighbouring Beirut, with smaller

concentrations in Tripoli and Zahlé cazas, and other Armenians scattered over the country. The overall picture was similar to that in 1926, although it is possible to identify a decrease in the Armenian population of Saida region, suggesting continued dispersal from that arrival-port. There was in 1932 very little difference between the distribution of Catholics and Apostolics (I.D. = 3.9), and no apparent relationship between the distribution of Armenian and other Catholics (I.D. = 68.9). Catholics provided 18.4% of the Armenian population, compared with 61.5% of indigenous Armenians in 1922.

<b>Table 3.16:</b> Distribution of Armenians in Lebanon, according to the Census of 1932 <sup>16</sup>				
Caza	Aposts.	Caths.	%	Tot
<b>Beirut</b>				
Total	18,244	4169	18.6	22,413
<b>N. Lebanon</b>				
Koura	23	-	-	23
Zghorte	13	32	71.11	45
Batroune	52	16	23.53	68
Akkar	5	17	77.27	22
Tripoli	664	121	15.41	785
Total	757	186	19.72	943
<b>S. Lebanon</b>				
Saida	209	34	13.99	243
Tyr	42	16	27.59	58
Merdjayoun	13	14	51.85	27
Jezzine	14	25	64.1	39
Total	278	89	24.25	367
<b>Mt. Lebanon</b>				
Baabda	162	101	38.4	263
Meten	3847	811	17.41	4658
Chouf	29	25	46.3	54
Aley	328	49	13.0	377
Kesrouane	1229	209	14.53	1438
Total	5595	1195	17.6	6790
<b>Bekaa</b>				
Zahlé	1159	241	17.21	1400
Baalbek	56	5	8.2	61
Hermel	6	-	-	6
Rashaya	7	5	41.67	12
Total	1228	251	16.97	1479
Overall Total	26,102	5890	18.41	31,992

<b>Table 3.17:</b> Percentage distribution of selected population groups in Lebanon by caza, 1932 <sup>17</sup>									
Caza	(A)% Armenians	(B)% Non-A.s	(C)% Chrs.	(D)% Non-Chrs.	%A.Caths.	%A.Aposts.	%Non-A.Caths.	A/B	C/D
Beirut	70.058	12.194	10.177	14.105	70.781	69.895	6.722	5.745	0.717

<sup>16</sup> Arch.Dip., Documents in course of classification.

<sup>17</sup> Arch.Dip., Documents in course of classification.

Koura	0.072	2.393	4.49	0.462	-	0.088	1.769	0.03	9.719
Zghorte	0.141	3.902	7.709	0.398	0.543	0.05	9.887	0.036	19.369
Batroune	0.213	2.502	4.984	0.218	0.272	0.199	5.404	0.086	22.862
Akkar	0.069	6.539	5.416	7.573	0.289	0.019	3.215	0.011	0.715
Tripoli	2.454	7.721	2.625	12.412	2.054	2.544	1.278	0.318	0.211
Saida	0.760	7.050	2.567	11.177	0.577	0.801	3.221	0.108	0.23
Tyr	0.181	6.467	1.705	10.852	0.272	0.161	2.129	0.028	0.157
Merdjayoun	0.084	4.313	2.271	6.193	0.238	0.05	1.165	0.019	0.367
Jezzine	0.122	2.194	3.775	0.739	0.424	0.054	4.944	0.056	5.108
Baabda	0.822	5.517	7.351	3.829	1.715	0.621	8.246	0.149	1.92
Meten	14.56	4.593	9.189	0.362	13.769	14.738	9.708	3.17	25.384
Chouf	0.169	6.981	6.339	7.571	0.424	0.111	8.102	0.024	0.837
Aley	1.178	4.921	5.192	4.672	0.832	1.257	4.269	0.239	1.111
Kesrouane	4.495	7.174	13.54	1.314	3.548	4.708	17.345	0.627	10.304
Zahlé	4.376	6.929	8.493	5.490	4.092	4.44	8.553	0.632	1.547
Baalbek	0.191	5.3	2.123	8.224	0.085	0.215	2.416	0.036	0.258
Hermel	0.019	1.774	1.085	2.408	-	0.023	1.424	0.011	0.451
Rashaya	0.038	1.537	1.032	2.001	0.085	0.027	0.204	0.025	0.516
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	-	-


**Table 3.18:** Indices of Dissimilarity between the distribution of selected population groups in Lebanon, 1932<sup>18</sup>

	Armenians	Arm. Caths.
Non-Armenians	67.8	-
Non-A. Chrs.	65.3	-
Non-Chrs.	75.3	-
A. Apostolics	-	3.9
Non-A. Caths.	-	68.9

*The Civil Register for Alexandretta Sanjak, 1936 (Fig. 3.11, Tables 3.19-3.21)*

Figures available for the end of the second quarter of 1936 reveal for the first time the population distribution by nahié. They yield an I.D. between Armenians and others of 82.2, but again this was lower between Armenians and Christians (58.2) than between Armenians and non-Christians (84.7), a function of the much greater concentration of Christians in Alexandretta town. The Armenians were most notably concentrated in the Jebel Moussa, Qassab, Kirik Khane (town), Alexandretta (town) and Beflane. While all these centres had Armenian populations pre-war, it seems that apart from the Jebel Moussa and Qassab groups, the concentrations in the other centres must be explained partly or wholly by refugee immigration. This seems most true of Alexandretta and Kirik Khane caza, where not only their concentration in Kirik Khane town but also their presence in Rihaniyé were post-war features. Interestingly, Catholics were particularly strongly represented in Kirik Khane, while Protestants were overwhelmingly concentrated in the Qassab grouping.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Arch.Dip., Documents in course of classification.



**Fig. 3.11:** Distribution of Armenians in the Sanjak of Alexandretta, 1936

<b>Table 3.19:</b> Distribution of Armenians in the Sanjak of Alexandretta by nahié according to the Civil Register of 1936 <sup>19</sup>						
Nahié	A. Apost	A. Caths	%	A. Prots	%	Tot. As
<i>Alexandretta caza</i>						
Alexandretta (town)	7923	304	3.5	-	-	8227
Dependent villages	320	-		-	-	320
Arsouz	8	-	-	-	-	83
<b>Total</b>	<b>8326</b>	<b>304</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>8630</b>
<i>Antioch Caza</i>						
Antioch town	597	129	14.5	167	18.7	893
Soueidiyé	17	-	-	31	64.6	48
Jebel Moussa	6115	-	-	468	7.1	6583
Karamout	9	-	-	-	-	9
Qassab	1985	530	12.8	1643	39.5	4158
El Ourdou	4	-	-	-	-	4
Harbiyé	-	-	-	-	-	-
Middle Kousseir	-	-	-	-	-	-
Upper Kousseir	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lower	-	-	-	-	-	-

<sup>19</sup> Arch.Dip. Documents in course of classification.

Kousseir						
<i>Total</i>	8727	659	5.6	2309	19.7	11,695
<i>Kirik Khane caza</i>						
Kirik Khane town	3171	1217	27.1	-	-	4388
Central nahié	108	1		-	-	109
Ak Tépé	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rihaniyé	806	-	-	-	-	806
Beilane	1452	140	8.8	-	-	1592
<i>Total</i>	5537	1358	19.7	-	-	6895
<i>Overall Total</i>	22,590	2321	8.5	2309	8.5	27,220

**Table 3.20:** Percentage distribution of selected population groups in the Sanjak of Alexandretta, 1936<sup>20</sup>

Nahié	(A) Armenians	(B) Non-As	Non-A Chris.	Non- Chris.	A/B
Alexandretta	30.224	5.538	30.219	3.332	5.458
Dependent villages	1.176	5.89	1.912	6.246	0.197
Arsouz	0.305	5.556	3.837	5.71	0.055
Antioch town	3.281	18.868	33.776	17.536	0.174
Soueidiyé	0.176	8.791	12.241	8.483	0.02
Jebel Moussa	24.184	0.141	1.715	-	171.518
Karamout	0.033	8.513	0.006	9.273	0.004
Qassab	15.276	0.262	2.007	0.106	58.305
El Ourdou	0.015	5.935	1.855	6.3	0.003
Harbiyé	-	4.59	-	5.0	-
Middle-Kousseir	-	5.767	3.576	5.963	-
Upper-Kousseir	-	4.948	-	5.39	-
Lower-Kousseir	-	6.92	5.933	7.008	-
Kirik Khane town	16.12	1.247	2.338	1.15	12.927
Central nahié	0.4	5.684	0.019	6.19	0.07
Ak Tépé	-	3.786	-	4.124	-
Rihaniyé	2.961	5.32	0.019	5.793	0.557
Beilane	5.849	2.245	0.546	2.397	2.605
Total	100	100	100	100	-

Comparison with the 1922 Census shows that the Armenian population increased less rapidly than the rest of the population (Comparison with the 1926 Register yields the opposite results). An increased proportion of the Armenian population inhabited Kirik Khane caza, and a decreased proportion the other two cazas. Although the same development was true of the rest of the population, the Armenian population of Kirik Khane did in fact increase in percentage terms more than the rest of the population of that caza. These calculations are, of course, grossly unreliable, but it does seem that there was a continuing influx of refugees

<sup>20</sup> *Source:* As Table 3.19.

into Kirik Khane caza between 1922 and 1936. There was little change during this time in the distribution of Catholics and Protestants, but the percentage increase of the Catholics was higher than that of the Apostolics in Kirik Khane and Alexandretta cazas, and lower in Antioch.

*The Civil Register 1938, (Fig. 3.12, Tables 3.22-3.24)*

Totals available at caza level for the Syrian Republic (now excluding Lebanon and the Sanjak) at Dec. 31, 1938 share the inadequacies of all Civil Register figures. Indeed, there is specific mention in official sources that the Armenian total presented for Damascus is too high.<sup>24</sup>

Analysis yields an I.D. between the Armenians and the rest of the population of 62.7, with little difference in segregation between Armenians and Christians (I.D. = 61.1) and non-Christians (I.D. = 63.5). Segregation was due especially to the outstanding concentration of Armenians in Aleppo. Elsewhere they were over-represented in Kamichliy , Damascus, and Djerablous, and fairly strongly represented in Hassetch , Azaz, Latakia and Raqqa. They were therefore most concentrated in cazas containing large towns (Aleppo, Damascus, Latakia), in the north-east (Kamichliy , Hassetch , Raqqa) and in the northern cazas of Aleppo Mohafazat (Djerablous, Azaz). The large number of Armenians in the North-East cannot be accounted for by the direct migration of 1929-30. The figures suggest some internal migration. The figures revealing also the distribution of Armenians within the northern cazas of Aleppo Mohafazat for the first time, it is not known for how long they had been established there. Certainly, however, there was, as already observed, some migration direct to Djerablous. There was little difference between the distribution of Armenian Catholics and Apostolics (I.D. = 12.0), due especially to the concentration of both groups in Damascus and Aleppo. The most striking distinguishing feature of Armenian Catholic distribution was their contribution to the Armenian population of the north-east provinces, in particular to the cazas of Deir el Zor and Hassetch . There was less segregation between Armenians and non-Armenian Catholics than between them and non-Catholic Christians, due largely to the lesser concentration of Catholics in Homs and their greater concentration in Damascus and Aleppo. Further comment and comparison may be made at the provincial level.

**Table 3.21:** Comparison between the distribution of Armenians in the Sanjak of Alexandretta in 1922 and 1936<sup>1</sup>


	% Armenians (A)		% non-As (B)		A/B		% incr. As		% incr. non-As		% incr. A. Caths.		% incr A. Aps.	
	1922	1936	1922	1936	1922	1936	1922-36	1922-36	1922-36	1922-36	1922-36	1922-36	1922-36	1922-36
Caza	38.634	31.704	19.57	16.985	1.974	1.867	34.86	54.76	123.53	32.94	61.16	171.02	64.64	
Alexandretta	46.568	42.965	66.971	64.734	0.695	0.664	51.63	70.94	14.41	232.84	107.23			
Antioch	14.798	25.331	13.459	18.281	1.099	1.386	181.31	140.22	76.85					
Kirik Khane	100	100	100	100	-	-	64.34	76.85						
Total	100	100	100	100	-	-	64.34	76.85						

<sup>1</sup> *Source:* As Tables 3.5 and 3.19.

<b>Table 3.22: Distribution of Armenians in Syria according to the Civil Register, 1938<sup>21</sup></b>				
Caza	Armenians	A. Apost	A. Caths	%
<b>Mohafazat of Damascus</b>				
Damascus	18,309	16,450	1859	10.18
Damascus suburbs	8	2	6	
Douma	-	-	-	-
Zebdani	5	5	-	-
Ouadi el Ajam	14	6	8	57.14
Qouneitra	68	18	50	73.53
Nebek	28	5	23	82.14
<b>Total</b>	<b>18,432</b>	<b>16,486</b>	<b>1946</b>	<b>10.56</b>
<b>Mohafazat of Aleppo</b>				
Aleppo	58,291	50,954	7337	14.4
Idlib	295	295	-	-
Maarret el Nomane	171	170	1	0.58
Harim	21	12	9	42.86
Kurd Dagh	587	538	49	8.35
Azaz	1825	1811	14	0.68
Jebel el Smaane	-	-	-	-
Bab	838	823	15	1.79
Menbidj	358	358	-	--
Djerablous & Ain el Arab	2934	2624	310	10.57
Djizr el Choghour	334	334	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>65,654</b>	<b>57,919</b>	<b>7735</b>	<b>11.78</b>
<b>Mohafazat of Homs</b>				
Homs	850	721	129	15.18
<b>Total</b>	<b>850</b>	<b>721</b>	<b>129</b>	<b>15.18</b>
<b>Mohafazat of Hama</b>				
Hama	324	301	23	7.1
Selemiyé	183	164	19	10.38
<b>Total</b>	<b>507</b>	<b>465</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>8.28</b>
<b>Mohafazat of Hauran</b>				
Deraâ	116	13	103	88.79
Ezraa	106	106	-	-
Zaouiyé	2	-	2	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>224</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>46.88</b>
<b>Mohafazat of the Euphrates</b>				
Deir el Zor	1005	592	413	41.09
Meyadine	11	-	11	100
Abou Kemal	37	7	30	81.08
Raqqa	1688	1473	215	12.74
<b>Total</b>	<b>2741</b>	<b>2072</b>	<b>669</b>	<b>24.41</b>
<b>Mohafazat of the Jezira</b>				
Hassetché	1405	743	662	47.12
Kamichliyé	5941	5353	588	10.07
<b>Total</b>	<b>7346</b>	<b>6096</b>	<b>1250</b>	<b>17.02</b>
<b>Mohafazat of the Jebel el Druze</b>				
Soueida	278	220	58	20.86

<sup>21</sup> "Rapport" (1938), pp. 220-21.

Salkhad	84	25	59	70.24
Chahba	27	27	-	-
Total	389	272	117	30.08
<b>Mohafazat of Latakia</b>				
Latakia	2026	1923	103	5.08
Haffé	324	324	-	-
Djeblé	21	19	2	9.52
Banias	63	63	-	-
Massiaf	216	185	32	14.81
Tartouss	56	56	-	-
Rouâd	-	-	-	-
Sâfita	30	23	7	23.33
Tell Kalakh	-	-	-	-
Total	2737	2593	144	5.26
Overall Total	98,880	86,743	12,137	12.27



**Fig. 3.12:** Distribution of Armenians in the Syrian Republic at December 31, 1938

For the former State of Damascus, comparison may be made with the situation in 1926 and in 1922. Compared with the situation in 1926, the figures show the Armenians to have provided a slightly reduced percentage of the area's population, having increased proportionally less than the non-Armenian population (Table 3.25). The Armenians were still largely concentrated in Damascus Mohafazat, the new feature of the distribution being their greater representation in Hama Mohafazat. Comparing percentage increases of Armenian and non-Armenian population, the Armenians increased less than non-Armenians in Damascus and notably at Homs, at about the same rate in the Hauran, and considerably more in Hama. Armenian Catholics increased proportionally more than the Apostolics, most noticeably in the Hauran, suggesting either differential rates of natural increase, or differential accuracy in registration.

**Table 3.24:** Indices of dissimilarity between the distribution of selected population groups in Syria, 1938<sup>22</sup>

	Non-A.s	Non-A Chrs.	Non-Chrs.	A. Apost.	Non-A. Caths.	Non-A., non-Cath Chrs.
Armenians	62.7	61.1	63.5	-	-	-
Arm Apost.	63.2	61.7	63.9	-	45.1	70.8
Arm. Caths.	63.4	61.1	64.3	12.0	45.8	70.9

Direct comparison at caza level with the 1922 Census results for Damascus State is not possible, because of changes in administrative boundaries. It is however possible to compare I.D.'s. (Table 3.26). These reveal that segregation between Armenians and others increased slightly between 1922 and 1938, essentially due to the much-reduced percentage of Armenians recorded in Homs, and the increased percentage in Damascus. In 1938, the I.D. between Armenians and Christians was higher than that between them and non-Christians, the reverse of the 1922 situation. Again, this appears due to the decreased proportion of Armenians in Homs and the increased proportion of Christians recorded there in 1938. In fact, the absolute decrease in the Armenian population of Homs is the most striking point of comparison between the 1922 and 1938 figures.

**Table 3.26:** Comparison between Indices of Dissimilarity between selected population groups in the former State of Damascus in 1926 and 1938<sup>23</sup>

	Armenians	
	1922	1938
Non-Armenians	61.1	66
Non-A. Chrs.	59.9	71.7
Non-Christians	64.3	65.3

Comparison at caza level is possible for Latakia Mohafazat (Alawi Territory) at 1926 and 1938 (Tables 3.27, 3.10, 3.13, 3.22). Between these dates the Armenians increased in numbers proportionally more than non-Armenians (65.08% vs 28.74%). But this proportional increase was locally confined to Latakia and Massiaf cazas where the Armenians increased their concentration. In all other cazas the concentration of Armenians decreased, two of them actually recording absolute decreases in Armenian population while in the others the Armenian population remained static or increased only slightly. There seems here to be evidence of increasing concentration in Latakia, accompanied by the desertion of outlying centres, except for Massiaf. Catholic Armenians increased proportionally more than Apostolics, increasing their percentage of the Armenian population in all their centres of settlement except Massiaf. Surprisingly the Catholic population actually increased in two cazas where the Apostolic population decreased. This might reflect better registration of Catholics, or it may reveal more significant changes in population distribution disguised by the aggregate caza totals.

<sup>22</sup> *Source:* As Table 3.22.

<sup>23</sup> *Source:* As Tables 3.4, 3.22.

**Table 3.23:** Percentage distribution of selected population groups in Syria by caza, 1938<sup>1</sup>

Caza	(A) % Armenians	(B) % non-As	% non A. Chrs	% Non-Chrs	(C) % A. Caths	(D) % A. Apost	% Non-A. Caths	% Non-A. non-Cath Cris	A/B	C/D
Damascus	18.516	10.224	10.334	10.213	15.317	18.964	16.884	7.146	1.811	0.808
Dams. Sub.	0.008	2.899	0.693	3.129	0.049	0.002	0.074	0.994	0.003	24.5
Douma	-	2.467	2.166	2.498	-	-	4.01	1.269	0	-
Zebdani	0.005	0.859	0.967	0.848	-	0.006	0.23	1.325	0.006	0
Quadi el Ajjam	0.014	0.995	2.409	0.847	0.066	0.007	1.452	2.875	0.014	9.429
Qouneitra	0.069	1.256	0.718	1.313	0.412	0.021	0.908	0.625	0.055	19.619
Nebek	0.028	2.662	3.51	2.573	0.190	0.006	7.958	1.345	0.011	31.667
Aleppo	58.951	9.002	15.582	8.317	60.452	58.741	29.998	8.566	6.549	1.029
Idlib	0.298	2.879	0.425	3.134	-	0.34	0.023	0.621	0.104	0
Maaret en Nomane	0.173	1.424	0.015	1.571	0.008	0.196	0.004	0.02	0.121	0.041
Harim	0.021	1.478	0.005	1.631	0.074	0.014	-	0.007	0.014	5.286
Kürd Darh	0.594	2.431	0.043	2.68	0.404	0.62	0.052	0.039	0.244	0.652
Azaz	1.846	2.072	0.077	2.279	0.115	2.088	0.071	0.08	0.891	0.055
Jebel es Semsâne	-	2.917	-	3.221	-	-	-	-	0	-
Bab	0.847	1.701	0.012	1.877	0.124	0.949	0.001	0.017	0.498	0.131
Menbidj	0.362	1.953	0.015	2.155	-	0.413	0.027	0.009	0.185	0
Djerablous	2.967	1.877	0.159	2.056	2.554	3.025	0.2	0.14	1.581	0.844
Djisir ech Choghhour	0.338	1.241	1.17	1.248	-	0.385	1.37	1.072	0.272	0
Homs	0.86	8.334	18.179	7.309	1.063	0.831	9.738	22.287	0.103	1.279
Hama	0.328	4.625	7.184	4.358	0.19	0.347	0.401	10.485	0.071	0.548
Selemiyé	0.185	1.173	0.007	1.295	0.157	0.189	0.004	0.009	0.158	0.831
Deraâ	0.117	1.893	0.988	1.987	0.849	0.015	0.66	1.148	0.062	56.6
Ezraa	0.107	2.147	2.648	2.095	-	0.122	6.316	0.863	0.05	0
Zaouiyé	0.002	0.534	0.063	0.583	0.016	-	0.037	0.076	0.004	?

<sup>1</sup> **Source:** As Table 3.22.

Deir ez Zor	1.016	4.037	0.632	4.392	3.403	0.682	0.864	0.519	0.252	4.99
Meyadine	0.011	1.571	0.002	1.734	0.091	-	-	0.003	0.007	?
Abou Kemal	0.037	1.345	0.009	1.484	0.247	0.008	0.003	0.011	0.028	30.875
Raqqa	1.707	2.161	0.149	2.37	1.771	1.698	0.092	0.178	0.79	1.043
Hassetché	1.421	1.422	2.008	1.361	5.454	0.857	0.831	2.581	0.999	6.364
Kamichliyé	6.008	2.637	5.061	2.384	4.845	6.171	1.971	6.565	2.278	0.785
Soueida	0.281	1.274	1.812	1.218	0.478	0.254	1.617	1.907	0.221	1.882
Salkhad	0.085	1.001	0.775	1.024	0.486	0.029	0.44	0.938	0.085	16.759
Chahba	0.027	0.608	0.505	0.619	-	0.031	1.292	0.122	0.044	0
Latakia	2.049	2.32	2.977	2.252	0.849	2.217	1.556	3.669	0.883	0.383
Haffé	0.328	1.831	1.046	1.913	-	0.374	0.081	1.515	0.179	0
Djeblé	0.021	2.249	0.175	2.465	0.016	0.022	0.018	0.251	0.009	0.727
Banias	0.064	1.385	1.576	1.365	-	0.073	2.266	1.241	0.046	0
Massiaf	0.219	1.664	1.6	1.671	0.264	0.213	0.966	1.908	0.132	1.2333
Tartouss	0.057	1.539	2.865	1.401	-	0.065	1.059	3.744	0.037	0
Rouâd	-	0.179	0.009	0.197	-	-	-	0.013	0	-
Sâfita	0.03	2.299	5.813	1.933	0.058	0.027	3.636	6.873	0.013	2.14
Tell Kalakh	-	1.434	5.619	0.998	-	-	2.891	6.946	0	-
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	-	-

**Table 3.25: Comparison between the distribution of Armenians in the former State of Damascus in 1926 and 1938<sup>1</sup>**

Sanjak (Mohafazat)	% A's in Sanjak		A's as % tot pop		A. Caths as % A's		% incr. A.s 1926-38	% incr. non-A.s 1926-38	% incr. A. Caths 1926-38	% incr. A. Ap. 1926- 38
	1926	1938	1926	1938	1926	1938				
Damascus	94.084	92.1	3.83	3.51	8.57	10.56	40.14	53.35	72.67	37.09
Hauran	0.966	1.119	0.21	0.21	28.15	46.88	65.93	102.77	176.32	22.68
Homs	4.442	4.247	0.63	0.43	9.18	15.18	36.88	80.42	126.32	27.84
Hama	0.508	2.533	0.09	0.37	4.23	8.28	614.08	66.36	1300	583.82
Total	100	100	2.4	2.07	8.8	11.1	43.16	66.93	81.39	39.48

<sup>1</sup> Source: As Tables 3.10 and 3.22.

**Table 3.27:** Comparison between the distribution of Armenians in Latakia Mohafazat (former Alawi Territory), 1926 and 1938<sup>24</sup>

Caza	% A.s (A) 1938	% others (B) 1938	A/B 1938	A/B 1926	% increase of A.s 1926-38	% increase of A. Caths 1926-38	% increase A. Apost. 1926-38
Latakia	74.023	15.571	4.754	3.54	+97.66	+127.5	+95.23
Haffé	11.838	12.289	0.963	1.494	+8.36	-	+8.36
Djeblé	0.767	15.096	0.051	0.094	-12.5	?	-20.83
Banias	2.302	9.292	0.248	0.402	+18.87	-	+18.87
Massiaf	7.928	11.169	0.71	0.446	+181.82	+128.57	+193.65
Tartouss	2.046	11.529	0.177	0.824	-62.67	-	-62.67
Tell Kalakh	-	9.625	-	-	-	-	-
Sâfita	1.096	15.43	0.071	0.124	-	?	-23.33
Total	100	100	-	-	+65.08	+166.67	+61.66


In the Jebel el Druze, Armenians were recorded for the first time in 1938, suggesting a small migration to that province since 1926. Immigrant Armenians may, however, have been un-recorded on the 1926 Register.

In Aleppo Mohafazat and the north-eastern provinces, the registration for the first time of the whole refugee population dramatically diminished the proportion of Catholics.

*O. C. P. Census of Lebanon (Figs. 3.13, 3.14, Table 3.28)*

The revised 1943 results of this Census are used as they are available for individual settlements as well as for cazas. The figures yield an I.D. between the Armenians and the rest of the population of 62.4, i.e., less than in 1932, but this decrease, rather than representing any trend towards desegregation undoubtedly reflects the concentration in Zahlé caza of new Armenian immigrants from the Sanjak. Armenians were thus over-represented not only in Beirut and Meten, but also in Zahlé caza. Excluding this new influx from consideration, however, analysis of percentage changes indicates that the trend was towards increasing concentration in the capital. Thus, outside Beirut and Meten a large number of cazas actually registered decreases in population. While the Armenian population of Beirut city itself remained almost static, that of Meten increased dramatically due, it is revealed, to the development of Bourj-Hammoud, the Beirut suburb. The settlement figures also reveal for the first time that the Armenians in the mountain outside Beirut were scattered amongst many towns and villages. This was less true of the rest of the country where they tended to be concentrated in the administrative centres of cazas, notably in Tripoli.

<sup>24</sup> *Source:* As Tables 3.10, 3.22.



**Figure 3.13:** Distribution of Armenians in Lebanon December 31,1943

*Duguet (1927)*

A map prepared by Dr. Duguet of the Health Service shows the distribution of all refugees in Syria in May, 1927 (Fig. 3.15, Table 3.29). Unfortunately, there are inconsistencies in his figures, the most important of which is that, whereas those for the provinces of Syria, the Jebel el Druze and the Sanjak of Alexandretta represent families, those for Lebanon and the Alawi Territory represent individuals.<sup>25</sup> On the redrawn map presented, the totals for families have been multiplied by a factor of 3.8, the most probable estimate of average Armenian family-size at the time. The map depicts all refugees, not just Armenians, and at least 4750 Syrian Catholic refugees (958 families) noted in Duguet's text should be deducted from the total. Moreover, the total of 480 families in the Jebel Moussa refers to indigenous Armenians, not refugees, raising doubt as to the map's reliability. The source of Duguet's figures is not specified, but those for the Alawi Territory are closely related to the 1926 Register, and it seems, again, that they must concern all Armenians, not just refugees. By contrast, Duguet's figures for Lebanon seem to bear no direct relation to the 1926 Register, while a similar comparison is not possible for the other provinces where his figures

concern families, not individuals. Duguet appears to have derived his figures from a number of different sources.


**Table 3.29:** Distribution of refugees in Syria and Lebanon, May 1920 after Duguet (1928)<sup>25</sup>

	<b>Families</b>		<b>Families</b>
Hassetché	110	Jebel Moussa	480
Abou Kemal	2	Hama	34
Meyadine	1	Selemiyé	15
Deir el Zor	47	Homs	148
Raqqa	42	Damascus	909
Ain el Aarab	110	Jdaidet Aartouz	2
Djerablous	310	Katana	2
Menbidj	98	Mansourah	5
Bab	53	Qouneitra	12
Aleppo	8642	Moumsiyé	1
Azaz	194	Ain Ziouane	3
Afrine	24	Khochniyé	1
Harim	12	Joueizé	1
Idlib	20	Tibné	1
Djîsr el Choghour	10	Ezraa	12
Maarret el Nomane	3	Naoua	6
Sqalbiyé	10	Rhazalé	2
Hayaline	5	Deraâ	29
Alexandretta	1350	Bosra	3
Beilane	295	Chahba	7
Kirik Khane	440	Soueida	13
Rihaniyé	12	Salkhad	15
	<b>Persons</b>		<b>Persons</b>
Ghnémié	137	Aramo	207
Ain Ceutach	31	Latakia	1353
Djéblé	24	Massiaf	78
Qadmous	6	Banias	47
Tartouss	150	Sâfitâ	30
Halba	123	Qoubaiyate	4
Tripoli	750	Zghorte	115
Chekka	9	Batroune	59
Jbail	47	Qartaba	2
Baalbek	4	Zouk	2
Ghazir	125	Antoura	1
Bhannes	145	Ajaltoun	1
Zahlé	289	Rayak	36
Beirut	21,242	Aley	68
Sofar	4	Souk el Gharb	
“Asile Americaine”	312	Saida	375
Jezzine	8	El Djarieh	4
Nabatiyé	8	Tyr	29

<sup>25</sup> Duguet (1928).

Table 3.28: Distribution of Armenions in Lebanon, by caza, 1943, and comparison with the situation in 1932 <sup>1</sup>									
Caza	Armenians 1943	%Armenians 1943 (A)	% non-As 1943 (B)	A/B 1943	A/B 1932	Abs. incr. in A. pop 1932-43	% incr. in As. 1932-43		
Beirut	22,485	44.610	21.205	2.104	5.745	+72	+0.32		
Koura	4	0.008	2.409	0.003	0.03	-19	-82.61		
Zghorte	28	0.056	3.147	0.018	0.036	-17	-37.78		
Batroune	25	0.05	2.121	0.024	0.086	-43	-63.24		
Akkar	-	-	5.335	-	0.011	-22	-100		
Tripoli	1188	2.357	9.529	0.247	0.318	+403	+51.34		
Saida	147	0.292	6.126	0.048	0.108	-96	-39.51		
Tyr	91	0.181	5.444	0.033	0.028	+33	+56.9		
Merdjayoun	67	0.133	3.672	0.036	0.019	+40	+148.15		
Jezzine	-	-	1.498	-	0.056	-39	-100		
Baabda	102	0.202	5.741	0.035	0.149	-241	-91.63		
Meten	19,589	38.865	4.32	8.997	3.17	+14,931	+320.55		
Chouf	5	0.01	5.126	0.002	0.024	-49	-90.74		
Aley	324	0.643	3.874	0.166	0.239	-53	-14.06		
Kesrouane	560	1.111	5.384	0.206	0.627	-878	-61.06		
Zahlé	5709	11.327	6.879	1.647	0.632	+4309	+307.79		
Baalbek	72	0.143	5.323	0.027	0.036	+11	+18.03		
Hermel	-	-	1.47	-	0.011	-6	-100		
Rachaya	7	0.014	1.395	0.01	0.025	-5	-41.67		
Total	50,403	100	100	-	-	+18,411	+57.55		

<sup>1</sup> Sources: Revised O.C.P. Census results, in Ballitia (n.d.), and 1932 Census, as Table 3.16



**Figure 3.14:** Distribution of Armenians in Lebanon, 1943 by settlement


**Table 3.29:** Distribution of refugees in Syria and Lebanon, May 1920 after Duguet (1928)<sup>26</sup>

	<b>Families</b>		<b>Families</b>
Hassetché	110	Jebel Moussa	480
Abou Kemal	2	Hama	34
Meyadine	1	Selemiyé	15
Deir el Zor	47	Homs	148
Raqqa	42	Damascus	909
Ain el Aarab	110	Jdaidet Aartouz	2
Djerablous	310	Katana	2
Menbidj	98	Mansourah	5
Bab	53	Qouneitra	12
Aleppo	8642	Moumsiyé	1
Azaz	194	Ain Ziouane	3
Afrine	24	Khochniyé	1
Harim	12	Joueizé	1
Idlib	20	Tibné	1
Djizr el Choghour	10	Ezraa	12
Maarret el Nomane	3	Naoua	6
Sqalbiyé	10	Rhazalé	2
Hayaline	5	Deraâ	29
Alexandretta	1350	Bosra	3
Beilane	295	Chahba	7
Kirik Khane	440	Soueida	13
Rihaniyé	12	Salkhad	15
	<b>Persons</b>		<b>Persons</b>
Ghnémié	137	Aramo	207
Ain Ceutach	31	Latakia	1353
Djeblé	24	Massiaf	78
Qadmous	6	Banias	47
Tartouss	150	Sâfitâ	30
Halba	123	Qoubaiyate	4
Tripoli	750	Zghorte	115
Chekka	9	Batroune	59
Jbail	47	Qartaba	2
Baalbek	4	Zouk	2
Ghazir	125	Antoura	1
Bhannes	145	Ajaltoun	1
Zahlé	289	Rayak	36
Beirut	21,242	Aley	68
Sofar	4	Souk el Gharb	
“Asile Americaine”	312	Saida	375
Jezzine	8	El Djarieh	4
Nabatiyé	8	Tyr	29

At the national level the refugees were concentrated especially in the two centres of Beirut and Aleppo, but they also occurred notably in Damascus, the Sanjak of Alexandretta, the coastal towns of Alawi Territory and Lebanon, the

<sup>26</sup> Duguet (1928).

towns in the north of Aleppo Vilayet and in Deir el Zor Sanjak, and scattered in the cazas, around Beirut and Aleppo. While this distribution reflected the arrival points of the refugees, there had clearly been considerable internal migration, notably to Damascus, Homs and the north-east.



**Fig. 3.15:** Distribution of refugees in Syria & Lebanon after Duguet (1928)

At the provincial level, Duguet’s figures for Alawi Territory are, as noted, practically identical with the 1926 Register, (Table 3.30), the principal difference being Duguet’s higher figure for Latakia caza, which might be explained by immigrant Armenians unregistered in 1926 (a possibility already suggested).

Caza	C. R. 1926*	Duguet**
Latakia	1025	1353
Haffé	299	375
Djeblé	24	24
Banias	53	53
Massiaf	77	78
Tartouss	150	150
Tell Kalakh	-	-
Sâfita	30	30
Total	1658	2063

In Lebanon, by contrast, (Table 3.31), compared with the 1926 Register, Duguet’s figures are lower in every administrative unit. The overall difference (9,097 persons) is too great to be explained solely by the omission of indigenous

<sup>27</sup> Duguet (1928) and as Table 3.10. *Notes:* \*= Armenians, \*\* = Refugees.

Armenians by Duguet. It seems necessary to invoke in addition either emigration, over-registration in 1926, or inaccuracies in Duguet's figures. The differences between the Register and Duguet are most marked in Kesrouane, Meten, Zahlé and Saida cazas. In view of the inconsistencies of Duguet's figures they certainly cannot be taken in preference, even though a reduced total c. 1926-27 would correspond better with migration history and would eliminate the apparent decline in Lebanese population between 1926 and 1932 which is difficult to explain. Moreover, wide divergences with respect to Kesrouane, Meten and Zahlé also exist between the totals of Duguet and the 1932 Census (Table 3.32). In this case, the 1932 Census must be taken in preference, but these important regional divergences in Duguet's figures remain to be explained. By contrast Duguet and the 1932 Census agree in recording a decrease of the Armenian population of Saida since 1926. A further comparison between the figures concerning individual settlements presented by Duguet and the revised O.C.P. Census (1943) indicates such wide variation of population distribution within cazas that the value of comparison at the aggregate caza-level is anyway called into question.

**Table 3.31:** Comparison between the figures of Duguet (1928) and of the Civil Register (1926) concerning the distribution of Armenians in Lebanon<sup>28</sup>

Caza	1926 Register <sup>29</sup>	Duguet <sup>30</sup>
Beirut	22,038	21,242
Saida	1505	395
Tyr	89	29
Merdjayoun	41	-
Meten	2655	147
Chouf	483	99
Kesrouane	2990	176
Tripoli	1335	992
Batroune	242	68
Zahlé	1459	325
Baalbek	22	4
Deir el Qamar	-	-
Unidentified <sup>31</sup>	-	285
Total	32,859	23,762

For Aleppo Vilayet, Duguet's figures show that the dispersal of Armenians outside Aleppo, observed from the 1938 Register, was already established in 1927. Although no statistical comparison between the figures of Duguet and the 1938 Register is thought desirable (given the use of a family-size ratio in compiling the 1927 totals, and the probable inaccuracies of the register), the similarity of pattern in Aleppo Mohafazat at these dates is notable. The concentration in the northern towns of Aleppo Vilayet by 1927 suggests settlement directly in these towns during the 1922-24 migration, as already

<sup>28</sup> *Source:* As Table 3.30.

<sup>29</sup> Armenians.

<sup>30</sup> Refugees.

<sup>31</sup> "Asile americaine" (possibly in the caza of Chouf).

observed for those Armenians from Urfa who settled in Djerablous. Early dispersal in the north-east is also apparent from Duguet, though here the picture is confused by the addition of other Christian refugees to his totals.

Duguet's totals for the Sanjak of Alexandretta include the indigenous Armenians of the Jebel Moussa, but clearly exclude those of the Jebel Aqra (in Antioch caza). Their interpretation is thus made difficult and they cannot be directly compared with other totals. Nevertheless, excluding Antioch caza, totals for the town and caza of Alexandretta and for the caza of Kirik Khane are at least of the same order as those of 1922.

**Table 3.32:** Comparison between the distribution of Armenians in Lebanon according to Duguet (1928) and the 1932 Census<sup>32</sup>

<b>Caza</b>	<b>Duguet</b>	<b>1932</b>	<b>Caza</b>	<b>Duguet</b>	<b>1932</b>
Beirut	21,242	22,413	Baabda	-	263
Koura	-	23	Meten	147	4658
Zghorte	115	45	Chouf	-	54
Batroune	68	68	Aley	384	377
Akkar	127	22	Kesrouane	176	1438
Tripoli	750	785	Zahlé	325	1400
Saida	387	243	Baalbek	4	61
Tyr	29	58	Hermel	-	6
Merdjayoun	-	27	Rashaya	-	12
Jezzine	8	39	Total	23,762	31,992

For the former State of Damascus (Sanjaks of Damascus, Hauran, Homs and Hama), Duguet's totals can be compared roughly with both the 1922 Census and 1926 Register. In Damascus Sanjak, Duguet's totals are markedly lower than those of the earlier tables, a deficiency which cannot be explained in terms of indigenous Armenians and might be evidence of emigration.

By contrast, his figures for Hama Sanjak confirm the distribution of Armenians in the two centres of Hama town and Selemiyé. Likewise, in Homs Sanjak, Duguet confirms the significant decrease in Armenian population in the town between 1922 and 1926. In the Hauran Duguet suggests increasing Armenian population, 1922-27, but since he does not refer to any Armenians in this area in his text, those refugees marked on his map may not be Armenian. The same is true of the Jebel el Druze, where, no Armenians were recorded in 1922 or 1926 (although Armenians were recorded there in 1938).

### *The Annual Reports of the Mandatory Power*

A series of estimates concerning Armenian refugees in Syria occur in the annual reports of the mandatory power. The first set, representing the distribution of Armenian refugees at January 1, 1925, is clearly related to a table presented in a publication of the 2e Bureau representing their distribution in April, 1925, which seems to be merely a revised version of the former (Table 3.33). If the 2e

<sup>32</sup> *Sources:* Duguet (1928) and as Table 3.16.

Bureau table is compared with the 1926 Register, the close correspondence between the totals for Lebanon (32,640 c.f. 32,859) suggests that the 2e Bureau estimate may have been derived directly from the Register, in which case it would include not only refugees but also indigenous Armenians. In other provinces, there is no apparent relationship between the 2e Bureau table and the 1922 Census, 1926 Register or Duguet, despite the similarity in overall total with this last source (similar conclusions hold for the January, 1925 table). In view of the possible derivation of the Lebanese total, care is necessary in the interpretation of all these figures. The total of 10,000 Armenian refugees for the State of Damascus offers confirmation of the large number of refugees there suggested by one tabulation of the 1922 Census results. The figure is rather less than that recorded for all Armenians in the region in the 1926 Register, but confirms the picture of a relatively high refugee population at Damascus before the substantial diminution apparent from Duguet. The total for Aleppo Vilayet corresponds closely with Duguet. That for Deir el Zor Sanjak (1200 refugees) is the highest estimate given for that region at this time. It confirms the early dispersal to this region apparent from Duguet, but there is no basis on which to choose between the different estimates. The estimate for the Sanjak of Alexandretta certainly concerns refugees alone, and for this reason must be preferred to Duguet, who is inconsistent here. It confirms the earlier conclusion concerning emigration of refugees from the Sanjak. The estimate for Alawi Territory is lower than any of the comparable totals so far considered, possibly reflecting the difference between all Armenians and refugees alone. Even in this case, emigration from Latakia, where there were over 2000 arrivals at the end of 1921, would still have been considerable. Finally, these 1925 estimates give conflicting information about the Jebel el Druze, 100 refugees being recorded there in January and none in April. The difference may well be due to a tabulating error, but the situation in the Jebel remains obscure.

**Table 3.33:** Distribution of Armenian Refugees in Syria & Lebanon, 1925<sup>33</sup>

Former State	Jan. 1925	April 1925
Lebanon	33,700	32,640
Damascus	10,000	10,000
Alawi Territory	1450	1430
Jebel el Druze	100	-
Aleppo		
Aleppo Vilayet	37,300	37,400
Sanjak of Alexandretta	6250	6240
Sanjak of Deir el Zor	1200	1200
Total	90,000	88,910

<sup>33</sup> *Sources:* Jan. 1:- “Rapport”(1924), p. 50; April: Deuxième Bureau (1932), p. 10. *Note:* The figure of 33,700 refugees in Lebanon in Jan. 1925 is unexpectedly higher than the April figure. The difference may be explained by a tabulating error. The substitution of 32,700 for 33,700 would practically reconcile the two figures and would reduce the January overall total from 90,000 (the writer’s summation of the individual estimates presented in the original text) to 89,000 (the total actually presented in the original).

The 1926 “Rapport” contains estimates of Armenian refugees in the Vilayet of Aleppo which must be discarded as unreliable. More useful are those concerning the Sanjak of Alexandretta. Roughly equivalent to the 1925 estimates, they also share some common features with Duguet, but contradict him in other details (Table 3.34). The “Rapport” figures are more acceptable, given Duguet’s inconsistencies.

The 1927 “Rapport” contains estimates concerning all refugees, most of whom were Armenian (Table 3.35). They should accordingly be treated with reserve. They do not appear to be directly related to the figures in earlier reports. In general, they are higher than other contemporary estimates but the overall total is reduced by an anomalously low figure for Damascus town and a reduced total for Lebanon. The total for Aleppo (probably for the Vilayet) is of the same order as earlier estimates. Those for Alexandretta Sanjak are rather higher, but even the relatively high estimate of 6000 refugees at Alexandretta town, would still require considerable emigration after 1921. The estimates for “Homs-Hama” (i.e., presumably the two Sanjaks), Latakia (i.e., probably for Alawi Territory) and the Euphrates are all relatively high, and on balance more weight should be given to Duguet’s lower figures. The anomalously low figure for Damascus may be discarded. As regards Lebanon, the total for Beirut town is similar to that given by Duguet and the 1926 Register. However, only 2000 refugees are recorded in Lebanon outside Beirut, a low figure comparable in order with that of Duguet. The difference between these low estimates and those of the 1926 Register and 1932 Census remains to be explained.

**Table 3.34:** Comparison between the figures of Duguet and the 1926 “Rapport” concerning the distribution of Armenian refugees in the Sanjak of Alexandretta<sup>34</sup>

	Duguet	1926 “Rapport”
Alexandretta	1350 F	4200 P, less 100-120 Assyro-Chaldeans
Kirik Khane	440	1800 P (i.e., 5x440)
Rihaniyé	12 F	60 P (i.e., 5x12)
Antioch	-	400 P
Beilane	295 F	-
Jebel Moussa	480 F	several dozen families of refugees
Qassab	-	

**Table 3.35:** Distribution of refugees in Syria & Lebanon, after “Rapport” (1927)<sup>35</sup>

Aleppo	40,000	Latakia	2300
Alexandretta	6000	Euphrates Region	2500
Caza of Antioch	2000	Beirut	20,000
Caza of Kirik Khane	3000	Other centres of Lebanon	2000
Homs-Hama	2000	Town of Damascus	200
		Total	80,000

<sup>34</sup> Duguet (1928) and “Rapport” (1926), pp. 102-6. *Explanation:* F= families, P= persons.

<sup>35</sup> “Rapport” (1927), p. 66.

### *Other Official Estimates*

For the State of Syria (i.e., excluding Lebanon, the Jebel el Druze and Alawi Territory) a table of estimates concerning the ethnic groups of the State is available, compiled in January, 1927, after information provided by the Intelligence Service (Table 3.36). It appears to have been derived independently of the other figures so far considered. The total for the town of Alexandretta (5800 Armenians) is consistent with other contemporary estimates, and suggests that the relatively high total of 6000 refugees at Alexandretta presented in the 1927 Report should be reduced, given the 1202 indigenous Armenians registered in that town in 1922. The total for Antioch town (360 Armenians) compares with the 400 refugees there cited in the 1926 Report (although no refugees are marked at Antioch by Duguet). The estimates for Aleppo Vilayet and town are far higher than those recorded elsewhere while the number of Armenians recorded in the Vilayet outside Aleppo town is lower than that derived from Duguet (1640 c.f. 3225). In this latter case Duguet's estimates should be taken in preference. The estimates for Deir el Zor Sanjak are of a similar order to those presented elsewhere (with the exception of the anomalously high total in the 1927 "Rapport"). Those for Homs and Hama are rather higher than those recorded elsewhere, but still less than the 2000 refugees recorded in the 1927 Report. The total for Homs is, still, however, low enough to allow considerable emigration after 1922. The "Tableau" confirms the large decrease of Armenian population in Damascus Sanjak, due to the decrease in Damascus town indicated by Duguet. It also confirms the order of Duguet's figures for the Hauran, such that it may be assumed with more certainty that they do refer to Armenians, thus reinstating the idea of increasing dispersal to the Hauran.

<b>Table 3.36:</b> Distribution of Armenians in the State of Syria according to Intelligence Service estimates, Jan. 1927 <sup>36</sup>		
<b>A.- By sanjak</b>	Apost.	Cath.
Alexandretta	15,808	-
Aleppo	46,760	10,938
Deir el Zor	802	-
Homs	1100	-
Hama	416	(5546)
Damascus	3900	1236
Deraâ	242	-
Total	69,028	12,174
<b>B.- In princ. towns</b>		
Alexandretta	5800	-
Antioch	300	-

<sup>36</sup> Arch.Dip., Documents in course of classification. *Note*: Protestants included under "Apostolics". With the exceptions of Aleppo Vilayet and town, and Damascus Sanjak and town, the figures for Catholics and Apostolics would appear to have been transposed in the original table, and this error has been revised in the writer's tabulation. The extraordinary total of 5546 Apostolics (Catholics in the original) in the Sanjak of Hama appears to be a straightforward error in tabulation.

Aleppo	46,458	9600
Deir el Zor	133	-
Homs	1100	-
Hama	366	-
Damascus	3900	1140
Qouneitra	-	-
Deraâ	-	-

Figures presented by the Deuxième Bureau represent the distribution of Armenians at February, 1931 (Table 3.37). They appear to relate to all Armenians, as they include 5000 Armenians of the Jebel Moussa. They cannot be directly connected with any of the sources so far described, not even with the 2e Bureau's own totals of 1925 (Table 3.33). However, the total for Lebanon is similar to that presented for "Réfugiés A" in the Lebanese Civil Register for December 31, 1930 (Table 3.15), and may therefore have been based on the Civil Register. This derivation would appear all the more likely as it is consistent with that suggested for the 2e Bureau's own figures for 1925. The same derivation cannot be assumed for the other 1931 figures, especially in view of the differing precision with which these figures are presented. Indeed, in view of this variable precision, and the doubt as to their origin, the 2e Bureau figures cannot be accepted as giving an accurate picture of the situation in 1931. In particular, the total for Damascus would appear to contradict Duguet's (admittedly earlier) total. However, these figures do tend to confirm the small dispersal of Armenians to the Hauran.

The "Rapport" for 1937 lists the principal industrial centres inhabited by the Armenian immigrants (Table 3.38). All these estimates are lower than their equivalents on the 1937 Registers, an observation which can only be partly explained by the inclusion of indigenous Armenians on the Register. Thus, if the 1937 Report's estimates are accurate, the Registers are again seen to be substantially bloated, casting doubt on the value of all comparisons made on the basis of the Registers. The totals for Lebanon, by contrast, can be reconciled with the more accurate Censuses of 1932 and 1943. That for Beirut (32,000) is substantially greater than the 1932 figure, but this need not imply any incongruity as the former total probably includes Armenians settled in the neighbouring suburb of Bourj-Hammoud.

### *Non-French Estimates*

Non-French estimates of Armenian population distribution including those made by the Nansen Office, are not necessarily all independent of the French official figures, nor are they necessarily less accurate.

<b>Table 3.37:</b> Distribution of Armenians in Syria and Lebanon, February 1931 according to estimates of the Deuxième Bureau <sup>37</sup>	
<b>Lebanese Republic</b>	39,936 of which 30,000 at Beirut.
<b>State of Syria</b>	
Damascus	about 13,000
In the Hauran	53 families (sic)
Sanjak of Homs	about 700 persons
Sanjak of Hauran	about 195 persons (sic)
Vilayet of Aleppo	45,000 of whom 42,000 at Aleppo and 2500 at Djerablous
<b>Sanjak of Alexandretta</b>	
Caza of Alexandretta	about 4000 refugees of whom 3800 live in Alexandretta
Caza of Antioch	about 5000 persons in the Jebel Moussa grouping
Caza of Kirik Khane	2700 Armenians in the grouping of Kirik Khane 1000 in the grouping of Beilane 600 others distributed in the villages
<b>Sanjak of Euphrates &amp; Jezira</b>	about 2500 Armenians distributed in a dozen villages
<b>Province of Latakia</b>	about 2500 refugees, of whom 1700 at Latakia
<b>Jebel el Druze</b>	a few isolated persons

<b>Table 3.38:</b> Principal industrial centres inhabited by Armenian immigrants, 1937 <sup>38</sup>			
Town	Armenians	Town	Armenians
Aleppo	43,000	Homs	500
Beirut	32,000	Hama	110
Tripoli	1000	Saida	240
Damascus	8000		

### *The Catholicossate, 1924*

Three sets of figures<sup>26</sup> presented in 1924 and 1925, by the Armenian Catholicossate of Cilicia, M. Carle, delegate of the League Refugees Office, and Khanzadian appear to be intimately related, and the original source would appear to be the Catholicossate (Table 3.39). The estimates concern all Armenians, but even allowing for the inclusion of indigenous Armenians, their overall total is higher than other estimates, mainly due to the high estimates for Aleppo Vilayet and Lebanon. The anomalously high total for Aleppo Vilayet in fact agrees only with the high total presented by the Intelligence Service. Of the Lebanese estimates that for Beirut is of the same order as official estimates, while the relatively high totals for other settlements could result from differential inclusion of orphans. Estimates for other provinces correspond rather better with the official figures. The revised summation for the Sanjak of Alexandretta yields 18,000 persons, a total rather greater than in the 1922 Census, but of the same order. Those for Alawi Territory and the region of Damascus correspond roughly with the 1926 Register. For Hama-Homs the total is rather higher than the 1926 Register, but less than the 1922 Census, seemingly consistent with the decrease in population observed.

<sup>37</sup> Deuxième Bureau (1932), pp. 11-13.

<sup>38</sup> "Rapport" (1937), pp. 26-27.

*Nansen Office Estimates*

In 1926 M. Burnier presented two tables to the Nansen Office showing the distribution of Armenian refugees in Syria and Lebanon. The second table was clearly intended to be more precise than the first, whose estimates are rejected. The second table (Table 3.40) was essentially reproduced by Johnson who, in his report of December 1926 presented a breakdown of the figures concerning the Sanjak of Alexandretta (Table 3.41) from which it is clear not only that these figures are related to those of Duguet, but also that, although entitled “Armenian refugees”, Burnier’s table included some indigenous Armenians additional to those specified at Aleppo. His total of 10,000 refugees in Damascus and the Hauran may possibly have been derived from the 2e Bureau figures of 1925.<sup>27</sup> Otherwise his estimates appear to be independent. The high total for Aleppo (probably for Aleppo Vilayet) is more related to the estimates of the Catholicossate than to the lower figures derived from Duguet. The high estimate for Lebanon (38,000) with its relatively high total for Armenians in Lebanon outside Beirut, also seems, with the exception of the anomalously high total for Beirut, to be more in accordance with the 1926 Register and the Catholicossate than with Duguet. Burnier’s totals are reproduced again by Ross, Fry and Sibley,<sup>28</sup> with minor differences, the most important being a substantially reduced total of refugees (36,000) in Aleppo town. All these tables (Burnier, Johnson & Ross, Fry and Sibley) exclude those refugees (noted in other sources) in the north-east and the northern towns of Aleppo Vilayet.

<b>Table 3.39:</b> Distribution of Armenians in Syria and Lebanon, according to figures contained in the archives of the Armenian Catholicossate of Cilicia (n. d.,c. 1924)		
<i>State of Aleppo</i>	Aleppo & district	55,000
	Alexandretta	6000
	Total	61,000
<i>Alawi Territory</i>	Latakia & district	1500
	Antioch, Soueidiyé, Qassab <sup>39</sup>	12,000
	Total	13,500
<i>State of Damascus</i>	Damascus & district	13,000
	Hama & Homs	1500
	Total	14,500
<i>Greater Lebanon</i>	Beirut and district	22,500
	Djounieh	2400
	Orphans	7500
	Saida & Tyr	1200
	Zahlé and district	1500
	Tripoli	1300
	Total	36,400
<i>Overall Total</i>		125,400

<sup>39</sup> This total should be transferred to the Sanjak of Alexandretta.

<b>Table 3.40:</b> Distribution of Armenian refugees in Syria, according to Burnier, August 1926 <sup>40</sup>	
Aleppo (refugees)	50,000
Aleppo (previous residents)	8000
Antioch, Qassab, Alexandretta, Soueidiyé	15,000
Latakia	2500
Homs & Hama	1000
Tripoli	2000
Beirut & surroundings	30,000
Tyr & Saida	1000
Villages of Lebanon	5000
Damascus & the Hauran	10,000
Total	124,500

<b>Table 3.41:</b> Distribution of Armenians in the Sanjak of Alexandretta, according to Johnson Report, Dec., 1926 <sup>41</sup>		
Alexandretta camp	5350	i.e., 1350 families = Duguet
Beilane & district	1350	Locals. Possibly a tabulating error. Compare 1350 families in Alexandretta
Kirik Khane	1800	i.e., 440 families Duguet & 1926 "Rapport".
Rihaniyé	60	= 1926 "Rapport", & 5 x Duguet
Qassab	2627	local Armenians
Jebel Moussa	3843	
Total	15,030	= Burnier, Table 3.40

<b>Table 3.42:</b> Armenian population within the limits of the "Délégation Apostolique de Syrie," according to Mécérian, 1928 <sup>42</sup>	
Region	
Beirut	34,070
Damascus	6300
Alawi Territory	2197
Alexandretta	22,320
Aleppo	63,440
Total	128,327

### *Other Estimates*

Estimates apparently independent, presented by Mécérian in 1928 (Table 3.42) represent the Armenian population, within the limits of the "Délégation Apostolique de Syrie." The distribution resembles that so far established, but the overall total is inflated by the relatively high estimate for the Aleppo region. Figures presented to H. M. Consul-General in Beirut by Burnier in 1938 (Table 3.43) do not appear to be related to the Civil Registers as, for example, only 3500 Armenians are recorded at Damascus. They are useful in differentiating between

<sup>40</sup> *Source:* N. A., Burnier to Johnson, Aug. 18, 1926.

<sup>41</sup> N. A. C1429, Johnson Report, Dec. 18, 1926.

<sup>42</sup> Mécérian (1928)(1), p. 144. *Note:* Of these, 20,000 were Catholics, of whom 9000 at Aleppo, 3000 at Beirut and 1200 at Damascus. These figures exclude those Armenians of the north-east dependent on Baghdad.

indigenous and refugee Armenians, but the basis of their collection is unknown. Other figures from the Nansen Office for 1938 (Table 3.44) may more likely be related to the Register.

<b>Table 3.43:</b> Distribution of Armenians in Syria and Lebanon according to figures supplied to H. M. Consul-General in Beirut, by Burnier, 1938 <sup>43</sup>			
		Tot. Arms.	A. Refs.
<b>Lebanon</b>			
	Beirut & district	30,000	
	Rest of Lebanon	13,000	
	Total	43,000	31,000
<b>Latakia province</b>			
	Total	4000	4000
<b>Syria</b>			
	Aleppo & district	55,000	41,000
	Damascus & district	3500	7000
	Homs & district	1500	
	Hama & district	1000	
	Jezira & N. Syria	5000	
	Total	66,000	48,000
<b>Sanjak of Alexandretta</b>			
	Total	22,000	10,000
Overall total		135,000	95,000

<b>Table 3.44:</b> Distribution of Armenians in Syria and Lebanon according to Nansen Office estimates, 1938 <sup>44</sup>	
Lebanon	44,066
Sanjak of Alexandretta	27,000
Aleppo	61,200
Remainder of Syrian territory	18,000
Total	150,266

### *Estimates for Particular Regions and Towns*

The picture which emerges of Armenian population distribution from the overall estimates, both official and unofficial, is highly confusing, as there is no reliable set of figures to serve as a base against which to measure the others. The main rudiments of the distribution emerge from the maps, but the detail is obscured by conflicting totals. Again, it is necessary to sharpen the focus of enquiry and consider developments in each particular district and town. To the totals available from the tables discussed are then added the additional estimates for individual locations.

#### *Aleppo Vilayet*

The 1922 Census, 1926 Register and Burnier, 1938 provide indications of the size of the indigenous Armenian population of Aleppo Vilayet (Table 3.45). As

<sup>43</sup> F0371/21915.

<sup>44</sup> N.A. C1524.

regards refugees, the estimates of Duguet and the “Rapports” (1925, 1927) roughly correspond, but it is necessary to invoke a very high indigenous population to reconcile these figures with those of the Intelligence Service (1927), Catholicossate (1924) and Mécérian (1928). Given this insecure base it is difficult to comment on the subsequent increase in Armenian population, especially in view of the inaccuracy of the 1938 Register. More information may come from the figures for individual locations.

**Table 3.45:** Estimates of the Armenian population of Aleppo Vilayet<sup>45</sup>

Date	Estimate	Source
1923	6657 A.	Census of 1922. Table 3.4
c.1924	55,000 A.	Catholicossate. Table 3.39
1925	37,300 A.R.	“Rapport” (1924). Table 3.33
1925	37,400 A.R.	Deuxième Bureau (1932)
1926	9179 A.	Civil Register. Table 3.10
1927	40,000 R.	“Rapport” (1927). Table 3.35
1927	36,065 R.	Duguet (1928) (x 3.8)
1927	57,698 A.	Intelligence Service. Table 3.36
1928	63,440 A.	In Aleppo “region”. Mécérian (1928) (1), p. 144
1931	45,000 A.	2e Bureau (1932)
1938	65,654 A.	Civil Register. Table 3.22
1938	55,000 A.	Of whom 41,000 refugees. Burnier (1938), Table 3.43.
1938	61,200 A. R.	Probably includes indigenous Armenians. Nansen Office (1938). Table 3.44

At Aleppo town, the indigenous population enjoyed immunity from deportation during the war,<sup>29</sup> but thousands of other deportees passed through Aleppo on their way south or before being sent eastwards towards Deir el Zor. A number of these deportees managed to find refuge in the city, outwitting the Turkish authorities.<sup>30</sup> Many orphans were gathered in by Aharon Shirajian. During the subsequent repatriation, Aleppo again formed an important transit-point, this time for the journey home. It appears that the last deportees were repatriated from Aleppo in October and November 1919, but some orphans clearly remained, under Shirajian.<sup>31</sup> Refugees began to arrive again in 1920, from Zeitoun, Gaziantep and Hadjin,<sup>32</sup> but it is difficult to estimate their number, which was not large. The 1921 immigration also affected Aleppo to a relatively small extent, most of the refugees in the north heading for Alexandretta. Those who did head for Aleppo came for the most part from Gaziantep via Kilis, and their number was officially estimated at 4500.<sup>33</sup> By contrast, the 1922-24 migration was directed overwhelmingly at Aleppo, where the most reasonable estimate of refugee arrivals would appear to be about 25,500.<sup>34</sup> About 5600 of these refugees were subsequently aided in their departure southwards to Damascus and Beirut.<sup>35</sup> Another mass emigration concerned the orphans who, c. 1924, were removed in large numbers to other N.E.R. orphanages in Syria.<sup>36</sup> In September 1921 they had

<sup>45</sup> **Explanation:** A: Armenians; A. R.: Armenian Refugees; R.: Refugees (including non-Armenians).

numbered 1135.<sup>37</sup> However, Aleppo gained again by the arrival of about 200 families in 1929-30,<sup>38</sup> and through the flight of Armenians from the Sanjak in 1938-39.<sup>39</sup> Aleppo also gained Armenian population as the centre of the work of rescue of Armenian women and children taken into Arab and Kurdish homes during the deportations. At least 450 children were brought into Aleppo after the Armistice by N.E.R. while, between 1921 and 1930, Karen Jeppe brought in about 1900 women and children.<sup>40</sup> While data on these population movements are of variable quality, there is virtually none on demography or on population movements other than the principal migrations. Consequently, it is impossible to judge conflicting population totals (Table 3.46) on the basis of knowledge of population dynamics. It is only possible to single out those estimates whose base seems most reliable, notably that of Duguet, with which the estimates of Shirajian (1925, 1926), the 2e Bureau (1925) and the "Rapports" (1924, 1927) seem roughly in agreement. If Duguet's figures are reliable, then some of the other totals presented would appear to be gross overestimates even allowing for the addition of the indigenous Armenian population. The evolution of the Armenian population after 1927 is obscure, but some weight should be given to the 2e Bureau estimate of 42,000 Armenians in Aleppo in February 1931.

The pattern of refugee settlement in the north of Aleppo Vilayet in 1927 is illustrated on Duguet's map. It is uncertain whether these Armenians came directly to the northern towns in the course of immigration, or whether they moved there after an initial stay in Aleppo. The nuclei of the colonies were, however, established very early (Table 3.47), and there is certainly evidence of some direct settlement. On the other hand, Armenians were described moving to these towns from the urban camps,<sup>41</sup> and it seems likely that both processes were at work. The picture after 1927 is obscure. A comparison between Duguet and the 1938 Register shows large increases in Armenian population in all the cazas concerned, with the exception of Menbidj where the Armenian population appears to have remained static. Such a comparison is dangerous, however, given the inadequacy of data, and a further comparison with other estimates for Bab, Menbidj and Djerablous suggests that, while in each town Armenian population increased until about 1928, there was a subsequent decline in Bab and Menbidj, while only at Djerablous did the population continue to grow or sustain its previous level (Table 3.48). Insufficient evidence exists to enable similar comparisons to be made for the other settlements. Evidence is even more scanty concerning the Armenians in the south of the Vilayet. Duguet and the 1938 Register suggest some scattering of Armenians in the area, which included the long-established Armenians in Qénayé and Yacoubié.<sup>42</sup>

Table 3.46: Estimates of the Armenian population of Aleppo town <sup>46</sup>		
Date	Estimate	Source
1922	20,000 A.R.	i.e., before Nov. 1, 1922. Consul Smart, Aleppo, Jan. 6, 1923 (FO 371/9091)
1922	25,000 C.R.	i.e., 7000 after the Ankara agreement and 18,000 recently arrived. <i>Bulletin de Renseignements</i> , 399, Nov. 29, 1922 (Arch.Dip., Turquie, Vol. 57)
1923	50,000 A	Of whom 40,000 refugees. Hekimian, Near East Relief, Aleppo, June 26, 1923 (FO 371/9098)
1923	c.50,000 A.	Most of whom refugees. St. John Ward, American Red Cross, Beirut, Nov. 29, 1923 (Arch. A.R.C.)
1923	35-40,000R.	Of whom 95% Armenian. Consul Vaughan-Russell, Aleppo, Dec. 14, 1923 (FO 371/10195)
1924	30,000 C.R.	Weygand, French High Commissioner, March 6, 1924 (Arch.Dip. Turquie, Vol. 258)
1924	c.50,000 R.	Shirajian Report, April 10, 1925 (F. A. 97, 4Q, 1925, pp. 15-16) Shirajian was a Protestant Armenian philanthropist involved in relief work.
1924	40,000 A.	Possibly refers to refugees only. Mécérian (1924), p. 222. Mécérian was a Jesuit priest involved in relief work.
1925	40,000 R.	Including 3000 Syrians. Shirajian Report.
1925	25,000 A.R.	Carle Report (1925), p. 6
1926	50-60,000 A.	including c.40,000 refugees. H.M. Consul at Aleppo, quoted by Consul-General Satow, Beirut, May 11, 1926 (FO 371/11550)
1926	58,000 A.	including 50,000 refugees. Burnier, Aug. 18, 1926 (N.A. C1429)
1926	35,000 A.R.	plus 2500 Syrian refugees. Shirajian Sept. 3, 1926 (F.A. 102, 1Q, 1927, p. 3)
1926	c.40,000 A.R.	Mécérian (1926), pp. 536-37.
1927	32,080 A.R.	Duguet (1928), (i.e., 3.8 x 8442 families)
1927	44,000 A.	Ross, Fry & Sibley (1929). Includes 36,000 refugees. Total indigenous Armenians (8000) derived from Burnier.
1927	56,058 A.	Intelligence Service. Table 3.36
1931	42,000 A.	2e Bureau (1932)
1933	40,000 A.	Paul Berron, <i>Le Levant</i> , 10e Ann. nos. 6-7, aout, 1933, p. 3. Berron was director of "Action Chrétienne en Orient."
1934	52,000 A.	of whom 42,000 refugees. Jalabert (1934), p. 119. Jalabert a Jesuit priest. "42,000 refugees" possibly derived from 2e Bureau, above.
1937	43,000 A.	"Rapport" (1937), pp. 26-27
1938	58,291 A.	Civil Register. Table 3.22
1939	55,000 A.	<i>Le Levant</i> , 16e Ann., no. 6, avril-mai, 1939, p. 2.
1939	61,000 A.	Armenian bishop of Aleppo, May 20, 1939 (FO 371/23302)

<sup>46</sup> *Explanation*: As Table 3.45. Also, C.R.: Christian Refugees.

<b>Table 3.47:</b> Armenian settlement in the northern towns of Aleppo Vilayet, according to Hekimian, 1923 <sup>47</sup>		
Azaz	1200 persons	from Kilis
Djerablous	400 persons	from Birecik
Menbidj	40 families	from Gaziantep
Bab	40 families	from? (Probably also Gaziantep)

<b>Table 3.48:</b> Estimates of the Armenian population of the northern towns of Aleppo Vilayet <sup>48</sup>		
<b>Bab</b>		
Date	estimate	Source
1923	40 F	Hekimian, N.E.R., June 26, 1923 (FO 371/9098)
1927	53 F	Duguet (1928)
1928	45 F	(i.e., 225P) Manoogian to Gracey, March 1, 1928 (N.A. C1431). Manoogian was a Protestant Armenian pastor involved in relief work.
1928	50 F	Burnier to Johnson, April 10, 1928 (N.A. C1431)
1928	50 F	Burnier to Johnson, June 5, 1928 (N.A. C1429)
1937	17F	Nerses Khachadourian, a Protestant Armenian pastor, April 20, 1937 ( <i>Levant</i> , 14e ann., no. 6-7, juin-août., 1937, p. 3)
1938	838 P	Civil Register. Table 3.22. Refers to population of caza.
<b>Menbidj</b>		
1923	40 F	Hekimian.
1925	250 P	Burt Report, 1925 (N.A. C1425). Joseph Burt of the Society of Friends visited Syria to examine the problem.
1925	250 P	Hedwige Bull of A.C.O., who visited Menbidj, March 14, 1925 ( <i>Levant</i> , 2e Ann., no. 59, juin, 1925, p. 7)
1927	c. 400 P	Bull, who revisited Menbidj, May 12, 1927 ( <i>Levant</i> , 4e Ann., no. 6, juin, 1927, p. 3)
1927	98 F	Duguet (1928)
1928	72 F	(i.e., 370P). Manoogian.
1928	75 F	Burnier, June 5, 1928
1932	30 F	Bull, <i>Levant</i> , 9e Ann., no. 7, juillet, 1932, p. 2.
1933	c. 40 F	Berron, <i>Levant</i> , 10e Ann., no. 6-7, avril-aout, 1933, pp. 3-4.
1938	358 P	Civil Register. Table 3.22. Refers to population of caza.
<b>Djerablous</b>		
1923	400 P	Hekimian.
1925	750 P	Manoogian, <i>FA</i> , 97, 4Q, 1925, p. 5.
1927	310 F	Duguet (1928)
1927	c.1500 P	Bull, <i>Levant</i> , 4e Ann., no. 6, juin, 1927, p. 3.
1928	c.1600 P	Manoogian
1931	2500 P	2e Bureau (1932)
1933	1500 P	Manoogian, <i>FA</i> , 125, Feb., 1933, p. 7.
1938	500 F	Chadavérian (1938), p. 101.
1938	(2934 P)	Civil Register. Table 3.22. Refers to the two cazas of Djerablous and Ain el Aarab.

<sup>47</sup> **Source:** Report by Mr. Hekimian, Aleppo representative of Near East Relief, June 26, 1923 (FO 371/9098).

<sup>48</sup> **Explanation:** F: Families, P: Persons.

### *The North-East*

In the north-east, it is not known how many of the indigenous Armenian inhabitants of Deir el Zor and Raqqa caza survived the war. The 1926 Register may include some immigrant Armenians, but the high proportion of Catholics (54%) recorded in the district suggests the survival of an indigenous, largely Catholic, population. However, according to the 2e Bureau figures of 1925 there were already then 1200 refugees in the district, in addition to the indigenous population, although Duguet suggests a lower figure. According to the Register the Armenian population had grown to 10,087 by 1938, with the Catholic proportion now reduced to 18% still relatively high in comparison with other areas, but a diminution expected given the addition of a large dominantly non-Catholic immigrant population. (In the newly populated caza of Hassetché however, 47% Armenians were Catholics in 1938, suggesting a relatively high Catholic component in the migration). The migrants came most noticeably in 1929-30, but there was migration direct to the area at other times, including, for example, the Armenians from Urfa who made their way via Djerablous to Raqqa. Others came from Aleppo, notably those involved in Karen Jeppe's colonisation scheme, while the numbers may have been further swelled by surviving deportees, and escapees from Arab and Kurdish tribes.<sup>43</sup> Accurate figures concerning these population movements are not available, so it is impossible to judge the accuracy of the 1938 Register total against Burnier's estimate of the same year. Nor do the various unreliable totals for individual settlements<sup>44</sup> contribute much to an understanding of the processes at work. It appears, however, that early migration was to the western half of the district, including the influx of migrants to Raqqa already noted, and the establishment of several colonies by Karen Jeppe in the valley of the Nahr el Belkh (Balikh), between Raqqa and Tell Abiad. However, Hassetché was already receiving Armenians by 1925,<sup>45</sup> though whether direct or via Aleppo is uncertain, and it was the far north-east, especially Kamichliyé, which benefitted most from the influx of 1929-30, so that the centre of gravity of Armenian population in the Euphrates and Jezira regions was now found in this town. A remarkable feature of Armenian population distribution in the area was their concentration in towns along the Turkish-Syrian boundary. This feature, also observable in the north of Aleppo Vilayet, was associated with the formation of twinned settlements, i.e., Turkish border settlements with newly added twins across the border in Syria.<sup>46</sup>

### *Sanjak of Alexandretta*

Alexandretta town had a substantial indigenous Armenian population and the 1922 Census gives the best estimates of its size after the war (c.1200) (Table 3.49). It subsequently received refugees in 1920 (c.1300-2500) and in 1921 (c.9200). Estimates of its Armenian refugee population after these migrations are as high as 20,000, but De Caix found only about 10,000 there in April, 1922, a figure which seems more in accordance with estimates of incoming migrants.

There followed an official dispersal of refugees from Alexandretta,<sup>47</sup> and population totals fell accordingly. Thus the 1922 Census and Armenian Catholicossate are agreed on the order of 6000 Armenians (total) in Alexandretta. Duguet's total of 1350 refugee families (c.5130 persons) are the best indication of the situation by 1927. After this there is little information available on the evolution of the population, the impression of growth indicated by the 1936 Register being offset by the reduced total presented by the 2e Bureau for 1931.

There was also a large indigenous population in the Sanjak outside the centre (see Fig. 1.4), concentrated in the Jebel Moussa, the Jebel Aqra (around Qassab), and Antioch town, all in the caza of Antioch, and scattered in some villages in the Amanus in the caza of Alexandretta and the nahié of Beilane. They do not appear to have benefitted to any large extent by the influx of refugees.<sup>48</sup> By contrast, the caza of Kirik Khane owed its rapid growth between 1924 and 1936 to the influx of refugees, especially to the town itself (Table 3.50), where the first migrants arrived in 1922, according to Jalabert.<sup>49</sup> It is not clear whether they came

<b>Table 3.49: Estimates of the Armenian population of Alexandretta town<sup>49</sup></b>		
Date	Estimate	Source
c.1920	1690 C.R.	Du Véou (1937), p. 259
1920	1500 R.	Eliz. S. Webb, Presbyterian Mission, c.Oct., <i>F.A.</i> 79, Jan., 1921, p. 10
1921	2500 C.R.	Vincent Paskès, April 16 (Arch. Laz.). Paskès a Lazarist missionary who followed his refugee flock from Ekbes to Alexandretta.
1921	10,000 A.R.	Annie Davies, of Friends of Armenia, Dec. 14, <i>F.A.</i> 83, 2Q) 1922, p. 9.
1922	20,000 A.R.	Davies, Feb. 18 (FO 371/7873)
1922	20,000 A. R.	W. Lytle, Irish Mission, Feb. 18 (FO 371/7874)
1922	20,000 C. R.	Paskès, March 1.
1922	10,000 R.	De Caix, Sec. Gen., French High Commission, April 1 (Arch.Dip., S-L-C., Vol. 143)
1922	15,000 A.R.	Manoogian, April 27 (FO 371/7874)
1922	c.20,000A. R.	Agent of the "Messageries Maritimes," May 1 (Arch.Dip. S-L, Vol. 190).
1922	8-10,000 R.	Davies, July 14, <i>FA</i> , 85, 3Q, 1922, p. 11
1924	6026 A.	Of whom 4824 immigrants. Census of 1922. Table 3.9
1924	6000 A.	Catholicossate. Table 3.39
1925	5000 A.R.	Burt Report (1925). Table 3.48
1926	4200 R.	All Armenians, less 100-120 Assyro-Chaldeans "Rapport" (1926)
1926	1350 R.F.	Johnson Report. Table 3.41 and Duguet (1928)
1927	6000 R.	"Rapport" (1927)
1927	5800 A.	Intelligence Service. Table 3.36
1931	6275 A.	of whom 4710 immigrants. Jacquot (1931), p. 60
1931	3800 A.R.	2e Bureau (1932)
1936	8630 A.	Civil Register. Table 3.19

<sup>49</sup> *Explanation*: As Table 3.46, Also R.F. Refugee families.

direct from Turkey, or if they reached Kirik Khane via another port of entry, like those Catholic Armenians who were installed with the Lazarists' mission in 1923,<sup>50</sup> and those settled by the Nansen Office. Elsewhere in the *caza*, the increase in population is attributable to the establishment of a number of colonies by the Nansen Office. (See Chapter 5).

### *Homs & Hama*

Within the districts of Homs and Hama, it would appear that the only Armenian settlement was in the towns of Homs and Hama themselves and in Selemiyé. Population estimates are rather contradictory. By 1923 according to the Census, there had been considerable immigration to Homs,<sup>51</sup> and a small movement to Selemiyé, while the Armenian population of Hama was largely indigenous.<sup>52</sup> After this, while the written sources suggest continuous emigration, the figures become contradictory.<sup>53</sup> Using Duguet and the 1938 Register, there appears a rapid decrease in the population at Homs, 1923-27, with a small increase at Hama and Selemiyé, followed by a steady increase in all three towns, 1927-1938. However, if the 1937 "Rapport" estimates are regarded as more accurate than the 1938 Register, then this latter increase becomes negligible, Armenian population remaining static in the towns of Homs and Hama. Other evidence<sup>54</sup> suggests a small absolute (but relatively high percentage) increase in the Armenian population at Selemiyé up to 1936. This is the best picture which can be presented, by rather arbitrary selection of population estimates. The large immigration to Homs and subsequent dispersal are, however, clearly established.

Date	Estimate	Source
1925	1160 A.R.	Sarrail, French High Commissioner, Jan. 27, 1925 (Arch.Dip. S-L, Vol. 177). Such an estimate of indigenous Armenians is contradicted by other sources.
	2144	
1925	c.1700 A.	including 200 Protestants. Manoogian, June 4, 1925 (FA, 98, 1Q, 1926, p. 21)
1926	440 A.R.F.	Johnson Report. Table 3.41, Duguet (1928) and "Rapport" (1926)
1928	2500 A.	M. W. Frearson of Friends of Armenia, FA, 109, 4Q, 1928, p. 12. This total apparently excludes those Armenians in the Nansen settlement
1931	3000 A.	i.e., 2000 Apost., 500 Cath., 300 Prot. Jacquot (1931), p. 173
1931	2700	2e Bureau (1932)
1932	c.4000 A.	i.e., 2500 Apost., 1000 Cath., 3-400 Prot. Tallon (1932), pp. 224, 227. Tallon a Jesuit priest.
1933	3878 A	Bazantay (1933), p. 14
1934	>3500 A.	i.e., >3000 Apost., c.500 Caths., Jalabert (1934), p. 113
1936	4388 A.	i.e., 3171 Apost., 1217 Cath. Civil Register. Table 3.19

### *Alawi Territory*

In Alawi Territory, indigenous Armenian communities existed in Latakia and the villages of Aramo and Ghnémié. In 1921, 2226 refugee arrivals were recorded

<sup>50</sup> *Explanation:* As Table 3.49; Also I.A.: Indigenous Armenians.

at Latakia town, and more refugees were transferred there from Alexandretta in 1922.<sup>55</sup> It is then surprising that the totals for Armenians recorded in the Territory by the 1922 Census, and in Latakia caza by the 1926 Register, are substantially less than the number of arrivals at Latakia town. It seems that either there was an error in the number of refugees recorded or considerable emigration should be invoked. Estimates of the Armenian population of Latakia in 1925-27 are anyway inconsistent, though most emphasis should probably be put on Duguet (Table 3.5). After 1927, there are insufficient reliable estimates available to enable any assessment of Armenian population growth in Latakia and the growth suggested by a comparison of Duguet and the 1938 Register may be illusory given the inaccuracies of the latter. Information on the growth of the Armenian population outside Latakia town is similarly lacking. The 1926-38 comparison above would suggest a movement away from the smaller centres, in which some refugees were reported as settling,<sup>56</sup> while the disproportionate increase in the Armenian population of Massiaf caza should be explained by the creation of the colony of Mouchachène Armène by the Nansen Office.<sup>57</sup>

#### *Damascus and Southem Syria*

Damascus contained a small Armenian community before the war, and the reduced 1922 Census total of 1280 seems the more realistic of the two Census totals for indigenous Armenians after the war, if rather high compared with pre-war estimates. Subsequently, Damascus received immigrants from both Beirut and the north. Of the refugees evacuated from Cilicia by sea by the French authorities, Damascus received 4500. More may have reached the city from Alexandretta, and another substantial group, comprising at least 3000 refugees, arrived from Aleppo in 1923.<sup>58</sup> Thus by the close of 1923, at least 7500 Armenian refugees had arrived in Damascus. Subsequently there was a mass exodus as a result of the events accompanying the extension of the Druze Revolt to Damascus in 1925. There are no reliable estimates of the number of refugees who fled from Damascus to Beirut at this time,<sup>59</sup> but the total was clearly of the order of thousands: Duguet, for example, notes 4000. This migration history makes it possible to understand the inconsistencies regarding Damascus already observed. Before the events of 1925 the estimates (Table 3.52) suggest a total Armenian population, the bulk of which were refugees, of between 10,000 and 15,000, a total retained in a few post-1925 estimates. Other sources are unanimous in presenting totals after the events reduced by the order of thousands to between 3500 and 5000: Duguet's total of about 829 families is probably the most accurate. Subsequently the Armenian population appears to have risen to about 8000 by 1937, although there are contradictory estimates. Certainly by 1938 the total was much less than that cited by the Civil Register, by now totally divorced from reality as regards Damascus.

Table 3.51: Estimates of the Armenian population of Latakia town <sup>51</sup>		
Date	Estimate	Source
1922	2226 C. R.	Arch.Dip. Table 3.2
1923	1500 R.	Eliz. W. Webb, Presbyterian Mission, <i>FA</i> , 89,4Q, 1923, p. 15
1924	1500 A.	In Latakia & district. Catholicossate. Table 3.39
1925	1430 A. R.	In Alawi Territory. 2e Bureau (1932)
1926	1025 A.	In Latakia caza. Civil Register. Table. 3.10
1926	2500 A. R.	Burnier, Aug. 18, 1926. Table 3.40
1927	1353 A.	Duguet (1928)
1927	2300 R.	“Rapport” (1927). Uncertain if this estimate relates to town or region.
1929	1046 A.	Jacquot (1929), p. 160
1931	1700 A. R.	2e Bureau (1932)
1933	1300 A.	i.e., c.1250 Apost. & c.80 Prot. Manoogian, <i>FA</i> , 127, Oct., 1933, p. 6
1935	1000 A.	<i>FA</i> , 134., Feb., 1936, p. 5
1938	1700 A.	Weulerese (1938), p. 56
1938	2026 A.	In Latakia caza. Civil Register. Table 3.22

Apart from the material already presented, there is practically no information available regarding the Armenian population of the rest of Damascus Sanjak, the Hauran and the Jebel el Druze, beyond one letter<sup>60</sup> which confirms the small dispersal of refugees to these areas.

### *Lebanon*

At Beirut, it is not known how many indigenous Armenians survived the war. The first refugees, however, arrived in 1920, from Gaziantep, and included the N.E.R. orphans. As many as 2000 were reported.<sup>61</sup> The great influx to Beirut, however, was at the end of 1921, when about a thousand refugees arrived using their own resources, and 10,466 were transported to Beirut by the French. Of these latter, however, only 4562 were still in Beirut by January 21, 1922,<sup>62</sup> about 6000 having been dispersed elsewhere, notably to Damascus. More refugees arrived in 1922, before the next large immigration, including a number of Marash orphans and refugees, and a number of refugees dispersed from Alexandretta.<sup>63</sup> There are no figures available. Later, between 1922 and 1924, at least 1000 refugees, sent southwards from Aleppo, reached Beirut.<sup>64</sup> The total was swelled further by those Armenians who fled to Beirut as a result of the Damascus troubles, 4000 according to Duguet. Finally, Beirut benefitted from the flight from the Sanjak, receiving refugees in 1938 and 1939, although none were evacuated to Beirut directly. Interpretation of the various estimates of Armenian population in Beirut (Table 3.53) is difficult because while some estimates refer to Armenians in Beirut and surroundings, others only count refugees within the city-limits. At the same time, information concerning immigration is inadequate. Nevertheless, it does seem difficult to reconcile the early estimate of Armenian population with migration history, and, in these circumstances, the first estimate which can be treated with respect is the 1932 Census total. This may be compared

<sup>51</sup> *Explanation*: As Table 3.49.

with that for 1943, but in so doing it is apparent that the real increase in the Armenian population is disguised by the growth of the suburb of Bourj-Hammoud, outside the city limits. Clearly the population estimates for Beirut can only be understood after examination of the distribution of the Armenians within the city.


<b>Table 3.52: Estimates of the Armenian population of Damascus<sup>52</sup></b>		
Date	Estimate	Source
1923	10,905 A.	of whom 5997 immigrants. Census of 1922. Table 3.6. This breakdown contradicted by another tabulation (Arch. Dip., Documents in course of classification) which notes 1280 indigenous Armenians & 11,565 refugees.
1923	>12,000 A. R.	Consul Palmer, Damascus, Sept. 8, 1923 (FO 371/9057)
1923	13-14,000 R.	St. John Ward, American Red Cross, Nov. 9, 1923 (Arch. A.R.C.)
1924	13,000 A.	In Damascus & district. Catholicosate. Table 3.39.
1924	15,000 A.	Mécérian (1924), p. 222.
1924	11,548 A.R.	Keeling to St. John Ward, American Red Cross, March 20, 1924 (Arch. A.R.C.)
1925	13,000 A.R.	Burt - Report (1925). Table 3.48
c.1925	c.14,000 A.	Ross, Fry & Sibley (1929) 266
c.1925	13,000 A.	of whom 500 indigenous. Acting-Consul Vaughan-Russell, Damascus, May 31, 1926 (FO 371/11550)
1925	10,000 A.	In State of Damascus. 2e Bureau (1932)
1926	13,153 A.	In Damascus Sanjak. Civil Register. Table 3.10
1926	10,000 A.R.	In Damascus & Hauran. Burnier, Aug. 18, 1926. Table 3.40
1926	3,500 A.R.	Consul Vaughan-Russell. Damascus, loc. cit. above.
1927	3150 A.R.	Duguet (1928) (x 3.8)
1927	200 A.R.	"Rapport" (1927)
1927	5040 A.	Intelligence Service. Table 3.36
c.1927	6-7000 A.	Ross, Fry & Sibley (1929), p. 266.
1928	5000 A.	Mécérian (1928)(1), p. 147.
1928	5-6000 A.R.	Rept. by Dorothy Redgrave, Friends of Armenia, Nov., 1928 (N.A. C1431)
1931	13,000 A.	12e Bureau (1932)
1931	10,634 A.	Including 9668 immigrants. Bernard (1931), p. 247, citing Civil Register figures
1935	6500-7000A.R.	Consul Mackereth, March 7, 1935 (FO 371/19676).
1937	8000 A.	"Rapport" (1937)
1938	18,309 A.	Civil Register. Table 3.22. But the true figure was substantially less than this. See note 3.24
1938	3500 A.	in Damascus & district. Burnier (1938). Table 3.43
1938	6000 A.	Berron, <i>Levant</i> , 15e Ann., no. 5-6, mai-juillet, p. 2.

Outside Beirut, there is little to add from supplementary sources to the picture of population distribution in Lebanon already described. There is some confirmation of an initial dispersal from arrival points, followed by a decrease of Armenian population in outlying towns and villages.<sup>65</sup> In any case, the number of orphans who were transferred to Lebanon (especially in 1922) was so great that

<sup>52</sup> *Explanation*: As Table 3.49.

it is difficult to understand the changing population distribution of the Lebanon before the distribution of orphanages has been examined.

<b>Table 3.53:</b> Estimates of the Armenian population of Beirut <sup>53</sup>		
Date	Estimate	Source
1922	c.30,000 A.R.	The Friends of Armenia, Jan. 31, 1922 (FO371/7789)
1923	20-25,000 A.	Delore (1923), p. 113.
1924	20,000 A.	Mécérian (1924)
1924	22,500 A.	in Beirut & district. Catholicossate. Table 3.39
1924	25,000 A.	of whom 17,000 within city limits. Marshall Fox (S.F. MS Vol. 216). Fox, of the Society of Friends, involved himself in the problem
1925	25,000 A.R.	Burt Report (1925). Table 3.48
1926	22,000 A.R.	Poidebard (1926), p. 16. Poidebard was a Jesuit priest.
1926	c.20,000 A.R.	Burnier to Johnson, Aug. 7, 1926 (N.A. C1429)
1926	30,000 A.R.	in Beirut & environs. Burnier, Aug. 18, 1926. Table 3.40
1926	22,038 A.	In city limits. Civil Register. Table 3.10
1927	21,242 R.	Duguet (1928)
1927	20,000 R.	“Rapport” (1927)
1931	30,000 A.	2e Bureau (1932)
1932	20,000 A.R.	Jude, Burnier & Lubet (1932), p. 173.
1932	22,413 A.	of whom 18,244 Apost., 4169 Cath. Census of 1932. Table 3.16. i.e., in city limits
1937	32,000 A.	“Rapport” (1937)
1938	30,000 A.	in Beirut & district. Burnier, 1938. Table 3.43
1943	22,485 A.	in city limits. Revised O.C.P. Census. Table 3.28



**Fig. 3.16:** Distribution of orphanages for Armenians in Syria and Lebanon, 1920-1939

<sup>53</sup> *Explanation:* As Table 3.49.

## ***Orphans***

The orphans, as has been observed, arrived in 1920, 1921 and especially in 1922 when the Near East Relief brought its orphans from interior Turkey to safety in Lebanon. At the end of 1922, the number of Armenian orphans in Syria and Lebanon may well have been over 10,000, so that they formed a significant percentage of the Armenian population. The orphans were progressively outplaced throughout the period, a number finding their way abroad. Thus, the number of orphanages was progressively reduced, the N.E.R. closing all its own orphanages or transferring their management to other hands by 1930.<sup>66</sup> Fig. 3.16 shows the distribution of these orphanages, based on the information reproduced in Appendix 1. The great majority of the orphanages were located in the Lebanon, and in the absence of reliable information it seems likely that this reflected the security offered by the Christian population, and possibly also the availability of Mission buildings for orphanages. The existence of these orphanages clearly accounts partly for the apparent dispersal of refugees in Lebanon noted in the discussion above. Thus, the presence of orphans may help to explain the concentration of Armenian population in Kesrouane, Meten and Saida observed from the 1926 Civil Register. The subsequent decrease in the Armenian population in the regions of Saida and Kesrouane between 1926 and 1932, sustained to 1943, may similarly be explained by outplacing of orphans. There was no parallel decline in Meten, of course, due to the rise of Bourj-Hammoud. The 1943 figures in fact reveal the persistence of former orphanage sites as minor nodes of Armenian population. Duguet's figures offer no confirmation of this picture, as they appear to exclude orphans, and this may possibly explain the inconsistencies between Duguet and the 1926 Register noted above.

## ***Rural-urban distribution***

Estimates of the rural-urban distribution of the Armenians may be made using the figures of Duguet and the O.C.P. Census of Lebanon (revised to 1943) relating to individual settlements. The overall Armenian population total (or refugee population total in the case of Duguet) may be compared with the total number of Armenians (or refugees) in the administrative centres of cazas, producing an estimate of rural-urban distribution based on an administrative definition of "urban" status. Duguet's figures (to which a population/family multiplier of 3.8 has been applied where appropriate, and from which the indigenous population of the Jebel Moussa has been excluded) reveal a refugee population 93.5% urban, due especially to their concentration in the cities of Aleppo, Beirut, Damascus and Alexandretta. The O.C.P. Census of Lebanon yields a corresponding value of only 49.3%. The discrepancy between the figures is explained by the exclusion of Bourj-Hammoud from the "urban" population in compiling the 1943 figure. If Bourj-Hammoud (a suburb of Beirut) is classed as "urban" then the urban percentage of the Armenian population rises to 88.2%, a figure which rises again to 95.2% if the recent Armenian arrivals from the Sanjak of Alexandretta, are

excluded from consideration. This percentage urban (95.2%) then compares well with that of Duguet for Lebanon alone (96.3%). These urban percentages are very high and may be compared with that of the population as a whole. No contemporary estimates of the urban population of Syria and Lebanon together are available, but the urban proportion of the Syrian population was only 37% in 1960<sup>67</sup> and had been increasing during the century. That of Lebanon was 37.9% in 1943, defined as above according to the O.C.P. Census. If Bourj-Hammoud were classed as “urban” this figure would still rise only to about 40%. In other words, in both Syria and Lebanon, the urban proportion of the total population was substantially less than that of the Armenian population, which was overwhelmingly concentrated in the towns. This concentration was also marked in comparison with the situation of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire before their migration to Syria and Lebanon. Although this situation is rather obscure, the migrations would appear to have been accompanied by a substantial rural-urban shift.

### ***Conclusions***

The available evidence concerning the distribution of the Armenians has now been described. The figures are inadequate and the resulting picture admittedly confusing. It is particularly unfortunate that no single set of figures concerning the distribution of the Armenians is entirely satisfactory: all must be examined in the light of developments in particular locations. Moreover, the basis of compilation of the figures is in most cases either unknown or known to be unreliable, so that to conduct statistical analysis using these figures is to invite error. Nevertheless, some conclusions must be attempted. Analysis of segregation on the basis of the available Census and Civil Register material (with the exception of the later Lebanese Censuses statistically highly suspect) did suggest that the Armenians maintained a distinctive ethnic settlement pattern, though segregation appears to have been higher between the Armenians and the non-Christian population than between the Armenians and other Christians. At this regional level there appear to have been very little difference between the distribution of Apostolics and Catholics, and no apparent significant relationship between the distribution of Armenian and non-Armenian Catholics. There remained at the end of the study-period a persistent relationship between initial migration history and population distribution, implying considerable inertia in the settlement process. Thus Beirut, Aleppo and Alexandretta, which served as the principal arrival points for the refugees, all retained considerable Armenian populations throughout the period. There was nevertheless considerable dispersal, notably to Damascus, but also for example to Homs, to the villages of Lebanon, to Kirik Khane and possibly to the north-east, which also requires explanation. The refugees were overwhelmingly concentrated in the towns, especially in the four centres of Aleppo, Beirut, Damascus and Alexandretta, and this concentration seems to have been increasing during the study period, with

secondary centres being deserted in favour of the principal cities. There was also some relationship between the pre-war pattern of Armenian population and the pattern of refugee settlement, notably the great concentration at Aleppo, though no causal connection need be implied. It is evidently impossible, in fact, to use the population data to infer a great deal about the processes in operation, or as the base for a quantitative analysis of locational decisions. The figures merely enable a few tentative conclusions to be drawn, and some interesting points of detail to be identified. They do enable the population totals presented in Chapter 2 to be assessed more critically, but the picture remains obscure: in some cases, it is as difficult to assess estimates for particular locations as it is to assess the overall total, and to combine uncertain and approximate individual estimates to provide an overall total would be to invite compound error. It would not therefore be a worthwhile exercise. As far as both population totals and distribution are concerned it is best to allow the inadequate and confusing statistics to speak for themselves.

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> *F.A.* 77, July 1920, p. 1, *Idem*, 78, Oct., 1920, pp. 1, 8-9; Arch.A.U.B. Mss MEI, File 8. Others reached Kilis; see F.O. 371/5050 & F. O. 371/5053.
- <sup>2</sup> *F.A.* 77, July 1920, pp. 1, 77,15, *Idem* 80, April, 1921, p. 5. In January, 1921, there were under N.E.R. care at Beirut, 1025 Armenian orphans, chiefly refugees from Aintab (Arch.A.U.B. Mss MEI). Miss Frearson brought 200 orphans, subsequently settled at Chemlan.
- <sup>3</sup> *F.A.* 79, Jan. 1921, p. 10, Arch.Laz.
- <sup>4</sup> *F.A.* 78, Oct., 1920, p. 16, *Idem*, 79, Jan, 1921, pp. 1, 7-8, 10-11, *Idem*, 80, April, 1921, pp. 2-3, *Idem*, 83, 10, 1922, p. 8. Refugees came also from Fendedjak, Zeitoun, Marash.
- <sup>5</sup> Naslian, *Vol.* 2, pp. 202, 244; *F.A.* 79, Jan, 1921, pp. 1, 7, 11.
- <sup>6</sup> "Rapport" (1922-23), pp. 18-20 and Arch.Dip. Arménie, Vol. O, S-L-C. Vols. 137-142, S-L Vol. 38.
- <sup>7</sup> The following figures are quoted, 6500 ("Rapport" (1922-3)18), 16,405 and 16,412 (Arch.Dip., S-L-C, Vol. 141), 14,535 (Arch.Dip., S-L-C, Vol. 142), 16,151 (Arch.Dip., S-L-C, Vol. 142).
- <sup>8</sup> Arch.Dip. S-L-C, Vols. 138-39.
- <sup>9</sup> "Rapport" (1922-23), p. 19.
- <sup>10</sup> Arch.Dip. S-L-C, Vols. 139, 142.
- <sup>11</sup> Arch.Dip. S-L-C, Vol. 142.
- <sup>12</sup> Jeppe to Riggs, Jan. 31, 1922 (N.A. R598).
- <sup>13</sup> Kerr, 247, 251; Alamuddin (1970), pp. 114-30; N.E.R. Reports (1921) (1922); *F.A.* 84, 2Q, 1922, p. 1.
- <sup>14</sup> N.E.R. Report (1922), p. 16. The figure includes orphans from Gaziantep, brought in in 1920.
- <sup>15</sup> Arch.Dip. Turquie, Vols. 57, 58, 256 and S-L. Vols. 174-176. Also reports by British Consuls at Aleppo of Dec. 13, 1922 (F.O. 371/7875), Jan. 6, 1923 (F.O. 371/9091) and March 4, 1924 (F.O. 371/10195). Also regular reports by L. Hekimian of the N.E.R. which appear in F.O. 371/9098 and F.O. 371/10195.

<sup>16</sup> Arch.Dip. Turquie, Vol. 258.

<sup>17</sup> *F.A.* 114, 1Q, 1930, pp. 1, 8, *Idem*, 115, 2Q, 1930, p. 5, *Idem*, 117, 4Q, 1930, p. 10; F.O. 371/13827 and F.O. 371/14553, Sahag II to the Délégué-Adjoint du Haut-Commissaire pour le Vilayet d'Alep, Oct. 30, 1929 (Arch.A.C.C.); *Massis*, Vol. 1, no. 12, Oct., 1929, pp. 268-69, Vol. 2, no. 3 Jan., 1930, pp. 69-70, Vol. 2, no. 4, Feb. 1930, p. 14, *N.A.*, C1428, C1430, C1584, C1586; *Le levant*, 7e ann. no. 3, jan.-fev., 1930, pp. 4-5, 7e ann. no. 4, mars, 1930, pp. 1-2, 8, 7e ann. no. 5, avril, 1930, pp. 1-2.

<sup>18</sup> Arch.Dip. Turquie, Vol. 258.

<sup>19</sup> Arch.Dip. Documents in course of classification.

<sup>20</sup> On the migration from the sanjak see Mécérian (1965), p. 108; Puaux (1952), pp. 53-56; Reports by Jacob Künzler, Nov. 8, 1938 (F.O. 371/21913), by consul Davies, Aleppo, July 6, 1939 (F.O. 371/23281) and July 27, 1939 (F.O. 371/23302), and by the Vicar-General of the Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia, Aug. 4, 1939 (F.O. 371/23302). Also correspondence in F.O. 371/21915 and *N.A.*, R5638, and reports and correspondence in *F.A.* and *Le Levant* for 1938-39.

<sup>21</sup> This paragraph is based on information in Longrigg (1958) *passim*.

<sup>22</sup> In the compilation of Table 3.10, the totals from the 1926 "Rapport" have been used. In fact, the totals for Lebanon and Alawi Territory appeared also in the "Rapport" (1925). A tabulation error involving the *caza* of Massiaf has been corrected.

<sup>23</sup> The distribution may, however, be distorted by the presentation of totals for specifically Armenian protestants for Antioch *caza* only. It is possible that the protestants recorded in the other cases may have been largely Armenian.

<sup>24</sup> In a footnote to the figures for Dec. 31, 1937 (Arch.Dip. Documents in course of classification) it is stated:- "Ces chiffres, fournis par le Service de L'État Civil ne peuvent pas être considérés comme rigoureusement exacts. En effet, certaines inscriptions ne correspondant pas à la réalité, le Conseiller pour l'Intérieur fit faire en 1935, une enquête auprès des officiers locaux de L'État Civil, des Chefs Religieux, des Moukhtars, etc. ...., pour savoir à quoi s'en tenir au sujet de certaines inscriptions qui lui semblaient fantaisistes. Notamment les différences suivantes, entre les chiffres de l'état civil pour 1937 et ceux de l'état établi pour 1935, à la suite de la dite enquête, méritent d'être signalées."

(There follows a list of these differences, including:-

Damascus town	Etat 1939	Etat 1935
Arm. Orth.	16,362	5582.

<sup>25</sup> See statement by Duguet to Armenian subcommittee of Nansen Office, June 17, 1927 (*N.A.*, C1430). Duguet also presents a table in his text giving overall estimates of Armenian refugees in the separate states, which yield a total of 88200. However, using the population: family ratio of 3.8 it is possible to derive a total based on the individual totals presented on his map i.e. refugee population of Alawi Territory (2063), Lebanon (23,762) and Syria (3.8 x 13,506) less non-Armenian refugees cited in text (3.8 x 958) and indigenous Armenians shown on map (3.8 x 480) = 71,680, i.e. c.71,500 Armenian refugees in Syria.

<sup>26</sup> Apart from Table 3.39 see also Carle Report (1925), p. 6; Khanzadian (1926), p. 44.

<sup>27</sup> It is strange that after noting 5000 refugees at Damascus in his first table Burnier should revert to this high estimate.

<sup>28</sup> Ross, Fry & Sibley (1929), pp. 263-64.

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- <sup>29</sup> Evidence from Arch.A.N.U. suggests that there were, in fact, some deportees from Aleppo itself during the war, or possibly some refugees who sought security further south.
- <sup>30</sup> On the Armenians in Aleppo during the war see: Naslian, *Vol. 1*, pp. 408-21; Bryce Report, pp. 547-54; Baurain (1930), pp. 111-13; Kerr, pp. 24, 29-30; Captanian, pp. 95-142; Jalabert (1974), pp. 13-17; Andonian, *passim*; Niepage, *passim*, *Ararat* (1915-18) *passim*; *ACABB Bulletin*, 4 (1916), p. 7, *Le Levant* 3e ann. No. 2, nov.-dec., 1927, p. 5, and Dodge to Vickrey, Dec. 11, 1920 (Arch.A.U.B. Mss MEI).
- <sup>31</sup> On the repatriation of refugees through and from Aleppo, see: Du Véou, pp. 23, 49; 2e Bureau, p. 8; Baurain, p. 118; Kerr, pp. 42, 49; Naslian, *Vol. 2*, pp. 310-11; *Ararat*, Vol. 6. (1919), pp. 308-9, 360; W.O. 95/4372-73, and references under note 2.8.
- <sup>32</sup> Arch.A.U.B. Mss MEI, *F.A.* 77-78, July-Oct., 1920; Kerr, pp. 234, 247.
- <sup>33</sup> See notes 3.11, 3.12.
- <sup>34</sup> See notes 2.18, 3.15.
- <sup>35</sup> "Rapport" (1922-23), p. 22, (1923-24), p. 27. See also the reports of Hekimian.
- <sup>36</sup> Shirajian Report, April 10, 1925 in *F.A.* 97, 4Q, 1925, p. 16.
- <sup>37</sup> "The Near East Relief in Syria" (Arch.A.U.B. Mss MEI).
- <sup>38</sup> See note 3.17.
- <sup>39</sup> See note 3.20.
- <sup>40</sup> See above on the rescue work.
- <sup>41</sup> Burnier to Johnson, April 10, 1928 (N.A. C1431).
- <sup>42</sup> According to Jacquot (1931), p. 582, there were 1000-1200 indigenous Armenians in Qénayé, but these were almost all of Latin rite and so would not appear as Armenians on the Register. By contrast about half the Armenians at Yacoubié were Apostolics (personal interview).
- <sup>43</sup> Charles (1942), pp. 50-51; *Le Levant*, 13e ann., nos. 6-7, juillet-août, 1936, p. 7; Report by Jeppe, Feb. 21, 1928 (N.A., C1431).
- <sup>44</sup> Charles (1942), pp. 50-51; De Vaumas (1956), p. 71, Burt Report, 1925 (N.A., C1425); *F.A.* 122, April, 1932, pp. 5, 12-13; *Le Levant*, *passim*; Naslian, *Vol. 2*, pp. 324-25; Poidebard (1927), p. 204. See also discussion of Karen Jeppe's colonisation scheme and the colony of Tell Brack in Ch. 5.
- <sup>45</sup> Poidebard (1927), p. 204.
- <sup>46</sup> See report from Consul Hough, Aleppo, May 17, 1928(F.O.371/13074).
- <sup>47</sup> See Ch. 5.
- <sup>48</sup> Despite assertions to the contrary e.g. by Gen. Sarraïl (Arch.Dip. S-L, Vol. 177) and by "Rapport" (1927).
- <sup>49</sup> Jalabert (1934), p. 112.
- <sup>50</sup> Arch.Laz.
- <sup>51</sup> See also *F.A.* 89, 4Q, 1923, p. 16.
- <sup>52</sup> Possibly some of this population had settled during the war. For concentration of deportees near Homs and Hama see Kerr, pp. 26-27; *Ararat*, Vol. 3(1915), p. 11, Vol. 4(1916), p. 103, Vol. 6(1918), pp. 219-20.
- <sup>53</sup> Report by Burnier, ca May, 1926 (N.A., C1429); Mécérian (1925), p. 440, (1961), p. 153; Naslian, *Vol. 2*, p. 358. See also Tables in text.
- <sup>54</sup> *Massis*, Vol. 9, no. 1, Dec. 1936-Jan. 1937, p. 8, notes 25 Armenian families at Selemiyé, most of whom were refugees from Gaziantep and Marash.
- <sup>55</sup> Arch.Laz.
- <sup>56</sup> France, M.A.E. (1922), p. 285; *F.A.* 127t., 1933, p. 6.

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<sup>57</sup> See Ch. 5.

<sup>58</sup> “Rapport” (1922-23), p. 22; St. John Ward to Bicknell, Nov. 29, 1923 (Arch.A.R.C.), F.O.371/7873, F.O. 371/9098, F.O.371/10195.

<sup>59</sup> “Rapport” (1925), p. 76, (1926), p. 103; Mécérian (1961), p. 153; Ross, Fry & Sibley (1929), p. 266; Mécérian (1928)(1), p. 147; Duguet (1928), p. 53; *F.A.* 98, 1Q, 1926, p. 5 and 99,2Q,1926, p. 20. Also F.O.371/11550.

<sup>60</sup> From the Armenian Bishopric of Damascus, dated Dec. 9, 1930 (Arch.A.C.C.), it notes 30 families at Dera’a, 15 at Soueida and 15 at Qouneitra.

<sup>61</sup> *F.A.* 77, July 1920, p. 1.

<sup>62</sup> De Caix to M.A.E. (Arch.Dip S-L-C, Vol. 141).

<sup>63</sup> Arch.A.R.C.; *F.A.* 84,2Q,1922, p. 1 & *F.A.* 85,3Q,1922, p. 7.

<sup>64</sup> “Rapport”(1922-23), p. 22; *F.A.* 89, 4Q, 1923, p. 19 & reports of Hekimian.

<sup>65</sup> Bacon to Forster, Nov. 28, 1922 (Arch.A.R.C.); Burnier to Johnson, Oct. 31, 1926 (N.A. C1429); Lytle to Russell, Feb. 18, 1922 (F.O. 371/7874); Naslian, *Vol.* 2, p. 358, and *F.A.* 131, Feb., 1935, p. 8.

<sup>66</sup> Apart from references previously cited see Barton (1930) *passim*, N.E.R. Reports & Pallis, p. 28.

<sup>67</sup> Dewiney (1972), p. 136.

## **ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS ON SETTLEMENT**

### INTRODUCTION

The refugees who arrived in Syria and Lebanon were in many cases deprived not only of their homes, but of their possessions as well. There was, of course, some variation in the amount of possessions they managed to bring out with them. Thus, the migration from Cilicia at the end of 1921, which had been anticipated as early as March of that year, was for the most part on a more orderly basis than the later migration of 1922-24 from interior Turkey, when the Armenians left precipitately and had little or no time to prepare. Likewise, while the earlier arrivals in 1929 sometimes got through with their animals, others were robbed of everything. To a large extent, the Armenians began their new life in Syria and Lebanon as impoverished refugees. The economic constraints on settlement might therefore be expected to have been severe.

This chapter examines the extent to which Armenian settlement was restricted by economic constraints or channeled by economic opportunities. Paradoxically, however, while the constraints involved might be expected to have been severe, little or no relevant information is available on the decision-making process, except with regard to settlement schemes, considered in the next chapter. The lack of data on economic constraints is ironic in view of the fact that the assumption behind the settlement schemes was precisely that without intervention the Armenians would be unable to resettle themselves (See Chapter 5). However, while this assumption was basic to the settlement schemes, it was not supported by any detailed study of the economic forces involved. The Nansen Office settlement scheme was indeed pursued on a somewhat ad hoc basis, and the next chapter will reveal some of the contradictory assumptions made regarding, for example, the number of "agricultural" families among the refugees. Moreover, once the settlement scheme began, discussion of why action was necessary in the first place became secondary to discussion of practical solutions (i.e., to an essentially, ill-defined problem), and this situation is reflected in the record of the decision-making process.

An examination of the relationship between Armenian settlement and economic opportunities and economic constraints is therefore necessary to test the assumptions behind the settlement schemes. Given that information on the decision-making process is lacking, one is confined to a somewhat dangerous comparison of occupational structure and economic status with observed settlement preferences. It is of course precisely such structural comparison which the study in principle tries to avoid. There is no methodological inconsistency here, however, for the necessity to search for explanations outside the record of the decision-making process was acknowledged in the Introduction. The chapter begins with an analysis of occupational structure, which is related to the settlement pattern, and some tentative conclusions are drawn regarding the

locational attraction of assumed occupations. This analysis also serves as an introduction to a discussion of the economic status of the Armenians, which is also related to the settlement pattern in order to assess the nature and extent of economic constraints on settlement. In the conclusion the results of the analysis of occupational structure and economic status are related to each other. It must be stressed that these conclusions, while of considerable import, are based on structural comparisons rather than the preferred analysis of the decision-making process. They should therefore be treated with reserve.

Before examining how the Armenians fitted into the economic system of Syria and Lebanon, it will be helpful to outline the main developments within that system during the period of Armenian settlement.<sup>1</sup> The economy of the Levant states remained throughout this period, according to Longrigg, “humbly and sometimes precariously viable”.<sup>2</sup> The base of the economy was of course agriculture. In this period the region witnessed the expansion of the cultivated area following the establishment of security, the improvement of crops and produce, progress in irrigation, the establishment of a cadastral survey with accompanying land-reform and fiscal reform, and the beginning of the replacement of the old sharecropping and “mush’a” methods by private-holdings and the capitalist farm-system. Cereals were the most important crops grown, but the importance of industrial raw materials increased during the period. Alongside this agricultural expansion industry, itself based mainly on agricultural raw materials, witnessed a decay of the traditional industries, characterised by primitive methods of production, and the development of new industries, that is industries involving factory production, sometimes through the modernisation of the old. The decay of the traditional industries resulted from foreign competition, the closure of traditional markets following the establishment of new trade barriers, and changes in fashion. The development of the modern industries could not offset the loss of employment due to the decay of the traditional sector, and serious unemployment resulted. Alternative employment opportunities were offered by the continuous improvement of the infrastructure of the country through public works and the concessionary companies. Notable was the development of the road-system and parallel development of motor-traffic. But even these opportunities were limited by the reduction of government expenditure on public works during the depression. Thus, the opportunities offered to the Armenians were limited. While the land offered possibilities for settlement, the industrial outlook was bleak, unless they could capture a disproportionate share of employment in the modern sector. Public works offered a promising but unstable alternative. How did the Armenians respond to this situation? And how did their response influence their settlement?

## OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE AND SETTLEMENT

### *Occupational Structure: Overall Estimates*

No single source is available to give an overall assessment of the occupational structure of the refugees. Two sources, *L'Indicateur Syrien* and the *Annuaire Commercial industriel touristique* published by Alphonse Ghanem in 1935-6 provide information on the principal towns but not on the smaller towns and villages. Since, however, the Armenian population was overwhelmingly urban and concentrated especially in the four cities of Aleppo, Beirut, Damascus and Alexandretta, the conclusions derived from the directories may have some general application.

The *Indicateurs* contain for each of the principal towns of Syria and Lebanon nominal lists of those involved in each trade or profession from which it is possible to abstract Armenian names for analysis.<sup>3</sup> Ideally one would wish to apply to this data the International Standard Classification of Occupations,<sup>4</sup> but the *Indicateur* lists are not in a state to permit this; in particular they do not differentiate, in listing many products, between sales and production. Moreover, the *Indicateurs* are highly selective, registering employers or the self-employed but not employees. Thus, the results of the analysis will not be representative of the Armenian population as a whole. Granted these difficulties, however, it is still possible to use the *Indicateurs* to compare the occupational structure of the Armenians with that of the rest of the population. The classification adopted in this analysis distinguishes between *Services*, *Professions* and the sale and manufacture of specific *Products*. No distinction between sales and manufacture is possible, nor any analysis of the mode of production.

Using the *Indicateurs*, Table 4.1 compares the entries of Armenians in occupational groups with entries of the rest of the population in 1924.<sup>5</sup> It also compares entries of Armenian names recorded in 1928-9 but not in 1924 with entries of the rest of the population in 1928-9. While the 1924 entries might be expected to reflect the occupations of the indigenous Armenians, the new Armenian entries in 1928-9 might reflect the preferred occupations<sup>6</sup> of the immigrant refugee Armenians. The table shows in 1924 a marked preference compared with the non-Armenian population for the professions. Amongst new entries in 1928-9 this preference was reduced in favour of Agricultural and Manufactured Products, as one would expect, but there was still over-representation in the Professions. Possibly the Armenians who succeeded in re-establishing themselves in the Professions found it easier to do so than those who endeavoured to re-establish themselves in industry. As regards preferred product-classes, data from the *Indicateurs* concern almost exclusively Beirut and Aleppo, and will be considered when the Armenians' occupational structure in those two cities is considered below.

	Occupational structure of Armenians in the principal towns of Syria & Lebanon (from <i>L'Indicateur Syrien</i> ) <sup>1</sup>													
	1924						1928-29							
	Armenians			Others			New Armenian entries			Others				
	Aleppo	Beirut	Other 1	Total	%	Total	%	Alppo	Beirut	Other 1	Total	%	Total	%
Agricultural and manufactured products	23	62	6	91	38.889	7150	77.633	14	167	4	185	58.917	7,434	75.718
Financial services	8	9	6	23	9.829	731	7.937	4	2	12	18	5.732	733	7.466
Other services	-	1	-	1	0.427	114	1.238	2	1	-	3	0.955	162	1.650
Professions	42	50	27	119	50.854	1215	13.192	70	28	10	108	34.395	1,489	15.166
Total	73	122	39	234	99.99	9210	100.0	90	198	26	314	99.999	9,818	100.0

<sup>1</sup> Note: i.e. Damascus, Alexandretta, Antioch, Baalbek, Zahlé, Tyr, Saïda, Tripoli, Djouniej, Latakia, Djeblé, Tartouss, Baniyas, Homs, Hama.

	Armenians	%	Other	%
Agricultural and manufactured products	37	23.270	1644	75.551
Financial services	20	12.579	160	7.353
Other services	-	-	11	0.506
Professions	102	64.151	361	16.590
Total	159	100.00	2176	100.00

	1924					
	Armenians					Others
	Armenians	Others	% as	% other	Difference in %	% as % others
Agriculture	-	8.3	-	6.019	6.019	-
Food and drinks	5	310	14.706	22.480	7.774	0.654
Oils, soap and perfume	-	32	-	2.321	2.321	-
Metals	4	134	11.765	9.717	2.048	1.211
Textiles	7	525	20.588	38.071	17.483	0.541
Leather & shoes	3	69	8.824	5.004	3.820	1.763
Construction	1	83	2.941	6.019	3.078	0.489
Machinery and precision instruments	5	31	14.706	2.248	12.458	6.542
Glass & porcelain	-	34	-	2.466	2.466	-
Paper, printing & related	4	10	11.765	0.725	11.040	16.228
Furniture	2	43	5.882	3.118	2.764	1.886
Products not elsewhere classified	3	25	8.824	1.813	7.011	4.867
<i>Total</i>	34	1379	100.001	100.001	78.282	

Table 4.2 shows the occupational structure of the Armenians in the principal towns of Syria (excluding Lebanon) using the data of Ghanem, classified on the same basis. The data, concerning all Armenians, not just refugees, again reveal an overwhelming concentration in the Professions, and corresponding underrepresentation in Agricultural and Manufactured Products. Again, the results are not representative of the Armenian refugee population as a whole. More interesting is the distribution of the Armenians by product-classes (Table 4.3). Here comparison with the distribution of the rest of the population yields an Index of Dissimilarity of 39.1, not particularly high, with the Armenians over-represented in five classes; Paper, Printing & Related, Machinery & Precision Instruments, Furniture, Leather & shoes, and Metals. These results are devalued,

<sup>1</sup> I.e. Aleppo, Alexandretta, Antioch, Latakia, Soueida, Damascus, Homs, Hama.

<sup>2</sup> \*: Less "products unclassifiable".

however, by the small size of some classes, and the small population of Armenians on which they are based.

It might be expected that the Armenians, lacking an inherited role in the regional economy, and with their lifestyle disturbed by the migrations, would be flexible in their approach to occupational selection, i.e., more prepared than the indigenous population to participate in the modern industrial sector, and that they would gravitate to those centres offering opportunities in this sector, (acting thereby incidentally as agents of innovation and modernisation). An Industrial Census, taken by the French authorities in 1937<sup>7</sup> differentiates between indigenous and immigrant labour in “new” and “old” industries, and thus enables some appreciation of the contribution of the Armenians (who formed the bulk of the immigrants) to the modern, sector (Table 4.4). The immigrant workers were mainly concentrated in Aleppo (45.73%), Beirut (35.64%), Damascus (9.13%) and the Concessionary Companies (7.26%), a distribution which reflects the distribution of the Armenians in the country, and provides confidence in the use of “immigrants” as a surrogate for Armenians. They provided 10.10% of the industrial workforce (as against about 4% of the country’s population). 30.45% of the immigrants were employed in “new” industries, 69.55% in the “old”, but their distribution between “old” and “new” industries was not uniform over the country, their concentration in “new” industries being greatest at Beirut and in the Concessionary Companies. A much greater percentage of the immigrants (30.45%) than of the rest of the working population (14.66%) was employed in “new” industries. However, this situation varied greatly between individual settlements. Thus, in Aleppo and the Concessionary Companies a greater percentage of immigrants than of others was employed in the new industries, while this situation was reversed at Beirut and Damascus. In fact, in these four classes as a whole, where the immigrants were largely concentrated, there was little difference between the percentage of immigrants (31.00%) and others (28.11%) in “new” industries. The difference between the overall percentages of immigrants and others in “new” industries is to be accounted for by the small percentages employed in the “new” industries in the smaller towns (grouped under Diverse) where the Armenians did not settle. In other words, the Armenians settled in the cities which contained most “new” industry, but within those cities as a whole they did not provide a disproportionately large percentage of the workforce in the “new” industries.

No breakdown is given in the 1937 “Rapport” of the results of this Census by industry. However, an anonymous report based on the Census lists the principal trades in which the immigrants engaged, without a numerical breakdown (Table 4.5).

**Table 4.4: Artisans and Workmen in the Principal Industries of Syria and Lebanon, 1937<sup>3</sup>**

	Immig.	% immigs. in town	Immigs. in new inds.	%	Others	Others in new inds.	%
Beirut	7342	35.64	3012	41.02	19,371	13,741	70.94
Damascus	1881	9.13	220	11.7	29,398	5655	19.24
Aleppo	9421	45.73	2143	22.75	35,249	4522	12.83
Tripoli	183	0.88	14	7.65	12,703	340	2.68
Saida	24	0.12	2	8.33	1463	58	3.96
Homs	212	1.03	-	-	6663	375	5.63
Hama	-	-	-	-	1915	-	-
Concessionary Companies	1495	7.26	869	58.13	5633	1284	22.79
Diverse	43	0.21	13	30.23	70931	901	1.27
<i>Total</i>	20,601	100	6273	30.45	183,326	26,876	14.66

Apart from these tables, a number of individual references in the literature suggest a broad outline of Armenian occupational structure. While a number of Armenians found work as retailers in the camps,<sup>8</sup> it seems that the bulk of them found work either as skilled artisans,<sup>9</sup> especially, according to one source, in the mechanical trades, or as unskilled labourers. The sources insist on the contribution made by Armenian labour to public works and to construction, both public and private.<sup>10</sup> The tendency to participate in modern industry, suggested inconclusively by the 1937 Industrial Census, is stressed,<sup>11</sup> their innovations in iron-founding being noted in particular. The participation of the women in the fabrication of woollen carpets, in the fine linen trade, and in embroidery is noted,<sup>12</sup> and the importance of the Armenians in the textile industry is stressed.<sup>13</sup> Female participation in the textile industry is confirmed by Table 4.5. It undoubtedly contributed greatly to the apparently large proportion of Armenians in the textile industry as a whole. Moussalli<sup>14</sup> draws attention to the trade in lace and Persian carpets, both, he claims, introduced by Armenians after the war. By contrast, while some Armenians undoubtedly managed to establish themselves in commerce or the liberal professions,<sup>15</sup> most were not so privileged, while government service and the law were effectively closed to non-Arabic speakers.<sup>16</sup> Very few became agricultural workers;<sup>17</sup> their settlement principally in urban centres has already been observed. The picture which emerges from these sources is, in fact, very different from that derived from the directories, with their emphasis on the Professions. More light may be shed on the true situation by an examination of the evidence at the local level.

**Table 4.5: Principal trades in which immigrants engaged in Syria and Lebanon, 1937<sup>4</sup>**

	Men		Women
tailors	bootmakers	mechanics	embroidery
turners	fitters	plumbers	rug making
bricklayers and masons	carpenters	concrete-workers	weaving
cabinet-makers	boiler-makers	hairstylists	domestic work
bakers	chauffeurs	soldiers	

<sup>3</sup> "Rapport" (1937), pp. 218-19.

<sup>4</sup> Anon, I.L.R. (1939), pp. 522-23. Based on the Industrial Census of 1937.

## Aleppo

The *Indicateur* figures (Table 4.6) reveal for 1924 an Armenian occupational structure similar to that of the country as a whole, while new entries in 1928-9 by contrast exhibited a continued and exaggerated preference for the Professions, with a very small percentage in Agricultural and Manufactured Products. With regard to product-classes entries of Armenians in 1924 were too few to permit meaningful analysis (Table 4.7). For the record the figures yield an I.D. between Armenians and others of 49.9, with the Armenians over-represented in Metals, Textiles, Leather & Shoes, and Construction. Entries of newly-recorded Armenians in 1928-9 were also too few to permit meaningful analysis (Table 4.8). They yield an I.D. between new Armenian entries and others of 72.9, considerably higher than the 1924 figure, indicative of greater ethnic specialisation. New Armenian entries were in fact over-re-presented in Metals, Furniture, and Machinery & Precision Instruments. Most notable was their concentration in Machinery, accounted for by clock-making. Between new entries and 1924 Armenians, the I.D. was 64.3, suggesting little correspondence in preferred occupations except, the figures reveal, for Metalwork.

**Table 4.6:** Occupational Structure of Armenians in Aleppo (from *l'Indicateur Syrien*)

	1924				1928-29			
	Armenians		Others		New Armenian entries		Others	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Agricultural and manufactured products	23	31.5078	783	76.093	14	15.556	852	70.882
Financial services	8	10.959	128	12.439	4	4.444	131	10.899
Other services	-	-	5	0.486	2	2.222	13	1.082
Professions	42	57.534	113	10.982	70	77.778	206	17.138
Total	73	100.	1029	100.	90	100.	1202	100.01

**Table 4.7:** Occupational Structure (by product) of Armenians in Aleppo, 1924 (from *l'Indicateur Syrien*)

	Armenians	Others	% A.s	% Others	Difference in %	% As/% others
Agriculture	-	80	-	12.177	12.177	-
Food & drink	2	266	11.111	40.487	29.376	0.274
Oils, Soap & perfume	-	15	-	2.283	2.283	-
Metalwork	5	39	27.778	5.963	21.842	4.68
Textile & clothing	6	160	33.333	24.353	8.980	1.369
Leather & shoes	3	32	16.667	4.871	11.796	3.422
Construction	2	25	11.111	3.805	7.306	2.92
Machinery & precision instruments	-	6	-	0.913	0.913	-
Glass & porcelain	-	3	-	0.457	0.457	-
Paper, printing & related	-	14	-	2.131	2.131	-
Furniture	-	5	-	0.761	0.761	-
Products not elsewhere classified	-	12	-	1.826	1.826	-
Total	18	657	100.	100.	99.848	1.000

Table 4.8: Occupational structure (by product) of new Armenian entries in <i>l'Indicateur-Syrien</i> , 1928-9, for Aleppo										
	Armenians new entries 1928-9	Others 1928-9	% new A. entries 1928-9	% Others, 1928-9	Difference in %s of new A. entries & others 1928-9	% new A. entries/% others 1928-9	% Armenians 1924	Difference in % of A.s 1924 & % new A. entries, 1928-	% new A. entries 1928/9 / % A.s 1924	
Agriculture	-	108	-	14.95 8	14.958	-	-	-	-	
Food & Drink	-	294	-	40.72	40.720	-	11.1	11.111	-	
Oils, soap & perfume	-	14	-	1.939	1.939	-	-	-	-	
Metal-work	3	45	21.429	6.233	15.016	3.438	27.7	6.349	0.771	
Textiles & clothing	2	143	14.286	19.806	5.520	0.721	33.333	19.047	0.429	
Leather & shoes	-	33	-	4.571	4.571	-	16.667	16.667	-	
Construction	-	21	-	2.909	2.909	-	11.111	11.111	-	
Machinery & precision instruments	7	12	50.000	1.662	48.338	30.084	-	50.000	?	
Glass & porcelain	-	4	-	0.554	0.554	-	-	-	-	
Paper, printing & related	-	13	-	1.801	1.801	-	-	-	-	
Furniture	1	9	7.143	1.247	5.896	5.728	-	7.143	?	
Products not elsewhere classified	1	26	7.143	3.601	3.542	1.984	-	7.143	?	
Total	14	722	100.01	100.01	145.764	1.000	100.00	128.571	1.000	

Ghanem lists only nine Armenians by Product, the majority entered being those in the professions. (Table 4.9) There is some correspondence with the *Indicateur* data, but no statistical comparisons are desirable. Similarly, no statistical comparisons are desirable with the entries of Armenian names in the nominal lists contained in the bulletin of the Aleppo Chamber of Commerce which, although in principle excluding the Professions, bear some resemblance to the data of Ghanem and the *Indicateur*. (Table 4.10)

<b>Table 4.9.- Occupational Structure of Armenians in Aleppo, from Ghanem, 1935-6</b>	
Occupation	Entries
<i>Metalwork:</i>	
Iron & ironmongery	3
Total	3
<i>Textiles &amp; clothing:</i>	
Tailors	1
Carpets	2
Total	3
<i>Machinery, &amp; precision instruments:</i>	
Clock-makers	2
Total	2
<i>Furniture:</i>	
	1
Total	1
<i>Financial Services:</i>	
Insurance-agents	1
Commission-agents	1
Total	2
<i>Professions:</i>	
Lawyers	7
Doctors	30
Dentists	25
Chemists	6
Total	68
Overall Total	79

More helpful is a nominal list of those employed in the various industries of Aleppo in 1932-33, also contained in the *Bulletin de la Chambre de Commerce d'Alep* (Table 4.11). This list is not directly comparable with the previous lists, as it excludes not only Professions but also salesmen as distinct from industrial workers. The industries listed are "celles qui sont les plus en vue et strictement liées avec le marché local." The figures yield an I.D. between Armenians and others of only 24.1, essentially a function of the concentration of both in Metalwork and Textiles (Table 4.12). While the preference for Metalwork did emerge from the *Indicateurs* this is not true of Textiles, where the importance of the Armenian contribution is revealed. Within these two classes, the Armenians were heavily concentrated in particular occupations, especially as "silver-smiths", and in embroidery and carpetmaking, where they exercised a virtual monopoly. From the comments in the *Bulletin* accompanying these tables, it is learned that both the carpet and embroidery industries developed after the war, the latter being actually referred to as "Aintab (Gaziantep) embroidery". Here there seems to be

clear evidence of refugee activity, and this is confirmed, in the case of carpet-making, by the fact that, alone of the various industries indicated, this industry was almost completely localised in the new Armenian quarters of Aleppo (Meidan). The importance of these industries to the Armenians in Syria and Lebanon as a whole has already received comment.

<b>Table 4.10.- Occupational Structure of Armenians registered at the Aleppo Chamber of Commerce, 1932-3 and 1938-9<sup>5</sup></b>		
Occupation	Entries 1932-3	Entries 1938-9
<i>Agricultural &amp; manufactured products:</i>		
Food & drink	-	2
Iron & ironmongery	2	3
Gold - & silver-smiths	1	2
Threads	2	-
Kilims / carpets	2	1
Fabrics	1	-
Clothing	-	1
Garages	1	3
Electrical equipment	-	1
Wood & coal	-	2
Novelties	-	1
"Produits du pays"	-	2
Total	9	18
<i>Financial Services:</i>		
Commission agents, Contractors etc.	6	6
Exchange	2	-
Total	8	6
<i>Professions:</i>		
Druggists	1	3
Photographers	-	1
Total	1	4
Overall Total	18	28

A further picture of Armenian occupational structure at Aleppo comes from a table presented by Shirajian in a report dated April 10, 1925 (Tables 4.13 – 4.5). This table, unlike those previously considered, is stated to concern only refugees, but it seems likely from the text that indigenous Armenians were included too, (at least in the group Professions) as well as some Syriac refugees. The basis of compilation is not known, but in view of the fact that Shirajian states that “of the 20,000 men and women capable of working only about half can get work, and... even this proportion is greatly reduced at present”, it is not certain if his table refers to their former or present occupations. The table should therefore be treated with reserve. The total of about 20,000 (20,370) working refugees was made up, according to Shirajian, of 13,000 men and 7000 women. Shirajian’s figures set the proportion of the refugees in the Professions in perspective. They show a population in which the great majority was employed in either industry or as day labourers, porters, or domestic servants. (Unlike the Directories, Shirajian’s

<sup>5</sup> Bull. Ec. Ch. Comm. Alep (1932-3), p. 3-12; (1938-9), pp. 5-16.

figures do enable a distinction to be made between Industry and sales, although no doubt many of those listed under Industry, e.g., the tailors, would also have exercised some sales function). The day labourers, porters and domestic-servants are excluded in tables previously considered, but their importance in the country as a whole has been observed from the literature, as has the importance of female labour in domestic service. Shirajian's tabulation of industrial occupations may be compared on a product basis with that in the *Bulletin*. There is some similarity, in particular the great concentration in Textiles & Clothing. It is apparent, however, that the situation differs somewhat through the inclusion in Shirajian's classification of menial workers excluded from the *Bulletin*, notably needle-workers and rug-makers. Shirajian notes too that an important industry, quite new

Occupation	Armenians	Others
<i>Food &amp; drink:</i>		
Milling	-	5
Cigarette-papers	-	5
Confectionery	2	11
Cheese	-	4
Total	2	25
<i>Oils, soap &amp; perfume:</i>		
Soap	-	6
Total	-	6
<i>Metalwork</i>		
Gold- & silver-smiths	10	26
Iron	3	3
Copper	1	7
Total	14	36
<i>Textiles &amp; clothing:</i>		
Weaving; mechanical looms	1	9
Weaving; hand looms	2	16
Carpets	9	1
Embroidery	7	3
Mechanical hosiery industry	-	3
Clothing; menswear	3	6
Clothing; womenswear	1	4
Printed handkerchiefs	1	3
Dyeing	-	14
Ropes & string	-	6
Total	24	65
<i>Leather &amp; shoes:</i>		
Hides & skins	-	10
Total	-	10
<i>Construction:</i>		
Cement	-	4
Joiners	2	6
Total	2	10
Overall total	42	152

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 73-84.

**Table 4.12:** Armenian's participation in the industries of Aleppo, 1932-3<sup>1</sup>

	Armenian	Others	% Armenians	% Others	Difference in %s	% As % others
Agriculture	-	-	-	-	-	-
Food & Drink	2	25	4.762	16.447	11.685	0.290
Oils, soap & perfume	-	6	-	3.947	3.947	-
Metal-work	14	36	33.333	23.684	9.649	1.407
Textiles & clothing	24	65	57.143	42.763	14.470	1.336
Leather & shoes	-	10	-	6.579	6.579	-
Construction	2	10	4.762	6.579	1.817	0.724
Machinery & precision instruments	-	-	-	-	-	-
Glass & porcelain	-	-	-	-	-	-
Paper, printing & related	-	-	-	-	-	-
Furniture	-	-	-	-	-	-
Products not elsewhere classified	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	42	152	100.00	99.999	48.147	1.000

<sup>1</sup>Bull. Ec. Ch.Comm. Alep (1932-3), pp. 73-84.

to Aleppo, and entirely in the hands of the Armenians, was that of cleaning and repairing second-hand clothes imported from Europe and America. In this some 2500 women were employed, who do not appear to have been included in his table. In fact, Shirajian's figures suggest that, rather than being distributed evenly throughout industry and the small-trades, the bulk of the Armenians were dependent on a few basic occupations; needle-working, rug-making, labouring and domestic service. It is evident that female employment in the sectors of needle-work, rug-making and domestic service provided a vital ingredient of the occupational structure, while the menfolk worked principally either as artisans, as retailers, or as simple labourers. This is a much different picture from that derived from the *Indicateurs*.

**Table 4.13.-** Occupational structure of Armenian refugees in Aleppo, from, a table prepared by Rev. A. A. Shirajian, April 10, 1925<sup>7</sup>

	Total	%
Industry	12,190	59.843
Sales	760	3.731
Financial services	225	1.105
Other services	320	1.571
Professions	623	3.059
Day labourers, porters & domestic servants	6252	30.692
Total	20,371	100.001

**Table 4.14.-** Armenian Refugee participation in the industries of Aleppo, 1925<sup>8</sup>

	Total
<i>Metalwork</i>	
Black-smiths	280
Goldsmiths	50
Brass-workers, tinsmiths, re-tinners, comb-makers etc.	150
Total	480
<i>Textiles &amp; clothing:</i>	
Tailors	280
Weavers	830
Needle-workers & rug-makers	8000
Total	9110
<i>Leather &amp; shoes:</i>	
Shoe-makers	650
Total	650
<i>Construction:</i>	
Masons, etc.	1500
Carpenters	450
Total	1950
Overall total	12,190

<sup>7</sup> F.A. 97,4Q, 1925, p. 15.

<sup>8</sup> *Source:* As Table 4.13.

	Armenians	%
Food & Drink	-	-
Oils, soap & perfume	-	-
Metalwork	480	3.938
Textiles & clothing	9110	74.733
Leather & shoes	650	5.332
Construction	1950	15.997
Machinery & precision	-	-
Glass & porcelain	-	-
Paper, printing & related	-	-
Furniture	-	-
Products not elsewhere classified	-	-
Total	12,190	100.000

It is, however, substantially confirmed by a report on the Armenian refugees settled in the new Armenian quarter of Aleppo by 1930. Here there were in November 1930, 39 shops (Table 4.16) providing basic services for the Armenians of the quarter. In addition, there were several workshops where carpets, kilims and woven fabrics were made, where 106 looms were used, and where about 200 workmen and workwomen were employed. In view of the earlier discussion of the participation of the Armenians in the “modern” sector of industry, the organisation of workshops in the quarter is particularly interesting. About 200 women and girls did embroidery work at home for employers with businesses in town. The rest of the inhabitants worked outside the quarter (Table 4.17), and here the overwhelming importance of Labouring is shown (presumably the “workwomen” were employed either in domestic service or in factories), while in the skilled sector the greatest number were employed in Construction. If the information concerning the industrial occupations of the Armenians both inside and outside the quarter is combined (Table 4.18), the situation which emerges, is comparable to that presented by Shirajian for the refugees in 1925, with the great dominance of Textiles (which emerged also from the *Bulletin* figures), and the notable concentration in Construction. As with Shirajian of course these percentages might be changed by the inclusion of labourers etc.

Bakeries	2
Grocers	25
Butchers	3
Hairdressers	5
Cafes	2
Tailors	1
Gold & silversmith	1
TOTAL	39

<sup>9</sup> Source: As Table 4.13.

<sup>10</sup> N.A. C1583.

<b>Table 4.17.- Occupations of Armenians from the Meidan quarter of Aleppo, 1930<sup>11</sup></b>		
Occupation	Pop.	%
<i>Food &amp; drink</i>		
Bakers	5	
Total	5	1.09
<i>Metalwork</i>		
Founders	4	
Tinsmiths	4	
Blacksmiths	15	
Coppersmiths	6	
Gold & silver-smiths	2	
Total	31	6.75
<i>Textiles &amp; clothing</i>		
Tailors	5	
Total	5	1.09
<i>Construction</i>		
Stone-cutters	25	
Masons	35	
Carpenters	20	
Total	80	17.43
<i>Sales</i>		
Hawkers	5	
Total	5	1.09
<i>Financial services</i>		
Brokers	2	
Total	2	0.44
<i>Other services</i>		
Chauffeurs	7	
Coachmen	15	
Hairdressers	6	
Total	28	6.1
<i>Professions</i>		
Teachers	1	
Photographers	2	
Total	3	0.65
<i>Labourers etc.</i>		
Jobbing-workmen	200	
Workwomen	100	
Total	300	65.36
Overall total	459	100.00

<b>Table 4.18.- Industrial occupations of Armenians living in the Meidan quarter of Aleppo, 1930<sup>12</sup></b>		
	Armenians	%
Food & drink	5	1.558
Oil, soap & perfume	-	-
Metal-work	31	9.657
Textiles & clothing	205	63.863
	-	-

<sup>11</sup> *Source:* As Table 4.16.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

Leather & shoes	-	-
Construction	80	24.922
Machinery & precision instruments	-	-
Glass & porcelain	-	-
Paper, printing & related	-	-
Furniture	-	-
Not elsewhere classified	-	-
Total	321	100.00

**Table 4.19.-** Service provision in the Meidan quarter of Aleppo, 1933<sup>13</sup>

Butchers' shops	13
Bakeries	7
Hairdressers	13
Shops of grocers, and for cereals, clothing, hardware & ironmongery	210
Chemist	1
Clinics	2
Dentists	2
Total	248

This was still the picture in 1933, according to the comparable report for that year. Then, there still existed in the quarter basic service provision (Table 4.19). In addition, (Table 4.20) there were in the quarter two weaving sheds (with mechanical looms), as well as 205 hand-loom and 32 looms for carpets. There were also 800 female embroiderers, while the great majority of the remaining work-force within the quarter found employment in the construction industry. Several hundred workers still worked in the town, but their occupations are not stated. This situation was essentially the same the following year as well (Tables 4.21, 4.22).

Figures of dubious reliability presented in the Report of the Mandatory Power for 1926, classifying the Armenians in the camps of Aleppo by occupation (Table 4.23), fail to differentiate between skilled and non-skilled workers, and add nothing to our understanding.

The occupational structure evident from the analysis of the figures of the Nansen Office and of Shirajian is, however, confirmed by individual references to Armenian occupations at Aleppo. These confirm the establishment of basic service provision in the camps,<sup>18</sup> the participation of Armenians in industry and the small trades<sup>19</sup> (where the importance of their imported skills is stressed), and their employment as labourers,<sup>20</sup> notably on public-works, but especially their dependence on such trades as weaving, embroidery, carpet-making and the second-hand clothes industry.<sup>21</sup> It was in particular the concentration in textiles and clothing which characterized the Armenian economy in Aleppo. In December 1926, Duguet noted 2000 looms being worked among the 8671 refugee families at Aleppo.<sup>22</sup> It is significant that in pursuing weaving the refugees from Marash and Gaziantep were apparently continuing their old trades in a new setting,<sup>23</sup> while, as observed, their embroidery was known as "Aintab embroidery". The

<sup>13</sup> N. A. 9 C1584.

question of whether the Armenians imported their occupations or assumed new ones will be resumed later.

<i>Metal-work</i>	
Copper-smiths	9
Smiths	3
<i>Textiles &amp; clothing</i>	
Hand-loom	205
Looms for carpets	32
Weaving-sheds (mechanical looms)	2
Female embroiderers	800
<i>Construction</i>	
Masons	70
Joiners	50
Stone-cutters	180
Quarry-men	35
Plasterers	20
<i>Miscellaneous</i>	
Mattress-makers	4
Electrical joinery	2

Clinics	3
Chemists	1
Butchers	12
Ironmongery	5
Building materials	4
Fuel-merchants	3
Cafes	4
Restaurants	1
Grocers & diverse	80
Total	109

<i>Food &amp; drink</i>	
Distillery	1
Pastry-shops	3
Bakeries	15
Electrically-powered mills	1
<i>Metal-work</i>	
Copper-smiths	9
Smiths	8
<i>Textiles &amp; clothing</i>	
Female embroiderers	850
Weaving-loom	200
Looms for carpets	20

<sup>14</sup> As Table 4.19.

<sup>15</sup> "Illustrated Report of the Refugee Housing Scheme carried out in Syria & Lebanon through the Nansen Office, Geneva, Beyrout, 1934." (S.F., MS Vol. 216).

<sup>16</sup> *Source:* As Table 4.21.

Weaving-sheds (electrically powered)	3
Tailors	4
Couturières	10
<i>Leather &amp; shoes</i>	
Shoemakers	9
<i>Construction</i>	
Masons, stone-cutters, quarry-men	200
Joiners	12
<i>Services</i>	
Oriental bath	1
Hairdressers	16
<i>Miscellaneous</i>	
Mattress-makers	1
Electrical joinery	1

**Table 4.23:** Occupations of the Armenians in the camps of Aleppo<sup>17</sup>

	Families	%
Artisans	3345	88.0%
Shopkeepers ("commerçants")	251	6.6%
Agricultural workers	203	5.3%
Liberal professions	-	-
Total	3799	99.9

### *Beirut*

For Beirut, the *Indicateur*, figures reveal for the Armenians in 1924 an occupational structure similar to that at Aleppo, i.e., a disproportionate concentration in Professions (Tables 4.24 - 4.27). However, the figures for new Armenian entries, 1928-29, reveal an altogether different picture from that at Aleppo, the bulk of these new entries in Beirut concentrating in Agricultural and Manufactured Products. This result was more expected, and probably reflects the higher number of entries of Armenians at Beirut, reducing distortion. Regarding product-classes, the Beirut figures for 1924 yield an I.D. between Armenians and others of only 24.9 (again in contrast with Aleppo). Preferred occupations of the Armenians were Metal-work, Paper, Printing & Related, and Textiles. The preference for Textiles was very slight, that for Paper etc., involved very small numbers, so that Metal-work seems definitely to have been the preferred sector for Armenians in 1924. With regard to new Armenian entries, 1928-9, compared with the rest of the population their I.D. was 22.7, i.e., slightly reduced compared with the 1924 situation. Between new entries and 1924 Armenian entries, the I.D. was 22.2, i.e., slightly lower still (Again the Aleppo figures seem suspect in comparison), but hardly indicating a significantly greater correspondence. With respect to product-classes, while new Armenian entries were still over-represented compared with the rest of the population in Metal-work, Paper etc., and Textiles, they were also over-represented in other fields, i.e., in Construction, Leather and Shoes, and Machinery and Precision Instruments. Their greatest

<sup>17</sup> "Rapport" (1926), p. 103.

over-concentration was in Construction, while Metal-work was popular with new entries as with the 1924 Armenian entries. Compared with the 1924 Armenians, however, new entries were under-represented in all three previously preferred classes except Textiles, though still over-represented in these classes compared with the rest of the population in 1928-9. Their under-concentration in these classes compared with the 1924 Armenians is, in fact, a measure of their diversification throughout the product-classes. However, not too much emphasis should be placed on the figures at the product-class level. Figures for classes disguise more specific occupational trends. Thus, while the percentage of Armenians employed in Textiles and Clothing did not change significantly, there was, amongst the new entries, a greatly increased number of tailors, and the establishment of new branches of shirt-making and, significantly, the used-clothing industry. Also, while the percentage of new entries in Metalwork was less than that of 1924, it was much higher regarding goldsmiths and iron-workers and smiths. The figures for new entries show little correspondence with the Aleppo findings, apart from the continued over-concentration in Metalwork. Like Aleppo there was an over-concentration in Machinery and Precision Instruments and, perhaps significantly, the largest contribution to the total of new entries in this class was made in Beirut as at Aleppo by clock-makers.

The only other table recording the occupational structure of the Armenians in Beirut, the Nansen Office Report for 1930, (Tables 4.28, 4.29) concerns one of the new Armenian quarters (“Gebeili”). Table 4.28 lists the shops and workshops in the quarter where, apart from basic service provision and the existence of a number of artisans, the most notable feature was the existence of 9 carpet-makers. Table 4.29 classifies the Armenians by occupation (apparently excluding those involved in Table 4.28). Here the significant features were the large proportion of labourers (26.6%), the relatively high number employed in Construction (with two shops devoted to building materials in Table 4.28), and the relatively high number employed in the Boot & shoe trade (with three shoe-shops also listed in Table 4.28). When the industrial occupations of the Armenians in the quarter are classified alone (Table 4.30), the situation is similar to that in the Meidan quarter of Aleppo, but without the heavy concentration in Textiles and Clothing.

	1924				1928-29			
	Armenians		Others		New Armenian entries		Others	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Agricultural and manufactured products	62	50.859	3795	79.574	167	84.344	3414	76.772
Financial services	9	7.337	376	7.884	2	1.010	366	8.230
Other services	1	0.820	60	1.258	1	0.505	94	2.114
Profession	50	40.984	538	11.281	28	14.141	573	12.885
Total	122	100.00	4769	99.997	198	100.00	4447	100.001

Table 4.26: Occupational Structure (by product) of new Armenians in <i>l'Indicateur Syrien, 1928-29, for Beirut</i>										
	Armenians New	Entres 1928-9	Othes 1928-9	% new A entres 1928-9	% Others 1928-9	Diff. in %	% new entres Armenians over % others	% Armenians 1924	Diff. in % As 1924 & % new As 1928-9	% new As 1928-9 over % As 1924
Agriculture	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Food & Drink	13	746	8.725	24.499	15.774	2.167	0.356	15.686	6.961	0.556
Oils, soap & perfume	-	66	-	2.167	2.167	0	0	-	-	-
Metal-work	21	259	14.094	8.506	5.888	1.657	1.657	23.529	9.435	0.599
Textiles & clothing	61	975	40.94	32.02	8.92	1.279	1.279	37.255	3.685	1.099
Leather & shoes	13	190	8.725	6.24	2.485	1.398	1.398	3.922	4.803	2.225
Construction	13	154	8.725	5.057	3.688	1.725	1.725	-	8.725	?
Machinery & precision instruments	13	233	8.725	7.625	1.073	1.14	1.14	3.922	4.803	2.225
Glass & porcelain	1	36	0.671	1.182	0.511	0.568	0.568	1.961	1.29	0.342
Paper, printing & related	5	73	3.356	2.397	0.959	1.4	1.4	7.843	4.487	0.428
Furniture	-	97	-	3.186	3.186	0	0	-	-	-
Products not elsewhere classified	9	216	6.04	7.094	1.54	0.851	0.851	5.882	0.158	1.027
Total	149	3045	100.01	100	45.385	100	44.347	100	44.347	100

**Table 4.25:** Occupational Structure (by product) of Armenians in Beirut in 1924 (from *l'Indicateur Syrien*)

	Armenians	Others	% As	% Others	Difference in %s	% As/% other
Agriculture	-	-	-	-	-	-
Food & drink	8	808	15.686	24.337	8.651	0.645
Oils, soap & perfume	-	80	-	2.41	2.41	-
Metalwork	12	247	23.529	7.44	16.089	3.163
Textiles & clothing	19	1142	37.255	34.398	2.857	1.083
Leather & shoes	2	206	3.922	6.205	2.283	0.632
Construction	-	152	-	4.578	4.578	-
Machinery & precision instruments	2	250	3.922	7.53	3.608	0.521
Glass & porcelain	1	67	1.961	2.018	0.057	0.972
Paper, printing & related	4	63	7.843	1.898	5.945	4.132
Furniture	-	92	-	2.771	2.771	-
Products not elsewhere classified	3	213	5.882	6.416	0.534	0.917
Total	51	3320	100.	100.001	49.783	

**Table 4.27:** Changes in the Occupational Structure of Armenians in Beirut, based on *l'Indicateur Syrien*, 1924 and 1928-29

Occupation	1924 %		1928-9 %		Names added %	
Agriculture	0	0	0	0	0	0
<i>Food &amp; drink</i>						
Groceries (Denrées Col.)	1		2		1	
Foodstuffs	1		-		-	
Arak, wine & drinks	1		-		-	
Bakeries	4		6		5	
Yeast for beer	1		-		-	
Groceries (épicerie)	-		4		4	
Sales of cigarettes	-		1		1	
Drinks	-		1		1	
Wheat & flour	-		1		1	
Total	8	6.6	15	6.2	13	6.6
<i>"Chemical" &amp; related</i>						
Photographic goods	1		2		1	
Chemical & pharm'l prod.	1		-		-	
Total	2	1.6	2	0.8	1	0.5
<i>Metalwork</i>						
Jeweler-goldsmith	1		8		8	
Tinner	2		-		-	
Electro-metallurgy	-		1		1	
Hardware & ironmongery	3		7		5	
Hot-water dishes	6		-		-	
Iron-workers & smiths	-		7		7	
Total	12	9.8	23	9.5	21	10.6
<i>Textiles &amp; clothing</i>						
Spinning & thread	-		1		1	
Used clothing	-		12		12	
Haberdashery	5		2		2	
Ladies' dress-makers &	-		3		3	

tailors						
Drapery	-		4		4	
Shirt-making	-		6		6	
Ready-made clothes	-		1		1	
Hosiery	3		9		7	
Embroidery	-		2		2	
Mandils	2		1		-	
Carpets & Oriental rugs	6		4		3	
Tailors & merchant tailors	2		17		17	
Fabrics & cotton goods	1					
Dealers in rope/string	-		2		1	
Tapestry-workers	-		1		1	
Upholsterers	-		1		1	
Total	19	156	66	27.3	61	30.8
<i>Leather &amp; shoes</i>						
Shoe-makers	1		11		11	
Saddlery etc.	1		-		-	
Boot & shoe trade	-		1		1	
Items for shoemakers	-		1		1	
Total	2	1.6	13	5.4	13	6.6
<i>Construction</i>						
Timber-merchants	-		2			2
Joiners	-		7			7
Mechanical saw-works	-		1			1
Placarding	-		1			1
Painters & decorators	-		2			2
Total	-	0	13	5.4	13	6.6
<i>Machinery &amp; precision instr.</i>						
Phonographs & discs	-		3		3	
Clock-making	2		4		4	
Lamps	-		1		1	
Electrical appliances	-		1		1	
Gunsmiths	-		1		1	
Mechanics' workshops	-		2		2	
Typewriters	-		1		1	
Total	2	1.6	13	5.4	13	6.6
<i>Glass &amp; porcelain</i>						
Glassworks	1		1		1	
Total	1	0.8	1	0.4	1	0.5
<i>Paper, printing &amp; related</i>						
Stationery & office supplies	2		3		2	
Zincography	-		1		1	
Music	1		1		-	
Book-shops	1		2		2	
Total	4	3.3	7	2.9	5	2.5
<i>Products not elsewhere classified</i>						
Musical instruments	1		-		-	
Toys & knick-knacks	-		1		1	
Piano-tuners	-		2		2	
Spectacles	-		1		1	
Vulcanisation	-		1		1	
Tyres	-		1		1	

Charcoal						
Total	1	0.8	8	3.3	8	4.
<i>Unclassifiable products</i>						
Travel goods	-		2		2	
Novelties	-		1		1	
Manufactures	11		15		12	
Household goods	-		2		2	
Bedding	-		1		1	
Total	11	9.0	21	8.7	18	9.1
<i>Financial services</i>						
Insurance-agents	3		1		2	
Commission-Agents	6		-		-	
Exchange-agents	-		7		-	
Total	9	7.4	8	3.3	2	1.0
<i>Other services</i>						
Hairdressers	1		1		1	
Total	1	0.8	1	0.4	1	0.5
<i>Professions</i>						
Doctors	25		30		16	
Dentists	20		11		5	
Architects-Engineers	-		2		2	
Lawyers	-		1		1	
Chemists	-		4		4	
Druggists	2		2		-	
Dealers in drugs	1		-		-	
Photographers	2		1		1	
Total	50	41.	51	21.1	28	14.1
<i>Overall Total</i>	122	100	242	100	198	100

Bakeries	2	Building-materials	2
Grocers	9	Shoe-shops	3
Butchers	1	Hairdressers	3
Jewelers	2	Also listed	
Cutlers	2	Stores	35
Carpet-makers	9	Factories	4
Tailors	1	Mineral-water factories	2

Occupation	Pop	%
<i>Metalwork</i>		
Blacksmiths	9	
Tinsmiths	3	
Total	12	8.63
<i>Textiles &amp; clothing</i>		
Tailors	7	
Total	7	5.04
<i>Leather &amp; shoes</i>		

<sup>18</sup> *Source:* As Table 4.16.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

Shoe-makers	13	
Cobblers	8	
Total	21	15.11
<i>Construction</i>		
Masons	11	
Plasterers	4	
Sawyers	1	
Carpenters	22	
Total	38	27.34
<i>Sales</i>		
Tinkers	2	
Total	2	1.44
<i>Services</i>		
Chauffeurs	5	
Coachmen	1	
Knife-grinders	2	
Boot-blacks	4	
Total	12	8.63
<i>Professions</i>		
Engineers	1	
Teachers	4	
Total	5	3.6
<i>Office-workers</i>		
Clerks	5	
Total	5	3.6
<i>Labourers</i>		
Jobbing workmen	37	
Total	37	26.62
Overall Total	139	100.01

**Table 4.30:** Industrial occupation of Armenians living in the Gebeili Quarter of Beirut, 1930<sup>20</sup>

	Armenians	%
Food & drink	-	-
Oils, soap & perfume	-	-
Metalwork	12	15.385
Textiles & clothing	7	8.974
Leather & shoes	21	26.923
Construction	38	48.718
Machinery & precision instruments	-	-
Glass & porcelain	-	-
Paper, printing & related	-	-
Furniture	-	-
Not elsewhere classified	-	-
Total	78	100.

Individual references confirm the involvement of the Armenians in industry and the small trades at Beirut.<sup>24</sup> In particular, the way in which the Armenians found slots for themselves in the lowest rungs of the economy is apparent, for example, from the occupations of some Armenians who were lent money by the

<sup>20</sup> *Source:* As Table 4.16.

“Friends of Armenia” in 1927<sup>25</sup> (a barber, a vegetable-stall owner, a hawker of calico, etc., and a lemonade vendor), and from the occupations of the children described by Mécérian in 1924;<sup>26</sup> boot-blacks, and sellers of lace, envelopes, chocolate, combs, etc. Two aspects of Armenian employment emerge more strongly from the literature than from the tables; the importance of the construction industry<sup>27</sup> (it being often stated that the new Beirut was reconstructed by Armenian labour), and the employment of women and girls as domestic servants,<sup>28</sup> or in silk-weaving, carpet-making and embroidery.<sup>29</sup> In the final analysis, the occupational structure of the Armenians at Beirut seems to have been similar to that at Aleppo, despite the evidence of the *Indicateurs*.

### *Damascus*

At Damascus, the *Indicateurs* reveal nothing regarding the occupational preferences of the immigrant Armenians, representing such a small percentage of all Armenians, while Ghanem provides even less information, listing only two doctors. The *Guide Annuaire* of 1933 is scarcely of more use. The only really useful indication of the occupational structure of the immigrant Armenians is contained in the Nansen Office Report of 1930 (Tables 4.31, 4.32), on the new Bab Charki quarter. Table 4.31 shows basic service provision within the quarter, as well as participation in the small-trades, notably that of shoemaking. “There is also a carpet-making shop which is not yet opened by the owner, who finds it pays better to have carpets woven in private houses.” The bulk of the refugees found employment outside the quarter, however, and their occupations are shown in Table 4.32. The dominance of labourers (70.8%), and the importance of tinkers and hawkers (17.7%) is immediately apparent. It is also noted that a number of the womenfolk worked in the tobacco and wool-factories, but these are not included in the table. This picture of occupational distribution at Damascus seems confirmed by the few other references available to shop-keeping, labouring, and to wandering salesmen.<sup>30</sup> In short, the occupational structure of the Armenian refugees at Damascus seems to have been similar to that at Aleppo and Beirut, though without the dominance of textiles.

Grocers	4
Tailors	2
Butcher	1
Baker	1
Shoemakers (slippers)	5
Shoemaker’s apprentice	1
Hairdresser	1
Tinkers	3
Weaver	1
Joiner	1
Total	20

<sup>21</sup> *Source:* As Table 4.16.

**Table 4.32:** Occupations of the Armenians of the Bab Charki quarter, Damascus, 1930<sup>22</sup>

Occupation	Total	%
Fisherman (?)	1	0.88
Tailors	2	1.77
Joiners	4	3.54
Hawkers & tinkers	20	17.7
Money-changer	1	0.88
Hairdressers	2	1.77
Priest	1	0.88
Workmen	80	70.8
Soldiers	2	1.77
Total	113	99.99

### Alexandretta

At Alexandretta, entries of Armenians in the *Indicateur* for 1924, and also of new entries for 1928-29 relate only to the Professions and Financial Services, and clearly reveal nothing about the occupational structure of the refugees. Ghanem is possibly more instructive. Here, again, most entries of Armenians relate to the Professions and Financial Services, but some evidence is available concerning the occupations of Armenians outside these classes (Table 4.33). Entries are few, however, and no statistical analysis is thought desirable. The entries of Armenians under Motor cars and Garages are perhaps significant. The Armenians appear from other tables too to have had an interest in the driving and servicing of motor vehicles, a developing sector in Syria and Lebanon at this time.

Figures submitted by Burnier to Geneva in 1927 concern refugees only. (Tables 4.34-4.36) Notable is their concentration as Labourers, etc., as shopkeepers (i.e., in basic services) and in Services, especially as cabbies, car-drivers and chauffeurs. Very few were in the Professions of Financial Services. 35% were employed in industry (excluding labourers), with notable concentrations in Leather & shoes, and also Food & Drink (basic services), Construction, Textiles and Metalwork. The occupational structure was in fact basically similar to that in the other main cities. Notable within industry was the lesser concentration in Textiles, but the high proportion in Leather & shoes is also worthy of note, having been observed in the Gebeili quarter of Beirut.

**Table 4.33:** Occupations of Armenians in Alexandretta, from Ghanem, 1935-6

Occupation	Entries
<i>Food &amp; drink</i>	
Foodstuffs	1
Flour	1
Cereals	1
Total	3
<i>Textiles &amp; clothing</i>	
Embroidery	1

<sup>22</sup> *Source:* As Table 4.16.

Tailors		1
	Total	2
<i>Construction</i>		
Bricks		1
	Total	1
<i>Machinery &amp; precision instruments</i>		
Motor-cars		2
Garages		4
Phonographs & radios		1
	Total	7
<i>Paper, printing &amp; related</i>		
Bookshops		2
	Total	2
<i>Furniture</i>		1
	Total	1
<i>Products not elsewhere classified</i>		
Photographic equipment		1
	Total	1
<i>Products unclassifiable</i>		
Novelties		2
	Total	2
<i>Financial services</i>		
Exchange		2
Contractors		5
Businessmen (“Negociants”)		10
“Transitaires”		2
	Total	19
<i>Professions</i>		
Engineers		1
Chemists		2
Lawyers		2
Doctors		3
Midwives		2
Dentists		2
Photographers		1
	Total	13
Overall Total		51

**Table 4.34:** Occupational structure of Armenian refugees in Alexandretta, 1927<sup>23</sup>

	Total	%
Agriculture & industry	401	35.05
Sales	204	18.71
Financial services	-	0
Other services	107	9.35
Professions	16	1.4
Labourers etc.	358	31.29
Office-workers	48	4.2
Total	1144	100.

<sup>23</sup> Figures submitted by Burnier to Geneva, May 2, 1927 (N.A. C1431).

<b>Table 4.35: Occupational structure of the Armenian refugees in Alexandretta, 1927<sup>24</sup></b>		
Occupation	Armenians	%
<i>Agriculture</i>		
Agricultural workers	1	
Total	1	0.09
<i>Food &amp; drink</i>		
Butchers	31	
Bakers	27	
Confectionery	8	
Cooks	7	
Millers	7	
Pork-butchers	4	
Total	84	7.34
<i>Metalwork</i>		
Smiths	26	
Tinners, silverers	10	
Bronze-workers	5	
Goldsmiths	5	
Farriers	3	
Tinmen	3	
Grinders	1	
Total	53	4.63
<i>Textiles &amp; clothing</i>		
Tailors	43	
Tapestry-workers, upholstery	12	
Dyers	2	
Total	57	4.98
<i>Leather &amp; shoes</i>		
Shoemakers	108	
Makers of pack-saddles	8	
Curriers	8	
Total	124	10.84
<i>Construction</i>		
Masons	19	
Wood-sawyers	7	
Joiners & carpenters	36	
Marble cutters or polishers	1	
Total	63	5.51
<i>Machinery &amp; precision instruments</i>		
Mechanics	9	
Clock-makers	1	
Gunsmiths	6	
Total	16	1.4
<i>Glass &amp; porcelain</i>		
Potters	3	
Total	3	0.26
<i>Sales</i>		
Shopkeepers	214	

<sup>24</sup> *Source:* As Table 4.34. *Note:* The total, 1144, represents the real total of Burnier's figures less two printers. Burnier's total is 1156 and is incorrect.

	Total	214	18.71
<i>Services</i>			
	Cabbies	47	
	Car-drivers	34	
	Hairdressers	24	
	Chauffeurs	2	
	Total	107	9.35
<i>Professions</i>			
	Chemists & druggists	6	
	Doctors	1	
	Vaccinators	1	
	Photographers	8	
	Total	16	1.4
<i>Labourers etc.</i>			
	Labourers	290	
	Workmen	68	
	Total	358	31.29
<i>Office-workers</i>			
	Clerks	48	
	Total	48	4.2
	Overall Total	1144	100.

**Table 4.36:** Occupational structure (by product) of Armenian refugees in Alexandretta, 1927<sup>25</sup>

	Armenians	%
Agriculture	1	0.249
Food & drink	84	20.948
Oils, soap & perfume	-	-
Metals	53	13.217
Textiles	57	14.214
Leather & Shoes	124	30.923
Construction	63	15.711
Machinery & precision Instruments	16	3.99
Glass & porcelain	3	0.748
Paper, printing & related	-	-
Furniture	-	-
Products not elsewhere classified	-	-
Total	401	100.

### *Other Towns and Regions*

Information on the occupations pursued by the Armenians in the Vilayet of Aleppo outside Aleppo town is very limited. There is only one reference, to the settlement of Armenian artisans in Bab,<sup>31</sup> which would suggest that the Armenians found work as artisans rather than as farmers. Information is also lacking on the situation in the North-East. Later writers<sup>32</sup> stress the employment of Armenians as Artisans, but the accelerated development of the region came during the Second World War, and one should not assume that the ethnic occupational structure operating after this development was the same as that before. Contemporary sources, in fact, seem to stress agricultural employment.

<sup>25</sup> *Source:* As Table 4.34.

Thus, Hedwige Bull of the A.C.O. writing from Kamichliy  in May 1938,<sup>33</sup> noted that there were a large number of poor Kurdish-speaking Armenians in the town who worked as day-labourers in the fields. At the nearby village of Wout-Wouti, the Kurdish-speaking Armenians were working as metayers for the rich landowners. Captain Gracey, of the Lord Mayor’s (Armenian) Fund, noted in 1930<sup>34</sup> that the first arrivals in the 1929 migration to the region had arrived in Syria with their animals and in some cases with small flocks of sheep, and had since joined up with Kurdish farmers in the district, Shirajian noted<sup>35</sup> that a drought in the winter and spring of 1931-32 had caused “thousands” of Armenians to leave their villages to search for pasture for their livestock. A number of agricultural colonies were certainly established in this region and will be considered in the next chapter. In short, if a number of Armenians may have found employment in the region as artisans, there was certainly a large agricultural component in the Armenian population. In the Sanjak of Alexandretta, apart from the agricultural colonies established by the Nansen Office, the only large concentration of refugees, outside the town of Alexandretta itself, was at Kirik Khane, where they are described as both agricultural workers and artisans.<sup>36</sup>

In Alawi Territory, where the refugees settled principally in Latakia town, an official report was published in 1935 concerning the competition from immigrant labour.<sup>37</sup> This report noted that the Armenian immigrants occupied a preponderant place in the small-trades, as for example masons, joiners, shoemakers and jewelers. It stated that there were in the province 400 Armenians who immigrated before the Great War and who were distributed in a dozen villages, and 1800 who had immigrated since. Amongst this population of 2200, largely concentrated in Latakia town, 30% were engaged in commerce or the liberal professions, 40% were artisans, and 30% (sic) (those who settled a long time ago) were devoted to agriculture. According to Weulersse,<sup>38</sup> they were generally devoted to the most “western” occupations; chauffeurs, garagemen, mechanics. Local Armenian inhabitants observe how, while originally the refugees had been simple workmen, they later established themselves as skilled artisans. The Nansen Office colony established at Mouchach ne Arm ne will be considered later.

No such report is available for the Lebanon, for Homs and Hama, and for southern Syria, and the occupational structure of the Armenians in these districts remains obscure. It is evident only that a number of Armenians found work in the villages of Lebanon in the fields and vineyards, at least temporarily.<sup>39</sup> Otherwise the only information available comes from the highly selective tables of the *Indicateur* and Ghanem.

## CONCLUSIONS

This review of occupational structure is clearly unsatisfactory, for, while adequate information is available concerning occupational structure in the

principal centres of Armenian settlement, which attracted most attention, very little exists on the structure in the outlying towns and villages. Nevertheless, a number of tentative conclusions may be drawn; the tendency to continue former occupations, the lack of agricultural workers, the tendency to assume occupations of low economic status, the tendency to find work in the “modern” sector of industry, and the establishment of basic services.

The occupations of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire before 1915 have been described in Chapter I. There is evidence in Syria and Lebanon, in the concentration of refugees in industry and the small trades in the towns, and as agricultural workers in the north-east, of the continuance of former occupations, with some degree of specialisation, for example in the metal-trades. This is also true of the textile industry and of embroidery, but it is questionable if these crafts ever had in Cilicia the vital importance they assumed for the Armenians in Aleppo. In some cases, these industries were encouraged by the philarmenian relief societies in imitation of the earlier work for the Armenians within the Empire.<sup>40</sup> The continuance of former occupations suggests a certain lack of integration of the Armenians into the economic system of Syria and Lebanon, implying that settlement would not be related to those (few) opportunities in thriving occupations offered by the System. This is not necessarily the case, however. Ethnic specialisation of labour may occur in well-integrated economic systems, and it is possible that the Armenians concentrated in those towns which offered the most promising outlets for the exercise of their former talents.

The reduction in the proportion of rural dwellers in the Armenian population, compared with that in the Empire (observed in the previous chapter), and the small number of agricultural workers amongst them, might imply a shift from agriculture (in the Empire) to “urban” occupations in Syria and Lebanon. However, the formerly “rural” Armenians within the Empire included a proportion of “rural” artisans, who, with their skills, might have been able to find related employment in the towns of Syria and Lebanon. In fact, the data available on the occupational structure of the Armenians both in the Empire and in Syria is too imprecise to permit clarification of this point. In any case, a rural-urban shift and accompanying abandonment of agricultural pursuits would not in itself be evidence that such a shift was based on the “pull” of “urban” occupations. This indeed seems highly unlikely. Employment opportunities for urban dwellers were limited. Employment in industry in Syria and Lebanon was actually decreasing during the period, so that none of the towns could provide much industrial employment. Real outlets were offered only by emigration or by settlement on the land. It has already been observed that there was considerable Armenian emigration during the period. In the next chapter the mostly unsuccessful official attempts to induce settlement on the land will be described. It is evident, however, that on their own the Armenians were unable or unwilling to achieve this redistribution.

With regard to the concentration of Armenians in occupations of low economic status, the four centres of Aleppo, Beirut, Damascus and Alexandretta all reveal this tendency. In each of these towns large numbers of Armenians were employed as labourers or workmen, or in weaving, carpet-making and embroidery, these latter occupations employing especially the women. This concentration in jobs of low economic status may be partly a reflection of former occupations. Thus, migrant Armenians had previously been employed as labourers in Constantinople and the coastal cities, while, as observed, the participation of the women in the textile industry was characteristic of the Empire. One should also note, however, the demand for construction workers at Beirut, or the opportunities offered to the women of domestic-service in the homes of the wealthy in the principal cities. Once again, however, it is difficult to say whether such opportunities actually stimulated population movement.

The tendency to work in the modern sector of industry was revealed especially by the analysis of the 1937 Industrial Census. However, as regards locational attraction, it is significant that the Census figures suggested that this tendency was mainly a function of the settlement of the Armenians in locations with modern industry, rather than of a disproportional representation in the modern sector in the towns in which they settled. The implication is that the locational attraction of modern industry was slight.

Finally, there is clear evidence of the establishment of basic services amongst the Armenians themselves which, once established, would, more than any other occupations, tend to create vested interests in inertia, and maintain the initial settlement pattern.

## ECONOMIC STATUS AND SETTLEMENT

### *Economic Status: Overall Estimates*

The analysis of occupational structure has already shed much light on the economic status of the Armenians, revealing them as a population of low economic status. Their economic status may now be examined in more depth. As a starting point, one is fortunate in possessing a set of figures presented by Duguet in 1927 classifying the refugees according to economic-status. (Table 4.37, Fig. 3.15) Overall, 52% of refugees listed are described as “not in need of aid”. Of the principal centres of Armenian concentration, however, only Aleppo (58.7%) reached this total, while Beirut had 41.4%, Alexandretta 19.3% and Damascus only 5.2%. Outside these principal centres, many of the smaller towns recorded 100% “not in need of aid”. This was true of the entire Alawi Territory, and most of the settlements in Aleppo Vilayet and the north-east. It was less true of southern Syria (possibly due to the recording of refugees from the Druze Revolt?) and the Lebanon, where the status of the refugees in the smaller centres varied considerably. The distribution of those “in need of aid” and “in utter poverty” was, of course, the reverse of this. However, there were significant locational variations between these two classes of impoverished refugees. Thus, while

Beirut (56.7%), Damascus (86.9%) and Alexandretta (48.2%) all had higher than average (33%) numbers of refugees “in need of aid”, of the principal centres only Alexandretta (32.6%) and Aleppo (25.1%) (which had a higher-than-average number of refugees “not in need of aid”), had higher than average (15%) numbers of refugees “in utter poverty”. The economic status of the refugees was clearly not constant over the country, and there appear to have been significant variations even between the principal centres of Armenian concentration, where it has been suggested that Armenian occupational structure was basically similar.

**Table 4.37:** Economic Status of refugees in Syria & Lebanon (after Duguet, 1927)<sup>26</sup>

	Not in need of aid		In need of aid		In utter poverty		Total
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	
<i>Syria (families)</i>							
Hassetché	110	100	-	-	-	-	100
Abou Kemal	2	100	-	-	-	-	2
Meyadine	1	100	-	-	-	-	1
Deir el Zor	47	100	-	-	-	-	47
Raqqa	42	100	-	-	-	-	42
Ain el Aarab	110	100	-	-	-	-	110
Djerablous	310	100	-	-	-	-	310
Menbidj	98	100	-	-	-	-	98
Bab	53	100	-	-	-	-	53
Aleppo	5075	58.7	1398	16.2	2169	25.1	8642
Azaz	194	100	-	-	-	-	194
Afrine	24	100	-	-	-	-	24
Mabatli	-	-	-	-	15	100	15
Harim	12	100	-	-	-	-	12
Idlib	20	100	-	-	-	-	20
Djizr el Choghour	10	100	-	-	-	-	10
Maarret el Nomane	3	100	-	-	-	-	3
Sqalbiyé	8	80	2	20	-	-	10
Hayaline	5	100	-	-	-	-	5
Alexandretta	260	19.3	650	48.2	440	32.6	1350
Beilane	295	100	-	-	-	-	295
Kirik Khane	133	30.2	245	55.7	62	14.1	440
Rihaniyé	12	100	-	-	-	-	12
Jebel Moussa	480	100	-	-	-	-	480
Hama	31	91.2	3	8.8	-	-	34
Selemiyé	10	66.7	5	33.3	-	-	15
Homs	-	-	116	78.4	32	21.6	148
Damascus	47	5.2	790	86.9	72	7.9	909
Jdaidet Aartouz	2	100	-	-	-	-	2
Katana	-	-	2	100	-	-	2
Mansourah	5	100	-	-	-	-	5
Qouneitra	10	83.3	2	16.7	-	-	12
Moumsiyé	1	100	-	-	-	-	1
Ain Ziouane	3	100	-	-	-	-	3
Khochniyé	1	100	-	-	-	-	1
Joueizé	1	100	-	-	-	-	1

<sup>26</sup> Duguet (1927). The basis of this classification is unknown.

Tibné	-	-	1	100	-	-	1
Ezraa	3	25	8	66.7	1	8.3	12
Naoua	3	50	3	50	-	-	6
Rhazalé	1	50	1	50	-	-	2
Deraâ	6	20.7	23	79.3	-	-	29
Bosra	1	33.3	2	66.7	-	-	3
Chahba	7	100	-	-	-	-	7
Soueida	13	100	-	-	-	-	13
Salkhad	15	100	-	-	-	-	15
<i>Alawi Territory</i>							
Ghnémié	137	100	-	-	-	-	137
Aramo	205	100	-	-	-	-	205
Ain Ceutach	31	100	-	-	-	-	31
Latakia	1353	100	-	-	-	-	1353
Djeblé	24	100	-	-	-	-	24
Massiaf	78	100	-	-	-	-	78
Qadmous	6	100	-	-	-	-	6
Banias	47	100	-	-	-	-	47
Tartouss	150	100	-	-	-	-	150
Sâfita	30	100	-	-	-	-	30
<i>Lebanon (Persons)</i>							
Halba	-	-	4	3.25	119	96.75	123
Qoubaiyate	-	-	4	100	=	-	4
Tripoli	250	33.3	300	40	200	26.7	750
Zghorte	14	12.2	82	71.3	19	16.5	115
Chekka	-	-	9	100	-	-	9
Batroune	-	-	59	100	-	-	59
Jbail	-	-	47	100	-	-	47
Qartaba	1	50	1	50	-	-	2
Baalbek	4	100	-	-	-	-	4
Zouk	2	100	-	-	-	-	2
Ghazir	125	100	-	-	-	-	125
Antoura	1	100	-	-	-	-	1
Bhannes	-	-	82	56.6	63	43.5	145
Ajaltoun	1	100	-	-	-	-	1
Zahlé	128	44.3	95	32.9	66	22.8	289
Rayak	8	22.2	18	50	10	27.8	36
Beirut	8795	41.4	12,039	56.7	408	1.9	21,242
Aley	-	-	68	100	-	-	68
Sofar	-	-	4	100	-	-	4
Souk el Gharb	-	-	27	100	-	-	27
“Asile Americaine”	285	100	-	-	-	-	285
Saida	47	12.5	248	66.1	80	21.3	375
Jezzine	-	-	8	100	-	-	8
El Djarieh	-	-	4	100	-	12.5	4
Nabatiyé	-	-	7	87.5	1	-	8
Tyr	-	-	29	100	-	-	29

Figures contained in the annual reports of the Nansen Office to the Assembly (Table 4.38), whose basis of compilation is again not known, suggest an improving situation between 1926 and 1932, but should be treated with reserve.

**Table 4.38:** Economic status of Armenian refugees in Syria and Lebanon, 1926-1932

Total Refs.	Arm.	Unemployed or employed on casual or temporary work	Source & date
124,500		60,000	L.o.N. Doc. A.44.1926
86,500		20-30,000	L.o.N. Doc. A.48.1927 VIII
86,500		32,700	L.o.N. Doc. A.33.1928 VIII
85,842		32,700	L.o.N. Doc. A.23.1929 VIII
120,000		9000	L.o.N. Doc. A.24.1932

It is clear from Duguet's total of 48% of refugees "in need of aid" or "in utter poverty" that the picture of a low economic status population derived from the analysis of occupational structure is essentially correct. It is confirmed by other sources. It is evident that the arrival of so many refugees flooded the labour market locally and led to a sharp depression of wages,<sup>41</sup> which was, of course, felt by the refugees themselves. Nevertheless, after passing through difficult times during the Druze Revolt, the Armenians appear to have been making ground by 1927-28.<sup>42</sup> This, it appears, was particularly due to the boom in the construction industry at Beirut and Aleppo, itself encouraged by the depression of labour-costs. Such an apparent success was illusory. As an economically weak population, the Armenians were especially vulnerable to disease and economic crisis,<sup>43</sup> a circumstance not lost on Mécérian nor on Burnier, who wrote in April, 1928:

...les agglomérations urbaines de réfugiés heurtent violemment les intérêts des populations ouvrières locales. Elles ont provoqué des crises de misère profonde au cours des années 1921 à 1924. Depuis cette date une activité formidable de constructions immobilières à BEYROUTH et à ALEP a enrayé la crise. Combien durera cette activité? L'optimisme le plus développé en fixe la durée à encore deux ou trois années. Ensuite nous retomberons sûrement dans le chômage et l'on en mesurera l'intensité en réfléchissant qu'il n'existe aucune industrie et qu'il n'en peut être créé aucune...<sup>44</sup>

M. De Caix, French spokesman to the Permanent Mandates Commission had already observed;

...the Armenian artisans settled in Syria were very numerous in comparison with the buying power of the country. An unemployment crisis might occur at any time...<sup>45</sup>

From the annual reports of the Nansen Office Delegate in Beirut,<sup>46</sup> it seems that a prolonged crisis for the refugees began in 1931, as a result of the general economic crisis in the country. The workmen suffered more than the artisans. Construction-workers and other workmen were laid off and wages fell. Shopkeepers and small-traders were obliged to close shop because of their impoverished clientèle. Reimbursements to the Nansen Office from Armenians who had received loans are stated to have fallen. The crisis appears to have been felt more at Beirut than at Aleppo, and this was attributed to the fact that the Armenians of Beirut lacked the industries of Aleppo. Thus, when construction workers and others were laid off in the economic crisis, the Armenian economy

at Beirut had not the same backbone as at Aleppo. Burnier's reports bring out this contrast more strongly than the preceding analysis of occupational structure which, while indicating the central importance of the textile industry to the Armenians of Aleppo, stressed the similarities in Armenian occupational structure between the two cities, rather than this difference. Aleppo benefitted in particular by the measures of protection taken in 1932 for the textile industry, such that the weavers and carpet-makers could set up their looms again and sell their products, although at a low price. According to Pallis,<sup>47</sup> even this -situation deteriorated from 1935, as a result of general economic stagnation, and was greatly aggravated by the fall in the value of the French franc, conclusions also reached by the President of the Nansen Office on a visit made in November 1936,<sup>48</sup> and noted by the General-Secretary of the "Friends of Armenia" in June 1937:

When the French franc was devalued last October, we hoped that it might bring some benefit to the poor in Syria, and that the cost of living would go down or, at least, remain stationary. But all prices have soared and the cost of bread and food-stuffs is up by 100 per cent. A rise in wages has not been general, and never covers the extra cost of living. For those who could only just "make ends meet" before, the higher bread bill alone is alarming! A 4d loaf now costs 10d.<sup>49</sup>

The weakness of the Aleppo Armenians' backbone was also exposed by the closing of the Turkish market to Syrian textiles and the competition of cheap Japanese goods. Many factories closed down, and as the personnel employed were mostly refugees, they were the first to feel the effect. Pallis supports his assertion concerning an economic decline between 1935 and 1936 by reference to the reimbursements made by the refugees to the Office, but an analysis of annual reimbursements in the years for which figures are available (Table 4.39) is not very revealing, being distorted by a false entry and subject to difficulties of interpretation. The written record too may be deceiving. Despite the assertions of economic crisis, a table in the Nansen archives<sup>50</sup> noted at June 1938, only 1546 refugees unemployed in Syria and Lebanon, out of a total of 165,648, of which 150,266 Armenian. It is also necessary to bear in mind that, in suffering from these economic crises, the Armenians did not necessarily suffer more than other sections of the population. As M. De Caix reported to the Permanent Mandates Commission in June 1930:

It was doubtless right to be anxious as to the welfare of this population, but it would be a mistake to regard it as the most wretched population in Syria. Many artisans in the towns of the interior were leading a more arduous life than that of the great majority of the Armenians.<sup>51</sup>

### *Aleppo*

The general picture of an economically weak population highly vulnerable to employment crises is confirmed by the references to the situation at Aleppo. Here, as observed, the textile industry was of special significance, but while this gave the Armenian economy some backbone, the dependence on one sector was

always dangerous in time of economic crisis, and the refugees at Aleppo were highly vulnerable to the various employment crises which affected Mandated Syria. The Kurdish revolt in Turkey cut off Aleppo from its main market for weaving produce in 1925.<sup>52</sup> The Druze Revolt in Syria involved a temporary boycott of the Armenians of Aleppo by the local population.<sup>53</sup> The political uncertainty of the later years of the Mandate brought more instability.<sup>54</sup> Turkish customs policies temporarily closed the Turkish market to Aleppo weaving produce in 1925-26.<sup>55</sup> Annual fluctuations in climate also had their effect,<sup>56</sup> in so far as the Armenians in Aleppo depended on the rural population for business, for droughts would lead to the impoverishment of the rural population, who would not come to Aleppo to buy. Poverty in the countryside would, however, induce Arab villagers to migrate to Aleppo to seek work, thus flooding the labour market, and making employment an even more difficult problem for the refugee. Other refugees lost their employment as domestic servants when, as a result of the general crisis provoked by the fall of the franc, numerous families dispensed with their services.<sup>57</sup> The Aleppo textile industry, in which the Armenians had an important stake, came from 1932 under heavy pressure from foreign competition.<sup>58</sup> The Armenians were vulnerable too to rises in the cost of living, particularly that consequent on the fall of the French franc.<sup>59</sup> Crop-failures would also force up the cost of living,<sup>60</sup> while tending to increase the labour-supply available in the city and consequently depress wage-rates. Moreover, by their very presence, as has been seen, the Armenians had flooded the labour-market and kept down wage-rates, so that even when the employment situation improved, their actual earnings were sometimes inadequate to support their families. These crises, of course, operated selectively against particular population classes. The weaving industry, on which the refugee population was heavily dependent, suffered severely in the crises of 1925-6 and after 1932.<sup>61</sup>

**Table 4.39:** Annual reimbursements by Armenian refugees to the Nansen Office (urban settlements only)<sup>27</sup>

	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937
Aleppo	10,511.65	32,137.84	13,730.67	-20,489.86* <sup>28</sup>	10,769.77
Kirik Khane ("urban")	-	-	-	-	-
Alexandretta	-	-	-	-	-
Beirut	13,844.93	11,735.76	8,732.08	4,997.14	9,704.19
Damascus	1,896.0	1,991.44	1,082.25	301.25	-
Total	26,252.58	45,865.04	23,545.0	-15,191.47*	20,473.96

Former farm-workers found difficulty in securing employment in the new urban environment,<sup>62</sup> those Armenians who had escaped from the Arabs having

<sup>27</sup> L.o.N. Docs, A.19.1933, p. 23; A.12.1934, p. 28; A.3(a) 1935.X, p. 10; A.3(a) 1936.X, p. 12; A.3(d) 1937.X, p. 12; A.3(d) 1938.X, p. 12.

<sup>28</sup> \* "The sum of 27,812.48 Syrian pounds was deducted in 1936 as representing an entry...not to an actual payment."

particular difficulty. Generally, the economically weakest suffered most from the crises in employment and the rise in the cost of living; widows and those with no initial capital.<sup>63</sup>

### *Beirut*

While the economic status of the refugees at Aleppo is relatively well documented, there is less information available for Beirut to substantiate that already cited. Nevertheless, the existing references confirm the picture again of an economically weak population exposed to recurrent crises. There are frequent references to unemployment,<sup>64</sup> while it is suggested, as for the country as a whole, that the refugees, by their very presence, brought down wage-levels.<sup>65</sup> As observed the refugees appear to have benefitted initially from the construction boom at Beirut, explaining why Burnier could refer to their material situation, despite their low wages, as relatively satisfactory in May 1926.<sup>66</sup> When, with the depression, there came a reduction in building activity, the refugees suffered accordingly. With their low wages they were at any time vulnerable to rising costs, and particularly those attendant on the fall of the franc.<sup>67</sup>

### *Damascus*

At Damascus, there is reasonable evidence of the distress resulting from unemployment in the short period before the troubles, exacerbated by the fact that, even before the employment of the Armenian irregulars, Arabs were described as not caring to employ Armenians.<sup>68</sup> As a result the "Friends of Armenia" were obliged to send aid to the children in Damascus in 1923 and 1924,<sup>69</sup> while a number of the Marash and Gaziantep Armenians sent free of charge to Damascus from Aleppo in May and June 1923, returned to Aleppo in November of the same year, because they could not find work in Damascus.<sup>70</sup> They reported that unemployment amongst the refugees was greater at Damascus, and that many would return to Aleppo if they had the money to pay the railway fares. This situation was, of course, exacerbated by the troubles of 1925-26,<sup>71</sup> which not only brought an Arab boycott of the Armenians, but also so depressed commerce that little employment was in any case available. Subsequently conditions appear to have improved by the end of the period,<sup>72</sup> but the refugee population had been reduced substantially by the troubles, and it is likely that those who remained in 1926, or returned, were the more successful Armenians with vested interests in Damascus.

### *Alexandretta*

The situation at Alexandretta is more obscure, at least in the latter half of the period. Initially, the town seems to have been quite unable to provide work for the thousands of refugees who descended on it.<sup>73</sup> The economic absorptive capacity of a smaller town like Alexandretta would have been less than that of the larger cities of Aleppo and Beirut; hence the relatively high percentage of the

Armenians in Alexandretta described by Duguet (Table 4.37) as “in need of aid” or “in utter poverty”. Subsequently, though little information is available, conditions do not appear to have greatly improved. Thus, in mid-1938, out of the 64 heads of families in the Nansen Office Quarter, 20 were unemployed<sup>74</sup> (although by that time the economic situation in the Sanjak had in any case been disturbed by political uncertainty).

### *Other Towns and Regions*

Information on the economic status of the Armenians in the Vilayet of Aleppo outside Aleppo town is very limited. Burtt noted in 1925 that at Menbidj, the poorest Armenians could not get work, while at Djerablous, though not destitute, many of the Armenians were too poor to pay for the education of their children.<sup>75</sup> Duguet’s figures, (Table 4.37) by contrast, suggest a satisfactory situation in the Vilayet outside the town, and Consul Hough described the Armenian quarter of Djerablous in May 1928 as “considerably more prosperous than its Turkish counterpart.”<sup>76</sup>

In the North-East, it has already been suggested that the picture of a flourishing Armenian artisanate post-dates the period under consideration. There is evidence, in fact, from the discussion of occupational structure, of the economic capture of Armenian labours, with Armenians working as *métayers* for local landowners. This is not surprising, as many were already impoverished when they arrived in 1929. Captain Gracey<sup>77</sup> reported in 1930 that the first arrivals had got through comparatively easily. They were comfortably off, and so were able to bribe their way through, arriving in Syria with their animals and in some cases with small flocks of sheep and furniture. These Armenians had since made good by joining up with Kurdish farmers in the district. Those who arrived later, however, were robbed of everything, and reduced to a very miserable condition. Of these, some had recently travelled 260 km on foot to Deir el Zor in the hope of finding work on the suspension bridge being built there by the French. Thus, as elsewhere, the economic status of the Armenians appears to have varied, and there apparently still existed an impoverished element in the Armenian population of Kamichliyé by the end of the period.<sup>78</sup> Duguet’s figures, presenting a satisfactory economic situation among the refugees of the North-East, of course pre-date the principal migration to this area in 1929-30.

At Kirik Khane in the Sanjak of Alexandretta Duguet notes a higher-than-average number of refugees “in need of aid”, which would perhaps explain the emigration from this settlement noted by Jacquot. Jacquot<sup>79</sup> in fact notes an emigration from the Sanjak of 375 emigrants in 1928 and 141 in 1929. He states that the Armenian population of Kirik Khane provided about a third of the emigrants. Later however, he notes that their situation had rapidly improved, but confirmation is lacking.

In Alawi Territory, there is evidence, from the government report already cited, that by 1935 the Armenians had secured a preponderant position as

artisans.<sup>80</sup> (See Chapter 6) Certainly, Duguet's figures suggest that the material situation of the refugees in this province was satisfactory, as do comments in the reports of Johnson, the Deuxième Bureau, and elsewhere.<sup>81</sup> However, refugees were reported leaving the town of Latakia soon after settlement in face of the initial reluctance of the local inhabitants to allow them to rent either houses or shops.<sup>82</sup> Furthermore, refugees who were transported to Baniyas in 1922 were reported to be leaving that place for larger towns because of lack of work,<sup>83</sup> so it seems possible that while the economic situation of the bulk of the refugees in Latakia town, was satisfactory, that of the refugees in outlying centres may have been otherwise.

For the rest of the country, information is again lacking, Duguet's figures suggest an unsatisfactory situation at Homs, with the entire refugee population "in need of aid" or "in utter poverty", and this impression is reinforced by Burnier's comment made in 1926 that at Homs and Hama, the Armenians were only vegetating with difficulty because of a hostile population.<sup>84</sup> Within Lebanon, Duguet suggests considerable variation in the economic status of the refugees in the smaller centres. There is some evidence of economic failure by the Armenians in these villages. Thus, Arthur A. Bacon of the Beirut Chapter, American Red Cross, reported in November 1922,<sup>85</sup> that the refugees who had passed through Beirut and found work in the villages in the summer had begun to drift back to the Beirut camp when the work in the fields and vineyards stopped. Much later, in 1935, Sisag Manoogian noted<sup>86</sup> in Djounieh a family who could not find work and could not afford to move to Aleppo or Damascus as they wished. "This is only a sample of many families who are imprisoned in the villages." On the other hand, Burnier noted in 1926<sup>87</sup> the prosperity of the Armenians who had moved to the villages from Saida, and also those in Saida itself who had been able to construct a little church and school at their own expense at the end of 1924. This prosperity, however, seems totally belied by Duguet's figures, which reveal over 87% of refugees at Saida to have been either "in need of aid" or "in utter poverty".

## CONCLUSIONS

There is clearly a dearth of sound information concerning the economic status of the Armenians in the outlying centres, the bulk of the available data concerning the principal cities. Nevertheless, it may be concluded that in general the Armenians formed a population of relatively low economic status, extremely vulnerable to economic crises. This was true in almost all the towns (with the possible exception of Latakia) and especially in the principal cities of Aleppo, Beirut, Damascus, and Alexandretta where the Armenians were overwhelmingly concentrated. Thus, it does not seem that the Armenians were attracted to, or retained in, these towns by economic opportunity.

This picture of economic stagnation seems true, moreover, not only of the Armenians who remained in their arrival points (certainly in the cities of Aleppo, Beirut and Alexandretta), but also of the Armenians who moved elsewhere. Little

is known, it is true, of the economic status of those who moved to the north-east, to the outlying towns and villages of Aleppo Vilayet, or to southern Syria. There is, however, evidence of economic malaise at Kirik Khane (in the Sanjak of Alexandretta) in the outlying centres of Alawi Territory and Lebanon, and in interior Syria at Homs and Damascus (at least, before the exodus).

The situation in Damascus was similar to that in the other principal centres which were by contrast, also arrival points. It would seem to follow either that the economic attraction involved in these movements was weak or non-existent, or that those responsible for them were guilty of grave errors of judgement.

It also seems difficult to explain the progressive desertion of the secondary centres and concentration in the principal cities in strictly economic terms. At first sight, it seems quite possible that the economic malaise noted in the smaller centres where Armenians settled contributed to their desertion; in particular Homs, Saida and some of the smaller towns of the State of the Alawis and Lebanon all appear to have experienced population decline simultaneously with economic malaise. However, the principal cities of concentration could hardly be considered centres of economic attraction for the refugees as they already contained large stagnating Armenian populations. Thus, the desertion of the secondary centres in favour of the principal cities does not appear to have reflected any rational appreciation of the distribution of economic opportunities. In short it does not seem from this analysis of economic status that the distribution of the Armenians is to be explained in terms of the distribution of economic opportunities. It seems more likely, in view of the lowly economic status of the Armenians, that they tended to remain at their arrival points partly at least because they were unable to move and settle elsewhere.

How do these conclusions relate to the analysis of occupational structure? In fact, economic stagnation would appear to have been the counterpart of the fact that, while real outlets in the region lay on the land, the Armenians remained concentrated in the cities. Within the cities the country was simply unable to offer sufficient opportunities to an impoverished refugee population to assure its livelihood. Thus, rather than being attracted to particular settlements by specific employment opportunities it is suggested that for the most part the Armenians assumed their occupational structure in situ, finding precarious footholds where they could in the regional economy. The next chapter will show how the Armenians did consider escaping from this situation by seeking resettlement on the land. But the conditions in which such resettlement was socially desirable i.e., in large groups could not be fulfilled without considerable expense. Unable to afford this expense, the Armenians remained concentrated in the cities. This was the fundamental problem which confronted the resettlement planners. It would be perpetuated by the assumption of occupations by the Armenians in the cities and by their establishment of basic service industries which would tend to reinforce the status quo. In the final analysis, however, it must be stressed that, in the absence of sound data concerning the decision-making process, the conclusions

of this chapter are based on inferences made from structural comparisons that this method is in principle unsatisfactory and that the strictures made in the introduction on the value of the analysis still apply.

## ENDNOTES

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<sup>1</sup> Hershlag (1964), pp. 249-56; ed. Himadé (1936) *passim*; Longrigg, pp. 271-82; Weulerese (1946); Lewis (1955).

<sup>2</sup> Longrigg, p. 271.

<sup>3</sup> Generally speaking, Armenian names end in –IAN, or –YAN. The procedure followed has been to select all names with these endings, from which have been omitted those obviously not Armenian. This procedure can therefore only give an approximate picture, as Armenian names not ending in –IAN or –YAN are excluded, while some names selected will clearly not be Armenian. In particular the indigenous Armenian population had often acquired Arabized Armenian names which would not be selected.

<sup>4</sup> I.L.O. (1969).

<sup>5</sup> The total number of *entries* have been selected for Table 4.1. In a number of cases entries are duplicated. Where this occurs, they have been counted twice. This is because, while it would be possible to eliminate duplication in a consideration of entries of Armenians alone, this is clearly an impracticable consideration when all entries (over 10,000 in 1928-9) are considered, as is necessary for comparison with entries of Armenians.

The sub-classification is the author's and should be treated with reserve given the complexity of Middle Eastern commerce. A number of occupational groups listed in the *Indicateur* have been excluded as they do not in general contain names or individuals but of business concerns. These are: Abattoirs, Agences, Assurances (Cies d'), Bains de Mer, Bains Turcs, Banques, Cafés, Cafés-Concerts et Bars, Casinos, Caisses d'Epargnes, Cercles, Cinematographes, Chemins de Fer, Coffres Forts (location de) Dispensaires, Eaux, Fonderies de Caractères d'Imprimeries, Garages, Hôpitaux, Hospices, Asiles et Ouvroirs, Hôtels, Imprimeries, Journaux et Revues, Lithographie, Maisons de Santé, Navigation (Cies de), Pétrole et Benzine, Pensions, Restaurants, Théâtres, Tir aux Pigeons.

<sup>6</sup> Throughout this chapter the term "preferred occupations" is used in the names of occupations in which the Armenians were disproportionately concentrated. It is not meant to suggest that Armenians were free to choose their occupation, or that they enjoyed a "preferred" occupation more than any other.

<sup>7</sup> "Rapport" (1973), pp. 218-19.

Unfortunately the "Rapport" does not define what exactly is meant by "new" and "old" industries. One might cautiously assume a definition on the basis of the mode of production as suggested in the introduction. Again it is regrettable that employees of the concessionary companies are not listed by location so that the picture is distorted.

<sup>8</sup> Carle Report, p. 6; Berron Report.

<sup>9</sup> Carle Report, p. 7; Jalabert (1934), pp. 122-23; Berron Report; Pallis, p. 9-10; Berenstein (1936), p. 715.

<sup>10</sup> Carle Report, p. 7; Jude, Burnier & Lubet, pp. 173-74; "Rapport" (1927), p. 67; Mécérian (1928) (1), pp. 146-47; Jalabert (1934), pp. 122-23; Pallis, p. 10; Berron

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- Report; PMC Minutes, 18<sup>th</sup> Sess., 11<sup>th</sup> Mtng, June 26, 1930, pp. 107-8; LoN Docs. A 44.1926, pp. 25-27, A.48.1927.VIII, p. 25, A.24.1932, p. 5.
- <sup>11</sup> “Rapport” (1937), pp. 26-27; Moussalli (1933), p. 50.
- <sup>12</sup> Jalabert (1934), pp. 122-23; 2e Bureau, p. 13; MER Report 1921, p. 8.
- <sup>13</sup> “Rapport” (1924), p. 45; Pallis, p. 10.
- <sup>14</sup> Moussalli, p. 50.
- <sup>15</sup> Mécérian (1928) (1), pp. 146-47.
- <sup>16</sup> Pallis, pp. 4, 7, 9-10.
- <sup>17</sup> PMC Minutes, 8<sup>th</sup> Sess., 3<sup>rd</sup> Mtng., Feb. 17, 1926, p. 18 & 10<sup>th</sup> Sess., 19<sup>th</sup> Mtng., Nov. 15, 1926, p. 123.
- <sup>18</sup> *F.A.*, 101, 4Q, 1926, p. 11.
- <sup>19</sup> Baurain, p. 241, “Installations des Réfugiés Arméniens en Syrie et au Liban, Rapport pour l’Année 1931” (N.A. C 1584).
- <sup>20</sup> “Installations etc. 1931”; *Le Levant*, 8e ann., no. 6, juin, 1931, p. 1, 10e ann., no. 3, jan.-fév., 1933, p. 2.
- <sup>21</sup> Mécérian (1926), p. 337, (1928)(1), p. 146; Duguet, p. 57; 2e Bureau, 13; Pallis, p. 12, *Nouvelles etc.* (1932) 37; *Le Levant*, passim; *F.A.*, pp. 101, 4Q, 1926, p. 10, Idem, 102, p. 18, 1927, p. 3, Idem, 103, p. 28, 1927, p. 12, Idem, 122, April, 1932, p. 1. From S. F. see letters from Marshall Fox, May 8, 1925 (S.F. PSC 8/4) and from Rachel Rutter, Dec. 9, 1926, (S.F. M.S. Vol.174). In F.O. see reports from Hekimian. In N.A. see “Installations etc. 1931”, Idem 1932 (N.A. C 1584); Report by Ellen Chater of the “Save the Children Fund,” Aug., 1930 (N.A. C1584), Burnier to Johnson, Oct. 7, 1926 (N.A. C1429), and Burnier to Sec.-Gen. O.I.N.R., March 23, 1932, (N.A. C1487).
- <sup>22</sup> Duguet to H.C.F., Dec.10, 1926 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>23</sup> Hekimian Report, Oct. 4, 1932 (F.O. 371/9098).
- <sup>24</sup> Keuroghlian (1970), pp. 64-65; Carle (1926), p. 198; Report by Burnier for the year 1930 (N.A. C1583).
- <sup>25</sup> *F.A.*, 106, 1Q, 1928, p. 8.
- <sup>26</sup> Mécérian (1924), p. 224.
- <sup>27</sup> Report by Consul-General Satow, May 11, 1926 (F.O. 371/11550); Carle Report, p. 7; Mécérian (1924), p. 224; Université St. Joseph (1931), pp. 22-23; Pallis, p. 9.
- <sup>28</sup> Ross, Fry & Sibley, p. 264; *F.A.*, 114, 1Q, 1930, p. 2.
- <sup>29</sup> Mécérian (1924), p. 224; Report by Burnier, 1930.
- <sup>30</sup> Poulleau, pp. 62-63; Burit Report; Thoumin (1931), p. 109. See also report by Consul Palmer, Damascus, Sept. 8, 1923 (F.O. 371/9057).
- <sup>31</sup> Burnier to Johnson, June 5, 1928 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>32</sup> De Vaumas (1956) p. 76; Levis (1955); Charles (1942), pp. 50-51.
- <sup>33</sup> *Le Levant*, 15e ann. Nos 7-8, août-sept., 1938, p. 3.
- <sup>34</sup> Gracey Report (N.A. C1584).
- <sup>35</sup> *Nouvelles*, etc. (1932), p. 37.
- <sup>36</sup> Jacquot (1931), pp. 162, 174-75; Tallon (1932), p. 229; Jalabert (1934), p. 113.
- <sup>37</sup> “Enquêts” etc. (1935), pp. 91-96.
- <sup>38</sup> Weulerese (1940), pp. 72-73.
- <sup>39</sup> Bacon to Forster, Nov. 28, 1922, (Arch.A.R.C.).
- <sup>40</sup> See e.g. *F.A.* & *Le Levant*, passim.
- <sup>41</sup> Jude, Burnier & Lubet, p. 173; Berron Report; Carle Report, p. 7, “Rapport” (1924), p. 45, (1926), p. 104, (1937), pp. 26-27; and Report etc. by M.E. Satow, April, 1923, p. 11.

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- <sup>42</sup> Berron Report; Mécérian (1928)(1), pp. 146-47, and statement by De Caix in P.M.C. Minutes, 11<sup>th</sup> Sess., 18<sup>th</sup> Mtng., June 30, 1927, p. 146. Also Burnier to Johnson, April 10, 1928 (N.A. C1431).
- <sup>43</sup> See e.g. St. John Ward to Bicknell, n.d. (1923) and Dodge to A.R.C., Dec. 22, 1923 (Arch.A.R.C.).
- <sup>44</sup> Burnier to Johnson, April 10, 1928 (N.A. C1431).
- <sup>45</sup> Statement by De Caix, P.M.C. Minutes, 13<sup>th</sup> Sess., 20<sup>th</sup> Mtng., June 25, 1928, pp. 164-65.
- <sup>46</sup> Contained in N.A. C 1583, C1584, and S.F. MS Vol. 216. See also L.o.N. Doc. A.12.1934, pp. 11-12, and Burnier to Sec.-Gen. O.I.N.R., March 23, 1932 (N.A. C1487).
- <sup>47</sup> Pallis, p. 13.
- <sup>48</sup> N.A. R5638. See also correspondence from Burnier to Geneva, Feb. 19, March 6 and April 17, 1936 (N.A. C1598).
- <sup>49</sup> *F.A.*, 138 June, 1937, p. 4.
- <sup>50</sup> N.A. C 1524.
- <sup>51</sup> P.M.C. Minutes, 18th Sess., 11<sup>th</sup> Mtng., June 26, 1930, pp. 107-8.
- <sup>52</sup> *Le Levant*, 2e ann., no. 5, juin, 1925, p. 3; Shirajian Report, April 10, 1925; Marshall Fox, May 8, 1925 (S.F., F.S.C.S/4).
- <sup>53</sup> Mécérian (1928)(1), p. 146; Berron Report, and *Le Levant*, 3e ann., no. 5, avril-mai, 1926, p. 2.
- <sup>54</sup> *Le Levant*, 13e ann., no. 4, fev.-mars, 1936, p. 4, & 15e ann., no. 1, Oct., 1927, p. 3.
- <sup>55</sup> Mécérian (1928)(1), p. 146; Jeppe to Thomas, Feb. 26, 1926 (N.A.C. 1429).
- <sup>56</sup> *Le Levant*, 6e ann., no. 2, nov.-dec., 1928, p. 2, 9e ann., no. 7, juillet, 1932, p. 4, & 10e ann., no. 6-7, juin-août, 1933, p. 5; *Nouvelles* (1932), p. 37.
- <sup>57</sup> *Le Levant*, 15e ann., no. 5-6, mai-juillet, 1938, p. 6.
- <sup>58</sup> *Le Levant*, 9e ann., no. 2, nov.-dec., 1931, p. 3, 9e ann., no. 7, juillet, 1932, p. 4, 12e ann., no. 5, mai, 1935, p. 3. In N.A. see "Installations etc....1932" & Burnier to Sec.-Gen., O.I.N.R., March 23 & Dec. 28, 1932 (C1487).
- <sup>59</sup> Pallis, 13; *Le Levant*, 14e ann., no. 2, nov.-dec., 1936, p. 3, 15e ann., no. 2, nov.-dec., 1937, p. 3, & 15e ann., no. 4, mars, 1938, p. 4.
- <sup>60</sup> *Le Levant*, 2e ann., no. 3, jan.-fèv., 1925, p. 2, 6e ann., no. 1, Oct., 1928, p. 7, 6e ann., no. 4, mars-avril, 1929, p. 2, 9e ann., no. 5-6, mai-juin, 1932, p. 5, & 9e ann., no. 7, juillet, 1932, p. 4. See also J.C. Martin, Nov. 28, 1924 (S.F., M.S. Vol. 216).
- <sup>61</sup> Mécérian (1926), p. 537, (1928)(1), p. 146; Shirajian Report, April 10, 1925; *Le Levant*, 1e ann., no. 4, juillet-sept., 1924, p. 3, 2e ann., no. 5, juin, 1925, pp. 2-3, & no. 6, juillet-août, 1925, p. 4, 3e ann., no. 5, avril-mai, 1926, p. 3, 9e ann., no. 2, nov.-dec., 1931, p. 3, & no. 7, juillet, p. 4. See also *F.A.*, 101, 4Q, 1926, p. 10, and in N.A. "Installations etc.... 1932" & Burnier to Sec.-Gen., O.I.N.R., March 25, 1932.
- <sup>62</sup> "Rapport" (1926), p. 104; Berron Report; Johnson Report, Dec. 18, 1926, & Jeppe to Thomas, Feb. 26, 1926.
- <sup>63</sup> *Le Levant*, 15e ann., no. 5-6, mai-juillet, 1938, p. 6; Hekimian Report, June 26, 1923; "Installations etc....1932".
- <sup>64</sup> Mécérian (1924), p. 226; *F.A.*, 85, 3Q, 1922, p. 6, Idem, 99, 2Q, 1926, p. 8, Idem, 106, 1Q, 1928, p. 9, Idem, 107, 2Q, 1928, pp. 1-2; L.o.N. Doc. A.19.1933, p. 4; Dodge to A.R.C. Nov. 12, 1923, and Report of the Use of the Red Cross Special Relief Fund, Beirut, Feb. & March, 1924 (both Arch.A.R.C.).

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- <sup>65</sup> Mécérian (1924), pp. 224-25; Poidebard (1926), p. 17; *Le Levant*, 10e ann., nos. 6-7, août, 1933, p. 2, and Report by Burnier, ca May, 1926 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>66</sup> Report by Burnier, ca May, 1926. See also "Rapport" (1926), p. 102.
- <sup>67</sup> Mécérian (1924), p. 226, and *F.A.*, 110, 1Q, 1929, p. 6, Idem. 137, Feb., 1937, p. 8.
- <sup>68</sup> Burt Report, St. John Ward to Bicknell, Nov. 29, 1923 (Arch.A.R.C.) & *F.A.*, 89, 4Q, 1923, p. 5.
- <sup>69</sup> *F.A.*, 89, 4Q, 1923, p. 16, Idem. 91, 2Q, 1924, p. 6 & Idem. 96, 3Q, 1925, p. 6.
- <sup>70</sup> Hekimian Report, Dec. 11, 1923 (F.O. 371/10195).
- <sup>71</sup> Report by Acting-Consul Vaughan-Russell, Damascus, May 31, 1926 (F.O. 371/11550).
- <sup>72</sup> Ross, Fry & Sibley, p. 266; L.o.N. Doc. A. 12. 1934, p. 2; *Le Levant*, 15e ann., nos. 5-6, mai-juillet, 1938, p. 2; *F.A.*, 106, 1Q, 1928, p. 8; Mackereth to Gracey, March 7, 1935 (F.O., 371/19676), and in N.A. see Report by Dorothy Redgrave, Nov., 1928 (C1431); Chater Report, Aug., 1930 (C1584) and Report by Burnier, 1930.
- <sup>73</sup> *F.A.*, 79, Jan. 1921, p. 10; Letter from Manoogian, April 27, 1922 (F.O., 371/7874); P.M.C. Minutes, 11<sup>th</sup> Sess., 18<sup>th</sup> Mtg., June 30, 1927, p. 146, & 11<sup>th</sup> Sess., 19<sup>th</sup> Mtg., July 1, 1927, p. 155; De Caix to M.A.E., April 1, 1922 (Arch.Dip, S-L-C, Vol. 143).
- <sup>74</sup> N.A. C1524.
- <sup>75</sup> Burt Report.
- <sup>76</sup> Report by Consul Hough, Aleppo, May 17, 1928 (F.O. 371/13074).
- <sup>77</sup> Gracey Report, 1930.
- <sup>78</sup> *F.A.*, 137, Feb., 1937, back cover, & 140, Feb., 1938, p. 6.
- <sup>79</sup> Jacquot (1931).
- <sup>80</sup> Enquête, p. 94.
- <sup>81</sup> 2e Bureau, p. 12; *F.A.*, 127, Oct., 1933, p. 6; Johnson Report, Dec. 18, 1926.
- <sup>82</sup> *F.A.*, 127, Oct., 1933, p. 6, & 134, Feb., 1936, p. 5.
- <sup>83</sup> *F.A.*, 127, Oct., 1933, p. 6.
- <sup>84</sup> Burnier Report, ca May, 1926.
- <sup>85</sup> Bacon to Forster, Nov. 28, 1922 (Arch.A.R.C.).
- <sup>86</sup> *F.A.*, 131, Feb., 1935, p. 8.
- <sup>87</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Oct. 31, 1926 (N.A. C1429).

## SETTLEMENT SCHEMES

The previous chapter suggested that far from being attracted to or retained in their centres of settlement by economic opportunity, the Armenians were confined in these centres partly at least by their inability to move and settle elsewhere. What is certain is that the Armenians were stagnating in the cities, many in squalid “camps” or shantytowns, at a time when the cultivated area was expanding. The various efforts made by the philanthropic organisations to combat this situation by encouraging new industries could have only a temporary palliative effect. A redistribution of population was necessary. To this end, one remedy was emigration, and this has already been described in Chapter 2. No doubt the motive behind this movement was largely economic. Another remedy was redistribution of the Armenians within the country. This chapter describes and assesses the various attempts made to achieve this redistribution.

### FIRST ATTEMPTS

#### *Early French Attempts at Redistribution*

The first effort to distribute the Armenians in accordance with the economic opportunities in the country came in 1921 when, during the evacuation of refugees from Cilicia to Syria and Lebanon, the French authorities found themselves obliged to take charge of those refugees who were initially unable to secure their own livelihood. Plans to receive these refugees were outlined by M. Robert De Caix, Secretary-General to the French High Commission, in December 1921.<sup>1</sup> At Mersin in Cilicia, where the refugees had accumulated, they would be listed according to confession, livelihood, craft and preference concerning destination. After transport to Syria by boat those with an assured livelihood would be left free in their choice of residence. For the others camps would be created using army-tents, reed-huts or monasteries. These would be on the coast of Lebanon, at Latakia, or in the State of Damascus. For political reasons, and because refugees were arriving there spontaneously, no camps would be created at Alexandretta and Aleppo. For the refugees in these camps, building-sites would be opened where they would be obliged to work for wages lower than those current in the country. In this way they would be encouraged to find work in local industries while their labour would prove beneficial to the Levant States, which would thus be induced to reimburse to the High Commission the money expended on the employment of this labour, which would be regarded as a loan made towards their public works. The labour of the refugees would also be offered to individuals and local industry while demands for refugee labour would be centralised. The cost of maintaining the refugees would be reduced by a stoppage on their wages to persuade them to become self-sufficient. It was vitally important to assure their dispersal from the camps as soon as possible. De Caix noted further the importance of operating outside Lebanon, in order to reduce the number of

refugees who would fall into French care. He envisaged out-placing amongst the land-owners who were complaining of lack of labour, and noted the possibilities of the Bekaa and perhaps the plain of Homs-Hama. Agricultural colonies would not however be established, in order to avoid expense. The refugees who settled on the land would be those engaged by local landowners, or requested for experimental stations by the agricultural adviser of the High Commission, or left free to settle, with the aid of their community, on rented lands.

It is evident that dispersal according to economic absorptive capacity was a principal element in this French plan.<sup>2</sup> The extent of the redistribution which had taken place (by French means) by January 21, 1922, is shown in Table 5.1, which may be compared with Table 3.2. Of these refugees, only 1421 remained in French care. The extent of French dispersal of refugees to the villages of Lebanon is not known, but the dispersal seems confirmed by Burnier,<sup>3</sup> who notes that the 1200 (sic) Armenians who had arrived by sea at Saida in December 1921 remained until September 1922 in the care of the French Administrator of the region, who gradually found the means to distribute them in the country according to their crafts.

When, despite their own efforts, the French were faced with a large accumulation of Armenians at Alexandretta, they again found themselves obliged, as much for economic as political reasons, to pursue a policy of dispersal. The appalling condition of the refugees at Alexandretta attracted the concern of the "Friends of Armenia" who in March 1922 advised the Foreign Office of French inaction in the face of an agglomeration of "20,000" refugees. The question was taken up by Lord Curzon who reported this total to both M. Poincaré, the French Prime Minister, and General Gouraud, the High Commissioner, at the Peace Conference. De Caix was immediately instructed to communicate more precise information to the Quai d'Orsay, but by this time he was himself due to leave for Alexandretta on a tour of inspection with Dr. Melconian, effective representative of Armenian interests in Syria. This was possibly as a result of pressure from Mr. McAfee, Director of the Near East Relief, who was also reported in March, 1922 to be bringing pressure on the government to remove the refugees from Alexandretta.<sup>4</sup>

Beirut	4562
Djounie	1700
Zahlé	100
Tripoli	1432
Saida	1852
Damascus	4500
Alawi Territory	2266
Total	16412

<sup>1</sup> *Source:* De Caix to M.A.E., Jan. 21, Arch.Dip. S-L-C., Vol. 141.

On April 1, De Caix wired his report on the situation to General Gouraud at Paris.<sup>5</sup> He estimated that there were about 10,000 refugees at Alexandretta. He thought it necessary to evacuate as soon as possible to the south 4000 or 5000 of them who could not find work. About 2000 agricultural workers could be settled at some expense on unoccupied land. 1500 could be absorbed by Alawi Territory and 1500 by the Tripoli-Hama region. That, however, was the limit, as there was already unemployment at Beirut and Damascus. The evacuation, which could only be undertaken by persuasion and through offers of work, and by assuming the cost of transport, would be organised in collaboration with Dr. Melconian and the Armenian leaders. He concluded with a bitter jibe at British hypocrisy:

Toute la difficulté vient de la fermeture aux réfugiés des pays dépendant de nations qui nous accusent maintenant de n'avoir pas soin des Arméniens pour qui elles ont beaucoup moins fait que nous. A moins de dépenser des sommes (énormes) qui serviraient surtout à démoraliser les réfugiés il n'y a qu'à essayer de répartir dans les régions où ils peuvent s'employer des gens qui ne sont pas plus mal installés à Alexandrette que les Français du Nord arrivant pour relever leurs foyers dévastés.

It is evident that in execution of these desires some dispersal of refugees from Alexandretta did take place, although their exact destination is obscure. Some certainly reached Latakia and Beirut, while others may have reached Damascus. They included, for example, the Armenians from Ekbes who had moved to Alexandretta as early as 1920, and who were transferred to Latakia in May, 1922.<sup>6</sup>

It was partly similar economic considerations which led the French authorities to disperse from Aleppo to Beirut and Damascus, about 4500 of the refugees who arrived there in 1922-24.<sup>7</sup> The financial burden assumed by the French was, however, soon dropped. After their initial, and incomplete, dispersal, the Armenians were left to their own resources, and their absorption into the economic life of the country was left incomplete. It is evident nevertheless that French policy was largely responsible for such dispersal of refugees as did take place from their arrival points. In so far as the objective of this policy was to enable the economic absorption of the refugees, it must be admitted that it was manifestly unsuccessful. As observed, the economic plight of the Armenians who had been dispersed, especially in, for example, Damascus, appears not to have been significantly better than that of those who remained at their arrival points, though what the situation in the arrival-points would have been without dispersal one shudders to consider. In this respect, the net effect of the dispersal policy was, to be fair, beneficial, that is, to have spread the poverty of the Armenians more evenly over a country which simply was not able to absorb them without large injections of capital.

### ***Karen Jeppe***


In recognition of the need for a more radical solution efforts were made to encourage agricultural colonisation. The first positive steps were taken in this respect by Miss Karen Jeppe, League Commissioner at Aleppo for the Protection of Women and Children in the Near East, supported by the Swedish branch of the

International Fellowship of Reconciliation. This latter organisation had already, as early as 1922, endeavoured to interest the League of Nations in a colonisation scheme, but its efforts failed. In 1923, however, at the international conference of the Reconciliation in Denmark, the question of the establishment of an agricultural colony was discussed on the initiative of the Swedish branch, supported by Paul Berron, Director of the “Action Chrétienne en Orient”, and in the presence of Karen Jeppe. As a result, the Swedish branch was asked to organise the work, while Karen Jeppe was appointed as their representative to look for a site and make preparations.<sup>8</sup>

The first colonies (Tell es Saméne Missak and its twin, Tell Armen) were established in 1924 in the valley of the Nahr el Belkh, between Raqqa and Tell Abiad. (Fig 5.1) The Armenian peasants from Garmudsh near to Urfa had been driven out of Turkey in the winter of 1923-4. As soon as they had reached Aleppo, the great landowners had tried to induce them to settle in their villages as their tenants. The Armenians were afraid to accept these offers, but trusted Miss Jeppe who had previously been working in the Urfa Region for about fifteen years. The land owners therefore turned to Miss Jeppe who considered their proposals and finally selected those of Hadjim Pasha, the hereditary chief of the Anezeh tribe. Thus, were established the twin colonies of Tell Saméne and Tell-Armen.<sup>9</sup> In February 1926, Miss Jeppe was envisaging the further settlement of refugees from the Urfa region in this district, while she thought that other refugees, from the mountainous part of Cilicia, might be settled in Alawi Territory. This latter idea she dropped as the French authorities did not consider it advisable, so she turned instead to a new colony in the valley of the Nahr el Belkh at Charb Bedros (Khourbet el Rizz) which was founded in Spring, 1926.<sup>10</sup> Other refugees appear to have been outplaced by Miss Jeppe in small groups in other villages, for in February 1926, she sent out four families, whose settlement depended on money provided by the “Friends of Armenia”, to be settled at the village of Ali Begdjili (El Bajiliyé?) near Tell Abiad.<sup>11</sup> With the establishment of the Nansen Office settlement scheme, Miss Jeppe lost much of her freedom of action, but continued to carry on her work on its limited scale. By 1934, the Tell es Saméne colony had apparently failed for, after the death of Hadjim Pasha, his heirs adopted a less conciliatory attitude to the Armenians, limiting their agricultural possessions to the extent that it was impossible for them to subsist. Accordingly, Miss Jeppe appears to have founded a new colony, at Tiné, this time founded on the principle of colonising the Armenians in common with the Arabs.<sup>12</sup>

Although Karen Jeppe’s scheme was designed largely to relieve pressure in the towns, and to resettle agricultural workers, there were other motives behind it; to reduce costs for her Rescue Home, and to create centres of international reconciliation.<sup>13</sup> The colonies themselves took in a number of the Armenian boys rescued from the Arab and Kurdish tribes.<sup>14</sup> The scheme itself involved a relatively small number of Armenians. In 1925, Joseph Burtt of the Society of Friends noted that the sister villages of Tell-Armen and Tell es Saméne together

had a population of 270 people, while in mid-1926, the population of Khourbet el Rizz was 40 Armenian families plus 30 of the older rescued boys.<sup>15</sup> At Tell es Saméne, the original tenancy agreement was that Hadjim Pasha would supply the land and seed free and take in return half the produce, so that the Armenians were, in fact, metayers. A dyke was constructed to regulate irrigation and a tractor brought with much difficulty across the Euphrates. Burt reported in 1925 that the colony was growing maize, millet, wheat, cotton, onions, melons, etc. 1500 mulberry trees had been planted, and there were horses, cattle and sheep.<sup>16</sup>



**Fig. 5.1:** Planned settlements of Armenian refugees in Syria and Lebanon, 1924-1939

***The Need for Large-Scale Schemes***

Laudable as Miss Jeppe’s schemes were, they remained on a small-scale only. To solve the problem, plans were required on a much larger scale, and such schemes found their propogandists in the philanthropic societies, who realized that

At the best ... individual benevolence, or even the corporate humanitarian gifts of Churches, can only relieve the existing suffering. They cannot really deal radically with the problem. Governmental action guided by far-sighted statesmanlike policy can alone grapple with and solve the root problem, which is the resettlement of these people.<sup>17</sup>

Foremost in the advocacy of such schemes were Karen Jeppe, Joseph Burt, and Paul Berron. Karen Jeppe persistently endeavoured to interest the League of Nations in a settlement scheme.<sup>18</sup> Joseph Burt, who visited the area in 1925, came to the same conclusion. Significantly he drew attention to Karen Jeppe's colonies, and advocated three centres where the Armenians might be settled on the land; the Antioch region, the region of Homs and Hama, and the Saida region.<sup>19</sup> Paul Berron, Director of the "Action Chrétienne en Orient" and his fellow-workers had become interested in colonisation as early as 1922. In 1926, Berron prepared a report<sup>20</sup> which noted the problem and urged agricultural colonisation as the best solution, again drawing on the example of Karen Jeppe. In this report he urged settlement along the coast, and suggested three particular areas; the Soueidiyé district, Qassab district, and the district of Latakia - Tripoli. The first two suggestions were derived from a report by Mr. A. Oskan, "patented agronomist", communicated to Berron by the local Armenian Doctor P. Sevian, himself an advocate of agricultural settlement. The four villages involved were in three cases formerly prosperous communities now partly depopulated, and in one case situated on swampy land, requiring drainage to support a larger population. The third area suggested, the coast between Latakia and Tripoli, Berron believed to be neglected, to the extent that it would be easy to establish small colonies of Armenians, whether to make up new villages or to extend those already existing.

Such proposals initially fell on deaf ears in the official quarters from where the backing and finance would be necessary. It has already been observed that the French authorities were reluctant, at the time of the 1921 migration from Cilicia, to involve themselves in agricultural colonisation schemes, hoping to rid themselves of the financial burden of the Armenians as soon as possible. Mr. Hekimian, representative at Aleppo of the Near East Relief, reports how, when the Armenian Catholicos requested from General Billotto, Delegate of the French High Commission to the State of Aleppo, that land from the domain of Sultan Abdul Hamid about Hama and Homs be given to the Armenians for colonisation, the General replied that the state of Aleppo was too poor to give any land.<sup>21</sup> He further advised the Armenians to disseminate in Syria, but this would appear to have been difficult for the Armenians on the grounds of security. Later, Hekimian reported that the French authorities had been repeatedly requested officially to authorise settlement by the Armenians on State domain land, and to grant loans for the purchase of equipment. Instead, they had attempted to scatter small groups of ten to twenty Armenian families in Arab villages to be employed by rich landowners. Caustically he observed that "they desire to reap a harvest in Syria without sowing".<sup>22</sup> The Mandatory authorities were clearly anxious to limit their financial commitment.

Here it will be appropriate to comment on the budgetary system of the Mandated territories which was as complex as their administrative organisation. Each separate State had its own budget, supported especially by direct taxation. In addition, the French-administered Common Interests organisation collected

the revenue from certain departments of common interest, such as the Customs, and allocated this revenue to the various Services (Health etc.) maintained throughout the territories, to certain other interstate charges, and as subventions to the budgets of the separate states. The expenses of the High Commission, and the French forces in the territory, however, devolved upon the French treasury. The States' budgets were intended to be self-supporting, thus "firmly (but not deliberately – T.G.) limiting the pace of possible development in beneficent State activity." That the territory pays its way without financial assistance from France was a cardinal principle of French policy. Indeed, the cost of the Mandate came under frequent fire in France.<sup>23</sup> To pay for comprehensive Armenian refugee settlement would have required either precisely such an objectionable injection of capital from France, or an extraordinary financial commitment from the limited resources of the territory, not only financially embarrassing but potentially politically so, especially at the level of the State budgets.

It is understandable, therefore, that official financial commitment to Armenian settlement was initially minimal. Consequent attempts to encourage small-scale dispersal met with Armenian opposition on the grounds of security, and, as already observed, do not appear to have been successful. M. De Caix, then French spokesman at the Permanent Mandates Commission, reported in November, 1926 that some Armenians who had been placed with Syrian or French landowners had left agricultural employment to become peddlers as soon as they had saved a little money. He concluded that the Armenians were not on the whole an agricultural population.<sup>24</sup>

In fact, the authorities appear to have been rather confused as to the number of agricultural workers (and hence potential agricultural colonists) amongst the Armenians. At Geneva in February, 1926, M. De Caix had to accept that there was a contradiction in the report of the Mandatory Power for 1924, concerning the manner in which immigration was regarded:<sup>25</sup>

In the second paragraph it was stated:

To sum up, the Christian immigrants of Anatolia, ... now ... constitute a remedy, to a large extent, for the lack of labour resulting from the traditional emigration of the inhabitants of Lebanon to the two Americas,

while two paragraphs further on, the report stated:

... They replaced them in quantity but not in quality for, while the emigrants belong for the most part to the peasant classes, the great majority of immigrants are artisans.

### ***The Carle Proposals***

If the French reaction to large-scale settlement proposals was disappointing, the League of Nations provided more hope. On September 25, 1924, the Assembly passed a resolution inviting...

the I.L.O., in collaboration with Dr. Nansen (the League High Commissioner for Refugees – T.G.), to institute an enquiry with a view to studying the possibility of settling a substantial number of Armenian refugees in the Caucasus or elsewhere...<sup>26</sup>

In view of the various representations made to this Commission regarding the situation of the Armenian refugees in Syria, one member of the Commission, M. Carle, was invited to proceed to Syria for the purpose of submitting a report on the Armenian refugee problem there. He concluded from his investigation that the refugees should be encouraged in every way to settle on the land if a final and permanent solution of the problem was to be found.<sup>27</sup> He noted the failure of the French authorities to persuade the Armenians to do so. Even in requesting Armenian landowners to encourage poor Armenians to settle on the land, both General Gouraud and M. Achard, agricultural adviser to the State of Syria, had seen several attempts fail. A Frenchman who owned a vineyard in the Bekaa had set up an Armenian as steward at Chtaura, only to see him desert to become a peddler. No doubt it was this example cited by Carle which had prompted De Caix's remarks to the Permanent Mandates Commission, but it has already been suggested that the failure of French attempts at dispersal was due to their small-scale. Now, however, M. Carle found French officials willing to consider larger-scale settlement. Lépissier, Assistant Secretary-General to the High Commissioner, was devoting his attention to the problem. M. Carle drew his attention to the possibilities existing at the head of the Ghab, scheduled for division into lots, and for which an improvement-plan had recently been prepared. He obtained the agreement of M. Fontana, Director of the Land Service, to a proposal to establish an Armenian village in this area, and M.M. Carle and Melconian (almost acting Armenian "consul") addressed a formal request to the High Commissioner to decide this question. Carle envisaged that capital of about a million francs would be required to allow the future landholders to obtain agricultural implements, livestock and seed. This would be provided by a loan at low interest, administered by the Crédit Agricole, involving funds from the interested local governments. He raised the question of the Nansen Office providing 500,000 francs to assist in the establishment of the first settlements. He envisaged that the million francs would provide for about 1500 hectares at about ten hectares per family, i.e., by implication the settlement of about 150 families, but in a letter to Major Johnson, Secretary-General of the League Refugees Office, he foresaw the settlement of five to eight thousand refugees in the Ghab, and noted too that the High Commission intended to endeavour to populate the region to the east of Aleppo beside the Euphrates. The question was discussed at a meeting of the League Refugees Advisory Committee in September, 1925,<sup>28</sup> when Dr. Nansen rightly pointed out that a settlement scheme in Syria could only be carried out with the permission of, and in co-operation with, the French authorities. Almost at the same time, however, the political situation in Syria deteriorated rapidly, and plans had to be shelved.<sup>29</sup> The Druze Rebellion, which was responsible for this inconvenience, erupted in August, 1925, and was not finally stamped out until 1927. Though affecting primarily, the southern part of Syria, it produced insecurity and fear even in the far north where the rebels secured no firm hold.<sup>30</sup>

## *The Nansen Office Settlement Scheme*

### *Initial Proposals*

Paradoxically, it was as an indirect result of the fighting in Syria that the question was revived.<sup>31</sup> In November, 1925 M. Schlemmer had been sent by the International Red Cross Committee to study the refugee problem caused by this conflict. He was replaced the next month by M. Burnier. At the beginning of April, 1926, Burnier accompanied Dr. Duguet, director of the health service of the "armée du Levant," on a tour of inspection, during which they observed the necessity of intervening more particularly on behalf of the Armenian refugees. On April 12, Burnier wrote to the Red Cross asking if Dr. Nansen, the League High Commissioner for Refugees, might be interested in co-operating in a solution, offering to act as negotiator. His letter was accompanied by a report which stated that the problem was that the great majority (6-7000 families) of the Armenians were agriculturalists who, unlike the traders and shopkeepers, were unable to obtain work. The solution to this problem was the creation of agricultural colonies. These proposals were taken under consideration by the League. When he heard that Dr. Nansen might perhaps be disposed to co-operate, Burnier informed the French authorities and after two conferences with M. de Reffye, Secretary-General to the High Commissioner, and M. Lépissier, his assistant, drew up the broad outlines of a plan, which was approved by M. de Jouvenal, the High Commissioner, for submission to the I.L.O. with a request for the formal participation of that organisation. This he presented to the I.L.O. Refugees Office on his return to Geneva on May 11, 1926.

The report<sup>32</sup> began with an outline of the problem. It noted that, while many refugees (especially businessmen, artisans and workmen) had been able to establish themselves in Syria, many others (above all peasants) had not. A distinction was drawn between the refugees at Beirut and those in other localities. At Beirut, the material situation of the refugees was relatively satisfactory, and the local population was not hostile. Elsewhere, especially at Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo, the situation was much less favourable. At Damascus and Hama, the population was absolutely hostile to the Armenians, who were having difficulty in making a living. At Aleppo, Syrian-Armenian relations were better, but the town could not support its Armenian influx. Out of 45,000 refugees at Aleppo, 35-40,000 were living in unstable conditions, and according to local relief committees most of these were peasants. The solution lay in the creation of agricultural colonies, the guiding principle of which should be the transfer to a predominantly Christian region of the Armenians living in predominantly Muslim regions. More specifically it was proposed that the Armenian agricultural workers in the interior towns be transferred to southern Lebanon where the Mandatory authorities were ready to provide, in the villages of Hasbaya and Merdjayoun, land and houses for 1500 families (8000 persons), and, in the region of Tyr, domain land (formerly property of the Sultan) able to hold about 4000 families (20,000 persons). It was because the French authorities and the State of

Lebanon could not afford the cost of establishing these colonies that they were addressing themselves to the High Commissioner for Refugees. These costs would, however, be in the form of loans to the refugees, reimbursable after an agreed period. A trial installation of 50 families was proposed to establish the cost of such a scheme.

A number of observations may be made on these proposals. First, they entirely supplanted those of M. Carle, made the previous year and which, concerned with settlement in the interior, would be excluded under the new proposals. Second, although established in collaboration with Burnier, they reflected French policy, from which political considerations were not absent. Third, the basis of the proposals was that the majority of the Armenians requiring assistance were peasants. This was in direct contradiction with earlier French statements and suggests that economic assessments were partly matters of political convenience. It is unfortunate that our knowledge of the former occupational structure of the Armenians is too imprecise to enable critical comment on these assessments. Fourth, following the Carle proposals, they represented a continuing French interest in large-scale solutions, no doubt related to the provision of finance by the League.

The vital condition for the acceptance of participation by the Office was a formal request from the French government.<sup>33</sup> Such a request was not initially forthcoming, as the proposals for the mass transfer of refugees were criticised at the Quai d'Orsay on political grounds. It was not until June 30, 1926 that M. De Jouvenal addressed a request for intervention to the Director of the I.L.O.<sup>34</sup> and suggested the sending of an envoy to Syria charged with the establishment of a general plan of settlement, in collaboration with the local authorities. Burnier was nominated to this task, as joint representative of the I.L.O. and the I.R.C. C.<sup>35</sup>

Once in Syria, Burnier resumed co-operation with the French authorities, and gradually developed the principal features of a settlement plan which was in several respects different from that originally foreseen.<sup>36</sup> It was decided, because Beirut and Aleppo together contained two thirds of the Armenian refugee population, to concentrate on solving the problem in those two settlements before considering other centres. The situation in Beirut camp would be relieved by the construction of a new quarter, a project already under study in April, and for which the French High Commission allocated a sum of three million francs. It is clear that such measures of urban improvement, while relieving conditions in the camps, would not fundamentally alter the economic position of the Armenians in the country. However, an experimental agricultural colony of about 50 families would be established in Southern Lebanon. On the inquiry of the "Service de Renseignements," some landowners of Saida and Tyr declared themselves willing to take Armenian métayers, and Burnier believed the region to be especially favourable to métayage, having large, fertile landholdings, adequate water-supply, a shortage of labour, and an indigenous population of Metwalis, (Shi'i Muslims) who had remained calm during the revolt. In the State of Syria,

the reorganisation of the Aleppo camp was foreseen, and the installation of agricultural colonies. These could be on the coast or in the Euphrates Region, but the Euphrates region was ruled out, at least initially, for economic, political and financial reasons. The political reasons will be considered later.

Of more direct concern is that in sparsely inhabited country, with poor communications, the refugees would lack markets. Further, the costs of installation would be too high, and could only be undertaken by a rich company, well provided with engineers and equipment, wishing to organise specialised cultivation, for example of cotton or cereals, over thousands of hectares. By contrast, for reasons of security, the coastal region of Antioch-Soueidiyé, containing a large indigenous Armenian population, was more acceptable. Some entire Armenian villages were the property of one or several Armenians, and the Armenian “Société de Secours” at Aleppo had already sent an agronomist to the region to make inquiries.<sup>37</sup> Not only the Armenian landowners but Greeks and Muslims too had expressed their willingness to take Armenians either as farmers or *métayers*. Many of the villages had been partly depopulated, and installation would be inexpensive. It was Beirut, however, which would take first priority; on October 12, 1926, three cases of plague had been reported in the camp.

It is clear that, compared with Burnier’s original proposals (also worked out in collaboration with the French), there were significant changes in the new arrangements. The large-scale transfer of refugees from the interior to southern Lebanon was no longer envisaged. Southern Lebanon would now receive refugees from Beirut, while there would be some stabilisation of the refugees at Aleppo, and their colonisation would be within the State of Syria, possibly in the Sanjak of Alexandretta. Beirut and Aleppo were selected for priority treatment; Damascus was, for the time being, ignored. The whole conception of the original plan had been altered, and more piecemeal proposals substituted.

At Geneva, meanwhile, the Consultative Committee for Refugees had decided to set up an Armenian sub-committee, charged with gathering the necessary funds for the scheme and advising the High Commissioner for Refugees as to their use.<sup>38</sup> The only positive action of this sub-committee at its first meeting on November 1 was to approve in principle the plan for an experimental colony of 50 families, and to invite Major Johnson to visit Syria in order to be able to submit concrete proposals to the committee.<sup>39</sup>

In his report on this visit Johnson outlined the problem.<sup>40</sup> Out of an estimated total of 86,500 refugees, he believed that the solution would involve the evacuation and resettlement of no fewer than 20,000 refugees (Table 5.2). In addition, the settlement elsewhere of the 10,000 refugees in the region of Damascus should be regarded as a practical necessity if and when the military effectives in that area should be appreciably diminished. The immediate problem consisted of 2000 agricultural families (10,000 refugees), whose settlement, he believed, would pave the way for the assimilation, in various capacities, of a large proportion of the remaining 10,000 refugees. In considering settlement proposals,

he first excluded schemes for the Euphrates Valley, for the same reasons as Burnier. He then proposed a number of schemes which he believed to be acceptable; that is resettlement at Beirut and settlement in the Sanjak of Alexandretta and in southern Lebanon, all for the same reasons as stated by Burnier. In southern Lebanon, 50 families could be placed forthwith as *métayers*, while, in the event of this experiment proving successful, the High Commission was still willing to consider placing certain State lands in the same region at the disposal of the Office. Johnson also presented two additional proposals. One was for settlement on marshes to be reclaimed at Alexandretta, the other for settlement in the *cazas* of Bab and Menbidj, within sixty to seventy kilometers of Aleppo. In this latter area, Johnson was informed by General Billotte that there were large tracts of vacant land and even abandoned villages which could be made available to the Armenians on advantageous terms. Furthermore, extensive irrigation works were being contemplated, with a view to the exploitation of large tracts of fertile land between Meskené and Aleppo, which would not only afford employment to considerable numbers of Armenians, but would open up further areas for their settlement. Aleppo would provide a market, while security would be assured by the concentration of troops in and around Aleppo. Detailed proposals in this respect were provided by General Billotte. The interesting new aspect of Johnson's overview of the situation was an acknowledgement of the necessity to act to alleviate the situation at Alexandretta town.

Johnson's proposals were presented to the next meeting of the Armenian sub-committee, when support was expressed for the settlement of Armenians in the Sanjak and southern Lebanon, in preference to the proposals for settlement in Aleppo Vilayet, on the grounds of security.<sup>41</sup> In the meantime, however, a new "Comité Central de Secours aux Arméniens" was formed in Beirut<sup>42</sup> involving Burnier, the French authorities and other interested parties, under the presidency of the Secretary-General of the French High Commission, to study the possibilities for settlement. Sub-committees would be constituted working under the control of the French delegate in each state. Henceforth, therefore, there was a certain dualism in administration, with the Beirut and Geneva committees sometimes at cross purposes, with Geneva losing some of its control over the allocation of finance, and Burnier finding some of his proposals, approved in Beirut, rejected by Geneva. This dualism was well represented by the preparation of a general plan by Duguet.<sup>43</sup> This plan, based on an appreciation of the problem similar to that of Johnson (Table 5.3), laid down that the initial operations should be the construction of a new quarter at Beirut, along with agricultural colonisation, the immediate possibilities being the establishment of 50 families as *métayers* in southern Lebanon, and the settlement of 150 families as owner-occupiers in the Antioch region. It clearly duplicated the proposals of Johnson.

**Table 5.2: Major Johnson's appreciation of the Refugee Problem in Syria<sup>2</sup>**

Present installation	Total no:	Situation and urgent action recommended
Beirut camp	22,000	1000 agricultural families (approximately 5000 refugees) should be established on the land as soon as possible, either in colonies or as métayers. A further 1000 families of unskilled workers engaged in casual labour should be evacuated as soon as possible to dwellings which could be constructed on the outskirts of the town.
Aleppo camp	28,000	800 agricultural families (approximately 4000 refugees) should be transferred to the land in the regions of Antioch-Soueidiyé and of Aleppo-Ménbidj-Meskene. The evacuation of a further 800 families of unskilled workers employed in casual labour would substantially liquidate the original Aleppo camp.
Alexandretta camp	5350 (1350 families)	450 families are destitute and a further 650 families are in a very precarious situation. 1000 families therefore require transfer elsewhere, to the Jebel Moussa for instance, or should be employed on draining the Alexandretta marshes where they are at present installed
Beilane & district	1350 autochthonous Armenians	Only 15 families are destitute and require establishment.
Kirik Khane	1800 (440 families)	60 destitute families and 240 indigent families require assistance
Rihaniyé	60	These refugees are all agriculturalists established under comfortable and even prosperous conditions
Qassab	2627	
Jebel Moussa	3843	
Latakia	2500	
Homs & Hama	1000	
Tripoli	2000	
Saida & Tyr	1000	
Lebanese villages	1000	No definite information yet available, but these refugees are reported to be more or less self-supporting. The refugees in the region of Damascus and Hauran, however, are clamouring for removal to safer regions.
Damascus & Hauran	10,000	

### *Ras Ul Ain*

One scheme which did get under way was that for the establishment of the experimental colony in southern Lebanon. Twenty-one families, in fact, were eventually placed as métayers at Ras el Ain near Tyr.<sup>44</sup> Agreement was reached with an Egyptian who was farming domain land leased from the government. The Armenians would provide oxen, tools and half the seed, (in fact supplied by the Beirut Committee), while the manager would provide lodging, land, food for the livestock until the harvest, the remaining seed and a kitchen-garden for each family. The Armenians would receive 55% of the harvest. They would in addition have available as much work as they could manage as day-labourers at 25 piastres

<sup>2</sup> *Source*: Johnson Report, Dec. 18, 1926 (N.A. C1429).

per day. The experiment ended in failure; the Armenians being taken back to Beirut whence they came by the end of 1927. Already in July, 1927, the refugees were reported to be suffering from malaria.<sup>45</sup> This was true, but according to Duguet it was due partly to the imprudence of the Armenians, who had destroyed an irrigation-dam in order to have a greater quantity of water for cultivation, without considering the possible consequences. The eventual liquidation of the colony was due, according to Burnier,<sup>46</sup> not to malaria, but to the system of *métayage*, which the Armenians viewed as unjust, the lack of organisation amongst the Armenians, who had no leader, and the system of recruitment, which paid no attention to place of origin. This abortive scheme was the only planned Armenian settlement in southern Lebanon. In fact, while at the time of Johnson's visit it had been intimated that, in the event of the experiment proving successful, the High Commission was willing to consider placing certain tracts of State domain in the region at the disposal of the Office, Burnier was already reporting in December, 1926 that it was not expected to find large outlets in Lebanon.<sup>47</sup> Settlement at Ras el Ain was, however, proposed again in May, 1928,<sup>48</sup> when the same land reverted to the Government, but this was then regarded as the sole remaining Government estate available in Lebanon for settlement purposes. Given low priority at Geneva,<sup>49</sup> it was eclipsed by other schemes. The large-scale colonisation of southern Lebanon envisaged by De Jouvenal never really began.

<b>Table 5.3: Duguet's appreciation of the Armenian refugee problem in Syria, Dec. 29, 1926<sup>3</sup></b>	
No. of families in the camps:	
at Beirut	2500 families
at Aleppo	3000 families
at Alexandretta	1000 families
TOTAL	6500 i.e., about 40,000 persons.
of which:	
60% agriculturalists	24,000
10% rural artisans	4000
30% urban artisans, "commereants," intellectuals	12,000
	40,000
At Beirut: 2500 families. Envisage	
(a) definitive urban installation of 1000 families	
(b) rural installation of 1500 families.	
At Aleppo: 3000 families. Envisage	
(a) urban improvements	
(b) rural installation of 1500 families of agriculturists or rural artisans.	
At Alexandretta: 1000 families comprising above all women and children at present dependent on charity. Each agricultural centre created by us should receive several of these especially needy families.	

### ***Proposals for Settlement in the Interior***

Less fortunate still were the plans suggested for settlement in the interior of Aleppo Vilayet. There, the French Delegate, M. Reclus, wished to keep within

<sup>3</sup> *Source*: N.A. C1429.

the Vilayet those Armenians who had settled there, regarding them, according to Burnier and Duguet, as an element of prosperity in the country.<sup>50</sup> He was in favour of the establishment of large agricultural colonies, and believed it would be necessary to settle 800 families of peasants. It was therefore proposed to create a first colony of 200-250 families at Qirate, 10 km north-east of Qalaat el Mudik, on two tracts of state domain, of 1600 hectares, on a plateau overlooking the Orontes Valley. Water-supply was insufficient, comprising unusable wells and cisterns, but M. Vitalis, an agricultural engineer, who undertook trials, found water-bearing rocks at little depth able to provide an adequate supply.<sup>51</sup> The scheme was approved in principle by Johnson, despite the preference of the Geneva Committee for settlement in coastal rather than interior regions, Burnier arguing (as Johnson had in his report) that security in the interior could, in certain cases, be assured. Nevertheless, the plan then ran into the opposition of “an important Armenian organisation” which, notwithstanding the success of M. Vitalis, still protested that the settlement would be deficient in water, and generally unhealthy. To avoid possibly embarrassing discussions with this Society, the Scheme was dropped. Burnier accepted the decision bitterly, protesting that the scheme had been carefully studied from the technical and security aspects, while not a single Armenian notable had actually bothered to visit the proposed site. He could not understand why the Armenians, having originally supported settlement in the Ghab, should now veto settlement in a nearby region.<sup>52</sup>

Two other schemes involving settlement in the interior also came to grief. One concerned land in the southern Hauran around Qouneitra, near to some Circassian villages established by the Sultan to create a dam between the Druzes of the Jebel and those of the Hauran and Hermon. Johnson did not consider that this would appeal to the Geneva Committee given their preference for settlement in coastal regions.<sup>53</sup> The other plan involved a resurrection of Carle’s plan for the Ghab which, it will be recalled, had fallen into abeyance at the time of the Druze Revolt. Burnier however considered that the lack of progress with work on the Ghab and its general unhealthiness made other schemes preferable.<sup>54</sup>

### ***Settlement in the Sanjak of Alexandretta***

One area, advocated by Burnier and Duguet, which was acceptable to Geneva, was the Sanjak of Alexandretta. The area had been suggested for settlement by both Burt and Berron, and Mr. Oskan, an agronomist, had made a study of the possibilities for settlement on behalf of the local Armenians. In this region, a number of landowners had expressed their willingness to take Armenians either as farmers or *métayers*. It was believed that in the many depopulated villages of the area installation would be inexpensive. Detailed proposals for the settlement of 150 families in five farms in the region were annexed to Duguet’s plan,<sup>55</sup> based on a study made by the chief officer of the “Service de Renseignements” of Antioch. All were lying fallow with their houses in ruins. In these farms would

be placed, not *métayers* as at Ras el Ain, but owner-occupiers, Burnier regarding the placement of owner-occupier in the Sanjak as more advantageous than that of *métayers* in Lebanon. In Geneva, it had been thought that *métayage* would achieve the best results, but Burnier argued against it on the grounds that the financial risks involved were too great, it achieved no definitive settlement and it was socially undesirable, arguments which were eventually accepted in Geneva.<sup>56</sup> Further, while originally the Sanjak had been proposed as a centre of settlement for the refugees of Aleppo, in view of the plans for the settlement of Armenians in the interior of Aleppo Vilayet (which never, in fact, came to fruition), the Armenians to be sent there would be chosen by preference from Alexandretta itself and Beirut.<sup>57</sup>

Money was sent from Geneva to Burnier for the purchase of these five farms,<sup>58</sup> but before the purchase could be completed, objections were raised by certain Armenian notables. A new study was ordered, this time by M. Vitalis, which confirmed the conclusions of the first. However, in the meantime, the price of two of the farms had decupled so that their purchase was abandoned.<sup>59</sup> Ultimately, only one of these farms was purchased, that of Ikiz Keupru, in the Jebel Moussa on August 10, 1927, half the money to be paid to the owners in Antioch, the other half to owners in the United States.<sup>60</sup> Two other farms were, however, purchased by Burnier. The first was Souk Sou in the Amouk plain purchased at the end of 1927<sup>61</sup> from an elderly indigenous Armenian no longer able to assure its exploitation. He sold it to his compatriots despite the fact that higher offers had been made by Muslims. The second was Bey-Seki eventually purchased in 1930.<sup>62</sup> In addition, a number of Armenians were aided in their establishment on two plots of land in the developing town of Kirik Khane, also in the Amouk plain.<sup>63</sup>

As an alternative to lands in private-ownership, a detailed list was drawn up of available state domain and escheat land. Investigation of these lands revealed three large tracts of land, all possessing fertile alluvial soils in the Amouk plain, and all of which could be used immediately, without preparation. Agreement in principle to settlement on these lands was communicated to Burnier in October, 1927, who obtained a lease on the property of Pré-Militaire, for three years, during which time it would be possible to sign a new agreement with the authorities. This land, of 650 hectares, was formerly used to quarter each year two regiments of Ottoman cavalry. It was considered suitable for the settlement of 150 families.<sup>64</sup>

More domain land was obtained in 1927 from a quite different source. This was a property at Kirik Khane of over one hundred hectares belonging to the Mission des Lazaristes.<sup>65</sup> The Lazarists found that they had not the resources to administer all their land and decided to surrender it to the Settlement Committee. The Lazarists themselves had apparently earlier been installed at Kirik Khane as part of a deliberate policy. They had been offered a tract of domain land at Kirik Khane in 1923 in order to reconstitute there their Mission from Ekbes,

presumably in accordance with the French policy of dispersal, for the project had the full support of the authorities. It had also, initially, the support of the local Apostolic notables who encouraged the Lazarists to found their Mission at Kirik Khane, possibly because such an action offered an additional guarantee of security. When the land was ceded, already inhabited, to the office by the Lazarists, it was on condition that only Catholic families should live on it, a condition which proved unacceptable to an important Armenian organisation. However, Burnier was able to report in April, 1928, that 14 of the 36 families already settled had merely declared themselves Catholics although Apostolics in order to take advantage of the land, while he made it clear to the refugees settled there that they depended on the office and no-one else.

### ***Massiaf (Mouchachène Armène)***

Further proposals for settlement in the Sanjak in 1928 and 1929 failed to materialise as the finance available was not sufficient.<sup>66</sup> One other agricultural colony was, however, founded before the end of 1929, in Alawi Territory.<sup>67</sup> The question of settlement in this region was raised with Burnier in 1929 by the High Commissioner. Settlement was envisaged initially in the north between Latakia and Qassab, on unpopulated lands, offering security, health, and low costs of installation. In April, 1929, Burnier submitted definite proposals for settlement in the Territory, involving one village near Qassab in the zone mentioned, as well as 100 hectares near Djeblé on the coast, and 2000 hectares in the Massiaf region, for the creation of two villages. While all these propositions were agreed in principle by Geneva, it was ultimately the proposals for the Massiaf region alone which were accepted. By contract of August 30, 1929, the Alawi State let to the League the whole of the disposable domain lands of El Qrayate and Joubb Ramlé in the Massiaf region. Thus, in the final analysis, the property acquired was not in the northern part of the Territory near Qassab, but in the interior.

### ***The Adoption of Alternative Schemes of Urban Resettlement***

The progress of agricultural colonisation was increasingly retarded by the adoption of alternative schemes for urban resettlement. Resettlement at Beirut had been studied by the French authorities as early as April, 1926, and endorsed by the Johnson Report. It was, however, given a low priority by the Geneva Committee who preferred rightly, in view of the economic situation, to give priority to the agricultural colonisation of agricultural refugees rather than to the urban settlement of artisan refugees.<sup>68</sup> However, as Burnier made clear, the three million francs granted by the French High Commission to the settlement scheme were always destined for urban resettlement at Beirut,<sup>69</sup> and construction went ahead in any case. Further schemes, however, were dictated by events. A number of rehousing crises developed in the principal centres of Armenian concentration, such that Burnier found himself obliged to participate in the construction of urban quarters as a rapid response, instead of carefully planned agricultural settlements.

Thus, approval was given in 1928 for the construction of new quarters at Aleppo, Alexandretta and Damascus, where in each case the refugees were faced with expulsion from the land on which they had settled. More construction was begun also at Beirut, where, after the first initiative of the Mandatory authorities, this situation appears to have become the same as at Aleppo. In this way, the problems of excessive local concentration were forcing their own solutions before the considered plans for dispersal could be implemented.

That this was so is evident from the vigorous defence of agricultural as opposed to urban resettlement made by Burnier in response to criticisms made of the state of health in the agricultural colonies.<sup>70</sup> Burnier argued in reply that the health situation was no better in the towns than in the villages. Further, from the economic point of view the presence of the refugees in the towns had caused a crisis of poverty between 1921 and 1924. Since that date a building boom in Beirut and Aleppo had alleviated the crisis. Burnier correctly prophesied, however, that in a few years this boom would be over, bringing unemployment in a situation where there was no (sic) industry and where none (sic) could be created. To abandon the agricultural programme on the basis of this temporary prosperity, he believed, would be a severe error of judgment. It was, he claimed, socially an error to retain in the towns those agriculturists who wished to return to the land. Their children were growing up to be nothing but workmen or labourers, to form a future army of rootless paupers, perpetually dependent on public charity, while the indigenous population feared the creation in the cities of unassimilable foreign colonies. The solution still lay in agricultural colonisation, which to be achieved at all would have to be achieved quickly. In a few years the scheme would become impossible. Perceptively, he prophesied that in that case...

Nous aurons non seulement confirmé l'instabilité de ces populations Arméniennes en Syrie, mais nous les aurons irrémédiablement fixées dans leur misère et dans la promiscuité immorale et dangereuse de leurs quartiers. Nous ne voyons pas que l'oeuvre poursuivie par le H.C. pour les réfugiés puisse être conduit ainsi et de telle façon qu'elle aboutisse à un résultat diamétralement opposé au but qu'il s'était proposé à l'origine.

### ***The Revival of Plans for Large-Scale Colonisation***

At the end of 1929 the question of large-scale agricultural colonisation was revived. As will be apparent hitherto the scheme had been hindered by inadequate finance. To meet this situation, the Office raised the possibility of the Armenian and philarmenian societies obtaining a loan for the settlement scheme which would be guaranteed by the Mandatory Power. Such a guarantee was opposed on political grounds, but eventually the Mandatory Power agreed on a credit of three million francs to the Rolling Fund,<sup>71</sup> (a significant departure from previous French budgetary procedure, stressing the importance they attached to the scheme). Presumably as a consequence of this decision, the Armenian sub-committee decided to invite the French government to appoint a representative to the committee.<sup>72</sup> The French appointed M. Pierro LeNail who immediately began

a reappraisal of the whole settlement scheme. After conversations with M. Ponsot, the High Commissioner, he envisaged large-scale colonisation of the plains of the Euphrates and Khabour, now pacified and incorporated into a zone of civil administration.<sup>73</sup> It is significant that, this time a new wave of migration was bringing Armenian refugees into the north-east of Syria direct, but it is evident that the proposals for settlement in the Euphrates Region pre-dated the new influx of the refugees. The large scale of operations envisaged by Le Nail was made clear to the Geneva committee at a meeting of December 2, 1929,<sup>74</sup> where he noted that the lands involved could be used not only for agriculture and cattle-raising, but also for cotton and for the raising of sheep for wool. He had discussed this question with industrialists in France who had expressed their readiness to afford every assistance to the Armenian refugees in this connection. He believed that 100,000 (sic) refugees could be settled on these lands, so that Aleppo, which would become the principal market for the produce of the refugees, would greatly profit by the scheme. This would result in the revival of the commercial prosperity of Aleppo, which would ensure the support of the indigenous population. Furthermore, the Mandatory Power contemplated the construction of railways and roads for the opening up of the Euphrates Valley.

It is clear from Le Nail's statements to the meeting, that he envisaged that the newly arrived refugees could be included in this scheme. The necessity for such action was recognised also by Burnier, who wrote on December 4, 1929,<sup>75</sup> that every effort would be made to prevent the refugees from concentrating again in the towns, and that the High Commissioner would endeavour to settle them in northern Syria where they had arrived. However, no action could be taken in this respect until the question of the competence of the Office with respect to the new refugees had been resolved, and it was not until April 22, 1930, that Johnson could communicate to Burnier agreement in principle to participation in the settlement of the new arrivals.<sup>76</sup>

In the meantime, consideration of Le Nail's scheme had gone ahead, and it was resolved at Geneva on December 19, 1929 to continue the programmes for the Alawi Territory (Massiaf) and Beirut, but to abandon the outstanding projects concerning the Alexandretta region in favour of Le Nail's proposals for the Euphrates.<sup>77</sup> Le Nail himself visited the region between April and June, 1930, and reported to the Committee on August 26, 1930.<sup>78</sup> In his report, he now not only proposed settlement in the Euphrates and Khabour Valleys, but also in the Palmyra area. Here the competent authorities had made over 25,000 hectares of land six kilometers out of the town. The engineer M. Vitalis was organising irrigation in this area where lucerne fields and sheep-breeding would be the principal agricultural undertakings. In response to repeated requests money had already been dispatched for this scheme,<sup>79</sup> but the Committee's recommendations were required as to its use. In fact, the scheme was to progress no further.

### *Reappraisal*

It seems that already, as early as June 27, 1930, there was a divergence between the plans suggested by Le Nail and those favoured by M. Ponsot, the French High Commissioner.<sup>80</sup> This was pointed out at a meeting of the Administrative Committee of the Nansen Office on April 28, 1931,<sup>81</sup> when the President, Max Huber, noted that there were deep divergences between the view of the French High Commissioner, who desired to renounce international aid from January 1, 1933 (according to a statement by the French representative) and those expressed by the French representative on the Central Armenian Committee (i.e. Le Nail) who envisaged a large scale work of settlement even permitting the introduction into Syria of a large number of Armenian refugees from other countries. The situation clearly required clarification, and to this end a meeting was held in Paris on June 24, 1931,<sup>82</sup> attended by Ponsot, Burnier, and representatives of the Nansen Office. At this meeting, Burnier argued in favour of the installation of the remaining refugees in the towns, for financial reasons. He had already observed to Geneva that reimbursements from the refugees resettled in the towns were more satisfactory than those from the rural settlements.<sup>83</sup> Nevertheless, in view of his earlier forthright defence of agricultural settlement as opposed to urban resettlement, this represented a considerable volte-face. He also argued that, by dealing only with those refugees in distress, a solution to the problem could be achieved in 1933. In fact, he was clearly endorsing the views expressed earlier by the High Commissioner, and it was these which triumphed in the resolutions adopted. It was resolved that:

**I** The present arrangements, whereby the Office is responsible for the Armenian settlement work in Syria, shall be maintained in force until Dec. 31<sup>st</sup>, 1933.

**II** The settlement work to be accomplished by the Office concerns the 15,000 Armenian refugees still remaining in refugee camps, principally those of Aleppo and Beyrouth.

The settlement of those refugees shall be confined to urban settlement, in view of the cheapness of that form of settlement as compared with agricultural colonisation, and of the greater rapidity with which it can be executed.

Thus, the ambitious plans for settlement in the regions of the Euphrates and Palmyra were abandoned. A scheme which had begun in 1926 as essentially one of agricultural colonisation, but which had progressively become one of urban resettlement in response to a series of rehousing crises, was now devoted solely to this latter objective.

Ultimately the settlement work of the Office was to last until the end of December, 1937 after which, with the problem still not completely solved, the final settlement operations were left in the hands of the AGBU.<sup>84</sup> During the whole of this period, there were only two departures from the agreed policy of resettlement of refugees in Beirut and Aleppo. The first concerned Baniyas, on the coast in Alawi Territory.<sup>85</sup> At the end of September, 1932, 26 families from Beirut

were engaged by a landowner of Banias to cultivate his property. The other exception was not even considered an “agricultural settlement”. This was at Rihaniyé, in the Sanjak of Alexandretta<sup>86</sup> where the Office bought land for a new “urban” quarter (comparable with the small “urban” quarter created earlier in the nearby settlement of Kirik Khane). The circumstances of these exceptional arrangements are not known, but their importance was minimal compared with the large resettlement efforts in Beirut and Aleppo.

### ***Private Initiations***

Further schemes of agricultural colonisation were the result of private initiatives. Two settlements are noted in the reports of the Mandatory Power.<sup>87</sup> These are twin villages at Tell Brack, and a number of houses constructed at Hassetché. Neither of these settlements were sanctioned or assisted by the Nansen Office according to available reports and correspondence. Nothing more, beyond the statements in the reports of the Mandatory Power, is known about the houses at Hassetché, of which, by the end of 1930, 232 had been built. Tell Brack is better documented. Here the twin settlements lay at the confluence of the Jagh-Jagh and the Radd. It appears that land had been offered free by the Mandatory Power, and funds were provided by foreign charitable organisations, principally Armenian, such as the A.G.B.U., whose agent was a refugee committee at Aleppo, which operated independently of the Nansen Office’s Beirut committee.<sup>88</sup> By the end of 1930, it is reported that 160 houses had been built, and 60 more were projected.<sup>89</sup> Wells had been sunk, gardens and fields were irrigated by pumps, and the efforts of the Armenians were even encouraging sedenterisation amongst the local Bedouin.<sup>90</sup> However, the colony suffered severely from drought in 1931,<sup>91</sup> following which its irrigation canals were destroyed by floods.<sup>92</sup> Several appeals for assistance with water supply were made, notably to the Nansen Office, but nothing could be done by the Office, and the colony, which was already reduced to 60 families by the end of 1932, was apparently already abandoned for lack of water at the time of the visit to Syria in 1933 of Mr. Werner, the President of the Office.<sup>93</sup>

Another colonisation scheme, also in the north-east, was planned by the “Action Chrétienne en Orient”. In this case the motivation was the critical situation of the refugees in Aleppo, and the need to find a home for those Armenians who had escaped from Arab homes, and who then found it difficult to find a place in life in Aleppo. It was intended that the colony would at the same time serve as a missionary centre. The land, on the banks of the Jagh-Jagh near Hassetché, was bought in 1936, and the missionaries sent out. The work of preparing the land was given over to the Arab who had been farming it, until the colony should be ready to receive the Armenians. It was envisaged that a motor-pump should be installed, and irrigation canals constructed, for the cultivation of cotton. However, during the troubles at Hassetché in July, 1937, the fields around were burnt. Then in 1938, the A.C.O. had to renounce this land altogether,

because of a law which forbade religious societies from acquiring land outside agglomerations.<sup>94</sup>

### ***The Fortunes of the Nansen Office Settlements***

It remains to consider the fortunes of the dispersed settlements established by the Nansen Office.<sup>95</sup> The growth of population in these settlements is presented in Table 5.4. Two of these, Kirik Khane and Rihaniyé, were classed as “urban”, and were in fact new quarters added to pre-existing population centres. Information on their economic prosperity is lacking: by November, 1936, reimbursements to the office of loans made to the refugees for their settlement in these two centres had barely started, but this situation was regarded as unjustified. (Table 5.5).

The remaining centres were classed as “agricultural” settlements, that on the land of the Lazarists at Kirik Khane being classed exceptionally as “half agricultural, half urban”. Their organisation was based on the experience gained from the failure of the Ras el Ain metayage experiment. It was decided to try to create true Armenian centres, each comprising a minimum of thirty families. This would permit the creation of an administrative organisation, recognised by the authorities, involving a headman and Council of Elders with sufficient authority to permit the success of the scheme. The system of recruitment was in principle as follows. When the Committee entered into possession of some land, then according to its importance, geographical situation and the type of cultivation appropriate, the Armenian region of Anatolia whose former inhabitants would adapt themselves most easily to the land acquired would be determined. The former headman or notables would then be consulted, and would carry out a census in all the concentrations of their former villages, and study the possibility of reconstituting their village. If they envisaged this as possible, and accepted the financial terms offered by the Office, the land would be put at their disposal. Initially work would be on a communal basis, but the land would be subdivided once all the houses had been built and the land put into production. The base of the system was that the Armenians should recognise that all funds expended on their behalf represented not a gift but a loan requiring reimbursement. To minimise financial commitment, all requests for financial assistance would be handled at village, not family level. They would then be channeled (at least those concerning the settlement in the Sanjak) through an Armenian representative nominated head of the Armenian villages in the Sanjak, who clearly had an influential position in the scheme. Initially, at least, the role was filled by Movses Der Kalousdian, a prominent member of the Dashnak party.

**Table 5.4:** Armenian refugees settled by the Nansen Office outside the principal urban centres<sup>1</sup>

	Dec. 31, 1928		Dec. 31, 1930		Dec. 31, 1931		Dec. 31, 1932		Dec. 31, 1933		Dec. 31, 1934		Nov. 1936		Dec. 31, 1937	
	F	P	F	P	F	P	F	P	F	P	F	P	F	P	F	P
<u>"Agricultural" settlements</u>																
Soouk Sou	50	184	40	165	?	164	?	?	?	206	?	160	?	160	40	190
Nor Zeitoun	43	152	16	63	?	?	?	?	?	95	?	64	?	64	14	40
Kirik Khane	35	154	35	152	?	160	?	?	?	175	?	144	?	144	35	178
Haiachène	97	398	78	264	?	306	?	?		634	?	644	?	644	150	640
Pré-Militaire																
Abdal Huyuk	36	126	60	247	?	229	?	?								
Massiaf (Mouchachène)	-	-	49	170	?	131	?	?	?	181	?	199	?	199	?	?
Bey-Séki	-	-	7	?	15	62	?	?	?	36	?	37	10	37	10	42
Banias	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26	109	?	?	?	109	?	?
<u>"Urban" settlements</u>																
Kirik Khane	15	56	52	230	60	371	76	318	76	318		327	67	267	?	389
Rihaniyé	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	50	240	?	221	42	221	?	280
Total	276	1070	331	?	?	?	?	?	?	1994	?	?	?	1845	?	?

<sup>1</sup> *Source:* Reports in N.A. C1429, C1583, C1584, R5638, C1598, and S.F., MS Vol. 216. *Explanation:* F: families, P: Persons.

**Table 5.5:** Reimbursements of loans made to Armenian Refugees settled by the Nansen Office, at November 1936<sup>4</sup>

	Expenditure (Fr. Fr.)	Reimbursements (Fr. Fr.)
Soouk Sou	385,255	-
Nor Zeitoun	242,522	-
Kirik Khane (“agricultural”)	92,063	2424
Pré-Militaire	1,864,384	17,026
Massiaf (Mouchachène)	860,257	500
Bey-Séki	46,876	-
Banias	25,000	-
Kirik Khane (“urban”)	34,317	1324
Rihaniyé	20,300	-
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3,570,974</b>	<b>21,274</b>

The agricultural settlements thus involved a degree of community reconstitution. One village, originally called Ikis Keupru, was renamed Nor Zeitoun, as it consisted of former inhabitants of Zeitoun (Zeytun) in Cilicia and their children. The population of Soouk Sou was drawn largely from Dortyol, that of Pré-Militaire from the vilayet of Harput, while those in Kirik Khane, already installed by the Lazarists, were largely from the Lazarists’ former missionary centre of Ekbes (Table 5.6)

**Table 5.6:** Origin of Families settled by the Nansen Office at Kirik Khane and Soouk Sou<sup>5</sup>

<i>Kirik Khane (agricultural settlement)</i>		<i>Soouk Sou</i>	
Origin	No. of families	Origin	No. of families
Ekbes	21	Dortyol	25
Hassan-Beyli	4	Keller	8
Marash	3	Ekbes	2
Dortyol	2	Chakrak	2
Sis	2	Kirik Khane	1
Teyeg	1	Nadjarli	1
Urfa	1	Zeitoun	1
Kirik Khane	1		
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>50</b>

It is evident, as far as the position of these refugees within Syria is concerned, that they were not always drawn from the principal centres of Armenian concentration, as laid down in the settlement plans. In fact, those settled in the Sanjak appear to have been drawn from all the nodes of Armenian population in northern Syria. Thus, while the population of Haiachène was drawn from Aleppo, that of Abdal Huyuk came from Kirik Khane, that of Nor Zeitoun from Kirik Khane, Alexandretta, Soueidiyé and Aleppo, and that of Soouk Sou from Kirik Khane, Beilane, Alexandretta and Qassab. (Table 5.7). The population of the Lazarists’ colony of Kirik Khane was, of course, already established there.

<sup>4</sup> *Source:* Nicolsky Report, N.A. R5638.

<sup>5</sup> *Sources:* Lists of families installed dating from C. December, 1927 in K.A., C1429, C1431.

<b>Table 5.7:</b> Origin of children, aged 6 years and under, settled by the Nansen Office at Soouk Sou <sup>6</sup>	
Origin	No. of Children
Kirik Khane	15
Alexandretta	7
Qassab	3
Beilane	1
Soouk Sou	1
Unspecified	12
TOTAL	39

Economically, the villages were never a success. They were subject to the whims of both the Syrian climate and the Syrian economy, with its price instability. Thus, they suffered from poor harvests between 1929 and 1931, and between 1934 and 1936, due partly to insects and droughts. They suffered further from the fall in prices of cereals, silk-cocoons, tobacco and cotton, and had to adjust their produce accordingly, the raising of silk worms, for example, being largely abandoned. The most profitable line appears to have been the sale of market-garden produce and fruit, (see Tables 5.8 - 5.14) while numerous colonists supplemented their income, through enterprise or necessity, by working as artisans in the neighbouring towns. Though in general the villages were adjudged capable of providing their own subsistence by Nicolsky in November, 1936, reimbursements of loans made by the office were poor.

Disillusioned, a number of colonists, complaining on occasion that their plots were too small, left the new settlements of Soouk Sou and Haiachène. The greatest exodus, however, was from Nor Zeitoun, where the population was reduced from 43 families at the end of 1928 to 16 at the end of 1930. These settlers had lost many of their goats through ignorance or laziness in the severe winter cold of 1929, though according to Burnier they had been worked on by elements hostile to the scheme living at Aleppo. They went back to Kirik Khane and Aleppo to “regain their liberty”, and could not easily be replaced. Thus, when Ellen Chater, of the Save the Children Fund, suggested to an Armenian mother at Aleppo that she move to Nor Zeitoun to fill one of the vacant places, she replied,

We had relatives who went to a village and came back very sick having lost all they had saved. Besides, the children got no opportunity to learn in the villages. It is better to stay here.<sup>96</sup>

<b>Table 5.8:</b> Soouk Sou harvest and livestock, 1928-1934 <sup>7</sup>					
Harvest (Quintals)	1928	1930	1931	1933	1934
Wheat	N.E.	144	24	390	300
Oats	N.E.	36	18	130	95
Tomatoes	N.E.	84	N.E.	140	370
Maize	N.E.	3.6	9.6	N.E.	N.E.
Onions	N.E.	60	24	N.E.	N.E.

<sup>6</sup> *Source:* List of families installed dating from C. Dec., 1927, (N.A. C1431).

<sup>7</sup> *Sources:* As Table 5.4. *Note:* Entries for harvest of 1930 and 1931 converted from Okes. *Explanation:* N.E.= No entry.

Water-melons	N.E.	18	18	N.E.	N.E.
Silk-worm cocoons	N.E.	3	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.
Cucumbers	N.N.	12	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.
Beans	N.E.	2.4	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.
Apricots	N.E.	6	3.6	45	90
Apples	N.E.	2.4	0.96		
Peaches	N.E.	1.92	0.96		
Plums	N.E.	1.2	0.96		
Sorghum	N.E.	N.E.	14.4	120	190
Barley	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	210	60
Lentils	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	32	35
Chick-Peas	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	90	60
Aubergines	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	75	270
Garlic	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	30	N.E.
Red Peppers	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	120
<i>Livestock (Population)</i>					
Beef-cattle	38	40	20	48	24
Cows	47	62	50	60	112
Calves	62	42	35	59	
Horses, asses, etc.	23	19	24	7	10
Sheep	N.E.	N.E.	10	N.E.	N.E.
Poultry	N.E.	300	400	350	600

<b>Table 5.9:</b> Nor Zeitoun, harvest and livestock, 1928-1934 <sup>8</sup>					
Harvest (Quintals)	1928	1930	1931	1933	1934
Wheat	N.E.	26.4	N.E.	N.E.	15
Potatoes	N.E.	36	10	N.E.	N.E.
Onions	N.E.	60	8	N.E.	N.E.
Garlic	N.E.	1.44	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.
Diverse vegetables	N.E.	A large quantity	13	N.E.	N.E.
Tobacco	N.E.	N.E.	4	N.E.	4
Oats	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	12
<i>Livestock (Population)</i>					
Beef-cattle	6	2	2	N.E.	5
Goats	550	350	280	N.E.	450
Horses, asses, etc.	2	7	7	N.E.	2
Cows	N.E.	3	10	N.E.	3
Calves	N.E.	1	7	N.E.	N.E.
Poultry	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	250

<b>Table 5.10:</b> Kirik Khane ("agricultural" settlement), harvest and livestock, 1928-34 <sup>9</sup>					
Harvest (Quintals)	1928	1930	1931	1933	1934
Wheat	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	30	25
Barley	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	15	6

<sup>8</sup> *Sources & Explanation:* As Table 5.8. *Note:* Entries for harvest of 1930 converted from Okes. Entries for harvests of 1931 and 1934 converted from Kg.

<sup>9</sup> *Sources & Explanation:* As Table 5.8.

Tomatoes	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	75	40
Aubergines	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	60	60
Onions	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	35	45
Garlic	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	6	N.E.
Potatoes	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.
<i>Livestock (Population)</i>					
Goats	88	350	150	N.E.	N.E.
Beef-cattle	N.E.	2	N.E.	N.E.	14
Cows	N.E.	3	N.E.	N.E.	25
Calves	N.E.	1	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.
Horses, asses, etc.	N.E.	7	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.
Poultry	N.E.	N.E.	350	N.E.	400

**Table 5.11:** Pré-Militaire, harvest and livestock, 1928-1934<sup>10</sup>

Harvest (Quintals)	1928	1930	1931	1933	1934
Wheat	N.E.	624	710	1200	820
Barley	N.E.	276	550	250	170
Lentils	N.E.	76	100	30	20
Sorghum	N.E.	60	N.E.	150	220
Chick-peas	N.E.	82	110	30	18
Cotton	N.E.	4	28	N.E.	150
Maize	N.E.	78	N.E.	65	40
Garlic	N.E.	12	150	40	6
Onions	N.E.	408	240	80	90
Beans	N.E.	78	N.E.	80	N.E.
Vetches	N.E.	144	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.
Sesame	N.E.	2	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.
Shallots	N.E.	6	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.
Shallot seeds	N.E.	1	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.
Tobacco	N.E.	N.E.	28	N.E.	N.E.
Tomatoes	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	150	490
Aubergines	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	80	170
Red Peppers	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	20	180
Fruits	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	15	25
Cucumber	N.N.	N.E.	N.E.	90	110
Cabbages	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	20	60
Water-melons	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	50	N.E.
<i>Livestock (Population)</i>					
Horses, asses, etc.	14	35	N.E.	17	23
Beef-cattle	71	235	495	160	160
Cows	7			125	110
Calves	N.E.	113		148	120
Goats	160	N.E.	N.E.	14	N.E.
Poultry	N.E.	c2625	1600	1050	1320
Pigs	N.E.	45	30	N.E.	N.E.
Sheep	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	10	30

<sup>10</sup> *Sources & Explanation:* As Table 5.8. *Note:* Entries for harvest of 1930 converted from Okes.

Harvest (Quintals)	1930	1931	1933	1934
Chick-peas	N.E.	14.4	15.75	31
Lentils	N.E.	14.4	N.E.	N.E.
Wheat	N.E.	N.E.	289.75	587
Barley	N.E.	N.E.	135.33	379
Djelban	N.E.	N.E.	6	23
Dari	N.E.	N.E.	25.75	N.E.
Cotton	N.E.	N.E.	.25	N.E.
Oats	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	37
<b>Livestock (population)</b>				
Beef-cattle	17	32	52	50
Cows	4	11	55	38
Calves	5	N.E.	22	45
Horses, asses, etc.	41	22	52	56
Goats	130	412	350	328
Sheep	74		150	157
Poultry	550	800	973	1380
Rabbits	20	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.
Buffalo	N.E.	7	8	3

Harvest (Quintals)	1933	1934
Wheat	95	43
Oats	29	45
Sorghum	25	15
Tomatoes	110	80
Aubergines	20	15
Fruits	3	6
Maize	2	2
Cucumber	10	16
Water-melons	15	10
Melons	10	6
Gourds	60	N.E.
Onions	N.E.	12
<b>Bey Séki (livestock)</b>		
Beef-cattle	17	15
Cows	21	14
Horses, asses, etc.	5	6
Goats	7	15
Poultry	95	130

<sup>11</sup> **Sources & Explanation:** As Table 5.8. **Note:** Entries for harvest of 1931 converted from Okes, and for harvest of 1934 from Kg. Unit for entries for the harvest of 1933 is the *Kantar*, which may not be identical with the metric quintal used for other years and in related tables.

<sup>12</sup> **Sources & Explanation:** As Table 5.8.

Table 5.14: Trees planted in the Nansen Office settlements at Dec. 31, 1930 and Dec. 31, 1934 <sup>1</sup>													
	Sootuk Sou		Nor Zeitoun		Kirik Khane		Pré-Militaire		(Mouchachène) Massiaf		Bey-Séki		
	1930	1934	1930	1934	1930	1934	1930	1934	1930	1934	1930	1934	
Poplars	4000	6000	N.E.	N.E.	Some thousands	4500	102,000	110,000	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	
Peaches	N.E.	350	450	500	N.E.	350	1350	1200	N.E.	60	N.E.	230	
Apricots	N.E.	450	130	150	N.E.	500	5150	3700	N.E.	100	N.E.	300	
Apples	N.E.	N.E.	300	50	N.E.	100	535	2500	N.E.	50	N.E.	100	
Plums	N.E.	120	90	10	N.E.	250	170	1000	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	150	
Vines	N.E.	N.E.	6300	5000	N.E.	120	1300	N.E.	N.E.	6000	N.E.	250	
Figs	N.E.	70	130	N.E.	N.E.	60	820	350	N.E.	60	N.E.	40	
Pomegranates	N.E.	90	40	N.E.	N.E.	90	2115	300	N.E.	60	N.E.	50	
Mulberries	N.E.	N.E.	500	N.E.	9000	3000	9900	1300	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	
Walnuts	N.E.	N.E.	35	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	6	
Eucalyptus	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	200	2000	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	
Olives	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	370	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	
Plane-trees	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	505	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	
Rose-trees	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	770	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	
Willows	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	790	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	
Lemon-trees	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	50	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	
Orange-trees	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	52	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	
Medlars	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	110	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	
Cherry-trees	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	50	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	
Quince	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	70	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	
*Various*	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	70	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	
Aurantiaecae	N.E.	80	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	
Sumacs	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	150	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	
Casuarinas	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	2000	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	
Forest-trees	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	15,000	N.E.	N.E.	
Pears	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	20	
Pistachio-trees	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	15	

<sup>1</sup> Sources & Explanation: As Table 5.8.

The most spectacular failure, however, was the village of Mouchachène in Alawi Territory. Here the results obtained were much inferior to expectations, probably due to a lack of water, and the colony was liquidated towards the end of the period.

The most strident criticisms of the scheme were not, however, made on these grounds, but on the grounds of health. The settlements in the Amouk plain (Soouk Sou, Kirik Khane, Haiachène and Abdal Huyuk) were strongly susceptible to malaria,<sup>97</sup> the most notable outbreak being in Haiachène in 1928, according to Burnier due to the action of the neighbouring village in damming a stream. At Soouk Sou, because of malaria it was necessary to move the temporary houses of the refugees from their initial location on the plain to a hill nearby which was bought in the course of 1928. At Nor-Zeitoun, there was an attack of dengue-fever in 1928 which at one time affected 50% of its inhabitants. Not surprisingly, outbreaks of malaria in settlements whose sites had been selected by the Nansen Office exacted some criticism that these sites had been poorly chosen. It is clear, however, that from the beginning Burnier was aware of the problem, but considered it outweighed by the fertility of the Amouk plain and by the fact that the marshes of the Amouk plain were due to be dried out to make the plain healthy. He pointed out that Cilicia itself, the origin of many of the refugees, was malarial, and that many refugees had arrived in this state, or had contracted the disease in their places of refuge at Alexandretta or Kirik Khane. Furthermore, better conditions of hygiene were hardly to be found in Beirut, Alexandretta or Aleppo.

Nevertheless, emergency action was required for the settlements at the end of 1928 when the harvest was not sufficient for the refugees already settled for the coming winter, and still less so for those who would be installed before the next year's harvest. The administration lacked adequate means to provide food and the necessary health facilities until the next harvest, and it was agreed that funds for the provision of food supplies and health measures be placed at the disposal of Burnier by the League of Red Cross Societies. The agreement, which was to last from March 15 to July 31, 1929, provided for a systematic distribution of food supplies to Haiachène, Abdal Huyuk, Soouk-Sou, Kirik Khane and Nor Zeitoun under the control and supervision of two French Red Cross nurses, who were also to conduct health visits. In the course of these visits the nurses brought about a marked diminution of malaria by supplying mosquito netting and quinine. After this service was discontinued, on July 31, 1929, arrangements were made for two nurses of the French Red Cross to continue health visits to the villages of Soouk Sou, Kirik Khane and Nor Zeitoun, an arrangement which came to an end at the end of 1931. The health service in the other villages was assured from February, 1930 by a nurse provided by the Near East Foundation (formerly N.E. Relief), and clinics were established at Haiachène, Abdal Huyuk and Mouchachène (Massiaf). At Pré-Militaire, the location of the worst outbreak of malaria in 1928, the situation was improved by the construction of 10,000 meters of drainage and

irrigation canals. Despite these measures, however, cases of malaria were being registered as late as about 1936 at Pré-Militaire, apparently as a result of lowered resistance to disease resulting from under-nourishment.

The success or failure of the settlements in the Sanjak ultimately proved immaterial. The refugees were all obliged to flee again with the cession of the Sanjak. Already, at the end of 1937, the villagers were reluctant to reimburse any payments to the Office, for fear of having to abandon their fields.<sup>98</sup> Between June and August, 1938, Rihaniyé and Soouk Sou were largely abandoned, and many Armenians left Kirik Khane.<sup>99</sup> When, in July, 1939, the exodus was completed by the transfer of the remaining Armenians to the south, the work of the Nansen Office in village settlement had been entirely ruined.

### ***Conclusion***

It is evident that the various efforts made to redistribute the Armenians were not very successful. They had been made in order to avoid, and subsequently in response to, the stagnation of the Armenian population in the cities where economic opportunities were limited. The first efforts were made by the Mandatory Power in response to the immigration of 1921, the accumulation of refugees at Alexandretta, and the accumulation of refugees at Aleppo in 1922-24, but the dispersal was left incomplete because of the lack of commitment of finance. In recognition of the need for a more radical solution, efforts were made by philanthropic organisations to encourage agricultural colonisation. The first steps were taken by Karen Jeppe, but remained on a small scale. To solve the problem, plans were required on a scale which would require governmental action, and were persistently advocated by the philanthropic societies. The Mandatory Power was initially unwilling to commit finance to large-scale agricultural colonisation, but later accepted the co-operation of the League in a settlement scheme, the critical factor being probably the provision of finance by the League. Once begun, however, the scheme, which envisaged large-scale agricultural settlement, was increasingly retarded by the adoption of alternative schemes of urban resettlement, largely dictated by the development of housing crises in the principal centres of Armenian concentration. The agricultural colonisation scheme was also hindered by inadequate finance, and in 1931 it was decided for financial reasons finally to concentrate on urban rather than agricultural settlement. Even the villages which were created by the Nansen Office were never an economic success, although this ultimately proved immaterial, as the villagers in the Sanjak were obliged to flee with the cession of the region to Turkey. Thus, apart from a few isolated settlements, the only work of settlement which remained intact in 1939 was that of urban resettlement in the principal centres of Armenian concentration. Far from redistributing the population on a national basis, the settlement scheme undertaken by the Nansen Office ultimately had the effect of reinforcing the existing pattern of population. The schemes for agricultural colonisation had failed essentially for lack of

finance. The lack of success of the Nansen Office's colonies illustrated the need for substantial injections of capital. Lacking this capital, little was achieved before the alternative "solution" of urban resettlement was imposed by necessity. Thus, at the level of planned settlement, the Nansen Office was the victim of the same economic constraints as the refugees themselves.

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> De Caix to M.A.E., Dec. 13, 1921, (Arch.Dip. Arménie, Vol. O); De Caix to Emily, Dec. 15, 1921 (Arch.Dip. S-L-C, Vol. 140).
- <sup>2</sup> "Raportt" (1922-23), pp. 18-19.
- <sup>3</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Oct. 31, 1926 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>4</sup> See on this episode *F.A.* 84, 2Q, 1922, pp. 2, 4; F.O. 371/7873; in Arch.Dip. S-L-C, Vol. 142, M.A.E. to H.C.F., March 23, 1922 & De Caix to M.A.E., March 24, 1922.
- <sup>5</sup> De Caix to Gouraud, April 1, 1922 (Arch.Dip. S-L-C, Vol. 143).
- <sup>6</sup> Arch.Laz.
- <sup>7</sup> See in Arch.Dip., De Caix to M.A.E., March 11, April 26, & May 8, 1923; Weygand to M.A.E., May 12, 1923 (Turquie, Vol. 58) & Weygand to M.A.E. March 8, 1924 (Turquie, Vol. 258) & Sept. 20, 1924 (S-L, Vol. 176).
- <sup>8</sup> Stevenson (1925), pp. 45-47; *Le Levant*, 3e ann., no. 1, oct., 1925, p. 7; L.o.N. Doc. A.69.1923. IV.
- <sup>9</sup> Report by Jeppe (N.A. C1430); Burt Report.
- <sup>10</sup> L.o.N. Doc. A.25.1926, IV; Report by Consul Hough, Aleppo, April 24, 1926 (F.O. 371/11518); Jeppe to Thomas, Feb. 26, 1926 & May 31, 1926 (N.A. C1430).
- <sup>11</sup> *F.A.* 101, 4Q, 1926, p. 4.
- <sup>12</sup> *Le Levant*, 11e ann., no. 8, août-sept., 1934, p. 3.
- <sup>13</sup> L.o.N. Docs. A69.1923, IV; A.46.1924, IV; Armenian Ladies Guild of London, Annual Reports, 1924, pp. 8-9, & 1925, p. 7; Armenian Red Cross & Refugees Fund, 9<sup>th</sup> Annual Report, 1923, p. 10.
- <sup>14</sup> L.o.N. Docs. A32.1925, IV; A.25. 1926, IV.
- <sup>15</sup> L.o.N. Docs. A25.1926, IV; Burt Report.
- <sup>16</sup> Stevenson (1925), pp. 45-47; Report by Jeppe (N.A. C1430); Burt Report. Karen Jeppe died in 1935. She is still remembered at Aleppo.
- <sup>17</sup> Memo by Basil Matthews, 1924 (S.F. F.F.M.A. Syria S/3).
- <sup>18</sup> L.o.N. Docs. A46.1924, IV; A32.1925. IV; *F.A.* 102, 1Q, 1927, p. 1; Jeppe to Thomas, Feb. 26, 1926.
- <sup>19</sup> Burt Report; Burt to Johnson, Aug. 7, 1925 (N.A. C1428); Memo of a conversation between Burt, Gilchrist, Colban & Crowdy, Aug. 17, 1925 (N.A. C1425).
- <sup>20</sup> Berron Report. On the interest of the A.C.O. in this question see also: *Le Levant* 2e ann., no. 5, juin, 1925, p. 6, 3e ann., no. 5, avril-mai, 1926, p. 5; Monnier to C.I.C.R. Jan. 8, 1926 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>21</sup> Hekimian Report, June 26, 1923. State domain land was land, formerly the property of the Sultan, which became the property of the Levant States after the collapse of the Empire. It was thus at the disposal of the Mandatory Power, and could be used for attempts to create a new agrarian structure.
- <sup>22</sup> Hekimian Report, ca Jan. 1924.
- <sup>23</sup> On the organization of public finance see Longrigg (1958), pp. 133-34, 265-67.

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- <sup>24</sup> P.M.C. Minutes, 10<sup>th</sup> Sess., 19<sup>th</sup> Mtg., Nov. 15, 1926, p. 125.
- <sup>25</sup> P.M.C. Minutes, 8<sup>th</sup> Sess., 4<sup>th</sup> Mtg., Feb. 18, 1926, pp. 27-28.
- <sup>26</sup> L.o.N., Report by Fridtjof Nansen, July 28, 1925.
- <sup>27</sup> Carle Report; Carle (1926), pp. 199-201; Carle to Johnson, Sept. 6, 1925 (N.A. C1428); Pachalian to M.A.E., Oct. 17, 1925 (Arch.Dip. Arménie, Vol. 18).
- <sup>28</sup> N.A. C1402.
- <sup>29</sup> Poidebard (1926), p. 18; Report by Con.-Gen. Satow, May 11, 1926 (F.O. 371/11550).
- <sup>30</sup> Longrigg (1958), pp. 154-69.
- <sup>31</sup> L.o.N. Dec. A.44.1926, p. 7; "Les réfugiés russes" etc. (1926), pp. 781-83; Report by Burnier ca May, 1926; Report entitled "Mission en Syrie" prepared by C.I.C.R., 1926 (N.A. C1402).
- <sup>32</sup> Report by Burnier, ca May, 1926.
- <sup>33</sup> Memo. by Johnson, May 15, 1926 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>34</sup> De Jouvenal to Thomas, June 30, 1926 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>35</sup> "Mission en Syrie".
- <sup>36</sup> Correspondence from Burnier to Johnson, Aug.-Oct., 1926 (N.A. C1429)
- <sup>37</sup> Probably a reference to Dr. Oskan whose report is annexed to the Berron Report.
- <sup>38</sup> N.A. C1430.
- <sup>39</sup> N.A. C1430.
- <sup>40</sup> Johnson Report, Dec. 18, 1926; Duguet to H.C.F., Dec. 10, 1926 (N.A. C1429) for Duguet's account of Johnson's visit.
- <sup>41</sup> N.A. C1430.
- <sup>42</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Dec. 29, 1926 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>43</sup> N.A. C1429.
- <sup>44</sup> Burnier (1928), pp. 401-4; Burnier to Johnson, Dec. 10, 1926 & Feb. 12, 1927 (N.A. C1429); Report by Buxton, Feb. 20, 1927 (N.A. C1430).
- <sup>45</sup> Golden to Johnson, July 11, 1927; Johnson to Burnier, July 19, 1927; Burnier to Johnson, July 30, 1927; Duguet to Johnson, Aug. 8, 1927 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>46</sup> Burnier (1928).
- <sup>47</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Dec. 29, 1926 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>48</sup> Burnier to Johnson, May 1, 1928 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>49</sup> Report on settlement work, May 18, 1928; Mtng of Armenian sub-committee, May 21, 1928 (N.A. C1430).
- <sup>50</sup> Burnier to Johnson, April 3, 1927 (N.A. C1429); Armenian sub-committee, Minutes of 3<sup>rd</sup> Mtg., June 17, 1927 (N.A. C1430).
- <sup>51</sup> Burnier to Johnson, April 3, June 6, July 17 & Sept. 18, 1927 & Feb. 22, 1928 (N.A. C1429, C1431).
- <sup>52</sup> Correspondence between Burnier & Johnson, Jan. 1927 to Feb. 1928 (N.A. C1429, C1430, C1431).
- <sup>53</sup> Burnier to Johnson, March 15, 1927 (N.A. C1431); Johnson to Burnier, May 5, 1927 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>54</sup> Johnson to Burnier, Aug. 20, 1927 & Burnier to Johnson Sept. 18, 1927 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>55</sup> N.A. C1429.
- <sup>56</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Dec. 29, 1926; Johnson to Burnier, Jan. 21, 1927; Burnier to Johnson, Feb. 12, 1927; Johnson to Burnier, May 5, 1927 (N.A. C1429, C1430).
- <sup>57</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Dec. 29, 1926 & April 3, 1926 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>58</sup> Johnson to Burnier, Feb. 22, 1927 (N.A.C. 1430).

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- <sup>59</sup> Report by Burnier & Raphal, communicated by Burnier to Johnson, May 25, 1927 (N.A. C1431).
- <sup>60</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Aug. 16, 1927 (N.A. C1431).
- <sup>61</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Oct. 30, 1927 (N.A. C1431).
- <sup>62</sup> Nicolsky Report, 1936 (N.A. R5638).
- <sup>63</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Dec. 15, 1927; Jan. 24, Feb. 21 & July 7, 1926; Johnson to Burnier, Jan. 1, 1928; Der Kalousdian to Burnier, Sept. 15, 1928 (N.A. C1429, C1431); Monthly report on settlement in the Sanjak for Aug. 1928 (N.A. C1429) & two legal documents recording acts of purchase made by Burnier (N.A. C1431).
- <sup>64</sup> Burnier to Johnson, May 2, May 25; June 6, Sept. 18 & Oct. 30, 1927; Johnson to Burnier, Oct. 4, 1927 (N.A. C1429, C1431).
- <sup>65</sup> Bazantay (1935), p. 46; Tallon (1932), p. 221; Arch.Laz.; Burnier to Johnson, July 17, 1927; April 4, 1928; Johnson to Burnier, March 13, 1928 (N.A. C1431).
- <sup>66</sup> Reports, Minutes & Correspondence in N.A. C1429, C1430, C1431.
- <sup>67</sup> Burnier to Johnson, March 22, April 13, Sept. 20, Sept 24, 1929; Johnson to Burnier, Oct. 16, 1929 (N.A. C1429); Mtg. of Armenian sub-committee, April 25, 1929 (N.A. C1430); Rapport Mansuel etc., July 17, 1929 (N.A. C1429); Projet des depenses pour fin 1929, drawn up by Burnier, Aug., 1929 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>68</sup> Johnson to Burnier, Jan. 21, 1927 (N.A. C1430).
- <sup>69</sup> Burnier to Thomas, Jan. 16, 1927; Burnier to Johnson, Jan. 26, Jan. 29, Feb. 12, 1927 (N.A. C1429, C1430).
- <sup>70</sup> Burnier to Johnson, April 10, 1928 (N.A. C1431).
- <sup>71</sup> On the question of the French guarantee and grant see correspondence in N.A. C1429 & C1431; Arch.Dip. Arménie, Vol. 21.
- <sup>72</sup> N.A. C1430.
- <sup>73</sup> Le Nail to Johnson, Nov. 3 & Nov. 14, 1929 (N.A. C1430); Le Nail to Massigli, Nov. 24, 1929 (Arch.Dip. Arménie, Vol. 21).
- <sup>74</sup> N.A. C1430.
- <sup>75</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Dec. 4, 1929 (N.A. C1428).
- <sup>76</sup> On the question of the competence of the Office see Minutes & Correspondence in N.A. C1428, C1429, C1430, C1583, C1584.
- <sup>77</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Dec. 22, Dec. 28, 1929, Jan. 13, Jan. 29, 1930 (N.A. C1428, C1583); Mtg. of Central Armenian Committee, Dec. 19, 1929 (N.A. C1430).
- <sup>78</sup> N.A. C1584, C1586.
- <sup>79</sup> See correspondence between Le Nail, Burnier & Geneva, May-July, 1930, in N.A. C1583, C1584.
- <sup>80</sup> Memos on a conversation between Kerno & Ponsot, June 27, 1930 (N.A. C1583, C1584); L.o.N. Doc. A28.1930. XIII.
- <sup>81</sup> Administrative Committee, Report of Meeting of April 28, 1930 (N.A.).
- <sup>82</sup> N.A. C1584.
- <sup>83</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Feb. 10 & June 9, 1930 (N.A. C1583, C1584).
- <sup>84</sup> Administrative Committee, Reports of Meetings of Oct. 28, 1932, April 26, 1933, March 30, 1935 (N.A.); L.o.N. Docs A.19.1933, pp. 4, 17; A.23.1936. XII, p. 10 & A.21.1938.XII, p. 7; Warmer (1933), pp. 395-405; "Rapport du Président du Conseil de l'administration de l'O.I.N.R. sur son voyage en Syrie, au Liban, et en Grèce", 1936 (N.A. R5638).
- <sup>85</sup> "Installations etc....1933" (N.A. C1584).
- <sup>86</sup> As note 85.

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- <sup>87</sup> “Rapport” (1930), p. 52, (1931), p. 54.
- <sup>88</sup> Corbyn (1932), p. 606; *Le Levant*, 7e ann., no. 4, mars, 1930, p. 1 & 7e ann., no. 7, juillet, 1930, p. 4; Report by Le Nail, 1930 (N.A. C1584); Gracey Report, 1930; Mtg. of Central Armenian Committee, Aug. 26, 1930 (N.A. C1586); Arch.Dip. Documents in course of classification.
- <sup>89</sup> “Rapport” (1930), p. 52.
- <sup>90</sup> Arch.Dip. Documents in course of classification.
- <sup>91</sup> Arch.A.C.C.
- <sup>92</sup> Administrative Committee, Report of Mtg. of April 20, 1932 (N.A.).
- <sup>93</sup> *F.A.* 125, Feb. 1933, p. 4; Administrative Committee, Report of Mtgs. of April 20, 1932, April 26, 1933, Oct. 25, 1933, April 9, 1937 & Sept. 11, 1937 (N.A.); Rapport du Président etc.,” 1936.
- <sup>94</sup> *Le Levant*, 1934-1938, passim.
- <sup>95</sup> References to the development of these settlements are too numerous to cite individually. See reports, minutes & corresp. in N.A. C1429, C1430, C1431, C1583, C1584, C1585, C1587, C1598; *F.A.* 118, 1Q, 1931, p. 5; *Idem*, 122, April 1932, p. 1; *Idem*. 124, Oct. 1932, p. 2; *Idem*. 125, Feb. 1933, p. 5; Burnier (1928), pp. 401-5; Ferrière (1930), pp. 11-14.
- <sup>96</sup> Chater Report, 1930.
- <sup>97</sup> On the question of health see again reports & correspondence cited in note 95. See also Ligue des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge (1929).
- <sup>98</sup> Burnier to Dir. Admin., N.O., Nov. 10, 1937 & Dec. 17, 1937; Burnier to Hansson, Jan. 11, 1938 (N.A. C1598).
- <sup>99</sup> Burnier to Hansson, July 19 & Aug. 8, 1938 (N.A. R5638).



## Chapter VI

# SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON SETTLEMENT

This chapter considers social and political constraints on settlement, which it has proved desirable to group together for purposes of explanation. It begins with a discussion of Armenian social aspirations and political divisions, considering in turn the Armenians' eventual acceptance of permanent settlement in Syria and Lebanon, their desire for security, and the relationship between their settlement and their internal religious segregation and political rivalries. It continues with an analysis of the attitude of the indigenous population towards the Armenian immigrants and of the political motives and social constraints behind French policy towards Armenian settlement. The repercussions on settlement of all these social and political forces are discussed separately, but the chapter concludes with an overview of political and social constraints on settlement in relation to the conflict of interest between French, Arabs and Armenians. The documentation on these constraints is variable. It is best (though woefully incomplete) on French policy, but less sound on Armenian and Syrian aspirations and attitudes, which have to be gleaned to a large extent at second-hand, though the archives preserve a number of primary statements by Armenians regarding their settlement preferences.

### **Armenian Social Aspirations and Political Divisions**

#### ***The Acceptance of Permanent Settlement***

When the Armenians entered Syria and Lebanon, they (or at least their leaders) did not initially see themselves remaining there indefinitely. Their political future was not then as certain as it seems with the benefit of hindsight. For a number of years their 'leaders' in Paris, of the Armenian National Delegation and its successor organisation, the "Comité Central des Réfugiés Arméniens," retained the idea of ultimate resettlement in Soviet Armenia of the refugees scattered throughout the eastern Mediterranean. It followed that permanent settlement in Syria should not be encouraged as it would reduce the number of refugees who would be prepared at a later date to uproot themselves again and migrate to Armenia.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, within the country, there were, as already described, various Armenian proposals for agricultural colonisation, indicating a desire for permanent settlement. By 1925 even the leaders of the C.C.R.A. seem to have given way to the conclusion that the refugees in Syria might be encouraged to settle permanently, a change of opinion due probably to the difficulties involved in transfers to Soviet Armenia, and the desire to avoid even greater dispersal to the Americas. Thus in 1925, the C.C.R.A. were prepared to encourage the transfer of Armenian refugees to Syria from Greece, -their representative M. Pachalian writing that Syria and France were the two countries outside Armenia which appeared to his organisation to be the most appropriate

for refugee settlement.<sup>2</sup> It is evident that these proposals of transfer from Greece to Syria were partly, if not wholly, instrumental in prompting the initial investigation of Armenian refugee conditions in Syria by Mr. Carle for the I.L.O., and it was Dr. Melconian, former representative of the Armenian National Union at Beirut, who, concurrently with Carle's visit, applied for a grant of 3000 hectares for the purpose of establishing an agricultural colony.<sup>3</sup> When the definitive settlement scheme was begun by the I.L.O. in 1926, the C.C.R. A. were prepared to support it. They had not abandoned hope of resettlement in Soviet Armenia however. They still considered that this was the only plan which could ultimately bring a solution of the Armenian problem.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, they realised that the Yerevan scheme could not possibly bring substantial results for some considerable time to come, and could at the best only provide for the settlement of a portion of the refugees in Greece. For this reason they welcomed the Syrian scheme.<sup>5</sup> Thus, Armenian desires for settlement in Armenia rather than in Syria were expressed in lack of financial support, rather than in deliberate obstruction.<sup>6</sup> Dr. Nansen himself seems to have been even more committed to resettlement in Armenia than the Armenian leaders themselves, and would not yield in his opposition to the Syrian scheme until absolutely convinced of its necessity.<sup>7</sup> The rapid rate of emigration from Syria was, however, a telling factor. In seeking to persuade Nansen of the merits of the scheme in January 1927, Albert Thomas stressed that since March 1926, an average of 2000 (sic) refugees per month were reported to have left Syria, and that unless effective measures were taken to enable the Armenian refugees to support themselves in Syria, there would be a few remaining to take advantage of the National Home, when the scheme for its establishment should finally be put into execution.<sup>8</sup>

This exaggerated picture in itself suggests that the views of the refugees themselves as to the desirability of emigration from Syria may have differed substantially from those of the C.C.R.A. at Paris. This at least was the opinion of Mr. Childs, I.L.O. representative at Buenos Aires who reported that the Armenians who had migrated to Argentina felt that they were better off there than in Syria or in any other country where they might be sent. He accused the Armenian organisations in general of being unreliable as regards representing the real desires of their people, and of being always willing to sacrifice people for politics. This they could do with impunity as on account of language difficulty it was difficult to get direct contact with the bulk of the people. Childs observed tartly with regard to the Yerevan scheme that "very few of the leaders and the sponsors of this movement show any desire to go to Soviet Armenia themselves."<sup>9</sup>

This contentious point will be considered further below. By the end of 1929, with the collapse of Nansen's Yerevan scheme, however, Pachalian was enthusiastically supporting Le Nail's proposals for settlement in the Euphrates region and Palmyra.<sup>10</sup> While previously settlement in the interior had been regarded as unacceptable. There seems to have been thus a new commitment to

settlement in Syria, which was so positive that it was even felt that there might be a political motive behind it. The view was expressed that the Armenians may have been trying to establish a foothold, even a “National Home”, in Northern Syria, and that the contemporary exodus of Armenians from eastern Turkey at the end of 1929 may have been at least partly prompted by Armenian propaganda.<sup>11</sup> This seems highly unlikely, as the Armenians had their “National Home” elsewhere. More likely, they saw the possibility of stabilising the Armenians of Syria and Lebanon. Their commitment to settlement in Syria did, after all, continue after Le Nail’s scheme had been rejected. Thus, the AGBU once more advocated the transfer of refugees from Greece to Syria,<sup>12</sup> and from the end of 1931 began increasingly to assume the financial burden of the settlement work, such that, as already observed, by the end of the period they had acquired responsibility for its completion. The financial commitment from 1931, contrasted with earlier reluctance, no doubt reflected the difficulties confronting any transfer from Syria to Armenia.

### ***Security of Culture and Security of Life***

More important to the distribution of the Armenians within Syria than the political aspects of Armenian nationalists were the preservation of Armenian national identity in Syria itself. Within Syria the Armenians constructed their own schools, their own churches, and ran their own charitable, cultural and athletic societies.<sup>13</sup> In their desire to preserve their own culture, they were frankly non-assimilatory, concerning “une solidarité ethnique sans rivale au monde.”<sup>14</sup> “The Armenians, - wrote Marshall Fox,- as ‘the Scotch of the Near East’ remind one often of the Scotch in their clannishness, thrift, and an independence bordering upon arrogance...”<sup>15</sup>

The Jesuit Father Jalabert was more charitable (and sentimental) than his Protestant rivals:

Pieusement, presque religieusement, les Arméniens gardent leurs vieilles traditions comme le seul trésor qui leur demeure. Bien qu’ils parlent couramment, les une l’arabe, la plupart le turc, ils ont pour leur langue Arménienne un culte vraiment filial. Ils consacrent leurs costumes traditionnels, leurs danses nationales, leurs chants patriotiques, et les yeux se mouillent lorsque, sur une scène de collège, des enfants paraissent revêtus des costumes de Bitlis, que des fillettes dansent l’exquise “danse de la lune” ou chantent ces complaintes d’une mélancholie si poignante que la phrase semble se briser dans un sanglot...<sup>16</sup>

The preservation of former life-styles involved in some cases the reconstitution anew of old communities in Syria and Lebanon. This has already been observed in the case of the villages established by the Nansen Office in the Sanjak. It was also demonstrated by the formation of Compatriotic Unions in the towns,<sup>17</sup> whose activities are considered in the following chapters. Community reconstitution was in any case favoured by the structure of the migration, which generally involved movements by communities rather than by individuals,<sup>18</sup> as

has been seen for example in the case of the Lazarists' flocks from Ekbes and the convoy from Urfa noted in a previous chapter.

Not only were the Armenians concerned to preserve their own communities and national culture, however. They were also genuinely concerned about their own security. The effect which this feeling had on attitudes to settlement emerges clearly from an examination of the Armenian attitude to redistribution through resettlement schemes. It has already been remarked how French efforts to disperse the Armenians in small groups in the early years of the period met with little response. General Billotte even claimed "that the Armenians were hesitating to settle in Syria and that the fault lay with the priests who were not encouraging<sup>19</sup> them to disperse."<sup>20</sup> Yet at the same time the Catholicos himself was, as noted, despite reservations in certain quarters about the desirability of permanent settlement in Syria, requesting agricultural resettlement, but on a large-scale. Later too Armenian support was forthcoming from the Armenian 'representative' Dr. Melconian for Carle's proposals for large-scale settlement in the Ghab.

It is evident that the Armenians were not opposed to agricultural colonisation per se, but only when it involved dispersal in small groups. Karen Jeppe reported that the Armenians of Aleppo were afraid of committing themselves to the landowners who tried to induce them to settle in their villages.<sup>21</sup> It was only special trust in Karen Jeppe herself which persuaded the refugees to settle in her colonies. Once the Nansen scheme had been initiated, Burnier summed up the feeling of the refugees, noting how, as a result of the events which brought the Armenians to Syria, they remained fearful and mistrustful, and that this spirit led them to concentrate in great herds as at Beirut or Aleppo. They preferred to live in poverty rather than to disperse. Their settlement in the villages, even Christian, as individuals or in small groups would be difficult, if not impossible. The security of recent years was not enough to wipe out old memories. Burnier had spoken to notables and village-elders who all desired the resumption of peasant life, but in sufficiently large groups to allow them the feeling of security. He concluded that it was on this basis that it would be necessary to plan.<sup>22</sup>

Johnson, who met the Armenian leaders on his visit to Syria, noted likewise in 1926 that the refugees had declined various offers made to them of transfer elsewhere, but that this refusal was quite understandable, given that these offers had involved the dispersal of the Armenians among Muslim populations who did not disguise their enmity for the refugees. No proposal for settlement would receive the support of the refugees unless adequate provision was made for security. As a result, Johnson felt that his settlement committee's field of choice was limited to areas contiguous to large towns enjoying adequate military protection, to land within easy reach of the sea, which had previously enabled the rescue of Armenians in times of crisis, and to establishment among other friendly Christian populations.<sup>23</sup>

When Johnson's report was considered by the Armenian subcommittee a preference was expressed by the philarmenian organisations for settlement in

coastal regions,<sup>24</sup> which continued to dominate the implementation of the Nansen scheme. Thus, the Ras el Ain experiment was approved while particularly favoured by the Armenians was the Sanjak of Alexandretta.<sup>25</sup> This region had already been the subject of an investigation by an Armenian agronomist, and was additionally favoured from the security aspect by its indigenous Armenian population (in Alexandretta town, the Jebel Moussa and the Jebel Aqra). The communal organisation of these settlements in the Sanjak had already been described. It took due account of the community structure of the Armenians, for Burnier had already recognized the weakness of the *métayage* experiment in this respect. He argued that *métayage*, outplacing families on their own or in small groups, involved complete dispersal of refugees used to living as a community, made it impossible for them to follow their religion, and above all made it impossible to organize teaching in their own schools to maintain their national culture. It was much better therefore to buy lands able to support thirty to sixty families or more, to create a normal village, with its own church and school. By buying lands near each other in the Sanjak, he argued, there would be created a true Armenian centre, which would then attract those Armenians capable of settling by their own means. Settlement in this manner would assure both prosperity and security.<sup>26</sup>

While settlement in coastal regions received the Committee's approval, settlement in the interior was rejected, not only in the Euphrates Region<sup>27</sup> and in the southern Hauran,<sup>28</sup> but also in the more immediate vicinity of Aleppo.<sup>29</sup> In rejecting settlement in the interior the Committee thus took a more extreme line on settlement preferences than the Armenians in Syria had done themselves; earlier Armenian settlement scheme proposed by the Catholicos and Dr. Melconian, had concerned the interior. The explanation may lie in the events of Damascus, of which more below. Burnier himself rejected the absolute necessity of settlement on the coast, believing that large groupings of Armenians would provide in themselves adequate security. Thus, large concentrations of refugees even in the interior would be better able to defend themselves than *métayers* dispersed in the coastal regions, who could not count on foreign assistance quickly enough to assure their security.<sup>30</sup> On this basis he urged the Qirate plan, but as already seen, this plan was killed by a protest from an Armenian organisation. The <sup>31</sup>only colony in the interior to be approved by the Committee was the unsuccessful colony of Mouchachène (Massiaf). Only in 1929 did Pachalian, of the C.C.R.A., at last offer support for the creation of Armenian colonies in the interior that is for Le Nail's scheme in the Euphrates region and Palmyra, previously considered too risky from the security point of view. But this scheme came to naught as shortly afterwards it was decided to concentrate exclusively on urban resettlement. This volte-face undoubtedly reflected the better conditions of security then prevailing in the north-east of Syria, but it may also have been related to political considerations. Elsewhere, the Committee was reluctant to agree to resettlement in Alexandretta town, as this was in a sensitive

zone near to the Turkish border.<sup>32</sup> This argument also was rejected by Burnier, and action was eventually required in any case by the development of a rehousing crisis in the town.

It may be assumed that the considerations of security of life and culture which influenced the settlement scheme in this manner operated also in the more spontaneous decisions made by the Armenians to encourage concentration rather than dispersal. It seems that these social constraints must have been partly responsible for the tendencies observed in Chapter 3; the relative lack of dispersal from arrival points, the tendency to cluster in the principal towns and desert secondary centres, and possibly also the rural-urban shift which accompanied the migrations. It is ironic that the one area in which there was successful planned dispersal of Armenians - the Sanjak of Alexandretta - was deserted by them at the end of the period, again through fear for their security.

### ***Religious Segregation and Political Rivalries***

In principle, it has been assumed that the Armenians acted as a homogeneous unit. In practice, it is possible to identify divisions within the Armenian community with implications for settlement, for as well as their nationalism and their fears, the Armenians also brought into Syria and Lebanon their divisions of religion and party.

Although the analysis of inter-communal segregation in Chapter 3 showed relatively little difference in general between the (regional) distribution of Apostolics and Catholics, the question of internal religious segregation certainly deserves further investigation. Urban religious segregation is considered briefly in later chapters. Otherwise, the sources permit few insights.<sup>33</sup> However it is possible to point to the reconstitution of the Lazarists' mission at Kirik Khane as an example of favouritism towards Armenian Catholics on the part of the Mandatory authorities producing a segregated Catholic community.

The documents are more revealing with regard to the manner in which political rivalries may have influenced settlement. Politically the Armenians in Syria were divided in loyalty between three principal parties;<sup>34</sup> the Dashnak, Hentchak, and Ramgavar parties. The Dashnak and Hentchaks were descendants of the revolutionary parties, but differed bitterly in their attitude to Soviet Armenia. The Hentchaks, whose links with the Communists were strong, tended to see Armenian aspirations realised by the establishment of the Armenian Soviet Republic, while the Dashnaks, who had been the ruling party in the independent Armenian Republic before their expulsion by the Soviets, were bitterly anti-Soviet. The Ramgavar party, lacking the popular base of the other two parties, but influential among the more wealthy Armenians and the AGBU, while eschewing the political principles of the Hentchak party, supported the maintenance of good relations with Soviet Armenia, and the idea of repatriation. In addition, Armenians were prominent in the founding of Communist cells in Syria and Lebanon between 1925 and 1930, during which time they dominated

the party in the region.<sup>35</sup> This was not without significance for French policy, which is discussed below. To return to the main point, however, it is apparent that Armenian politics in Syria and Lebanon under the mandate were dominated by Dashnak--anti-Dashnak rivalry, and sullied by violence and murder. This political rivalry appears to have influenced Armenian attitudes to the Nansen Office settlement scheme.

The settlements in the Sanjak of Alexandretta, for example, soon attracted hostile Armenian criticism, albeit working on fertile ground. It has already been observed that Burnier attributed the partial desertion of Nor Zeitoun in part to the action of elements hostile to the scheme living in Aleppo. Criticisms were made also in the Armenian Journal *Yeprad*, published in Aleppo, of the malarial state of the inhabitants of Haiachène.<sup>36</sup> A letter from Dr. E. Altounyan, an indigenous Armenian resident of Aleppo, which came to the attention of Major Johnson at Geneva, urged urban resettlement at Aleppo, claiming, "The number of agriculturally minded families in this group of refugees is entirely negligible."<sup>37</sup> Another letter which also came to Johnson's attention, from the Protestant pastor Manoogian, after criticizing the state of health at Kirik Khane, Soouk Sou and Pré-Militaire, went on to criticize the settlements from the points of view of health, education, religion and security:-

My humble objection is against dispersing the Armenians. They must not be far from the larger cities at all. At Ekiz Keopreu they are in a higher place. Malaria is not very near. Also, they are near Bitias, so that they can be sheltered in the mountains easily. But Soghook Sou and Soldiers Field will be ready to be swallowed by the enemy at any time. No, there is not any fear to-day but who knows the to-morrow? We have trusted the English and French people's good intention, but can we forget that in spite of all their good intention they massacred us in Damascus in the presence of the French army and in Aleppo in the presence of the English army. If they have done this in big cities, what will be the condition of small villages among the hostile neighbour and being separated from each other?

In short, this kind of separation is dangerous for the health of the people because of malaria; dangerous from educational point of view; dangerous from religious point; dangerous from political point of view. Therefore, it is better to leave them free in the places that they live at present, and help them to buy a piece of land to build their houses instead of the huts that they make of reeds and plaster with mud as they have done in Soghook Sou.<sup>38</sup>

Faced with these criticisms, Burnier rejected Altounyan's claim, maintaining that the number of peasants in Aleppo camp was not negligible.<sup>39</sup> He did acknowledge the educational problem raised by Manoogian,<sup>40</sup> but in his devastating reply to Manoogian's criticism he suggested strongly that political motives might lie behind them. It was necessary, he said, to ask who would gain and who would lose from the settlement scheme. The winners, he claimed, would be the impoverished refugee working populations; the losers would be the notables, the speculators and the clergy. While at Geneva and London it was the voice of the latter which was always heard, Burnier was living amongst the

former. He was urged not to disperse the camps, yet in the camp of Aleppo alone he had more requests for settlement than places available on the land acquired. The Armenian notables had forbidden settlement in the interior, saying that this was dangerous. In reality, he claimed, it was to prevent the dislocation of the camps. These notables, he said were doctors, politicians and priests. By the break-up of the camps, they lost their clientele, their votes and above all their flocks. The Armenian clergy, he claimed, were not priests by vocation but by trade. They were supported by the impoverished refugees over whom they would struggle with all their means to keep their influence, the source of their profits. Thus, the organisation of the Nansen colonies worried them. The notables were also annoyed because the organisation of the Settlement work was being carried on independent of them, directly between the refugees and Burnier himself. They had thus lost an influence which they believed assured.<sup>41</sup> This reply was undoubtedly unfair to Manoogian, an evangelical pastor, and in fact the letter was not directed against him personally. It is evident, however, that Burnier was in political conflict with a number of the Armenian notables.

Further clues as to the nature of this conflict are provided by William Jessop of the Near East Foundation and by the British Consul at Damascus. Jessop reported in November, 1931 that the Armenian notables were dissatisfied with Burnier, claiming that he never consulted them, that he was arbitrary in his judgement, and that they suspected him agent or taking bribes. Worst of all, they claimed that he was in the hands of the Dashnak party.<sup>42</sup> Consul Mackereth likewise reported from Damascus, in March, 1935 that Burnier was coming in for a good deal of contumelious criticism from the refugees, for "he is accused of favouring the 'Dashnaks' who are feared and disliked by the Orthodox Armenian clergy."<sup>43</sup> Now, Burnier's condemnation of the Armenian notables does read in places rather like a Dashnak tract, and it is evident from a statement by Duguet, that the Dashnaks, who had no sympathy for the Soviet Armenian regime, were critical of those Armenian notables who preferred to retain their capital for ultimate settlement in Soviet Armenia rather than use it to facilitate permanent settlement in Syria and Lebanon.<sup>44</sup> In short, the Dashnaks had a greater commitment to settlement in Syria than the anti-Dashnak parties. It is not therefore surprising that Burnier should come to be identified with them, and possibly come under their influence. Thus, this difference in outlook may also have lain behind the criticisms of the Nansen scheme and should be added to the allegations of self-interest made by Burnier in his reply to Manoogian's criticisms. Furthermore, Movses Der Kalousdian, whom Burnier chose as representative of the Armenian villages established in the Sanjak of Alexandretta, was a prominent member of the Dashnak party. Significantly the attack by *Yeprad*, a Ramgavar newspaper, on the situation of the settlements of Haiachènè and Nor Zeitoun also contained personal criticisms of Der Kalousdian.<sup>45</sup> It seems that in attacking the settlements in the Sanjak, the anti-Dashnak parties attacked Der Kalouatian by implication. It seems also that by virtue of his position, Der

Kalouatian acquired a new clientele for his party which had formerly fallen under the control of the notables in the towns, and that for this reason the urban Armenian notables have even desired to see the failure of the scheme for settlement in the Sanjak. This would set in context Burnier's allegations against the Armenian notables. Ellen Chater at least was suspicious of Der Kalousdian's role, feeling that his interest in the villages was perhaps more political than humanitarian.<sup>46</sup> But Burnier defended him loyally against these allegations.<sup>47</sup> Efforts to undermine the settlement work in 1931, attributed by Burnier to the desire to spread discontent, may also have been designed to weaken the position of the Dashnak party. Burnier wrote in December, 1931, that 'Bolshevik' agents were carrying on a propaganda campaign at Beirut and in the Nansen Office villages, and had achieved some success. They were encouraging the refugees not to settle in Syria, not to pay for the construction of their homes, and not to reimburse the loans made by the Office. This, he claimed, was solely in order to maintain the refugees in a state of indecision and discontent. So far, they had successfully persuaded fifteen families to leave Massiaf and one to leave Abdal Huyuk.<sup>48</sup>

## CONCLUSIONS

To resume, then, the impact on settlement of Armenian social aspirations and political divisions, it appears that an initial reluctance to settle in Syria, because of a desire for transfer to Soviet Armenia entertained at least by the Armenian 'leaders' at Paris, was followed by a more positive commitment to settlement in Syria when transfer to Soviet Armenia became practically impossible. Within Syria, a desire for security of life and culture encouraged concentration and discouraged dispersal. With regard to the Nansen Office scheme, it led to a preference for settlement in coastal regions, and rejection of plans for settlement in the interior, with the exception of Le Nail's abortive proposals of 1929. The tendency to concentrate represented the ethnic solidarity of the Armenians. Within Armenian society, however, there was a degree of religious segregation between Apostolics and Catholics, while political rivalries between Dashnak and anti-Dashnak parties appear to have influenced attitudes to the Nansen Office settlements.

### *The Attitude of the Indigenous Population*

The attitude of the indigenous population of Syria and Lebanon to the settlement of Armenian migrants was cool, sometimes openly hostile. It is idle to blame this reaction on "Muslim fanaticism." The immigration gave rise to genuine political and economic fears on the part of the indigenous population. Nevertheless, the hostility was based partly on "ethnic" grounds, the criterion for distinction being not simply religion but linguistic, cultural or "national" identity. While Syria and Lebanon were together composed of a mosaic of confessional groups, the overwhelming majority of the population of both territories (Muslim

or Christian, including the indigenous Armenian population) was Arabic-speaking. The strength of “Arabism” as a cultural-political force among the Syrian and Lebanese population at this time is however difficult to evaluate.<sup>49</sup> Confessionalism continued to dominate Lebanese politics while French policies (deliberately or not) perpetuated confessionalism in the State of the Alawis and the Jebel el Druze. Within interior Syria traditional religious allegiances could hardly be expected to die overnight in the face of the new nationalist politics. The nationalist struggle was directed essentially, of course, against French control. Within the nationalist movement it is possible to identify elements of both pan-Arabism and a specifically Syrian nationalism. To a specifically Syrian nationalist shorn of cultural overtones, the Armenian immigration would only be objectionable in so far as it resulted from French control (i.e., the objection would be political rather than “ethnic”). But, in so far as Syrian nationalism was identified with Arabism the Armenians inevitably ran the risk of being treated as foreigners: -

Toute la population de ces Etats parlant la langue arabe est aussi en grande majorité d'origine arabe. Sans doute les diverses nations qui ont conquis la Syrie, y ont laissé des sujets de leurs races. Mais il suffit de mentionner que, quoiqu'il en soit, les Syriens forment aujourd'hui une unité ethnique et linguistique incontestable. Entre tous existe à présent un fond de même origine et un réel sentiment de solidarité ... Il y a bien quelques milliers d'Arméniens immigrés après l'occupation française et des tcherkesses qui habitent le pays depuis longtemps. Mais ces deux éléments ne peuvent, étant donné leur petite proportion, changer l'aspect de la nation syrienne, composée d'Arabes et autres Orientaux syrianisés.<sup>50</sup>

The only way that the Armenians could avoid such antagonism was to shed their own “national” allegiances. In fact, they were in a cruel dilemma, elegantly expressed by Paul Berron:

Des conflits éclateront si les Arméniens restent fidele à leur passé. S'ils renoncent à leur caractère particulier, ce sera le massacre volontaire et sans que le sang coule, de la plus grande agglomération des réfugiés arméniens de Turquie.<sup>51</sup>

“Ethnic” antagonism was by no means the only cause of friction between Armenians and Arabs, but its importance was fundamental, for the ethnic label provided the basis for the identification of inequalities and the perpetuation of other grievances and fears.

Ethnic antagonism was encouraged by the non-assimilatory tendencies of the Armenians themselves, in particular their tendency to concentrate in compact groups. De Caix observed to the Permanent Mandates Commission in November 1926 how this tendency might lead the indigenous population to regard the Armenians as a foreign entity which refused to blend with the other inhabitants of the country.<sup>52</sup> And Burnier wrote in April 1928 that the indigenous population viewed with fear the development and growth in the cities of foreign colonies which would never be absorbed or assimilated.<sup>53</sup> These comments were no doubt prompted in part by views expressed when the Lebanese Chamber was invited to participate in plans for Armenian settlement. When the High Commissioner

requested that the State of Lebanon allocate three million francs to the resettlement of Armenians in Beirut, objections were raised, particularly by a Muslim deputy, that the resettlement envisaged would concentrate the Armenians in a particular quarter, instead of dispersing them and aiding their assimilation. It was felt also that it was unacceptable to vote a credit of three million francs in favour of the Armenian refugees without at the same time organising aid to the indigenous victims of the Druze revolt.<sup>54</sup> The refusal of the Lebanese Chamber to meet this demand ruined the efforts of the High Commission to obtain finance from the local states for the Armenian settlement scheme, and indirectly therefore contributed notably to the perpetuation of the settlement pattern then existing. Furthermore, this inability of the local states to participate in the work of Armenian resettlement (based partly on ethnic prejudice and partly, it must be stressed, on legitimate financial considerations) threw the Armenians back into dependence on the French, with consequent political repercussions.

Indeed, hostility towards the Armenians had a strong political basis. While Syria and Lebanon united contained an overwhelmingly Arab Muslim population, at the local level the establishment of a sizeable Armenian population could profoundly alter the confessional balance. While the Christian leaders in Lebanon might view such an alteration with favour,<sup>55</sup> the majority population viewed local Armenian concentration with suspicion.<sup>56</sup> There was opposition to Armenian naturalisation,<sup>57</sup> and fears about the Armenian birth-rate which was believed to be extraordinarily high.<sup>58</sup> When it was felt that the Armenians were being used or favored by the French Mandatory authorities, hostility was particularly intense. Allegations of favouritism could of course thrive in a situation where the inability of the local States to contribute to Armenian resettlement had thrown the Armenians back into dependence on the French. For example, the French scheme for the colonisation of Armenians in the Euphrates region was proposed by Pierre Le Nail, its enthusiastic protagonist, in terms of an Armenian "home" ("patrie"). When inaccurate reports of the scheme reached the attention of an Arab population outraged by the development of Zionism in Palestine, there was a series of violent protests across Syria. The subsequent abandonment of this scheme was probably related to these protests.<sup>59</sup> Again, the Armenians were in an unenviable situation, owing their loyalty both to the Syrian population and the French authorities. What, for example, was their duty in the elections? To vote for<sup>60</sup> the pro-Mandate candidates, and risk the wrath of the Nationalists? Or to vote for the Nationalists against their French "protectors"?<sup>61</sup>

The most important basis for hostile Arab feeling was, however, probably economic.<sup>62</sup> The Armenians were accused of lowering the wages of the indigenous labour force by accepting lower wages themselves. Contemporary observers were certainly of the opinion that the Armenians with their imported skills, industry, and willingness to work for lower returns proved formidable competition for the locals. In the report of the Mandatory Power for 1937 it is stated that the Armenians had lowered wages by 20-25% in industries where their

numbers were sufficiently high. The most reliable account of their economic impact concerns the province of Latakia.

An official report stated that there it was incontestable that Armenian labour had supplanted indigenous labour in numerous trades. More industrious, and better organised than indigenous labour, and having a deep feeling of communal aid, Armenian labour had gradually succeeded in forcing out indigenous artisans from those small trades which required just a little capital and the shrewd use of cheap labour. It was impossible, the report continued, to estimate exactly the influence of Armenian labour on wages, other deeper causes having provoked a decrease in wages. However, it was undeniable that the better organisation of the Armenian workshops and consequent lower prices had efficiently competed with indigenous producers, and obliged the latter to lower prices by cutting wages.<sup>63</sup>

As Marshall Fox pointed out, the Armenians were once more in a predicament. Employers would naturally prefer to employ workers to whom they could convey instructions in their own language, as the non-Arabic speaking Armenians were at a disadvantage. To earn a living, therefore, they had to offer some additional inducement, for example, working longer hours for less money. In this case even indigenous employers could be prepared to use the Armenians as a lever to bring down wage-rates, as "they all want cheap labour when they are employing."<sup>64</sup> It must be stated too that, if there was a depression in wage-rates which the Armenians encouraged, ultimately this resulted not (obviously) from the desire of the Armenians themselves, but from the flooding of the labourmarket resulting from their immigration. In fact, the precise economic impact of the Armenian immigration must remain in doubt: it might form the basis of a separate study. Suspicions were certainly felt by the local population, however, and these were all that mattered in terms of arousing hostility.

The most striking manifestation of Arab hostility to the Armenians occurred during the Druze Revolt, a local rebellion which broke out in 1925 and assumed partly the character of a nationalist uprising. To meet this crisis the French authorities established auxiliary units in which a number of Armenians were enlisted.<sup>65</sup> It appears that there was no collusion between the French and Armenians, but the French desperately needed troops to quell the uprising, and the Armenians, who needed employment, could not resist the attractive financial incentives which were offered. Consul Hough puts the responsibility for this recruitment firmly in French hands.

...it is impossible to hold starving men back from taking any employment which guarantees them regular pay. The whole responsibility is on those who engage them, and if it resulted later in attacks on this unhappy people the responsibility would be heavy.<sup>66</sup>

The irregular troops were soon accused of excesses in the oasis of Damascus. Not surprisingly then, when in October 1925 the rebels attacked southern Damascus, the first people they attacked were the Armenians in the refugee camp

of Kadem. Consul Smart, here rather less sympathetic to the Armenians than his colleague, explains the Arab point of view:

No doubt the Muslims exaggerate both the numbers of the Armenians enrolled in these irregular formations and the extent of their misdeeds. Yet, the fact remains that some Armenians are in these formations. These Armenians came here as pitiful refugees from Turkey. By their better craftsmanship and by the lower wages they accepted they caused economic prejudice to the natives. Yet these foreign Christian intruders had not been subjected to any bad treatment by the Muslims. A revolt breaks out which quickly assumes a nationalist character and is only directed against the French. The most elementary prudence and recognition of hospitality should have enjoined on the Armenians complete abstention from any participation in the hostilities. Instead of adopting this attitude of abstention, a number of them joined these irregular formations and fought against their Muslim hosts, who regard themselves as fighting for their native land...<sup>67</sup>

Notwithstanding this disaster, the French continued to use the Armenians as irregulars, and in February 1926, the Armenians themselves were involved in severe excesses during clearing-up operations in the Meidan Quarter of Damascus. Arab hostility was now so fierce that the Armenian Catholicos wrote to the French High Commissioner begging him to discharge the Armenians who had been recruited.<sup>68</sup> The clashes meanwhile had encouraged the movement of thousands of Armenian refugees from the camps of Damascus to Beirut.

The Damascus clashes were, it is true, the most bitter clashes which occurred between Arabs and Armenians in Syria in the course of an uneasy relationship which was not in general marked by violence. The movement from Damascus to Beirut which they encouraged was atypical in that it was the direct result of a specific disturbance. Otherwise, Arab hostility was more subtle in its influence on Armenian settlement. In leading the local States to refuse to participate in a solution of the Armenian problem it encouraged the perpetuation of the status quo and the rule of economic constraints while throwing the Armenians back into dependence on the French for resettlement. Subsequently it inhibited the implementation of French-inspired schemes for Armenian resettlement suspected of political bias. Perhaps most important, however, though impossible to measure (especially in view of the Armenians' pre-Syrian experience) was the effect which this hostility must have had on Armenian attitudes to settlement. It can only have increased their insecurity, especially after the events of Damascus. Paradoxically, the concentration and segregation encouraged by this insecurity would itself stress the ethnic separateness of the Armenians, increase their impact on local economies and increase their dependence on French protection, all of which would increase Arab hostility still further. One may identify a process which was essentially self-perpetuating. It was also clearly complicated by the French interest, and it is on French policy towards the Armenians that attention will now be focused.

### ***The Political Motives and Social Constraints Behind French Policy***

The Armenians constituted in Syria and Lebanon an additional element in the complex ethnic mosaic which made up those countries. It was a mosaic which had encouraged the Mandatory authorities to carve up the region into what Longrigg aptly refers to as a “strangely fragmented pattern” of states and territories. In view of this fragmentation, and the obvious temptation to use additional minorities as political chess-pieces, it is pertinent to ask whether or not the French authorities endeavoured to control Armenian settlement for political purposes. Such a question is based on the realisation that, while the Mandated territory was divided into a number of States with their own government, the reality of control lay with the Mandatory authorities. The independence of the Levant States was notoriously incomplete. The States applied laws which in many cases not they but the High Commissioner had enacted, and often after little consultation with them. Every act of their own Chambers required a French countersignature. Important departments, including the Common Interests, were entirely outside their control. Whole provinces were directly French-administered. Throughout the State administrations French advice, inspection and de facto control rendered local powers often no more than nominal.<sup>69</sup>

It might be expected, if the French wished to use the Armenians for political purposes, that they would have viewed the Armenian immigration with favour. In answering this question then, it is necessary first to examine the attitude of the authorities to the migrations. It is evident in fact that as early as March, 1921, when there was the possibility of an Armenian exodus from Cilicia to Syria, the French were concerned about the financial burden and the political complications it would bring.<sup>70</sup> When, in October, the possibility of an exodus was raised again, these concerns of a political and financial nature were retained, and the French endeavoured to persuade the Armenians to remain in Cilicia.<sup>71</sup> However, with other ports closed, and the necessity to avoid disease and disturbances at Mersin and Dortyol, where the refugees had accumulated, they were obliged to accept their moral obligation to receive the refugees whom they had gravely compromised by a contradictory policy,<sup>72</sup> and the evacuation and transport of the Cilician refugees to Syria was reluctantly agreed. De Caix gave early expression to the political misgivings consequent on this action, arguing that the Armenians’ political habits could only be embarrassing for the French, especially as those who had apparently arrived in Cilicia from America and the Caucasus after the armistice of 1918 would have “Bolshevist” tendencies.<sup>73</sup> The mischievous influence of their political committees, suggested the French Consul-General at Ankara, should be eliminated at any cost.<sup>74</sup>

The migrants of 1921 were thus clearly only accepted reluctantly, despite financial and political considerations. The same considerations were also felt with regard to the migrants who arrived between 1922 and 1924.<sup>75</sup> For the first time, it is true, the potential political advantage of the Armenian immigration was

acknowledged by General Weygand, the High Commissioner. He recognised the advantage in increasing in Syria the number of Christians who were favourable to the French presence and who would tend in certain towns to counterbalance the Muslims who were politically more “difficult”. However, he went on to restate the financial and political objections, observing that the earlier influx of Armenians had caused protests because it had made the housing crisis more acute and reduced wages. A new influx would exacerbate this feeling, especially as all the refugees from the previous influx had still not been absorbed.<sup>76</sup> It was considerations of this order which continued to dominate French policy towards the immigration. Even in 1929, when the Nansen Office scheme was well under way, the fresh migration of refugees was viewed as the same financial and political burden,<sup>77</sup> and some refugees were initially refused entry at the border.<sup>78</sup>

This attitude towards the forced or induced migrations was not contradicted by French policy towards the various suggestions which were made for orderly transfer of refugees to Syria. It has been observed that Armenian desires to transfer about five to six thousand refugees from Greece to Syria may have lain partly behind the mission of Mr. Carle to Syria to examine settlement possibilities there. Agreement to this proposal was apparently given in principle in Paris, subject to the approval of the High Commission.<sup>79</sup> The attitude of the High Commission is not known, but in any case, the Druze Revolt intervened to prevent any action being taken. Subsequently, once the Nansen Office scheme had been agreed, Johnson reported that during his visit, in November, 1926, he received the informal assurance of the High Commission that every facility would be afforded the Office for the establishment in Syria of Armenian refugees from other countries, as soon as substantial progress had been made in the settlement of the unemployed refugees already in Syria.<sup>80</sup> It is unlikely that these developments really represented a change in policy. If so, it was extremely brief. When, probably as a result of Johnson’s statement, the French ambassador to Turkey received a Turkish protest concerning a press report that the transport of Armenians from Europe to Syria had been discussed at Geneva,<sup>81</sup> it was met with a strong denial.<sup>82</sup> The impossibility of transfer was stated again in June, 1927 at a Refugee Conference in Geneva by Count Clauzel, the French representative,<sup>83</sup> and to the Armenian sub-committee at Geneva by Duguet, who stated that it would be premature to consider this question, given the difficulty of solving the problem of the refugees already in Syria.<sup>84</sup> Such attitudes were justified by the hostile Syrian reaction to rumours of mass immigration which appeared in September, 1928.<sup>85</sup> At the Paris Conference in June, 1931, however, which determined the future shape of the settlement work in Syria, and at which M. Ponsot, the French High Commissioner, was present, it was agreed that some refugees might be transferred to Syria from Greece. However, this movement could only be contemplated when definite provision had been made for the settlement of the 15,000 refugees remaining in the camps of Syria. Moreover, such transfers could only be made initially on an individual basis, and in favour

of these refugees who already had relatives or friends in Syria who would be prepared to receive them, and who would not therefore become a charge on public funds. For political reasons, the Mandatory Power could not allow the impression to gain ground that it contemplated a further Armenian colonisation in Syria. Burnier was charged by the Office with studying the transfer question,<sup>86</sup> and it is evident that the policy above was carried out. While a small number of refugees were admitted, it is clear that the French authorities were reluctant to admit refugees who were penniless or had no referees in Syria to assure their subsistence.<sup>87</sup> In so far as evidence is available, it seems therefore that French policy towards transfers was consistent with their policy towards the major refugee influxes. Indeed, some emigration was actually assisted. This was of orphans to France in co-operation with the N.E.R., and has been described already. On the other hand, a statement by Johnson suggests that the authorities were keen to prevent emigration to South America from assuming large proportions, and the motive may have been political.<sup>88</sup>

It is clear that the French cannot be accused of deliberately introducing Armenians into Syria for political purposes. On the contrary in general they viewed Armenian immigration as financially and politically embarrassing. Nevertheless, once the refugees had arrived, did they endeavour to influence their settlement for political purposes? Initially it is apparent that lack of finance ruled out large scale resettlement schemes whether politically based or not. Thus, in so far as political considerations influenced the dispersal of the 1921 refugees which did take place, these were wholly negative. The authorities were anxious to avoid an accumulation of refugees in the State of Aleppo and Sanjak of Alexandretta, where their presence would worry Turkey. It was felt that the increase of the Armenian element could cause difficulties in the "Turkish" region of Alexandretta for which a special regime was foreseen under the Ankara agreement. Therefore, it was decided that the impoverished refugees at Alexandretta should be transported to the south. For the same reason, it was decided that the evacuation of the refugees who were waiting to move into Syria from Dortyol should be carried out by sea to the southern coast, instead of by land to Alexandretta.<sup>89</sup> However, even this negative policy misfired, and the refugees at Dortyol, whose transport was envisaged by sea to the Syrian ports, were eventually received by Alexandretta.<sup>90</sup> The subsequent dispersal of refugees from Alexandretta, while consistent with the policy stated above, seems nevertheless to have been carried out in response to pressure from relief organisations rather than for political reasons. Turkish susceptibilities seem again, however, to have influenced the dispersal of the refugees who arrived in Aleppo after 1922. When an article appeared in the Turkish press about the Armenians in Syria, the High Commissioner, Weygand, wrote indignantly that far from attracting the Armenians, he had been more concerned about the financial burden they imposed, the economic difficulties they provoked, and the political danger they represented, as much from the point of view of relations with Turkey as from the

point of view of internal politics. Moreover, far from concentrating them in the Aleppo region, the Mandatory Power had endeavoured to disperse them in Syria and Lebanon, as much to avoid offending Turkish susceptibilities as to assure their subsistence.<sup>91</sup> (Turkish complaints about alleged bad behavior of Armenians in the regions of Aleppo and Alexandretta had in fact been made as early as April, 1923.<sup>92</sup>) Apart from these measures of redistribution from Aleppo, French efforts towards refugee redistribution after 1922 concerned only the encouragement of small scale dispersal, which did not even receive Armenian support. There was no question of largescale colonisation which continued to be ruled out for financial reasons. Mr. Hekimian, N.E.R. representative at Aleppo, was critical of French inaction in this respect, but Consul Smart considered him unfair, as the French Authorities “would easily arouse a storm of Arab opposition if they promoted too obviously Armenian colonisation in Syria”.<sup>93</sup> A regard for Arab susceptibilities would have been consistent with French policy towards the immigrations, so that negative political considerations may have been acting once again.

The Turkish government, however, believed the High Commission to be deliberately concentrating Armenians in villages in the Sanjak, and communicated these views to Paris.<sup>94</sup> These allegations were denied by General Sarrail, the High Commissioner who pointed out that a large number of refugees had been transferred to the interior “dans le but précisément de décongestionner la région Nord.”<sup>95</sup> The Turks however remained concerned,<sup>96</sup> so that Sarrail decided in future not to permit the residence of refugees from Turkey within thirty kilometers of the frontier.<sup>97</sup> While this provision may have been applied temporarily to new installations, it does not appear to have been retrospective, nor to have remained in force as refugees subsequently settled immediately next to the border. There is also some evidence of French involvement in the establishment of refugees at Kirik Khane.<sup>98</sup> Here the government provided land for the re-establishment of the Lazarists’ Mission of Ekbes, and so 30 to 35 rural families of their former flocks. In addition, they provided transport for these families from Latakia to Alexandretta, and it is clear that the operation involved co-operation at the highest levels of the French administration. Apart from the clear favouritism towards the Catholic Armenians which this move entailed, it suggests also that Turkish allegations may not have been unfounded. The motive, to reinforce the pro-Mandate element in an area whose political future was in doubt, was certainly not lacking, but such considerations in French policy seem excluded by the statements already recorded, which favoured dispersal from the Sanjak and accord with Turkey. It seems that the French were merely unwilling to deny themselves the opportunity of dispersing some Armenians in the Sanjak, despite political considerations, when the problem in the centres of Armenian concentration was so acute. A definitive answer, however, must await the opening of the archives of the High Commission.

More light on French policy comes from an investigation of the official attitude to the colonisation work of Karen Jeppe. The first statement located on this subject was made by M. Painlevé, the French representative at a meeting of the Council of the League in September, 1925, in which he noted the humanitarian work of Miss Jeppe but stressed that colonisation was a matter which lay solely within the competence of the Mandatory power.<sup>99</sup> The motive behind this statement is revealed in a letter from Briand, the Foreign Minister, to De Jouvenal, the High Commissioner, in 1926. Recalling the discussion at the League in 1925, he revealed that certain facts related by General Sarrail (the previous High Commissioner) and his predecessors on the subject of disorders provoked by Miss Jeppe in the Aleppo region had led the Department to wish to put an end to her mission which risked involving the Mandatory Power in difficulties with the indigenous population. However, the favour which this pro-Armenian work enjoyed with the feminist and evangelical associations, which exercised an undeniable influence on the League Secretariat and on certain of the principal delegations to the Assembly, had not permitted the French delegate to bring about such a radical solution. He had had to content himself with limiting the autonomy of Miss Jeppe in relation to the High Commission.<sup>100</sup> The disorders referred to probably concern the murder of an agent of Miss Jeppe in connection with her rescue work for women and children.<sup>101</sup> In other words, the French authorities were concerned to limit Miss Jeppe's freedom of action because they feared incidents with the indigenous population, a concern consistent with the policy already inferred. At the same time, Miss Jeppe continued to believe that she had French support for her settlement schemes, even into 1926.<sup>102</sup> Consul Hough, at Aleppo, therefore asked her what she thought lay behind Painlevé's statement to the League. She replied that she had been given to understand that General Sarrail had sent in an unfavourable report on her work, probably because she had enjoyed the confidence and support of French officials for whom he had a personal dislike. (This, felt General Hough, would be quite in accordance with the "demoniac" personality of the late High Commissioner.) The subsequent effect had been that though unable to continue colonisation schemes for the benefit of Armenian refugees as League of Nations Commissioner, she had been in touch with De Jouvenal, and receive his authority to continue them in her personal capacity, and on condition of her responsibility to the French in the matter.<sup>103</sup> In fact, there appears to have been no great inconsistency between the policies of the two High Commissioners. De Jouvenal's approval of the scheme was consistent with a desire to disperse the refugees, but he had also established French supervision of the work. Furthermore, at the same time as De Jouvenal was approving Miss Jeppe's schemes, he was writing to Paris, urging that her work be attached to the relief committee established in Syria by the International Red Cross to aid the Victims of the Druze Revolt,<sup>104</sup> in order to limit her autonomy. These preoccupations subsequently received satisfaction at the League Assembly which passed a resolution which,

Seeing that the work of Armenian colonisation undertaken by Miss Jeppe ... (falls) within the class of work entrusted by the Mandatory Power, in the general interest, to a central organ representing the Refugee Service at the I.L.O. and the direction of the I.R.C.C., invites Miss Jeppe to come to an understanding as regards the general direction of the work mentioned...with the liaison organization established by the Mandatory Power.<sup>105</sup>

Burnier was requested by Johnson to give effect to this resolution,<sup>106</sup> and in his report of his meeting with Miss Jeppe he gave an interesting summary of French preoccupations. He noted that the French complained that Miss Jeppe worked independently of the Mandatory authorities, and that she had never been to see the Delegate. They suspected her of having political tendencies contrary to the interests of the Mandate. Her agricultural colonies caused concern to the authorities. They were located in a region of nomadism, not far from the Kurds, and based on a contract established with a local chief - a small guarantee. Also, they were too small to provide for their own security. Up to the time of writing there had been no incident, because the colonies were poor. But should they become prosperous, the Bedouin tribes could well attempt a raid, and a single rifle-shot at an Armenian would have most unfortunate consequences. Finally, the latest reports from the region's Intelligence Officer noted that the Armenians had a tendency to behave unreasonably and look down on the indigenous population, as they believed themselves to be under the special protection of the League.<sup>107</sup> Burnier asked her to abstain from all new attempts at colonisation and to limit her activity to aiding the poor in Aleppo camp. Johnson then at least considered directing some of her funds through the Geneva Committee, so that she would be obliged to act in accordance with the instructions given her.<sup>108</sup> Subsequently, the affair disappears from the correspondence, but, with the exception of Tiné, Miss Jeppe did not found any new colonies. The affair illustrates two principal elements of French policy towards Armenian settlement; the desire to control the settlement work, and the desire to avoid antagonising the indigenous population, both consistent with the negative political considerations in French policy already inferred.

In 1925 the League intervened for the first time with the mission of Mr. Carle to Syria, and the French reaction to the Carle proposals is interesting.<sup>109</sup> For the first time they were willing to consider large-scale settlement, in fact in the Ghab and even east of the Euphrates. The reason for this change of policy was most probably the apparent willingness of the League to commit finance to the scheme, which the High Commission was reluctant to provide. There is no suggestion in the records consulted that political considerations lay behind this reversal of policy. French agreement was still, however, to be conditional on French control of the scheme, General Sarrail signaling that, being responsible for law and order, the High Commission must choose not only the sites, but also the most favourable time for the execution of the plans.<sup>110</sup> Moreover, according to a statement by M. Pams, French representative at the Fifth Committee of the League Assembly, no action could be taken until the Armenian 'leaders' had determined their attitude

to settlement in Syria. Until this had been done, Syria could not incorporate a large part of the Armenian people without either endangering the equilibrium of a possible future Armenian nation, or the equilibrium of Syria, if later a reconstituted Armenia was suddenly to withdraw from Syria more than 100,000 Armenians.<sup>111</sup> Ultimately, the scheme was dropped at the outbreak of the Druze Revolt. The French response to it illustrates again their concern for control of settlement operations and their need for finance.

When the question was revived by Burnier, his initial report to Geneva was prepared with French co-operation, and may be assumed to have met the requirements of the High Commission. It envisaged the transfer of the Armenian population from the interior, due to the bad relations existing there between Armenians and the indigenous population, a proposal consistent with the negative political considerations behind French policy inferred above. On the other hand, the counterpart of this proposal, their resettlement in southern Lebanon, taken in conjunction with proposals to stabilise the Armenian population of Beirut, suggests more positive political considerations. Correspondence in the Archives Diplomatiques confirm that in supporting Burnier's proposals, the High Commissioner, De Jouvenal, was supporting the increase of the Christian majority in the Lebanon which would result from them.<sup>112</sup> The figures of the 1925 Civil Register which, however inaccurate, were those available to the authorities and on which they had to base their policies, reveal that it was, in fact, only the presence of the Armenians which brought the Christian proportion of the Lebanese population to over 50%<sup>113</sup> (Table 6.1).

<b>Table 6.1:</b> The impact of Armenian settlement on the proportion of Christians in the Lebanon, according to the Civil Register 1925		
Population in Lebanon	Total	%
Armenians	32,859	5.5
Christians	326,890	54.68
Christians less Armenians	294,031	49.19
Total Population	597,799	100

There was clear advantage to the French in stabilising this population and increasing it. Locally the suggested colonisation would have had a dramatic impact on the population balance in the areas of southern Lebanon where the Christian population was weak. (Table 6.2) For the first time, positive political considerations lay behind French settlement policy. This might explain the dramatic change in the way the Armenians were viewed by the French. The assertion in Burnier's report that the majority of Armenians requiring assistance were peasants was in direct contradiction of earlier French statements. Lack of finance was cited by Burnier as the reason for the French request for outside assistance, despite their desire to control settlement work. Possibly too, given the political basis of the scheme, participation by the I.L.O. would provide a useful umbrella from criticism.

<b>Table 6.2:</b> Impact of proposed Armenian population transfer on the population balance in the cazas of Tyr and Merdjayoun, based on the Civil Register of 1925		
	Tyr	Merdjayoun
Population in 1925	34,588	24,645
Christian population in 1925	5574	8424
Christian population as % total population 1925	16.12	34.18
Proposed increase in population through transfer of Armenians	8000	20,000
Population after transfer of Armenians	42,588	44,645
Christian population after transfer of Armenians	13,574	28,424
Christian population as % total population after transfer of Armenians	31.87	63.67

The plan encountered strong opposition in Paris. A long unsigned memorandum urged its abandonment,<sup>114</sup> the principal reasons being itemised as follows:

- (1) There were no regions in southern Lebanon where 30,000 immigrants could be introduced without displacing the local population.
- (2) Given the number of inhabitants in these regions and the structure of land-ownership, it would have been impossible to settle the Armenians without proceeding to expropriations.
- (3) The governmental action which this project would have required would have contradicted the whole Mandate policy, which had consisted of creating local governments. It was inconceivable that these governments would approve and execute measures tending to substitute Armenian immigrants for a part of the Lebanese population.
- (4) Armenian colonisation was only acceptable if made spontaneously without expropriations, i.e., in the regions of the Mandated states which had no or virtually no population. To proceed otherwise would have compromised the Mandatory Power gravely and justly in the eyes of the local population.

Thus the High Commission was advised to take no action until the plan had been studied in depth.<sup>115</sup> The ensuing discussions were held up the commencement of the scheme.<sup>116</sup> Burnier, who was sent to Paris to hasten the negotiations, reported the opposition of the Ministry to the transfer to southern Lebanon, observing that the Ministry would have preferred the settlement of the Armenians within the states in which they were living, which would not provoke the accusations and discussions which might be provoked by a policy of transfer.<sup>117</sup> It is evident that the Ministry favoured a more cautious line than the High Commission, more in accordance with the earlier policy of avoiding upsetting local susceptibilities. The question was still not resolved when at last the I.L.O. received a formal request for participation.

Subsequently general plans were drawn up by Duguet and by Johnson, with similar recommendations, following negotiations resulting from Burnier's mission. That of Duguet provides an interesting statement of French policy and may be compared with the original proposals contained in Burnier's memorandum. The most significant change is that Duguet's proposals no longer envisaged the mass transfer of refugees from the interior to Lebanon. Instead, the

refugees of Aleppo should be resettled within the State of Syria. This fundamental change reveals the abandonment of the grand political design of De Jouvenal, and the substitution of the more cautious approach advocated by the Ministry. The southern Lebanon scheme was not wholly abandoned, but was greatly modified and now envisaged on a smaller, more discrete, scale.<sup>118</sup> The failed experiment of Ras el Ain was ultimately the only attempt made at Armenian colonisation in this region.

On the other hand, the Beirut scheme was given first priority. This was partly because of the embarrassment caused to the government by the state of the camp,<sup>119</sup> but also because the High Commission still saw the political advantage of stabilising the Armenian population of Lebanon, as M. Reffye stated clearly.

En dehors de ces raisons d'ordre moral, nous avons le plus grand intérêt, du point de vue politique, comme du point de vue militaire - les évènements récents nous ont fourni l'occasion de la constater - à essayer de maintenir au Liban les Arméniens qui s'y ont réfugiés et qui renforcent si utilement l'élément chrétien.<sup>120</sup>

Burnier noted the necessity to halt emigration as a reason for hastening settlement operations,<sup>121</sup> and he was probably here reflecting French concern. It is evident that while, as has been described, the High Commission was reluctant to encourage Armenian immigration, by 1926 it was at least aware of the possibilities of stabilising the Armenian population which had already arrived. Furthermore, while the policy of stabilising the Armenian population of Beirut conformed to the original design of De Jouvenal, it did not contradict the more cautious policy which sought the resettlement of the Armenians in the states in which they had accumulated. There was a further advantage to the High Commission in giving priority to Beirut. In so far as finance for the scheme would be provided by the Levant States, it was hoped that it would emanate from the individual states, not from the High Commission.<sup>122</sup> This was in accordance with the preoccupations of the Ministry with regard to the autonomy of the local states, and with the reluctance of the High Commission to commit finance to the scheme itself. It was hoped that the Lebanese Chamber would vote a credit of three million francs to the Beirut scheme, and that the example of Lebanon would facilitate the acquisition of a similar credit from the State of Syria. This arrangement, incidentally, enabled one to understand more clearly why the French authorities should accept the participation of the I.L.O. while they had previously been reluctant to concede control over settlement operations to external agencies. It is evident that the participation of the I.L.O. would provide a moral lever with which to obtain finance from the local states,<sup>123</sup> while the allocation of that finance once obtained could be controlled more easily from Syria than funds emanating from Geneva, which were viewed as supplementary to the funds to be provided by the local states. In the event, it proved impossible to obtain the approval of the Lebanese Chamber to a credit of three million francs, and this money had to be provided by the High Commission directly.<sup>124</sup>

The Beirut scheme was given low priority by the Geneva committee, but was able to proceed as the High Commission controlled the requisite funds. Plans for the settlement of Armenians in the interior of Aleppo Vilayet, however, did not receive the approval of the committee, despite French intentions, as in this case, the High Commission had no funds of its own available. After the failure to secure finance from the Lebanese Chamber, no funds were forthcoming from the local states. Thus, the High Commission became more dependent on finance from Geneva, and lost the control over the scheme which it had envisaged. It was only then able to implement schemes which had met Armenian aspirations at Geneva. Thus, schemes for settlement in the interior were rejected, while those for settlement near the coast in Alawi Territory and the Sanjak of Alexandretta went ahead. It is evident that in approving these plans the High Commission was paying attention to the demands of the Armenians.<sup>125</sup> In the case of the Sanjak, it has been suggested that political considerations were also involved. Not only did the High Commission approve the creation of Armenian villages in the Sanjak, but proposals were made for the resettlement on the reclaimed Alexandretta marshes of the refugees camped at that town. These proposals were opposed by the Geneva committee on the grounds that they were in a region whose future was not absolutely clear from the political point of view, objections which were rejected by both Burnier and Duguet, in statements obviously made with the approval of the High Commission. In view of previous French reluctance to risk offending Turkish susceptibilities in this region, it is pertinent to ask whether there had been a reversal of policy and if there was not a positive commitment to encourage Armenian settlement in the region. This at least was the view of Consul Hole at Damascus who wrote of the Armenian settlement scheme in a rather ill-informed report in November 1928 that "while the philanthropic aspect of the scheme has uniformly received the greatest publicity, its principal object has always been to create an Armenian enclave in a centre of internal disaffection or on an exposed frontier."<sup>126</sup> His views were, however, contradicted by Consul-General Satow, at Beirut,<sup>127</sup> and Consul Monck-Mason at Aleppo. Monck-Mason drew attention to the socio-economic advantages of settlement in the Sanjak already discussed. He felt, however, that these considerations certainly coincided with reasons of political convenience. The Sanjak, with a population which was largely Turkish, was, and was likely to remain for a long time, a hotbed of Turkish propaganda. An Armenian element dotted about the Sanjak, enjoying the support of the Mandatory authorities and rapidly increasing in numbers, would be in the nature of a safeguard against a reactionary Turkish population.<sup>128</sup> The final word however comes from the High Commission. When, in 1928, it was suggested by the French Finance Ministry that France had a political interest in settling Armenians along the Turkish frontier,<sup>129</sup> the High Commission denied this categorically, recalling to the Department that it had always been opposed to such a policy which would arouse Turkish susceptibilities, and would be more likely to compromise the security of the frontier than to guarantee it.<sup>130</sup> There does not

therefore appear to have been any change in French policy. It is suggested again that Armenians were settled in the Sanjak in accordance with economic opportunity and social necessity, despite reluctance to offend Turkish susceptibilities.

The High Commission was clearly hindered in the achievement of its objectives with regard to Armenian settlement by lack of finance. It has already been observed that France was unwilling to consider guaranteeing a loan to be made to the scheme. Such a guarantee would, according to French policy, have had to come from the local states in Syria, and in view of the earlier example of Lebanon, Ponsot considered it inadvisable to endeavour to obtain a guarantee from these states.<sup>131</sup> Ultimately, however, in 1929 France itself agreed on a new credit of three million francs to the Rolling Fund, an act which was accompanied by the designation of a French representative to the Geneva committee. The High Commission thus regained some of its freedom of action with respect to settlement. The new scheme presented by their appointee, M. Le Nail, envisaged large-scale settlement in the Euphrates region and later in Palmyra. This represented a departure from previous policy which had eschewed settlement in the interior and preferred coastal locations. This was made possible by the pacification of the region and its incorporation into a zone of civil administration. Nevertheless, the sudden commitment of French finance to the scheme, together with the volte-face in the Armenian attitude to settlement in this region expressed at the Geneva committee, lead one to suspect political collusion. Certainly, Le Nail's initial outline of the scheme to Johnson at Geneva had considerable political overtones.

Le Gouvernement français, en déléguant un représentant au comité central et en appuyant son geste d'une subvention de 3 millions, a voulu marquer son désir de voir la S.D.N. entreprendre un programme de plus grande envergure.

Il ne s'agissait plus seulement de secourir les réfugiés mais de leur refaire un Patrie.

...

Nous désirons grouper, autant que faire se pourra, les Arméniens chassés de leurs villes et villages autour de leurs chefs civils ou religieux, leur rendre non seulement la terre et la maison, mais le temple, l'école, la mairie, l'hôpital, etc.<sup>132</sup>

Whatever the case, the scheme was abandoned when, in June, 1931, it was decided at the Paris Conference to concentrate on a more limited programme of urban resettlement. There would appear to have been several reasons for this rapid revision of policy and the abandonment of the Le Nail proposals. First, whatever the political motivation behind the Le Nail proposals, they had aroused a storm of opposition amongst an Arab population already outraged by the development of Zionism in Palestine. That this feeling influenced the policy of the High Commission, which had hitherto had to take account of Arab susceptibilities, seems likely from a passage in the Deuxième Bureau's report on the Armenian Question, prepared in 1932.

L'idée d'un "FOYER ARMÉNIEN" à créer en Syrie est une erreur car une autonomie de race dégènerait rapidement en rivalité violente avec la population indigène,

chrétienne ou musulmane. Il faut plutôt envisager l'amalgame progressif des émigrés arméniens aux autochtones.<sup>133</sup>

In addition, even when Le Nail was proposing his scheme, he was urging that the refugees should not be settled close to the Turkish border, in order not to offend Turkish susceptibilities. He himself had ordered southwards a group of refugees who had hoped to settle permanently at Kamichliyé, near the border. Settlement there, he felt, would have provided a powerful temptation to anyone with a view to raiding across the border.<sup>134</sup> These concerns were also felt by High Commissioner Ponsot. He noted that the progress of settlement in the Upper Jezira was largely due to foreign charities such as the AGBU, which operated through an Armenian committee at Aleppo which had so far remained independent of the committee set up at Beirut to handle settlement work. This autonomous activity was all the more difficult to control as it concerned isolated regions in the steppe, far from the regional centre of Hassetché, and where adequate communications were lacking, especially in the rainy season. The two villages of Tell Brack were situated close to the bridge on the new road from Hassetché to Demir Kapou, at a point of greater strategic value. Armenians had settled close to the Turkish frontier, and might be tempted, especially under foreign influence, to launch raids into Turkish territory, a source of considerable concern to the High Commission. Thus, Ponsot felt that he should insist that it was absolutely necessary for the High Commission to control this charitable activity completely, and he had this question in mind in studying a new formula for co-operation with the League.<sup>135</sup> There is a clear link here between the necessity to control Armenian settlement near the Turkish border and the convening of the Paris Conference. Both the desire to control settlement schemes, and the need to avoid offending Turkish susceptibilities were consistent with earlier policies. Furthermore, just before the Paris Conference, De Caix reported to the Permanent Mandates Commission that the Turkish government was demanding, in exchange for the disarmament of the population of the frontier, that the Armenian refugees in the north of Syria should be removed from that region,<sup>136</sup> a demand which would have increased French awareness of the problem. Such concern for Turkish feeling was revealed by the continuation, even hardening, of a cautious policy towards settlement in the Sanjak. Thus, Le Nail regarded a large settlement at Alexandretta as inadvisable, given the closeness of the Turkish border,<sup>137</sup> while at the Paris Conference it was decided that further settlement operations should concern only Beirut and Aleppo, not Alexandretta. Turkish protests against the presence of Armenians on the border in any case prompted Catholicos Sahag II himself to write to Ponsot claiming that, "Connaisant bien la psychologie turques, nous avons prié tous les Hauts Commissaires, à commencer du General Gouraud, d'installer les Arméniens loin des frontières pour éviter les critiques lancées contre l'hospitalité cheveleresque de la France et les Arméniens de nouveau amertumes et dangers..."<sup>138</sup>. It is possible also that links which developed between the Armenian Dashnak party

and the Kurdish Hoyboun embarrassed the French and that they wished to stop this collaboration after Turkish protests.<sup>139</sup> Thus the desire to avoid offending Turkish susceptibilities, as well as Arab, lay partly behind the decision to abandon Le Nail's scheme. Certainly, this attitude found expression several times after 1931. Thus, in 1932 the French authorities advised against settlement projects in the region proposed by Miss Edith Roberts<sup>140</sup> and by Karen Jeppe.<sup>141</sup> Twice, in 1933 and 1936, the High Commission advised against the development of Tell Brack.<sup>142</sup> The Action Chrétienne were several times advised by the authorities to advise the Armenians not to remain in the region near the border, stressing the protests received from the Turkish government.<sup>143</sup>

The positive decision taken at the Paris Conference to concentrate on urban resettlement rather than continue with Le Nail's scheme was also, of course, a response to the development of urban rehousing crises, and to the relative cheapness of urban settlement. It is also possible, however, that one critical factor was French fear of the spread of Communism among the Armenian refugees. The dominance of the Armenians in the early Communist cells in Syria and Lebanon had already been noted. It was certainly a preoccupation of Ponsot shortly before the Paris Conference, when he wrote that Communism had found its most ardent propagandists amongst the impoverished Armenians of Beirut, and it was therefore necessary to decongest the camps as soon as possible.<sup>144</sup> Concern had already been expressed as early as 1921 by De Caix, and in 1927 Duguet was urging speed in installation, lest the Armenians become completely demoralised. The nature of demoralisation was then made clear.

Le Délégué, de la Grèce à la Conférence du Travail m'a appris en effet que ce sont les Arméniens, réfugiés à Salonique qui, aidés des Juifs, sont les principaux agents des troubles bolcheviks...

M. Kraft Bonnard a insisté sur la nécessité de ne pas perdre trop de temps pour les mêmes raisons...<sup>145</sup>

Subsequently the same concern appears in several statements by French officials.<sup>146</sup> It seems likely that it encouraged the desire for a rapid solution of the refugee problem and thus for cheaper urban resettlement rather than agricultural colonisation.

No fresh initiatives in Armenian settlement appear to have been taken by the French authorities after 1931. Though this may reflect gaps in the archival record, it is unlikely that a major initiative, if proposed, would have received no reference at all in the available sources. It remains, then, to resume "the evidence available concerning the political aspects of French policy towards Armenian settlement throughout the study-period. It is evident that initially political considerations in French policy were wholly negative. The High Commission viewed the Armenians as a financial and political embarrassment, and any politically inspired population movement was carried out in order to avoid offending Arab or Turkish susceptibilities. Positive political considerations were not considered until 1926, when De Jouvenal suggested the mass transfer of refugees from the

interior to southern Lebanon. This scheme however was not put into operation, again in order not to offend Arab feeling. Only the non-controversial stabilisation of the Armenian population of Beirut could be allowed. The same negative political considerations dominated settlement policy until in 1929 proposals were made for large-scale settlement in the Euphrates region, which may have involved some political collusion between French and Armenians. This scheme was also discarded however, once again partly to avoid difficulties with Turkey and the indigenous population. The High Commission was also hamstrung by its unwillingness to commit finance to Armenian settlement, and by the development of rehousing crises in the principal centres of Armenian concentration which ultimately ruled out any carefully planned agricultural settlement, whether politically inspired or not. The alternative rapid urban resettlement, however, at least met French concern about the spread of Communism amongst the Armenians in the squalid and crowded conditions of the camps.

### ***Conclusions***

It is evident that the attitudes and policies of Armenians, Arabs and French towards Armenian settlement were intimately related. The Armenians had moved from one situation of competing nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire to Mandated Syria, where they again found themselves embroiled in a triangular relationship between French, Arabs and Armenians, all with conflicting national aspirations. The Armenians themselves were concerned with security of both life and culture, an attitude which tended to encourage concentration and discourage dispersal. The Arab reaction to the immigrants was cool, sometimes openly hostile, an attitude based on ethnic, political and economic grounds, which was particularly intense when the Armenians became identified with French interests. In leading the local States to refuse to participate in a solution of the Armenian problem, Arab hostility encouraged the perpetuation of the status quo and the rule of economic constraints while throwing the Armenians back into dependence on the French for resettlement, with consequent political repercussions. It also increased the Armenians' need for security and thus for concentration, stressing their ethnic separateness, increasing their impact on local economies, and at the same time increasing their dependence on French protection, all of which paradoxically increased Arab hostility still further, so that the process of concentration became self-perpetuating. Faced with such a situation of Arab-Armenian hostility, the French were obliged to proceed cautiously with their settlement plans, paying due regard to Arab susceptibilities, and the Armenians' desire for security. Where they did endeavour to use the Armenians for their own political interest, whether in settlement schemes or not, this increased Arab fears and exacerbated Arab-Armenian hostility. French intervention in this manner acts as a catalyst to Arab-Armenian hostility and indirectly therefore to the process of concentration and segregation.

### ***Urban Settlement: Introduction***

The following chapters consider the processes involved in settlement in the four principal centres of Armenian concentration - Aleppo, Beirut, Damascus and Alexandretta and offer some preliminary conclusions on urban settlement. They consider the initial settlement of the Armenians, their distribution between town and refugee-camp, their living conditions and social structure within the camps, their subsequent transfer from the camps to new quarters, and their living-conditions and social structure within the new quarters. As with the distribution of the Armenians on the regional level, so with their distribution within the towns, the documentation available is very uneven. Thus, the bulk of the documentation on the settlement process in fact concerns the process of transfer from camps to new quarters, and is contained particularly within the archives of the Nansen Office and the journals of the philarmenian associations. Documentation on the initial settlement process, including the formation of the camps and the extent and nature of official involvement in this process, is by contrast very limited. Otherwise much of the available data concerns the structure of Armenian settlement, from which process must be (undesirably and cautiously) inferred. The best of this documentation concerns the living conditions of the Armenians within the camps which, apart from the implications it contains regarding this initial settlement process, provides the necessary background for understanding the transfer process. Again, by contrast information on the Armenians who settled within the towns themselves is very limited. It was the camps which attracted most attention from the philanthropic organisations, for they provided by far the most spectacular manifestation of the Armenian presence, while the transfer from camps to new quarters was the most important feature of the settlement after the initial settlement. Consequently, the Armenians who settled within the towns attracted correspondingly less attention. Even the basic facts concerning proportional distribution between town and camp are often in doubt, and clarification of the situation is not made easier by the often conflicting and contrasting estimates available concerning the total number of migrant arrivals at each city.

### **ENDNOTES**

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<sup>1</sup> *Massis*, passim; Cobryn, p. 605, Mécérian (1928)(1), p. 150; Berron Report; Jeppe to Thomas, Feb. 26, 1926 (N.A. C1430). See also statement at the meeting of the International Near East Assoc., April 4, 1927, by Mr. Khatisian (Delegation of the Armenian Republic), Mr. Sinapian, (AGBU) and Mr. Papajanian (Comité de Secours pour l'Arménie) (all in Arch.L.R.C.S.).

<sup>2</sup> Pachalian to Johnson, Feb. 23, 1925 (N.A. C1424).

<sup>3</sup> Kotelnikoff to Zwerner, April 2, 1923 (N.A. C1427) & Minutes of the Mtngs. of the Refugee Advisory C'tee, March 9 & Sept. 10, 1925 (N.A. C1402).

<sup>4</sup> Burnier to Johnson, July 5, 1926 (N.A. C1429).

<sup>5</sup> Armenian sub-c'tee, Minutes of Mtg. of Nov. 6, 1926 (N.A. C1430).

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- <sup>6</sup> *Massis*, Vol. 1, no. 1, Nov., 1928, p. 10, & Vol. 2, no. 10/12, Aug-Oct., 1931, pp. 225-26.
- <sup>7</sup> See corresp. between Nansen, Thomas & Johnson, Nov., 1926- Jan., 1927 (N.A. C1429, C1431). Also L.o.N. Report by Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, July 28, 1925, p. 2 & L.o.N. Records of the Meetings of the Fifth Committee, 1926, 8<sup>th</sup> Mtg., Sept. 20, 1926, p. 30.
- <sup>8</sup> Thomas to Nansen, Jan. 6, 1927 (N.A. C1430).
- <sup>9</sup> Childs to Johnson, Jan. 16, 1929 (N.A. C1428).
- <sup>10</sup> Mtngs. of Central Armenian C'tee, Dec. 2 & Dec. 19, 1929, March 14 & Aug. 26, 1930 (N.A. C1430, C1589); Nansen to Johnson, April 12, 1930, & Johnson to Nansen, April 22, 1930 (N.A. C1584).
- <sup>11</sup> Memo. by O'Molony, Jan. 4, 1930 (N.A. C1583).
- <sup>12</sup> Administrative C'tee, Record of Mtg. of April 28, 1931 (N.A.) Also Gulbenkian to Huber, July 23, 1931, Malezian to Huber, Sept. 10, 1931 (N.A. C1585) & Kotelnikoff to Johnson, Nov. 20, 1931, (N.A. C1586).
- <sup>13</sup> Pallis, pp. 14-20; Ross, Fry & Sibley, 267; Bazantay (1935), p. 105; Messerlian (1963), pp. 10-13.
- <sup>14</sup> Weulerese (1940), pp. 72-73.
- <sup>15</sup> Fox to Johnson, May 11, 1928 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>16</sup> Jalabert (1934), p. 131.
- <sup>17</sup> Mécérian (1924), p. 229.
- <sup>18</sup> Balian (1972), p. 44.
- <sup>19</sup> Hekimian Report, June 26, 1923.
- <sup>20</sup> Jeppe to Thomas, Sept. 14, 1925 (N.A. C1430).
- <sup>21</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Aug. 7, 1926 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>22</sup> Johnson Report, Dec. 18, 1926.
- <sup>23</sup> Armenian sub-ctee, Mtg. of Jan. 11, 1927 (N.A. C1430).
- <sup>24</sup> See note 23; Berron Report; Burnier to Johnson, Sept. 25 & Oct. 7, 1926 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>25</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Feb. 12, 1927 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>26</sup> Johnson Report, Dec. 18, 1926.
- <sup>27</sup> Burnier to Johnson, March 15, 1927 (N.A. C1431) & Johnson to Burnier, May 5, 1927 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>28</sup> See note 23. Also, Burnier to Johnson, April 3 & July 17, 1927, Feb. 22, 1928 & Johnson to Burnier, May 5 & Oct. 4, 1927, Feb. 6, 1928 (N.A. C1429, C1431).
- <sup>29</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Jan. 29, 1927 (N.A. C1430).
- <sup>30</sup> Burnier to Johnson, May 2 & June 27, 1927; Johnson to Burnier, June 14 & June 30, 1927 (N.A. C1429, C1431); Armenian sub-c'tee, Mtg. of June 17, 1927 (N.A. C1430).
- <sup>31</sup> On the persistence of religious divisions amongst the Armenians in Syria & Lebanon, see, Charles (1929); Jalabert (1934), pp. 127-28; Tallon, pp. 225-27; *Le Levant*, 16e ann., no. 3, jan., 1939, p. 2.
- <sup>32</sup> On political divisions and political violence see: Messerlian, pp. 10-13; Jalabert (1934), pp. 127-31; 2e Bureau, 22-25; Mécérian (1924), p. 229; Gracey Report, 1930. Statement by De Caix, PMC Minutes, 22<sup>nd</sup> Sess., 38<sup>th</sup> Mtg., Dec. 2, 1932, p. 379; *Massis*, Vol. 8, no. 2, Feb., 1936, p. 18; Arch.Dip. Arménie, Vol. 20; Catholicos Sahag II to the French High Commissioner & the President of the Lebanese Republic, both Feb. 2, 1929 (Arch.A.C.C.).
- <sup>33</sup> On Armenian links with the Communists see: Messerlian, p. 50; Menassa (1931), p. 4; P.M.C. Minutes, 22<sup>nd</sup> Sess., 37<sup>th</sup> Mtg., Dec. 1, 1932, pp. 273, 276, & 38<sup>th</sup> Mtg., Dec. 2, 1932, pp. 279, 283-84. Also reports by British consuls Meade (Aleppo), July 24, 1930,

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- Akras (Aleppo), Sept. 5, 1930 & Satow (Beirut), Sept. 17, 1930 (all F.O. 371/14554) and by Satow (Beirut), Feb., 1931, & Monck-Mason (Aleppo), Feb. 5, 1931 (both F.O. 371/15364).
- <sup>34</sup> Pachalian to Johnson, Oct. 23, 1928 (N.A. C1431).
- <sup>35</sup> Altounyan to Kennedy, date unknown (N.A. C1430).
- <sup>36</sup> Manoogian to Gracey, March 1, 1928 (N.A. C1431).
- <sup>37</sup> Burnier to Johnson, April 6, 1928 (N.A. C1430).
- <sup>38</sup> Burnier to Johnson, April 4, 1928 (N.A. C1431).
- <sup>39</sup> Burnier to Johnson, April 10, 1928 (N.A. C1431).
- <sup>40</sup> Report by William Jessop, N.E.F., Nov. 5, 1931 (S.F. MS Vol. 174).
- <sup>41</sup> Report by Consul Mackereth, Damascus, March 7, 1935 (F.O. 371/19676).
- <sup>42</sup> Report by Duguet, Oct. 1, 1928 (Arch.Dip. Arménie, Vol. 21).
- <sup>43</sup> Pachalian to Johnson, Oct. 23, 1928, Johnson to Burnier, Oct. 25, 1928, & Burnier to Johnson, Nov. 2, 1928 (N.A. C1431).
- <sup>44</sup> Chater Report, 1930.
- <sup>45</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Nov. 3, 1930 (N.A. C1524).
- <sup>46</sup> Burnier to Sec.-Gen. O.I.N.R., Dec. 4, 1931 (N.A. C1584).
- <sup>47</sup> On political developments in Syria & Lebanon during this period, see Longrigg (1958) *passim*, and Petran (1972), pp. 45-79.
- <sup>48</sup> Djabry (1934), pp. 74-75.
- <sup>49</sup> *Le Levant*, 13e ann., nos. 6-7, juillet-août, 1936, p. 2.
- <sup>50</sup> P.M.C. Minutes, 10<sup>th</sup> Sess., 19<sup>th</sup> Mtg., Nov. 15, 1926, p. 125.
- <sup>51</sup> Burnier to Johnson, April 10, 1928 (N.A. C1431). See also "Enquête" etc., pp. 94-96, & statement of De Caix, P.M.C. Minutes, 18<sup>th</sup> Sess., 11<sup>th</sup> Mtg., June 26, 1930, pp. 107-8.
- <sup>52</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Aug. 7 & Aug. 18, 1926 (N.A. C1429) & Report by Consul-Gen. Satow, Beirut, Aug. 30, 1926 (F.O. 371/11551).
- <sup>53</sup> Mécérian (1928) (1), p. 151.
- <sup>54</sup> Pallis, p. 7; Rondot (1947), p. 55; 2e Bureau, p. 14.
- <sup>55</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Aug. 7, 1926 (N.A. C1429); Pallis, p. 5.
- <sup>56</sup> Statement of M. Le Nail to Central Armenian C'tee, Aug. 26, 1930 (N.A. C 1586); Report by Consul Monck-Mason, Aleppo, Oct. 30, 1928 (F.O. 371/13074.); *Le Levant*, 13e ann., nos. 6-7, juillet-août, 1936, p. 2.
- <sup>57</sup> 2e Bureau, p. 15; *Le Levant*, 8e ann., no. 2, nov.-dec., 1930, p. 2; *Massis*, Vol. 2, no. 5, March, 1930, p. 98, Vol. 2, no. 6, April, 1930, p. 122, Vol. 2, no. 9, July, 1930, p. 194, Vol. 3, no. 8, June, p. 172.
- <sup>58</sup> Karadja (1932), pp. 6-7.
- <sup>59</sup> On the economic impact of the Armenians and the local reaction to this see: Mécérian (1926)(1), p. 151, "Enquête" etc., p. 95; "Rapport" (1937), pp. 26-27; Jude, Burnier & Lubet, p. 173; Des Jardin (1928), pp. 73-74; Pallis, p. 10; Jalabert (1934), pp. 128-29; P.M.C. Minutes, 4<sup>th</sup> Sess., 4<sup>th</sup> Mtg., June 25, 1924, p. 33, 8<sup>th</sup> Sess., 4<sup>th</sup> Mtg., Feb. 18, 1926, 27-28, 18<sup>th</sup> Sess., 11<sup>th</sup> Mtg., June 26, 1930, pp. 107-8, 25<sup>th</sup> Sess., 10<sup>th</sup> Mtg., June 5, 1934, p. 88; Reports by Consuls Satow, Beirut, May 11, 1926, and Hough, Aleppo, May 20, 1926 (F.O. 371/11550); Memo. by Basil Matthews, 1924 (S.F.F. F.M.A. Syria 8/3); Arch.Dip. Turquie, Vol. 258. In N.A. see Berron Report, Johnson Report, Dec. 18, 1926; Le Nail Report, Aug. 26, 1930 (N.A. C1584); "Rapport du Président" etc., 1936; Extract from a letter out of Beirut to Edith Glanville (N.E.R.), Aug. 30, 1927 (C1429);

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Buxton to Lord Mayor's Fund, March 22, 1927 (C1430); Memo of a conversation between Burt and representative of the Office, Aug. 17, 1925 (C1425).

<sup>60</sup> "Enquête" etc., p. 95.

<sup>61</sup> Fox to Burton, June 20, 1924 (S.F. F.F.M.A. Syria 8/3).

<sup>62</sup> On the recruitment of Armenians into the auxiliary units, the events of Damascus, 1925-26, and the flight from Damascus to Beirut, see: "Rapport" (1925), p. 32, Mécérian (1928)(1), p. 147; Poulleau, pp. 62-63, 117-18, 145, 183-90; *Le Levant*, 3e ann., no.4, fev.-mars, 1926, p. 4, 3e ann., no. 5, avril-mai, 1926, pp. 2, 5; Reports of Consul Smart, Damascus, Nov. 10, 1925 (F.O. 371/10852), Dec. 30, 1925 (F.O. 371/11517), Feb. 18, 1926 & Feb. 25, 1926 (F.O. 371/11506), of Consul Satow, Beirut, May 11, 1926 (F.O. 371/11550), of Consul Hough, Aleppo, Jan. 26, 1926 (F.O. 371/11505), and of Consul Vaughan-Russell, Damascus, May 31, 1926 (F.O. 371/11550); P.M.C. Minutes, 8<sup>th</sup> Sess., 15<sup>th</sup> Mtg., Feb. 26, 1926, & 18<sup>th</sup> Mtg., March 1, 1926, 9<sup>th</sup> Sess. 16<sup>th</sup> Mtg., June 17, 1926 & 17<sup>th</sup> Mtg., June 17, 1926, 11<sup>th</sup> Sess., 18<sup>th</sup> Mtg., June 30, 1927.

<sup>63</sup> Report of Consul Hough, Aleppo, Jan. 26, 1926 (F.O. 371/11505).

<sup>64</sup> Report of Consul Smart, Damascus, Dec. 30, 1925 (F.O. 371/11517).

<sup>65</sup> Catholicos Sahag II to De Jouvenal, note delivered verbally, March 5, 1926 (Arch.A.C.C.).

<sup>66</sup> Longrigg (1958), pp. 114-15, 127, 260-62.

<sup>67</sup> Arch.Dip. S-L-C, Vol. 137.

<sup>68</sup> On French policy towards this migration see Arch.Dip. S-L-C, Vols. 137-40.

<sup>69</sup> Franklin-Bouillon to M.A.E. Nov. 27, 1921 (Arch.Dip. S-L-C, Vol. 139). See also report on the emigration of Christians from Cilicia, Nov. 30, 1921 (Arch.Dip. S-L-C, Vol. 140).

<sup>70</sup> De Caix to M.A.E., Dec. 22, 1921 (Arch.Dip. S-L-C, Vol. 140).

<sup>71</sup> Laports to M.A.E., Dec. 24, 1921 (Arch.Dip. S-L-C, Vol. 140).

<sup>72</sup> Arch.Dip. Turquie, Vols. 57, 258, S-L, Vol. 169.

<sup>73</sup> Weygand to M.A.E., March 6, 1924 (Arch.Dip. Turquie, Vol. 258).

<sup>74</sup> Ponsot to M.A.E., Nov. 19, 1929 (Arch.Dip. Arménie, Vol. 21).

<sup>75</sup> D. Altounyan to Buxton, Nov. 29, 1929 (F.O. 371/13827); Roberts to Johnson, Dec. 3 & Dec. 4, 1929 (N.A. C1428).

<sup>76</sup> Kotelnikov to Zwerner, April 2, 1925 (N.A. C1427).

<sup>77</sup> Johnson Report, Dec. 18, 1926.

<sup>78</sup> Daeschner to M.A.E., March 4, 1927 (Arch.Dip. Arménie, Vol. 21).

<sup>79</sup> M.A.E. to Daeschner, April 4, 1927 (Arch.Dip. Arménie, Vol. 21).

<sup>80</sup> L.o.N. Doc. A.30.1927.XIII.

<sup>81</sup> Mtg. of June 17, 1927 (N.A. C1430).

<sup>82</sup> Arch.Dip. Arménie, Vol. 21.

<sup>83</sup> Conference in Paris, June 24, 1931 (N.A. C1584); Sec.-Gen. to Kotelnikov, July 24, 1931 (N.A. C1586); Administrative C'tee, Record of Mtg. of July 1, 1931. (N.A.).

<sup>84</sup> N.A. C1586.

<sup>85</sup> Johnson to Burnier, Nov. 20, 1928 (N.A. C1431).

<sup>86</sup> De Caix to M.A.E., Dec. 13, 1921 (Arch.Dip. Arménie, Vol. O). See also De Caix to M.A.E., March 18, 1921 (Arch.Dip. S-L-C, Vol. 137).

<sup>87</sup> Report on the evacuation of Armenians from Dortyol (Arch.Dip. S-L-C, Vol. 142).

<sup>88</sup> Weygand to M.A.E., Sept. 20, 1924 (Arch.Dip. S-L, Vol. 176). See also De Caix to M.A.E., March 11, 1923 (Arch.Dip. Turquie, Vol. 58).

<sup>89</sup> Mougou to M.A.E., April 5, 1923 (Arch. Dip. Arménie, Vol. 17).

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- <sup>90</sup> Report by Consul Smart, Aleppo, Jan. 29, 1924 (F.O. 371/10195). See also comment by Berron in *Le Levant*, 2e ann., no. 6, juillet-août, 1925, p. 7.
- <sup>91</sup> Aide-Memoire from the Turkish Embassy, Paris, Dec. 4, 1924 (Arch.Dip. S-L, Vol. 176).
- <sup>92</sup> Sarraïl to Mougin, March 2, 1925 (Arch.Dip. S-L, Vol. 177). See also: Sarraïl to Mougin, Jan. 27, 1925, & Sarraïl to M.A.E., March 11, 1925 (both Arch.Dip. S-L, Vol. 177).
- <sup>93</sup> Mougin to M.A.E., March 3, 1925 (Arch.Dip. S-L, Vol. 298).
- <sup>94</sup> Sarraïl to M.A.E., March 18, 1925 (Arch.Dip. Arménie, Vol. 18).
- <sup>95</sup> Arch.Laz.
- <sup>96</sup> O.J.L.N. (1925), p. 1339.
- <sup>97</sup> Briand to De Jouvenal, Aug. 19, 1926 (Arch.Dip. S-L, Vol. 382).
- <sup>98</sup> L.o.N. Doc. A32.1925.IV.
- <sup>99</sup> L.o.N. Docs. A46.1924.IV, A32.1925.IV & A25.1926.IV; Jeppe to Thomas, Sept. 14, 1925 & Feb. 26, 1926 (N.A. C1430); letter from Joseph Burtt, Aug. 27, 1926 (S.F. MS, Vol. 174).
- <sup>100</sup> Report by Consul Hough, Aleppo, April 24, 1926 (F.O. 371/11518).
- <sup>101</sup> De Jouvenal to M.A.E., Jan. 15, 1926 (Arch.Dip. S-L, Vol. 382).
- <sup>102</sup> L.o.N. Doc. A48.1927.VIII.
- <sup>103</sup> Johnson Report, Dec. 18, 1926.
- <sup>104</sup> Burnier to Johnson, April 3, 1927 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>105</sup> Johnson to Burnier, May 5, 1927 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>106</sup> See Ch. 5. See also Reau to Clauzel, Sept. 11, 1925; M.A.E. to M.C.F., Sept. 12, 1925; Sarraïl to M.A.E., Sept. 17, 1925; M.A.E. to Consul General, Geneva, Sept. 18, 1925 (all Arch.Dip. Arménie, 18); Refugee Advisory C'tee, Mtg. of Sept. 10, 1925 (N.A. C1402).
- <sup>107</sup> Sarraïl to M.A.E., Sept. 17, 1925.
- <sup>108</sup> L.o.N. Records of the Meetings of the Fifth Committee, 5<sup>th</sup> Mtg., Sept. 19, 1925, p. 26.
- <sup>109</sup> M.A.E. to H.C.F., May 18 1926 (Arch.Dip. Arménie, Vol. 19), citing De Jouvenal to M.A.E., May 3, 1926. The latter letter has not been located by the writer.
- <sup>110</sup> A fact which has been pointed out by several writers, e.g. De Vaumas (1955), p. 583; Pallis, p. 7; Rondot (1947), p. 27.
- <sup>111</sup> Unsigned memorandum, May 19, 1926 (Arch.Dip. Arménie, Vol. 19).
- <sup>112</sup> M.A.E. to H.C.F., May 20, 1926 & May 28, 1926; H.C.F. to M.A.E., May 30, 1926 (Arch.Dip. Arménie, Vol. 19).
- <sup>113</sup> See correspondence in N.A. C1429.
- <sup>114</sup> Burnier to Johnson, June 18, 1926 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>115</sup> Reffye to Ponsot, Sept. 4, 1926 (N.A. C1429); Duguet to Thomas, Dec. 8, 1926; Duguet to H.C.F., Dec. 10, 1926; Burnier to Johnson, Dec. 29, 1926 (all N.A. C1429).
- <sup>116</sup> Reffye to M.A.E., Oct. 12, 1926 (Arch.Dip. Arménie, Vol. 21); Ponsot to M.A.E., Oct. 16, 1926 (Arch.Dip. Arménie, Vol. 19).
- <sup>117</sup> Reffye to M.A.E., Oct. 12, 1926 (Arch.Dip. Arménie, Vol. 21).
- <sup>118</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Oct. 22, 1926 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>119</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Aug. 18, 1926 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>120</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Sept. 21, 1926 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>121</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Aug. 7, Aug. 18, & Sept. 25, 1926 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>122</sup> Reffye to M.A.E., Oct. 12, 1926 (Arch.Dip. Arménie, Vol. 21).

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- <sup>123</sup> Report by Consul Hole, Damascus, Nov. 14, 1928 (F.O. 371/13096).
- <sup>124</sup> Report by Con.-Gen. Satov, Beirut, Nov. 23, 1928 (F.O. 371/13096).
- <sup>125</sup> Report by Consul Monck-Mason, Aleppo, April 16, 1929 (F.O. 371/13805).
- <sup>126</sup> Poincaré to Service Francais, S.d.N., Aug. 11, 1928 (Arch.Dip. Arménie, Vol. 21).
- <sup>127</sup> Maugras to M.A.E., Sept. 10, 1928 (Arch.Dip. Arménie, Vol. 21).
- <sup>128</sup> Ponsot to Thomas, Feb. 8, 1928 (N.A. C1429). This policy was also noted by Burnier in Burnier to Johnson, Nov. 4, 1928 (N.A. C1431).
- <sup>129</sup> Le Nail to Johnson, Nov. 14, 1929 (N.A. C1430).
- <sup>130</sup> 2e Bureau, p. 28.
- <sup>131</sup> Central Arm. C'tee, Mtg. of Aug. 26, 1930 (N.A. C1586).
- <sup>132</sup> Ponsot to M.A.E., Jan. 8, 1931 (Arch.Dip. Documents in course of classification).
- <sup>133</sup> P.M.C. Minutes, 20<sup>th</sup> Sess., 5<sup>th</sup> Mtg., June 11, 1931, p. 46.
- <sup>134</sup> Le Nail Report, 1930.
- <sup>135</sup> Sahag II to Ponsot, Dec. 17, 1931 (Arch.A.C.C.); Sahag II to Ponsot, Dec. 24, 1931.
- <sup>136</sup> 2e Bureau, pp. 16, 23, 26; *Massis*, Vol. 3, no. 10/12, Aug.-Oct., 1931, pp. 224-26; Report by Sir. G. Clerk, Constantinople, March 6, 1930 (F.O. 371/14567).
- <sup>137</sup> Report by Consul Monck-Mason, Aleppo, July 13, 1932 (F.O. 371/16088).
- <sup>138</sup> Record of Joint Mtg. of Finance & Admin, C'tees, Feb. 6, 1932 (N.A.).
- <sup>139</sup> Record of Mtgs. of Admin. C'tee, April 26, 1933, Oct. 25, 1933, & April 9, 1937 (N.A.); "Rapport du Président" etc., 1936.
- <sup>140</sup> *Le Levant*, 10e ann., nos 6-7, août, 1933, p. 4, & 16e ann., no. 3, jan., 1939, p. 2.
- <sup>141</sup> Ponsot to M.A.E., Jan. 8, 1931.
- <sup>142</sup> Letter from Duguet, June 29, 1927 (Arch.Dip. Arménie, Vol. 21).
- <sup>143</sup> P.M.C. Minutes, 22<sup>nd</sup> Sess., 37<sup>th</sup> Mtg., Doc. 1, 1932, p. 273, 38<sup>th</sup> Mtg., Dec. 2, 1932, p. 283, & 27<sup>th</sup> Sess., 9<sup>th</sup> Mtg., June 7, 1935, p. 79; 2e Bureau, pp. 24-25.



## Chapter VII

### URBAN SETTLEMENT: ALEPPO

Armenian refugees arrived at Aleppo from Turkey in 1920, 1921, and 1929, and from the Sanjak in 1938-39, but by far the greatest influx to Aleppo was in the period 1922-24. As has been observed, it is difficult to reconcile estimates of migrant movement with estimates of the total number of refugees in Aleppo town. (See Table 3.46) This makes interpretation of statements concerning the distribution of the refugees within Aleppo doubly difficult. Both Burnier<sup>1</sup> and Shirajian<sup>2</sup> estimate that about half the refugees lived in the city itself, half in “camps” outside the city, but it is difficult to judge the truth of this assertion.

#### *Distribution Within the City*

It is not possible to judge accurately the number of refugees within the city, some comments may be made on their accommodation. A number were installed in khans rented by the local Armenian National Union.<sup>3</sup> According to Mr. Hekimian,<sup>4</sup> local representative of the Near East Relief, there were about 4000 Armenians in June, 1923, living in khans. They were shortly obliged to move, as funds no longer remained to the A.N.U. to pay the rent, and at the end of August, 1923, Hekimian reported<sup>5</sup> that the various khans rented by the A.N.U. had been emptied, and the refugees were building mud-brick huts in the camps of Ram and Meidan outside the city. Shirajian, in April, 1925, noted in 11 khans only 1600 refugees.<sup>6</sup> Clearly, the establishment of Armenians in khans in the commercial quarter of the city would involve some dispersal from an ideal pattern of ethnic segregation. The settlement of Armenians in these khans might represent some gravitation towards employment, but more likely it represented a response to the availability of cheap accommodation. Other Armenians settled on waste-ground within the city, like those from Gürün, who rented land direct from the owner in the quarter of Kastal-Harami on the north of the city, below Hamidiyé Street.<sup>7</sup> (Theirs is the only camp which still remains to this day). Others lived in rented houses, “several families uniting to rent a house, one room being deemed sufficient for a family, although in some cases two or even as many as five families are crowded into the same room.”<sup>8</sup> These were, in general, “des artisans, commercants ou ouvriers qui ont des moyens d’existence leur permettant de payer un loyer”.<sup>9</sup> Otherwise they were lodged by their employer, this being especially the case for the women employed as domestic servants.<sup>10</sup> The distribution of these refugees, housed in private accommodations, is obscure. Burnier<sup>11</sup> notes them in all quarters of the city an impression of dispersal which might have resulted from the distribution of some Armenians in the khans in the commercial quarter - but this seems unlikely. The Migration of numbers of the more wealthy Christian population to Aziziyé and other developing quarters of the west would have left accommodation available in the old Christian quarters on the north of Aleppo in the vicinity of the long-established Armenian church,

and it might be expected that most of the Armenian refugees within the city were to be found here amongst their compatriots.

### *The Camps*

Within the camps a total population of the order of 15,000 refugees is generally quoted for the period before the resettlement process began (see Table 7.1). The subsequent diminution of the population of the camp was interrupted by the new arrivals of 1929, many of whom settled in Zeitoun (Zeytun) Khan<sup>12</sup> (Essad Pasha Camp), by the arrivals from the Sanjak in 1938-39,<sup>13</sup> and by refugees who moved from the city to the camp, such as those expelled from the city khans. The bulk of the refugees appear to have been allocated vacant land by the French authorities,<sup>14</sup> to the north-west of the old city, close to the Christian quarters and the old Armenian churches. This land belonged to private owners, who seem to have been obliged by the French to receive the refugees. The Armenians were to be charged rent for this land, apparently of only two Syrian piastres per square meter per year. The Municipality appears to have been charged with the responsibility of collecting the rent. This arrangement, it seems, had the approval of the French authorities, although initially they intervened to stave off the claims of the owners. The Camp of Gürün within the city was apparently an exception, in that the refugees there paid their rent direct to the owner, without the intervention of the Municipality. The location of the camps, close to the Christian quarters and the Armenian churches, suggests that the desire to locate the refugee Armenians close to the indigenous community may have been a primary factor in the location of the camps. Although such considerations of security and solidarity may have been important, such an explanation in itself is facile, and a fuller enquiry should take account of the landholding situation, and the relations between the immigrant and indigenous Armenian communities. While the camps were not therefore disadvantageously situated on the north-west of the town with respect to the commercial-industrial sector of the town, compared with any other location on the urban periphery, commerce being concentrated especially to the west of the Citadel, there is no evidence to suggest, in the absence of documentation, that the location of industrial employment played any part in the choice of location. There was subsequently a concentration of industry in the area to the north of what was the camp, but this concentration, a feature of the establishment of modern industries, postdated the construction of the camps. Industry had not yet become segregated into special quarters.

Table 7.1: Armenian refugees in Aleppo Camp before its demolition <sup>1</sup>		
TOTAL	DATE	Source and comment
16,100	1925	Shirajian Report, April, 10, 1925, ( <i>F.A.</i> No. 97, 4Q, 1925, p. 15) Author's summation; excludes 1600 refugees in Khans. Shirajian an Armenian Protestant Pastor in Aleppo.
>15,000	1926	Sisag Manoogian (Armenian evangelist), ( <i>F.A.</i> No.100, 3Q, 1926, p. 14).
c15,000	1926	Edith Roberts (British phil-Armenian philanthropist working in Aleppo), ( <i>F.A.</i> No. 101, 4Q, 1926, p. 10).
c12,200	1926	Burnier (1926), p. 101.
28,000	1926	Johnson Report, (N.A. C1429). This figure undoubtedly refers to all refugees in Aleppo although the camp is cited.
17,000	1926	Karen Jeppe to Albert Thomas, Feb. 26, 1926 (N.A. C1430).
3000 families	1926	Duguet, "Programme general" etc. (N.A. C1429).
3799 families	1926	"Rapport" (1926)

Shirajian describes the distribution of the Armenians within the camps in 1925:

About one half of the refugees live in the city... The other and poorer half live in camps on the outskirts of the city, the largest of these being on the north side, and known as the Suleimaniyé, Hamidiyé or Ram Camp. This has a population of more than 13,000 and is divided into six sections, Nos. 1, 2, 4, with 1900 huts occupied by refugees from Marash, Kilis, Jibin, etc. Nos. 3 and 5 with 1348 huts occupied by Urfa refugees. One mile north of this large camp is Geul-Meydan Camp with 900 people from Harpout, Erzerum, etc., living in the ruins of some old military barracks. Of the famous and valiant natives of Zeitoun, a dispirited and broken remnant of 500 live in some half-built, deserted wretched buildings with the lordly name of Essad Pacha Camp. Bagdad station camp is made up of Syrians from Urfa. In addition to these there are four smaller camps with a total number of 1700 people from Aintab, Harpout and Gürün. Also 11 Khans, each one sheltering from 500 to 22 persons, in all 1600, besides several small groups numbering 15 or 20 persons each.<sup>15</sup>

This picture is confirmed by other sources, notably by Mécérian,<sup>16</sup> who also describes the distribution of the Armenians by camps. The area indicated to the writer<sup>17</sup> as forming the area of the old camp in Aleppo is marked on Fig. 7.1, a broad belt on the northern outskirts of Aleppo extending from Suleimaniyé Street in the west to the Turkish Military Hospital in the east. Zeitoun Khan and the Meidan building were to be found further to the north. The camp of Gurun, as already observed, is within the city. A more precise indication of the location of the camps may be obtained from the French map of Aleppo prepared in 1931, on which buildings made of wood are distinguished from others. (See Fig. 7.1) The area of wooden construction marked is considerably smaller than the area of the camp indicated above, but it is clear from the sources that even at an early stage, parts of the camp were constructed in brick or stone (see below), while the 1931

<sup>1</sup> *Note:* as there were several camps, it is unfortunately not always clear whether the sources include all the smaller camps as well as the principal camp within their totals. Some totals may also include the Syrian refugees in the Barakat quarter, who are not considered in this thesis.

map must exclude those huts demolished at the time of the movement to the first sector of the new Meidan quarter (see below), which is already marked on the map. Another indication of the area of the old camp emerges from a comparison of the French maps of 1931 and 1941 (Fig. 7.2). This comparison now reveals a larger area of camp (though still smaller than that indicated to the writer), and this should again be extended by the addition of the area of the huts demolished to make way for the first sector of Meidan, and by the area of ground formerly occupied by huts but subsequently built-over, for example in the north of Suleimaniyé camp. It is evident, however, that the wedge-shaped quarter at Djabrié should be excluded from the area of the camp, this apparently being constructed by indigenous Christians, before and simultaneously with the establishment of the Armenian camps.<sup>18</sup>




Fig. 7.1: Armenian refugee ‘camps’ in Aleppo, 1920-1930

### *Social Structure of the Camps*

The most remarkable feature of the distribution of the Armenians within the camps, which emerges from the descriptions of Shirajian and Mécérian, was the existence of spatially distinct communities based on town or district or origin. There seems in addition to have been some grouping of Catholic refugees around the Franciscan Monastery of Ram. This was in proximity to the camp of Marash, from whence had come a relatively large number of Catholic Armenians. According to Mécérian,<sup>19</sup> those of Latin rite were permitted to support their huts against the walls of the enclosure of the Franciscans. Community reconstitution itself is indicative of some degree of segregation from the indigenous Armenian community, and more light may be cast on the degree of segregation by an investigation of the distribution of Armenian churches and schools in Aleppo. Integration seems to have been especially lacking within the Armenian Catholic and Protestant communities. Thus, there was a separate wooden Armenian Protestant church-school (“Bethel”) to serve the camp, while the reconstructed

Protestant church in Aziziyé (“Emmanuel”) appears to have served only the Protestants in the city.<sup>20</sup> The division was more marked within the Catholic community, for the indigenous Arabophone Armenian Catholics were unable to look after the Turkish-and Armenian-speaking migrants. In these circumstances the Jesuits stepped in.<sup>21</sup> They reconstituted their expelled “Mission d’Arménie” in Syria, and established a chapel and school near to Ram, in Suleimaniyé camp, which served as parish church for the Catholic Armenians of the camp, while the old Armenian Catholic church in Salibé continued to serve the Arabophone indigenous community. An Armenian, as distinct from Latin, Catholic presence was not established in the camp until the Jesuits surrendered their camp chapel (St. Barbare) to the Armenian Catholics, when they themselves acquired impressive new premises in Bustan Pasha (1936). Apart from their intrinsic value, the provision of such church and school facilities reflected a certain competition between Catholics and Protestants for the allegiance of the refugees, with consequent influence on community structure. The situation regarding the Armenian Apostolics is more obscure, but the community division within the camps appears to have been reinforced by the provision of, for example, a wooden church for the Armenians from Marash. There were apparently separate priests for the refugees from Gaziantep and Marash,<sup>22</sup> and the refugees from Gaziantep were able to use the chapel in the grounds of the old Armenian church in Salibé which they had been using for years before the troubles.<sup>23</sup> Such a regrouping on community lines obviated the necessity for a more complete integration between migrant and indigenous Armenians. It is not known how clearly the refugees within the city were related to the indigenous community. An examination of their relations also with the Armenians of the camps would be particularly interesting but information is lacking.

### ***Living Conditions Within the Camps***

Within the camps, living conditions were unsatisfactory, even dangerous, and remained so as long as there remained any huts. Poor housing, poor roads, poor drainage, poor water, formed the background to life in the greater part of the camps. It is apparent that housing conditions were not uniformly bad, but it is never made clear exactly how many refugees enjoyed the better conditions.<sup>24</sup> Initially, some at least were housed in tents, which suffered particularly in the harsh Aleppo climate, but in 1925, for most, home was a hut built of wood or earthen bricks. “The largest is 4.50m (long) x 3.50m. (wide) x 2.60m.(high); the smallest 3 x 2.50 x 2.25m. There is an average of five people per hut.”<sup>25</sup> These dwellings were not only cramped, but the more flimsy structures were vulnerable to the Aleppo climate, the winter rains penetrating the roofs, entering the huts and causing earthen walls to crumble. In the winter of 1923-4 in particular, a number of refugees were caught with the roofs of their mud-brick houses incomplete. In summer, the refugees baked under their low overheated sheet-iron roofs. Some

of the worst conditions were to be found in Zeitoun Khan, where in each of the roofs four or more families made their homes.




Fig. 7.2: Changes in the built-up area of north Aleppo, 1931-1941

Although certain sections of the camps were relatively well laid-out, with large and well-aligned roads, the winter rains could turn the camp into a vast sea of mud, making the paths almost impassable. Dr. Duguet noted this inadequacy in October, 1926, but the Municipality objected to undertaking the necessary improvements. Instead, Duguet was obliged to suggest to the Armenian notables that they organise in the camp road-maintenance teams, constituted by the inhabitants themselves. This was apparently done, but the effects do not appear to have lasted until 1929.<sup>26</sup>

Sanitary conditions within the camps were clearly inadequate too.<sup>27</sup> There were only 165 W.C.'s for 13,000 people, and the camps were served only by an open-sewerage system. This deficiency was also observed by Duguet, who indicated that the open-sewers already laid down should be repaired and the network linked to the large collector-sewer of the town. Again, it appears that nothing was done, the Municipality again raising objections, as no doubt they were concerned that such measures would implant the Armenians permanently on the land they had occupied. Thus, the health menace remained, and as late as 1937, Shirajian could report that there were no proper drains in the surviving

camp.<sup>28</sup> The Armenians were not alone in this, however. Outside the new quarters, like Aziziyé, the sewerage system at Aleppo remained very primitive until the end of the Ottoman period, and although under the Mandate an effort was made to provide an adequate system, by 1938 one third of the houses of the town were still not connected.<sup>29</sup> Consul Hough could well report in 1926 that, while sanitation was the blackest spot in the housing situation, sanitary conditions in the Muslim quarters were hardly much better.<sup>30</sup>

As regards water-supply, it appears that at first the camps were relatively well supplied, receiving water from the supply which served the city, "but this was out of account of non-payment and wells are now used."<sup>31</sup> Gertrude Patterson, of the Friends of Armenia, speaks of the resulting problem of water-supply for the inhabitants of Zeitoun Khan:

... they have to walk a long distance for their water, as the well on the ground is of such a depth that with the primitive arrangements for drawing the water, it takes such a long time to get a small supply, and in this one building there are between 200 and 300 people.<sup>32</sup>

Dr. Kennedy, the representative of the Lord Mayor's (Armenian) Fund, who reported on conditions in the camp in December, 1927, noted the danger to health: ...the water supply consists of surface wells of which there are over 200 in the area ... These are not springs, just holes in the ground where water accumulates by percolating from the surrounding soil. The situation is very disturbing, and the camp remains a menace to the community.<sup>33</sup>

In view of the inadequate drainage of the camp, these wells clearly did constitute a serious health menace. They represented one traditional method of water-supply in Aleppo which was to tap the subterranean nappe under the town, itself supplied by the Kouek, which was again itself a receptacle for effluent. By the opening of the Mandate period, even with this source of supply, the other sources serving Aleppo (the Heylâne canalisation system and Ain Tell) were already inadequate to meet the city's needs, and despite the efforts of the electricity Company to improve the situation, Aleppo experienced a water-deficiency throughout the Mandate period.<sup>34</sup> This was, of course, felt mostly by those who could not afford to be linked to the Ain Tell system, as the refugees clearly could not, so to the insanitary state of the water-supply was added water-deficiency. Clearly, once the decision had been taken to transfer the Armenian refugees, the authorities would not spend money on remedying this situation, and the system remained inadequate and unhealthy until the end of the period.<sup>35</sup>

In view of the insalubrity of the water-supply and sewerage system, and the poor housing conditions, it is not surprising that there was a high incidence of disease in the camps.<sup>36</sup> Particularly important were consumption (pulmonary tuberculosis) and trachoma, an eye-disease which could entail complete blindness. The situation was exacerbated by undernourishment amongst the poorer refugees, the babies especially suffering from lack of milk from their debilitated mothers, so that infant-mortality was high. The secretary of the

“Friends of Armenia” reported that in 1923, amongst the refugee babies, 500 cases of fatal dysentery occurred in three months. Soup kitchens were established at times of particular hardship to combat hunger, notably by Karen Jeppe and the Action Chrétienne en Orient, while to combat disease, aid came from various philanthropic organisations. Particular notice should be made of the clinic run by the Armenian Red Cross, the help provided by the A.C.O., and the Milk Depot run by Mrs. D.S. Altounyan, with the aid of the “Friends of Armenia.”

The philanthropic societies had also to cope with the social problems endemic to the harsh living conditions of the camp;<sup>37</sup> nervous maladies, alcoholism, delinquency, political extremism, as a partial remedy to which a summer camp was established by the A.C.O. at Aatik in the Amanus mountains. Delinquency was one result of the lack of schooling available. The schools serving the camp children, which have been described above, were by no means adequate to meet the need.<sup>38</sup> There was not the school accommodation available to admit all the refugee children, nor were there the funds available to permit free entry. Consequently, there were hundreds of children (over 1000 in the year 1923-24, according to Hekimian; 2000 in 1925, according to Shirajian) who received no schooling and, if unemployed, had no alternative to roaming the streets except their miserable huts. Even the existing schools were described as “inadequately equipped and under-staffed.”<sup>39</sup>

### *The Persistence of the Camps*

Why then did the refugees remain in the “camps” in these conditions? Initially one may assume (though information is lacking) that accommodation within the city for such a large number of refugees at rents they (or their sponsors) could afford was simply not available. Subsequently the camps appear to have persisted partly by choice, partly by necessity. It seems that in general the refugees in the camps formed the poorer part of the refugee population, that is those unable to rent accommodation in the town, or for whom accommodation was not provided by their employer.<sup>40</sup> As observed, the Armenians living in khans within the city itself soon found themselves expelled to the camps once the Armenian National Union was no longer able to pay their rents. By contrast, in the camps, the rent had apparently been fixed at a nominal rate, while the French authorities were initially prepared to stave off the claims of the land-owners. Thus, the camps provided an insecure refuge for the poorer Armenians. Evidently too, as the transfer of population from the camps to the new quarters went ahead it was increasingly the poorest refugees who were left behind in the camps.<sup>41</sup> However, in 1926, Burnier felt that, “Beaucoup des habitants du camp pourraient aussi vivre en ville, mais préfèrent y habiter pour économiser les loyers et vivre au milieu de leurs compatriotes...”<sup>42</sup> No doubt, at the time this suggestion that the Armenians were reluctant to pay rent by living in the city was in some case true, but the social constraints on movement are also understandable. The Armenians probably saw security in their concentration in the camps, and especially in their community

reconstitution. Such a community structure would in any case tend to inhibit individual movement, leading to inertia in the settlement process as long as the bulk of the community saw advantages in the maintenance of the status quo. Furthermore, Burnier's comments were made at a time of relative prosperity for the refugees; a prosperity which was not constant and which could change rapidly with each fluctuation of the economy, to which the refugees were extremely vulnerable. Moreover, it was the economically weakest who suffered most from the crises in employment and the rise in the cost of living, and it was the economically weakest who tended to be concentrated in the camps. Furthermore, as the process of transfer went ahead, it was these people who increasingly came to constitute the core of the camp population, that is, those who were least able to move; those who were genuinely condemned involuntarily to unacceptable conditions of social deprivation.

### *The Transfer to New Quarters*

Between 1928 and 1938, the camps of Aleppo were virtually completely demolished and their inhabitants moved to new quarters in the north.<sup>43</sup> By the end of this period there were barely a hundred huts left standing.<sup>44</sup> For the most part this movement was not voluntary, but was the result of a demolition policy carried out on the orders of the Municipality. Where movement was voluntary, this seems to have been merely to avoid forced demolition. At other times, the demolition actually left some refugees homeless or with their new homes incomplete. In particular, in 1935, some families whose houses were demolished by order then experienced delays in obtaining building permits for their new homes, a case of particular lack of foresight and consideration. While delays in demolition were occasionally granted, Isabel Merrill, a member of the American Mission in Aleppo, describes just how callous the demolition procedure could be:

Only yesterday I heard that the men appointed to tear down a bakery came while dough was in the kneading trough and bread in the oven. The baker begged for delay, but it was not granted, and the walls soon came tumbling down over everything ... A grocer who had objected to having his large shop torn down was rewarded for his delay by having the police thrust his walls through and through with spears until they fell in.<sup>45</sup>

It is apparent that the real motive behind these demolitions was the desire of the land owners to regain their property, on which the Armenians through their inability – or unwillingness to pay rent, had become in effect de facto squatters. The insecurity of the Armenians had, in fact, already been demonstrated before 1928. In 1926, the refugees in Zeitoun Khan were at least threatened with expulsion,<sup>46</sup> while interesting correspondence in the archives of the Armenian Catholicossate of Cilicia concerns the proposed expulsion of Armenian refugees in 1925 from an unfinished building in the Meidan area,<sup>47</sup> which was required by the Gendarmerie. Towards the end of 1926, some refugees from Gaziantep were threatened. Miss Edith Roberts, a British philarmenian relief worker, observed that the Armenians concerned had apparently been living without paying any rent

for their land that the owner had previously agitated for rent, but that the French authorities had staved off his claim. The owner, however, had appealed to Paris, and the decision had been given in his favour. The rent was 3.5 Syrian Piastres per square meter, and the rent for the whole of the past three and a half years was being claimed. The claim was being made upon the camp quarter by quarter, and a quarter in which there were some very poor families had been started upon.<sup>48</sup> Previous to this legal decision the refugees had apparently been protected by the French authorities, in case of arrears, but Burnier observed, in October, 1926,<sup>49</sup> that the camp refugees would henceforth have to pay rent, presumably as a result of this decision. The landowners would then be able to take action against them over arrears, and indeed Burnier foresaw difficulties when the question of the ownership of the land on which the camps were situated should be determined by the courts, and when the inhabitants would have to reach agreement with the owners. The question seems to have come to a head at the end of 1927, when certain quarters of the camp under private ownership were required to be evacuated.<sup>50</sup> A letter written by Burnier on 6<sup>th</sup> April, 1928 put clearly the attitude of the owners and the authorities.<sup>51</sup> He observed that the Armenians had settled on land belonging to individuals who had been forced to receive them for an insignificant rent. This situation had lasted for seven years and no refugee, whatever his financial situation, had made the least effort to find lodgings outside the camp. The government could not oblige the landowners to keep the Armenians indefinitely for this would be simply theft. Moreover, the quarter, which had originally been only a provisional installation, and which one had thought would be absorbed quickly, had been constructed contrary to all laws of hygiene, cleanliness and urbanism, so that to retain it in its present state was impossible. The competent authorities, he continued, had not yet taken any obligatory measures, but had made it clear to the refugees that this situation could not continue indefinitely, in order to persuade them, or at least those possessing the means, to go to live elsewhere. This had had no results as the refugees had an interest in remaining in the camps as long as possible as they were then able to pay only a derisory rent and escape taxation. We have already commented upon the extent to which the Armenians were capable of moving out of the camp by their own means and on the social constraints involved. Here, it is important to observe that, whatever the concern of the authorities for the poor conditions of the camps, the determining factor in their taking action was the desire of the landowners to evict the refugees. The same desire seems to have been behind all the subsequent demolitions carried out by order of the Municipality. It has been observed, indeed, that one of the interested landowners was a senior member of the Municipal Council.<sup>52</sup> A delay in demolitions between 1932 and 1935 was apparently due to a legal action brought by the refugees against the landowners, during which time they were not able to demolish the huts. But in 1935, the court ruled that the Armenians should have one year to buy land and leave the huts, and after this, the demolitions resumed.<sup>53</sup>

Thus, the refugees, who in many cases had not the resources to escape from the environment of the camps, found themselves obliged to move in the face of a government demolition policy. Had they been completely alone, the social consequences might have been appalling. Fortunately, solutions were already being put forward in 1925 by various relief agencies to the question of the camps at Aleppo, encouraged by the employment crisis of that time. Drawing on the example of Karen Jeppe's work in establishing agricultural colonies for Armenian refugees in the valley of the Nahr el Belkh, they advocated colonisation of the unemployed refugees on the land.<sup>54</sup> When, in 1926, the Nansen Office took the problem of the settlement of Armenian refugees in Syria under its wing, this idea was retained. Then Major Johnson, the Assistant High Commissioner for Refugees, visited Aleppo, he reported that the solution to the problem lay there in improvements to the camps and the colonisation of 800 agricultural families on the land, after which "the problems of the Armenians in the Aleppo camp could be regarded as solved," and this view was restated by Duguet (although he envisaged the settlement of not 800, but 1500 agricultural families). Significantly, Johnson's visit was made at a time of economic recovery for the refugees in Aleppo, following the crisis which had provoked the rather more strident calls for agricultural settlement by the philanthropic organisations in 1925 and early 1926. Significantly too, neither Johnson nor Duguet yet envisaged the transfer of the refugees en masse from the camps to new quarters: any transfers to be made would be to agricultural settlements. A plan was considered involving the settlement of Armenian agriculturalists on state domain land at Qirate, near Qalaat el Mudik in the vilayet of Aleppo, but this came to naught through opposition from an important Armenian organisation. At this point, at the end of 1927, the first refugees in the camps were obliged to leave their homes. They accordingly addressed themselves to the representative of the Nansen Office in Syria,<sup>55</sup> who inaugurated the first negotiations by this Office for the purchase of land within Aleppo itself. Henceforth the problem for the Office became one not of colonisation of an agricultural minority, but of the large-scale resettlement of Armenians within Aleppo.

Purchases of land by the Office were made in 1928, 1930 and 1931 in the Meidan area of Aleppo,<sup>56</sup> and agreement reached whereby the refugees should construct their houses themselves, and pay off the price of the land by annual instalments. Later the Office confined itself to making loans for house-building. Meanwhile, the refugees endeavoured to meet the crisis by their own means, however limited these might be. A voluntary Settlement Committee was formed,<sup>57</sup> and the refugees also formed themselves into compatriotic unions, based on their town of origin. A number of agreements with the Office were made by these unions such that some, at least, of the reconstructed communities of the camps were transferred en masse to continue their separate existence in the new quarters. Thus, the Office's purchases of 1930 were made jointly with refugees

from Marash, from Urfa and from Gaziantep, and the land designated to receive refugees from these communities.

Cheapness and administrative ease were primary considerations in the purchase of land by the Office. Once the decision to transfer the refugees had been taken, there was danger of speculation in land, a danger identified clearly by Dr. Altounyan,<sup>58</sup> who wrote advocating that the authorities take an active part in securing a large tract of land on the basis of a flat rate, to be reserved for the refugees to purchase in lots as money became available. Burnier too was well aware of this problem, but was unable in 1929 to take advantage of an offer from the Vali and the Director of the “Waqf Property Administration” to facilitate the purchase of some Waqf land at exceptionally favourable prices, as there was finance available at that time from the Office. The lands neighbouring the tract bought in 1928 had meanwhile quadrupled in price. Administrative inconvenience and expense led to the rejection of the initial proposals for purchase by the refugees who originally asked for settlement. The tracts of land purchased in 1928 instead, for which title deeds are available, presented fewer administrative problems. They, were classed as “amiriyé” land, and were transferred to the Office from the possession of a group of private owners.

These purchases by the Office were made in the initial stages of transfer. When, in 1935, the process had to begin again, and the Office was no longer able to purchase land, a number of purchases were made by individual Armenian notables,<sup>59</sup> the land to be allotted to the refugees under rent-purchase agreements similar to those of the Refugees Office. These purchases included Cheikh Maksoud and Davidié (Achrafié). Other refugees reached agreements directly with individual landowners without the intervention of an intermediary such as the Nansen Office or one of their own notables.<sup>60</sup> Some of these refugees risked becoming heavily indebted in the crisis provoked by the fall of the franc.<sup>61</sup> This was increasingly the case too as the refugees remaining in the camps in the later stages were the poorest;<sup>62</sup> those who had been unable to move earlier. In fact, the last 200 families to be moved were all considered destitute, and their settlement was left, at the end of 1937, in the hands of the Armenian General Benevolent Union,<sup>63</sup> the organisation which progressively took over the work of the Nansen Office. The process had been prolonged by the settlement in the camps of poor families who previously lived in the city (presumably because they were not unable to pay rent), as well as young couples founding their homes there.<sup>64</sup> When the refugees arrived from the Sanjak of Alexandretta in 1938 and 1939, therefore, the final settlement had not been attained. Some of the poorer refugees had meanwhile found escape by taking accommodation as sub-tenants (see Table 7.4) among the newly-settled future-owners in the new quarters, an arrangement which also helped the future-owners to pay off the debts they had contracted for the purchase of their plots. As in the earlier purchases by the Office and the Compatriotic Unions, the poverty of the refugees again dictated that the sites bought should be cheap. By the end of the period, speculation had sent land prices

soaring, and it was necessary to buy sites relatively far removed from the city centre. Thus, amongst the cheapest sites were Davidié and Cheikh Maksoud,<sup>65</sup> both situated on small hills far removed from the town centre.

Tables 7.2 and 7.3 show the development of the new quarters between 1930 and 1937. Table 7.4 shows, in acre detail, the situation at November 15, 1936. It shows, in particular, the significant number of sub-tenants who came to live in the quarter. It also indicates the huts still standing in November, 1936. This is no indication of the situation at the close of the study-period, however, for, as will be apparent from Table 7.3, there was at that time considerable movement in progress, following the recommencement of expulsions after 1935. On these tables a number of lots are registered under the name of their previous owners. The names by which the new quarters were known by the Armenians, however, were quite different, and it was unfortunately not been possible to match the lots recorded under previous owner's names against the map.

**Table 7.2: Armenian refugees settled in the new quarters of Aleppo, 1930-1937<sup>2</sup>**

Date		1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1936	1937
Future owners	Persons	?	4416	?	7680	8400	9354	15,996
	Families	450	870	1200	?	?	2069	?
Sub-tenants	Persons	?	2743	?	4438	5800	6310	4885
	Families	200	410	700	?	?	1052	?
Total	Persons	3000	7159	9417	12,118	14,200	15,664	20,881
	Families	700	1280	1900	?	?	3121	?

**Table 7.3: Progress of the Settlement work in the new quarters of Aleppo<sup>3</sup>**

Quarter	At Nov. 15, 1936		At end of 1937	
	Houses	Persons	Houses	Persons
Meidan 1	460	4450	460	4400
Meidan 2	200	1850	200	1865
Meidan 3	177	1410	177	1462
Meidan 4	366	3200	366	3212
Bustan Pasha	180	1115	232	1165
Parcelle 2896/7	267	1335	308	1538
Cheikh Maksoud	30	150	200	1037
Cabbabé	114	600	207	1043
Davidié	65	350	484	2433
Myasser	-	-	100	506
Obégi	-	-	48	243
Dr. Subai	104	635	163	821
Victor Gürüllü	106	700	215	1053
Brimo	?	-	22	103
Adjour	-	-	-	-
Diverses	-	-	-	-

<sup>2</sup> Sources: Nansen Office Reports in N.A. C1583, C1584, C1524, C1598, and S.F.MB Vol. 216.


<sup>3</sup> Tables in N.A. C1524, C1598.

**Table 7.4:** State of settlement operations in Aleppo at Nov. 15, 1936<sup>4</sup>

Location		Houses		Future owners		Sub-tenants		Total population	
		Constructed	Unfinished	Families	Pop.	Families	Pop.	Families	Pop.
Office lots	Meidan 1	460	-	460	2200	450	2250	910	4450
	Meidan 2	200	4	200	1000	170	850	370	1850
	Meidan 3	177	-	177	885	105	525	282	1410
	Meidan 4	366	3	366	1800	270	1400	636	3200
Private lots	Bustan Pasha	180	43	180	900	43	215	223	1115
	Dr. Subai	104	-	104	520	23	115	127	635
	V. Gürüllü	106	-	106	530	34	170	140	700
	Parc. 2896	40	-	40	200	-	-	40	200
	Parc. 2897	227	15	227	1135	-	-	227	1135
	Cheikh Maksoud	30	40	30	150	-	-	30	150
	Cabbabé	114	28	114	600	-	-	114	600
	Davidié	65	215	65	350	-	-	65	350
	Myasser	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Obégi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Homes	Jeppe	-	-	-	-	-	-	50	200
	Veillards	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	42
	A.C.O.	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	30
	St. Grégoire	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	80
Huts	Hamidiyé	-	-	-	-	-	-	65	325
	Djabrié	-	-	-	-	-	-	160	800
	Suleymanié	-	-	-	-	-	-	305	1550
	Ourfalié	-	-	-	-	-	-	30	150
	Ramazanié	-	-	-	-	-	-	33	170
	Gurun	-	-	-	-	-	-	180	900
Total		2069	356	2069	9354	1052	6310	3956	19,911

Two oblique aerial views of Aleppo, dating from about 1934,<sup>66</sup> show the progress of the construction of the Meidan quarter to that date (see Fig 7.2), this being the quarter purchased by the Office and the Compatriotic Unions. Fig 7.2 shows areas of northern Aleppo built-up between 1931 and 1941, and these areas represent approximately the extent of the new Armenian quarters. The greatest concentration of new building is still in the Meidan quarter, of which the first sector was already built by 1931 and is marked as such. To the east are a number of new quarters, while to the north lies Bustan Pasha. Across the river to the north-west are the two eccentric quarters of Cheikh Maksoud and Davidié, both constructed on small hills far removed from the city centre. To these should be added the far northern quarter known as “Heulluk” or “Kermanik”, beyond Bustan Pasha on the road to Ain-Tell. A large-scale plan of a sector of the Davidié quarter bought by the A.C.O. is available (Fig. 7.3), and its location within the quarter marked on Fig 7.2.

<sup>4</sup> N.A. C1524.



**Fig. 7.3:** Plan of the ACO Quarter in Davidié, Aleppo, 1939

### *Social Structure of the New Quarters*

One notable characteristic of the new quarters was the reconstitution of the community structure. As has been observed, the Armenians in the camps had been grouped according to town or district of origin and Compatriotic Unions were formed to aid the poorer members of the community. When the movement to the new quarters took place, the Compatriotic Unions played an important role in the transfer process, at least initially so that land was purchased in the Meidan area for the refugees of Marash, Urfa and Gaziantep, for example. In this way the former grouping by town or district was at least partly re-established. As the huts were gradually demolished, so too were the old camp school-and church-huts. The churches were then re-established in the new quarters and reinforced the process of community reconstitution. Ultimately, for the Apostolic community, specific churches with schools attached were to be created for the various communities, for example St. Krikor (the church of Urfa), with its school “Sahagian”. Throughout the study-period, however, St. Krikor was the only Armenian Apostolic church in the Meidan quarter, and probably served all the local refugees. Apostolic schools were established more quickly, but a considerable number of the children of all denominations were still obliged to

seek their schooling in the old town (see Table 7.5). The Catholic and Protestant churches were also transferred, the Protestants moving to a new church-school near the old camp of Suleymanié and just south of the new quarters, so that the Protestant community would appear to have remained divided between old town and new quarters.<sup>67</sup> (Even the community in the new quarters was actually split by faction).<sup>68</sup> The division of the Catholic community seems to have broken down somewhat, however. The Jesuits did indeed move from the old chapel-school to impressive new premises in Bustan Pasha. But the old chapel (St. Barbare) was ceded to the Armenian Catholics, who also ultimately opened chapels in Heulluk and Davidié,<sup>69</sup> thus breaking down the division between the Jesuit-administered Catholics of the camp and the Armenian-administered Catholics of the city.

Apostolic	3 schools	1124 pupils
Protestant	1 school	360 pupils
Catholic	1 school	80 pupils
Frequenting the schools of the town		323 pupils
Total		1887 pupils

### *Living Conditions in the New Quarters*

The living conditions of the Armenians were not, of course, transformed overnight with the transfer to the new quarters. The refugees had still, in many cases, to be aided in building their houses. The sources abound with references to refugees facing winter in unfinished houses,<sup>70</sup> and the Nansen Office and the Action Chrétienne made many loans to refugees for building materials. Again, this seems to have been more necessary in the later stages, after 1935, when the transfer involved the poorer refugees, than in the earlier stages when the relatively wealthier or better organised refugees moved in anticipation of demolition. By this time, the Nansen Office was waiting for the reimbursement of earlier loans before consenting to further loans, so it was the poorest refugees, those who had remained in their huts as long as possible, who were least aided.<sup>71</sup> Nevertheless the small houses which were put up were considerably more habitable than the ramshackle huts which were evacuated and destroyed.

It was still impossible to admit children free to the schools, despite the creation of new schools in the quarters, so a number of children continued to receive no schooling, or to leave school early in order to learn a trade and support their parents.<sup>72</sup> In the Meidan quarter, sewerage appears to have improved on the camp, for, by the end or 1933, the inhabitants of the quarter had installed a complete network at their own expense but under the supervision of the Municipality.<sup>73</sup> Water was once again initially obtained by wells,<sup>74</sup> which, as in the camps, clearly risked contamination as long as the open sewerage-system remained. Once an adequate sewerage-system was provided, the problem was no longer as serious as it had been in the camps but, at the end of 1934 (six years after building began),

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<sup>5</sup> *Source:* Report in N.A. C1584.

the Meidan quarter was still not supplied with piped water although the question was under review.<sup>75</sup> Of the peripheral quarters, information is available concerning the situation at Davidié, and it is apparent that in terms of sewerage and water-supply, Davidié was even less privileged than Meidan.<sup>76</sup> According to Paul Berron, the Director of the Action Chrétienne, the Municipality initially desired to avoid responsibility for this peripheral quarter. This desire appears to have been overcome but, because of the rocky nature of the terrain at Davidié, the provision of an adequate sewerage system was considered too costly. By contrast, water was initially supplied free to a central supply point in the quarter, piped from the neighbouring barracks of the French spahis (Quartier Vingt), but this arrangement came to an end when the spahis found their reservoir emptying too quickly. The water company was then asked to install a conduit to Davidié and to construct a reservoir there, but refused to do so, fearing non-payment from the impoverished refugees of Davidié. In response to this, the Action Chrétienne had the conduit and reservoir constructed at their own expense, but the water-company still cut off the supply because, of non-payment of bills. Thus, the refugees at Davidié were obliged to turn to a single well forty-five meters deep, which, even when deepened, was not adequate for the population. Furthermore, as there was still no adequate sewerage system, there was a constant danger of contamination.

It was the inhabitants of the peripheral quarters, such as Davidié, who also suffered most from the distance between the new quarters and the centre of Aleppo which, if it extended to all quarters, was at least relieved in the more advantageously located Meidan quarter by the provision of a regular auto-car service between Aleppo centre and Meidan.<sup>77</sup> Thus another vicious circle of social deprivation was established. It was the relatively wealthy and better organised refugees who were able to settle first. The poor refugees, who were settled later, were obliged to accept the cheapest land, which was then further out from the city centre, as at Davidié or Cheikh Maksoud. They thus became relatively underprivileged in terms of distance, and because they could not then afford to pay for amenities whose provision was made more expensive by the distance from the town. This was all the more so because they were the poorest refugees in the first place. A self-perpetuating process of social deprivation was established.

### ***Conclusions***

The Armenian refugees who arrived at Aleppo settled partly in the city, partly outside. It is not possible to judge the exact proportional distribution. Within the city they occupied rented khans and houses, or vacant tracts of land, or were lodged by their employer. Outside the city they were lodged in “camps” which effectively developed into shanty-towns. Here the most remarkable feature of their distribution was the existence of spatially distinct communities based on town or district of origin. Living conditions in the camps were unsatisfactory,

even dangerous, but the refugees appear to have been confined there by both economic and social constraints. Between 1928 and 1938 the camps were virtually completely demolished and the inhabitants transferred to new quarters in the North. This was the result of a demolitions policy carried out by the Municipality often under unnecessarily harsh conditions. The real motive behind the demolitions was the desire of the landowners to evict the refugees from the property on which they had become de facto squatters. To meet the crisis, purchases of land in the Meidan area of Aleppo were made by the Nansen Office and the Armenian Compatriotic Unions, in which cheapness and administrative ease were primary considerations. Later, after 1935, the purchases were made by Armenian notables, while other refugees reached agreements directly with individual landowners. The sites bought in this latter stage of development were also required to be cheap and consequently were far removed from the town centre. Within the new quarters the community structure was reconstituted. Living conditions were improved, but not completely transformed.

Information from Davidié suggests that particularly deprived were the poorest Armenians who had been settled last in the peripheral quarters. One may conclude of the resettlement process that it was not voluntary, except in so far as it was a voluntary anticipation or compulsory demolition. It was not a carefully planned resettlement operation by an international agency, but a spontaneous response to an emergency situation. For the Armenians, it could be said to have been yet another forced or induced migration, of which they had already had too much experience since 1915.

## ENDNOTES

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<sup>1</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Oct. 7, 1926 (N.A. C1429).

<sup>2</sup> Shirajian Report, April 10, 1925 (*F.A.* 97, 4Q, 1825, p. 15).

<sup>3</sup> Hekimian Report, June 26, 1923 (F.O. 371/9098).

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> Hekimian Report, Aug. 28, 1923 (F.O. 371/9098).

<sup>6</sup> Shirajian Report, 1925. But he noted these refugees in discussing the “camps” so the total may be misleading.

<sup>7</sup> Table dated Nov. 15, 1936 (N.A. C1524).

<sup>8</sup> Shirajian Report, 1925.

<sup>9</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Oct. 7, 1926.

<sup>10</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Oct. 7, 1926.

<sup>11</sup> Burnier (1926), p. 101.

<sup>12</sup> *F.A.* 114, 1Q, 1930, p. 5; 115, 2Q, 1930, pp. 5-6.

<sup>13</sup> *F.A.* 143, Feb. 1939, p. 3; 144, June 1939, p. 3.

<sup>14</sup> Report of Consul Russell, Aug. 31, 1923 (F.O. 371/9098); Hekimian Report, Nov. 8, 1923 (F.O. 371/9098); “Illustrated Report etc. 1934” (S.F. MS, Vol. 216); *F.A.* 102, 1Q, 1927, p. 8 and in N.A.: Altounyan to Kennedy, March 14, 1928; Burnier to Johnson, April 6, 1928 (both C1430); Kennedy Report, Dec. 1927 (C 1429); Table of Nov. 15, 1936.

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- <sup>15</sup> Shirajian Report, April 10, 1925.
- <sup>16</sup> Mécérian (1926), pp. 56-39, 545-47.
- <sup>17</sup> By members of the Armenian community of Aleppo.
- <sup>18</sup> Opinions differ on this point however amongst local Armenians.
- <sup>19</sup> Mécérian (1926).
- <sup>20</sup> On the Protestant Church in the '20's, see: Hekimian Report, June 26, 1923 & Oct. 4, 1923 (F.O. 371/9098); *F.A.* 96, 3Q, 1925, inside back-cover, & Idem. 101, 4Q, 1926, pp. 11, 13, 14.
- <sup>21</sup> On the Jesuits in Aleppo camp see Charles (1929), pp. 84-85; Jalabert (1934), p. 120, (1974), pp. 19-20; Mécérian (1926); Naslian, *Vol. 2*, p. 359.
- <sup>22</sup> Mécérian (1928)(1), p. 153.
- <sup>23</sup> Personal communication.
- <sup>24</sup> Mécérian (1926); Rose, Fry & Sibley, p. 265; *Le Levant*, passim; *F.A.* 101, 4Q, 1926, p. 11; Idem. 105, 4Q, 1927, p. 8; Idem. 114, 1Q, 1930, p. 5; Idem. 139, Oct. 1937, inside front cover, Report by Consul Hough, May 20, 1926 (F.O. 371/11550); Hekimian Reports, Aug. 28 & Oct. 4, 1923 & Dec. 11, 1923 (F.O. 371/10195); St. John Ward to Bicknell, Nov. 29 & Dec. 11, 1923 (Arch.A.R.C.) & in N.A., Burnier to Johnson, Oct. 7, 1926; Johnson Report, Dec. 18, 1926; Duguet to M.C.F., Dec. 29, 1926 (C1429); Kennedy Report, Dec. 1927.
- <sup>25</sup> Shirajian Report, April 10, 1925.
- <sup>26</sup> *Le Levant*, passim; *F.A.* 101, 4Q, 1926, p. 11; Letter from Rachel M. Rutter, Dec. 29, 1926 (S.F. MS, Vol. 174); and in N.A., Burnier to Johnson, Oct. 7, 1926; Duguet to M.C.F., Dec. 29, 1926.
- <sup>27</sup> Shirajian Report, Sept. 3, 1926 (*F.A.* 102, 2Q, 1927, p. 3); Ross, Fry & Sibley, p. 265; *F.A.* 118, 1Q, 1931, p. 4; Burt Report; and in N.A. Burnier to Johnson, Oct. 7, 1926; Duguet to M.C.F., Dec. 29, 1926.
- <sup>28</sup> *F.A.* 139, Oct. 1937, inside front-cover.
- <sup>29</sup> Hamidé (1959), pp. 136-40.
- <sup>30</sup> Report by Consul Hough, May 20, 1926.
- <sup>31</sup> Ross, Fry & Sibley, p. 265. See also on water supply: Shirajian Report, Sept. 3, 1926; Report of Consul Russell, Aug. 31, 1923.
- <sup>32</sup> *F.A.* 114, 1Q, 1930, p. 5.
- <sup>33</sup> Kennedy Report, Dec. 1927.
- <sup>34</sup> Hamidé (1959), pp. 115-22.
- <sup>35</sup> *F.A.* 139, Oct. 1937, inside front-cover.
- <sup>36</sup> *Le Levant*, passim; *F.A.* passim; Baurain (1930), pp. 274, 277; Burnier (1926), p. 101; Hekimian Reports; Burt Report; Jeppe to Thomas, Feb. 26, 1926 & Aug. 27, 1926 (N.A. C1430); St. John Ward to Bicknell, Nov. 29, 1923; St. John Ward to Swift, April 21, 1924 (Arch.A.R.C.).
- <sup>37</sup> *Le Levant*, passim; *F.A.* 101, 4Q, 1926, p. 11; St. John Ward to Bicknell, Nov. 29, 1923.
- <sup>38</sup> Shirajian Reports, April 10, 1925 & Sept. 3, 1926; Hekimian Report; St. John Ward to Bicknell, Nov. 29, 1923.
- <sup>39</sup> *F.A.* 105, 4Q, 1927, p. 8.
- <sup>40</sup> Charles (1929), p. 84; Berron Report; Burnier to Johnson, Oct. 7, 1926.
- <sup>41</sup> *Le Levant*, passim.
- <sup>42</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Oct. 7, 1926; "Rapport" (1926), p. 104; Burnier to Johnson, April 6, 1928.
- <sup>43</sup> On the demolitions see: *F.A.* & *Le Levant*, passim

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- <sup>44</sup> *Le Levant*, 16e ann., no. 8, août-sept. 1939, p. 5.
- <sup>45</sup> *F.A.* 133, Oct. 1935, p. 6.
- <sup>46</sup> *F.A.* 102, 1Q, 1927, p. 9.
- <sup>47</sup> It is not clear if the building in question is again Zeitoun Khan or Geul-Meidan camp. See also Burt Report.
- <sup>48</sup> Roberts to Gracey, Oct. 31, 1926 (*F.A.* 102, 1Q, 1927, p. 8).
- <sup>49</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Oct. 7, 1926.
- <sup>50</sup> Kennedy Report, Dec. 1927; Altounyan to Kennedy, March 14, 1928.
- <sup>51</sup> Burnier to Johnson April 6, 1928.
- <sup>52</sup> Personal communication.
- <sup>53</sup> Personal communication.
- <sup>54</sup> See Ch. 5.
- <sup>55</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Dec. 15, 1927 (N.A. C1431); Kennedy Report, Dec. 1927.
- <sup>56</sup> On these purchases by the Office see N.A. C1429, C1430, C1431, C1583, C1584, C1585, *passim*.
- <sup>57</sup> *F.A.* 115, 2Q 1930, p. 6.
- <sup>58</sup> Altounyan to Kennedy, March 24, 1928.
- <sup>59</sup> *F.A.* 133, Oct. 1935, p. 7; and in N.A., Table of Nov. 15, 1936; “Rapport du President” etc., 1936.
- <sup>60</sup> In N.A. “Installations etc...1933”; Table of Nov. 15, 1936.
- <sup>61</sup> Burnier to Director, Nansen Office, March 31, 1938 (N.A. C1598).
- <sup>62</sup> *Le Levant*, 13e ann., no 1, oct. 1935, p. 2 & 13e ann., no. 8, sept. 1936, p. 3; Burnier to Director, Nansen Office, Jan. 11, 1938 (N.A. C1598).
- <sup>63</sup> N.A. C1598.
- <sup>64</sup> *Le Levant*, 9e ann., no. 5-6, mai-juin, 1932, p. 5.
- <sup>65</sup> *F.A.* 133, Oct., 1935, p. 7; *Idem.* 138, June 1937, p. 10; *Le Levant*, 15e ann., no. 5-6, mai-juillet, 1938, p. 3.
- <sup>66</sup> “Illustrated Report etc. 1934” (S.F. MS, Vol. 216).
- <sup>67</sup> *F.A.* 1930-38, *passim*; *Le Levant*, 13e ann., nos 6-7, juillet-août, 1936, p. 6; Gracey Report, 1930; “Installations etc...1933”.
- <sup>68</sup> Personal communication.
- <sup>69</sup> Jalabret (1974), pp. 28-29; Naslian, *Vol. 2*, p. 359; personal communication.
- <sup>70</sup> *Le Levant & F.A.* *passim*; N.A. C1598.
- <sup>71</sup> *Le Levant*, 15e ann., no. 2, nov.-dec., 1937, p. 2.
- <sup>72</sup> *Le Levant*, 11e ann., no. 4, mars, 1934, p. 7; 14e ann., no. 3, jan.-fèv., 1937, p. 3; 15e ann., no. 2, nov.-déc. 1937, p. 2.
- <sup>73</sup> “Installations etc...1933”; “Illustrated Report etc... 1934”.
- <sup>74</sup> *F.A.* 135, July 1936, p. 3; *Idem.* 138, June, 1937, p. 10; Chater Report, 1930; “Installations etc...1933”; “Illustrated Report etc... 1934”.
- <sup>75</sup> “Illustrated Report etc... 1934”.
- <sup>76</sup> *Le levant*, 1938-39, *passim*; *F.A.* 144, June, 1939, p. 11. Spahis were French colonial cavalry.
- <sup>77</sup> “Installations etc...1933”; “Illustrated Report etc... 1934”.

## Chapter VIII

### URBAN SETTLEMENT: BEIRUT

Beirut received refugees in 1920 and at the end of 1921 from Cilicia, and also in 1922 and 1923 by transfer from Alexandretta and Aleppo. More came as a result of the troubles at Damascus in 1925-26. Again, it is difficult to reconcile the estimates of migrants arriving at Beirut with the total number of refugees recorded there.

#### *Distribution*

The refugees were divided between town and “camp”,<sup>1</sup> but the relative proportion in each cannot be easily ascertained. Poidebard (1926) assigns 10,000 to the town itself and 12,000 to the camps of the Quarantine; Fox (?1924) 10,000 to the town and 7000 to the camps (within the city-limits).

The 1932 Census sheds some light on the distribution of the Armenians within the administrative limits of the city and their degree of segregation from the rest of the population (Tables 8.1-8.5, Figs. 8.1, 8.2). The Census yields an index of Dissimilarity of 52.1 between the Armenians and the non-Armenian population, but this figure rises to 72.0 between Armenians and non-Christians and falls to 45.1 between Armenians and non-Armenian Christians. Relative to the non-Armenian population, the Armenians were over-represented in three quarters: Medawar, Achrafié and Remeil (and also in the group “Diverse”). Medawar alone contained 48.0% of the Armenian population, and all three quarters lay on the east of the city. The Armenians were moderately (but under) represented in three quarters of the centre (Zokak el Blat, El Saife and Port), and little represented in the others, especially the outer quarters of the south and west. Significantly, the eastern quarters (Medawar, Achrafié and Remeil) were all dominantly Christian quarters. In the centre, however, the picture was more complex. While non-Armenian Christians were certainly heavily concentrated in El Saife, neither Zokak el Blat nor Port were quarters favoured by them. Apart from El Saife they preferred in the centre the quarters of Bachoura and Minet el Hosn, neither of which were favoured by the Armenians. Thus, within the centre there was little correspondence in residence between the Armenians and the non-Armenian Christians.

**Table 8.1:** Distribution of Armenians in Beirut according to the 1932 Census of Lebanon<sup>1</sup>

Quarter	Armenians	Total population	Armenians as % total population
Moussaytbé	592	17,122	3.46
Bachoura	1014	10,486	9.67
Ras Beirut	175	6480	2.7
Zokak el Blat	1454	7778	18.69
Achrafié	2870	12,180	23.56

<sup>1</sup> Arch.Dip., Dossiers in course of classification. The Table concerns only those inscribed as “Présents” in the Census.

Ain el Mreissé	327	3605	9.07
Remeil	1900	8008	23.73
Mazraa	259	17,081	1.52
Minet el Hosn	534	6197	8.62
Port	389	3026	12.86
El Saife	725	4306	16.84
Medawar	10,493	14,275	73.51
Diverse	1151	2860	40.24
Total	21,883	113,404	19.3

Table 8.2: percentage distribution of population groups in Beirut by quarter, 1932<sup>2</sup>

Quarter	Armenians	Non-Armenians	Non-Armenian Christians	Non-Christians	Armenian Catholics	Armenian Apostolics	Non-Armenian Catholics
Moussaytbé	2.71	18.06	14.48	20.42	3.43	2.54	7.57
Bachoura	4.63	10.35	6.5	12.84	8.21	3.82	10.54
Ras Beirut	0.8	6.89	4.28	8.6	1.13	0.72	3.14
Zokak el Blat	6.64	6.91	3.09	9.42	5.32	6.95	4.26
Achrafé	13.12	10.17	20.33	3.5	22.1	11.07	14.78
Ain el Mreissé	1.49	3.58	2.03	4.6	1.11	1.58	2.71
Remeil	8.68	6.67	16.37	0.3	8.95	8.62	17.03
Mazraa	1.18	18.38	5.19	27.05	3.06	0.76	2.65
Minet el Hosn	2.44	6.19	5.54	6.61	2.37	2.45	7.73
Port	1.78	2.88	0.93	4.16	1.68	1.8	1.09
El Saife	3.31	3.91	9.05	0.54	8.55	2.12	14.06
Medawar	47.95	4.13	8.78	1.08	28.19	52.45	10.5
Diverse	5.26	1.87	3.36	0.88	5.91	5.11	3.95




Fig. 8.1: Distribution of Armenians in Beirut, 1932

<sup>2</sup> Source: as Table 8.1.




Fig. 8.2: Location quotients for different population groups in Beirut, 1932

**Table 8.3:** Location quotations for different population groups in Beirut, 1932<sup>3</sup>

Quarters	Arm. vs Non-Arms.	Non-Arm. Christians vs other Non-Arms.	Arm. Catholics vs Arm. Apostolics	Non-Arm. Cath.s vs other non-Arm. Christians	Ar. Caths. vs non-Arms.	Arm. Apostolics vs non-Arms.
Moussaytbé	0.15	0.709	1.348	0.352	0.19	0.141
Bachoura	0.447	0.511	2.148	4.209	0.793	0.369
Ras Beirut	0.116	0.498	1.566	0.576	0.165	0.105
Zokak el Blat	0.961	0.328	0.766	2.262	0.77	1.005
Achrafié	1.29	5.809	1.997	0.569	2.173	1.088
Ain-el-Mreissé	0.416	0.441	0.701	2.034	0.310	0.442
Remeil	1.301	54.567	1.037	1.085	1.341	1.293
Mazraa	0.064	0.192	4.037	0.34	0.166	0.041
Minet el Hosn	0.394	0.838	0.963	2.34	0.382	0.397
Port	0.618	0.224	0.931	1.391	0.582	0.625
El Saife	0.847	16.759	4.032	3.578	2.187	0.542
Medawar	11.61	8.13	0.537	1.494	6.826	12.7
Diverse	2.813	3.818	1.157	1.425	3.163	2.733

**Table 8.4:** Indices of dissimilarity between the distribution of population groups in Beirut, 1932<sup>4</sup>

	Armenians	Armenian Catholics	Armenian Apostolics
Non-Armenians	52.1	46.9	54.4
Non-Armenian Christians	45.1	28.4	50.1
Non-Christians	72.0	67.4	73.1
Armenian Apostolics	-	25.9	-
Armenian Catholics	-	-	25.9
Non-Armenian Catholics	-	29	46.5
Non-Armenian, non-Catholic Christians	-	39	55.4

**Table 8.5:** Percentage distribution of population groups in Beirut by zone, 1932<sup>5</sup>

	East	Centre	South and West
Armenians	69.75	18.81	6.18
Non-Armenians	20.98	30.24	46.91
Armenian Catholics	59.24	26.12	8.72
Armenian Apostolics	72.14	17.14	5.6

Segregation between Armenian Apostolics and Catholics was low (I.D.= 25.9), but there were variations between the distributions of the two groups. Thus, in the eastern quarters, relative to each other the Apostolics were more highly concentrated in Medawar, the Catholics in Achrafié and Remeil. In the centre,

<sup>3</sup> *Source:* as Table 8.1.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* *Note:* East=Medawar, Achrafié, Remeil; Centre=Bachoura, Zokak el Blat, Minet el Hosn, Port, Es Saife; South & West=Moussaytbeh, Ras Beirut, Ain el Mreissé, Mazraa. "Diverse" excluded.

the Apostolics were more highly concentrated in Zokak el Blat and Port, the Catholics in El Saife and Bachoura. Overall, the Catholics were less concentrated in the east than the Apostolics, particularly so in Medawar. Compared with the non-Armenian population the Armenian Catholics (I. D. = 46.9) were slightly less segregated than the Apostolics (I.D. = 54.4). Both groups were highly segregated from the non-Christian population (I. D. = 67.4 for Catholics, 73.1 for Apostolics), but in relation to non-Armenian Christians the Armenian Catholics (I.D. = 28.4) were significantly less segregated than the Apostolics (I.D. = 50.1). Interestingly, while there seems to have been greater segregation between Armenian Catholics and non-Catholic non-Armenian Christians (I.D. = 39.0) than between them and non-Armenian Catholics (I.D. = 29.0), segregation between Armenian Catholics and all non-Armenian Christians was still lower than that between them and non-Armenian Catholics. The lower segregation between Catholic Armenians and non-Armenian Christians (compared with that of Apostolics) seems attributable to their lesser concentration in the eastern quarters (especially Medawar) and their concentration within the centre, relative to the Apostolics, in quarters of high Christian representation (i.e., El Saife and Bachoura). El Saife and Bachoura were both in fact also areas of high non-Armenian Catholic representation. But the same correspondence was not true of the eastern quarters where Armenian and non-Armenian Catholics displayed opposing preferences with regard to Medawar and Achrafié.

How should these figures be interpreted? It is apparent that of the three eastern quarters, Medawar contained the two principal refugee camps (of which the western one was already depleted by 1932), as well as the new Armenian quarter of Nor-Hadjin (see below), accounting together for its Armenian population. Remeil on the contrary contained no camps, and cannot have contained more than about 150 Armenians settled by the Nansen Office. Achrafié, by contrast, contained a number of Nansen Office quarters established by 1931 which must account for at least 2000 of its Armenian population recorded by the Census. If the Armenians known to be living in camps or new resettlement quarters are then deducted from the 1932 total, the calculation reveals that less than half the Armenians were actually living in the city, i.e., that the relative proportions suggested by Poidebard vis-à-vis the camps and the town may have been close to reality. Such a deduction also then reveals that the Armenians who lived in the city rather than in the camps or the resettlement quarters were actually more highly concentrated in the city centre than in the eastern quarters. This is partly explained by the presence of the indigenous Armenian population, dominantly Catholic, which no doubt helps to explain the greater concentration of Armenian Catholics than Apostolics in the central quarters recorded by the Census. Otherwise, in the absence of any further evidence, it is difficult to comment on the reasons for the location of the Armenians within the town. Their quarters of residence were mixed in social status, though the quarters of the centre contained much housing in course of deterioration. It seems quite possible that many

Armenians, like impoverished migrants elsewhere, occupied run-down residential accommodation inner-city.


### *The Camps*

The various estimates of the number of refugees who settled in the camps are presented in Table 8.6. Land appears to have been designated by the authorities,<sup>2</sup> and tents provided by the French military.<sup>3</sup> The refugees were settled mostly on vacant land to the north-east of the town. According to one source it was owned by the Maronite church,<sup>4</sup> and was apparently obtained for the refugees by Dr. Melconian of the local Armenian National Union.<sup>5</sup> Without documentary evidence it is difficult to attribute much significance to the location of the camps next to quarters dominantly Christian, although the same phenomenon was observed at Aleppo. Similarly, while the western quarter of Beirut contained already in 1922, an assortment of industrial establishments, there is no evidence to suggest that this industry played any role in the choice of location.

Date	Estimate	Source
1922	c. 5000	Arthur A. Bacon, Beirut Chapter, American Red Cross, Nov. 28, 1922 (Arc. A.R.C.)
1923	>5000	E.St. John Ward, n.d. (1923) (Arc. A.R.C.)
1924	12-15,000	Jean Coomber, Friends of Armenia, Jan. 21, 1924 (F.A. 91, 2Q, 1924, p. 8)
1924	c. 8000	Mary G. Webb & Hilda B. Phelps, Central Turkey Mission, May 2, 1924 (F.A. 92, 3Q, 1924, p. 4)
1924	13-14,000	Basil Matthews, 1924 (S.F. F.F.M.A. Syria S/3)
1924	7000	Marshall Fox, in comment on above (S.F. F.F.M.A. Syria S/3)
1926	7000	Berron Report
1926	22,000	Johnson Report, Dec. 18, 1926. This figure probably represents in reality all Armenian refugees in Beirut.
1926	2500	Families. Duguet, "Programme general etc.", Dec. 29, 1926 (N.A. C1429)
1926	12,000	Poidebard (1926), p. 16
1926	c. 15,000	"Rapport" (1926), p. 102
1928	c. 9000	Miss Patterson, Friends of Armenia (F.A. 106, 1Q, 1928, p. 2)
1929	15,000	Ross, Fry & Sibley (1929), p. 263

According to Mécérian,<sup>6</sup> the limits of the camp were: to the west the headquarters of the Tramways Company, to the east the Maronite church of St. Michel and the railway station, to the south the road from the town to the bridge of Beirut, and to the north the sea and the quarantine buildings. This description is rather ambiguous. Photographic evidence confirms the existence of a large camp to the east of the Tramways Co. in 1925.<sup>7</sup> Referring to Fig. 8.3, this would occupy the vacant land shown on the 1922 map between the Tramways Co. and St. Michel. This camp was separated by houses (marked on the 1922 map) from a second camp to the north, between the railway station and the quarantine buildings. The extent of this camp is indicated on the 1935 map, where the

representation of the Armenians' huts is unmistakable, and on-air photographs of 1934, but new building in this area since 1922 suggests that the camp was originally even more extensive. The area of both these camps is embraced by Mécérian's description, and other descriptions confirm that the camp by the sea was in fact divided into two separate parts.<sup>8</sup> It would appear that a large number of the Armenians in the Quarantine camp (i.e., the eastern part of the sea-shore camp) were only settled there c.1924. These were the Armenians from the Amanus Mountains, who settled initially on the hill of Achrafié,<sup>9</sup> which dominates the camp, and which is also described as housing a party from Alexandretta and Aleppo.<sup>10</sup> The Amanus Armenians would presumably have been amongst those dispersed from Alexandretta. Their camp was at first located on rented land in the neighbourhood of the Army Convalescence Hospitals. Under pressure from the Service de Santé, the Municipality obliged the camp to move, and they then settled near the sea, apparently forming a large part of the Quarantine camp. Near to them, by the sea, were installed, at about the same time, the Armenians from Yozgat, that is in May-June 1924. Carle's Report, although presented in 1925, would appear, in describing two camps by the sea and one on a hill, to reflect the situation a short time before 1925, that is before the movement of the Amanus camp from Achrafié. If the later arrivals from Alexandretta and Aleppo were in this way accommodated in the eastern part of the main camp



**Fig. 8.3:** Changes in the built-up area of East Beirut, 1922-1935 (Source: Town plans of 1 10,000 dated 1922 and 1935, Air photos c 1936 from S E Vol. 216)

(Quarantine camp), it seems logical to infer that the western half, nearer to the city (Camp St. Michel), contained the migrants who arrived earlier direct from Cilicia. Other refugees are described living under the railway viaduct,<sup>11</sup> and established across the Nahr Beirut in a camp known as “Tiro” after its location near a shooting-range (“Tir aux Pigeons”).<sup>12</sup> This camp is also marked on Fig. 8.3. It is not known how early it was established. When the refugees from the Damascus troubles arrived, they were settled initially in the huts of the Quarantine Service and in tents supplied by N.E.R. and the military in the camp.<sup>13</sup>

The situation of the camps with respect to rent and tax is rather obscure. It appears that in 1925 the French High Commission decided to make the refugees themselves pay for the measures of improvement necessary for their installation.<sup>14</sup> The camps were then placed under the administration of the town, and a decree was passed to oblige the Armenians installed in the camps to pay the rent for the land on which they had built their huts, as well as a municipal tax to cover the expenses of improvement. The collection of this money by the municipal authorities, apparently retrospective, encountered some difficulties (see below) and it was necessary to reduce the amount demanded by half.

### *Social Structure of the Camps*

The sources do not tell much about the community structure of the Beirut camps. There was, however, certainly some community reconstitution, as in the case of the Amanus Camp, which grouped the refugees from the villages of Kharne, Hassan-Beyli and Lapache in the Amanus.<sup>15</sup> That such grouping did exist elsewhere in the camps is suggested by the subsequent development of the new quarters on community lines. As at Aleppo, schools and churches were established by the various denominations, reinforcing the community structure within the camps. Apostolic churches were established in the main camp, in Amanus camp and in “Tiro”, with schools attached caring for about 1200 pupils in about 1931.<sup>16</sup> Two school-huts, with 300 pupils in 1923, were run by the Armenian Protestant Mission in the camp, where Protestant services also took place.<sup>17</sup> The Jesuits appear, as at Aleppo, to have been charged with caring for the Catholic Armenians of the camps.<sup>18</sup> They at first used the Maronite church (St. Michel) next to the camp, then, in 1923, a hut built on land let by the railway company, and finally a new church which opened in 1924. Parallel to the Jesuits opened a double school (école St. Gregoire) next to the church, which in 1928 provided education for 527 children, of whom over 300 were Catholics. The camps would appear then to have had their own religious institutions, plus some school facilities. However, numerous children attended the schools of the various denominations within the city,<sup>19</sup> so that, as in Aleppo, in this respect the town and camp communities were at least partly integrated. Where schools, churches and reconstituted communities did exist in the camps they would clearly provide considerable constraints on individual movement. These constraints would be reinforced by the establishment of shops in the camps,<sup>20</sup> the beginnings of a

rudimentary economic system providing even more social cohesion and vested interests in inertia.

### *Living Conditions*

Living conditions in Beirut camp were comparable with those in Aleppo.<sup>21</sup> The tents rotted and soon gave way to the same ramshackle huts. According to Joseph Burt, the refugees were not permitted to erect any permanent buildings on the camp-site, even if they had the means to do so. Roads were narrow alleys, clogged with mud in the winter rains. In 1924, the authorities opened some principal arteries across the camp, such that many huts were torn down, but the situation of the mass of the refugees was scarcely thereby improved. Drainage and sanitary conditions were appalling. By contrast, the question of water-supply did not draw the attention it did at Aleppo.

The incidence of disease, however, certainly did draw comment. When the migrants arrived by sea from Cilicia at the end of 1921, they were automatically showered, deloused and vaccinated on their arrival.<sup>22</sup> Those energetic measures taken by the French authorities could not, however, offset the ultimate effect of poor housing, poor nutrition and poor sanitation. The diseases commonly experienced were the same as those in Aleppo;<sup>23</sup> tuberculosis, eye-diseases, and the effects of undernourishment, especially on the children, and more particularly on the babies with debilitated mothers. More spectacular were the three cases of plague<sup>24</sup> reported in October 1926, and a case of cholera at the end of 1927.<sup>25</sup> However, the medical problem facing Beirut in particular was malaria.<sup>26</sup> This was especially fierce in the summer of 1923, and affected in particular the refugees coming from Alexandretta. No doubt this was in large measure due to their stay in the malarial marshes there. But the valley of the Nahr Beirut, before its improvement, was a breeding ground for malaria, and the original camp of the refugees from Alexandretta, before their move to the Quarantine Camp, was situated on the eastern slopes of Achrafié overlooking the river valley. The malaria was therefore partly generated and sustained by the malarial conditions of the camp-sites in Beirut. The French military were ultimately obliged to evacuate their barracks next to the camp each summer to avoid the danger of an epidemic. To meet the medical needs of the refugees two clinics were initially established in the camps by the Armenian Red Cross,<sup>27</sup> subsidised by Near East Relief, but these were unable to continue beyond 1923. They were superseded by a clinic established by the Jesuits at their Mission in 1923, and one established by the Near East Relief, financed by the Protestant "Beirut Relief Commission", in premises obtained directly opposite the Jesuit Mission! Danish Protestant workers also maintained a small clinic in the camp, while there was also a clinic in the Amanus Camp, both before and after its move from Achrafié, where anti-malarial injections were given. A sanatorium at Maamelteine, established in 1923 with the aid of NER, accommodated about thirty sufferers from tuberculosis. However, this site was not suitable and the air was unhealthy for the patients, and

it was not until 1938 that the sanatorium could be moved to a healthier site at Azounieh.

As at Aleppo, the Christian and philanthropic organisations had also to combat social disease. Prostitution, begging, and crime attract attention in the sources,<sup>28</sup> while in Aleppo attention focusses on nervous maladies, alcoholism and delinquency: - perhaps the more cosmopolitan port of Beirut provided more social traps than Aleppo. Delinquency was, however, a problem at Beirut, exacerbated again by the lack of school facilities available.<sup>29</sup> Common to both cities also were the embarrassing excesses of political violence. In February 1929, the Armenian Catholicos, Sahag II, wrote despairingly to the French High Commissioner and to the President of the Lebanese Republic begging them "*ne pas tenir responsable tout le peuple arménien pour un crime de vengeance personnelle ou de parti.*"<sup>30</sup> Much of the expressed concern for social disease and decline in moral standards at Beirut seems, however, to have been in reality based on a fear of communism,<sup>31</sup> and this fear was great enough in official circles to influence government policy towards the camps. The High Commissioner, Henri Ponsot, wrote in January 1931 that it was necessary to decongest the Armenian quarters as soon as possible as Communism was finding there its most ardent propagandists.<sup>32</sup>

The economic weakness and vulnerability of the Armenians at Beirut has already been described, and again it appears to have been the poorer refugees who were concentrated in the camps.<sup>33</sup> On November 28, 1925, Catholicos Sahag II wrote to the Governor of Lebanon describing the difficulty encountered by the Armenians in paying their rent and tax. He complained that the collectors, aided by the police, were using undue severity towards the Armenians of the camps in demanding from them sums of 10, 20, 30 or even 60 Syrian pounds per family. He complained that if all the sums demanded above were really collected, they would easily surpass the expenses due, i.e., the rent for the lands for the years 1924 and 1925, the contribution to the cost of improvements, and the wages of the clerks and supervisors. That at least was the conviction of most of the inhabitants quite apart from their complaints concerning the unfair distribution of the payments demanded, which bore no relation to the capacity of each person to pay. Those who asked for the slightest explanation on this subject or those not quick to pay, were being maltreated and even imprisoned.<sup>34</sup> To help relieve the distress, the NER established a Girls' industrial establishment,<sup>35</sup> which employed 469 girls in needlework at the end of 1928. The Jesuits also ran a workshop for young Armenian girls,<sup>36</sup> their embroidered products to be sold to women of French and Lebanese society. They also ran an employment bureau, placing refugees as domestic-servants, in the factories of Lebanon and France, and exercising some surveillance over emigration. The work of the NER in placing orphans in France has already been observed.

### *The Transfer to New Quarters*

Between 1928 and 1939, as at Aleppo, the greater part of the Armenian refugees was transferred from the camps to new Armenian quarters. The reasons for this move were similar, but not identical. The question of a landowner-refugee confrontation, which appears to have been dominant at Aleppo, does not appear to have been the initial motive behind the transfer in Beirut. It is true that in May 1926, Burnier observed that the necessity to move the Armenians from the Beirut camp had arisen because the railway company desired the land for the extension of the station,<sup>37</sup> but this is the sole reference to such a motive at this stage. The initial moves would appear to have been influenced rather by political motives, and made by the French authorities who, as observed, had an interest in stabilising the Armenian population of Lebanon. Within Beirut, such a stabilisation would necessarily involve the transfer of the refugees from the squalid conditions of the camps, from which there was considerable emigration, to new quarters presenting more satisfactory conditions for permanent occupation. Such a scheme appears to have envisaged even before the intervention of the Nansen Office. Furthermore, even after the Nansen Office had become involved, the finance for the initial settlement at Beirut came from the French High Commission, again suggesting a strong political commitment to the scheme. The motive was not, however, wholly political. The authorities were undoubtedly afraid of epidemics,<sup>38</sup> a fear which in Beirut had the additional inconvenience of threatening the summer-holiday trade, wealthy Egyptians apparently refusing to come to Beirut for fear of infection.<sup>39</sup> There seems to have been also a fear of disorders in the camps,<sup>40</sup> no doubt to some extent disguising the fear of communism, expressed above by the High Commissioner, M. Ponsot, in 1929. Whatever the motive, the result was that, in the case of Beirut (unlike Aleppo) the initiative for the new settlements seems, in the early stages, to have lain with the Settlement Committee rather than with the municipality, such that more consideration could be shown in the transfer, since demolitions could be coordinated with housing available. The sine qua non of this arrangement was the early commitment of finance to the scheme.

Initial plans, it will be recalled, established by the Nansen Office in co-operation with the Mandatory authorities, envisaged the transfer to the land of about 1000 "agricultural" families.<sup>41</sup> As at Aleppo, this scheme ultimately came to naught. Alongside agricultural settlement there would, however, be a reorganisation of the Camp, involving the creation of roads and sewers and the decongestion of the overpopulated quarters. The inhabitants dislodged by these operations would be transported to a new quarter to be allotted to them. In the event, even in Beirut, the first transfers were to take place in a crisis situation. An outbreak of plague on October 12, 1926, led to the burning of 150 huts in the camp on the orders of the Health Service. The unfortunate inhabitants were temporarily lodged in the buildings of the Quarantine Station (as distinct from the Quarantine Camp). They joined there a number of widows, orphans and old folk

without shelter, as well apparently, as the remaining refugees from Damascus. Such a situation could not last as the Station was required for the early summer to accommodate the Mecca pilgrims. Nothing had been achieved by that time, so the inhabitants of the Station were temporarily transferred to tents on Achrafié in the summer, before being readmitted. Their permanent settlement meanwhile became a priority for the Settlement Committee. Purchases of land were made in February 1927 (“Pavillons” and “Parcelle 603”) and in April 1928 (“Gebeili”), all three plots being situated on Achrafié, overlooking the valley of the Nahr Beirut. Nothing is known concerning the previous ownership of the plots purchased in 1927, but the Gebeili plot was in private ownership (Gebeili Frères). On the larger plot purchased in 1927, twenty large buildings (“Pavillons”) were constructed to be let to a total of 160 refugees, that is eight in each building. This form of arrangement was later abandoned in the other two quarters, and a rent-purchase agreement substituted, under which the refugees would build their own homes, albeit with some financial assistance from the Office; i.e., the arrangement pursued at Aleppo. The “Pavillons” were, in fact, virtually the only houses actually built by the Office in urban settlements in the whole period. The abandonment of construction work resulted from its high cost, and from the preference of the refugees to live in their own individual homes rather than in rented apartments.<sup>42</sup> Priority in settlement was naturally to be given to the plague victims. Parcelle 603, however, appears to have been reserved exclusively for Armenian Catholics. In view of the fact that the money for the purchase of this plot came from the French High Commission’s certain favouritism towards the Catholic Armenians may have been involved. If so, it had the effect of formalising the split between the religious communities by planned spatial segregation. It is not clear what became of the poor widows and old folk who had been housed in the Quarantine Station. In a letter written on June 5, 1928,<sup>43</sup> Burnier refers mysteriously to 250 widows, old-folk and children settled in huts to the west of the “Pavillons” quarter, beside the railway. Such a settlement, as is evident from the map, is impossible, unless for “oust” should be read “est.” Elsewhere, Burnier refers to five huts for 250 people beside the Nansen Office Quarter.<sup>44</sup> Now, it is apparent that by the end of 1931 there existed in Gebeili quarter, 5 “pavilions” for widows and old-folk established by the British and Swiss Friends of Armenia.<sup>45</sup> It is tempting to explain Burnier’s earlier references in terms of these buildings in the Gebeili quarter, as there is no evidence of the establishment of similar homes anywhere else on Achrafié before 1936, except the small homes of the Armenian Catholic quarter.

From 1929 onwards, the Settlement Committee appears to have lost the initiative in the resettlement process. The Municipality then appears to have begun to implement a systematic demolitions policy, to be carried out quarter by quarter, beginning in August 1929.<sup>46</sup> According to Suzanne Ferrière of the International Red Cross, these demolitions were to take place because the landowners concerned wished to evict the refugees.<sup>47</sup> There is no other

confirmation in the written sources (not even in the Nansen Archives) of this situation, but Ferrière had just visited the Beirut camp, in May 1929, in the presence of M. Burnier, so she ought to have been well informed. If so, then the subsequent resettlement in Beirut becomes a copy of the parallel resettlement in Aleppo. Certainly, the refugees were faced with the same determined implementation of the demolitions policy as at Aleppo.

The demolitions process was hastened by one event, exceptional but not unforeseen. On the evening of January 30, 1933, fire broke out in a bakery in the camp,<sup>48</sup> and within five hours had burnt down about 450 huts (other reports claim 600 huts destroyed, and 3000 made homeless). The flames destroyed the whole of the remaining part of the Camp St. Michel that is the western section adjoining the buildings of the Tramways Company. Miraculously there was no loss of life, and the authorities were thereby saved considerable embarrassment. Some of the victims found shelter with friends in the city; the remainder, about 1800, were housed temporarily in the Quarantine Station, continuing its role as an emergency relief camp. But because the arrival of the Mecca pilgrims was imminent a rapid solution had to be found to their settlement. Fortunately, this part of the camp was in any case apparently due to be demolished, and a site had been purchased by the Office for the refugees there. The demolition of their huts had already been delayed by the intervention of the Armenian religious authorities, concerned for the plight of the unemployed. Two months after the fire, therefore, all the victims had been installed in the new quarters either as sub-tenants, or in houses built by the Office.

Apart from the exceptional clearance brought about by the fire, the demolitions, as remarked, were carried out systematically sector by sector. The area destroyed by the fire is described as the last remaining part of the Camp St. Michel, and its approximate extent is marked on Fig. 8.3 It follows that the large area of the camp to the east of this had been already demolished, that is by about the end of 1932. By contrast, the Quarantine camp appears to have been still largely standing in 1935, so that it seems that the demolitions began in the east of the Camp St. Michel, were completed in that camp by the fire of 1933, and were only extended to the Quarantine camp afterwards. A table drawn up in November 1936 shows the huts remaining at that date (Table 8.7). Some of them (in Nor-Hadjin, Nor-Marash, Trad, Nor-Sis, and Nor-Adana) were within the new quarters, but by far the greatest number were in the Quarantine camp. There were smaller numbers in "Tir aux Pigeons," and in quarters described as "Shell", "Sin-el-Fil" and "Dahr-el-Jamal." It has not been possible to locate precisely the huts of Sin-el-Fil, but they must have been across the river and possibly represented huts transferred under threat of demolition. The same might be true of "Shell": hut-like buildings appear on the 1935 map to the south of the Shell Depot, east of the river. Of the original camps within the city limits, huts remained standing only in the Quarantine camp. By June 1938, the situation had not greatly improved, as is evident from a table drawn up by Burnier representing the situation of the huts

at that date (Table 8.8). Amanus Camp, as observed, formed a part of the Quarantine camp. The camp of “Tir aux Pigeons” was, according to Burnier, installed on rented land in Bourj-Hammoud, and there was no disagreement between the refugees and its owner.<sup>49</sup> As long as the demolitions were confined to the limits of the Municipality of Beirut, therefore, these refugees were relatively secure in their huts. The same would presumably be true of the “Shell” camp. However, when the process of demolitions in Beirut Municipality was nearing completion, with the notable exception of the Amanus Camp, the Municipality of Bourj-Hammoud was by the end or 1937 likewise requiring the demolition of “Tir aux Pigeons” for reasons of hygiene and urban improvement. As is apparent from the table, nothing had been achieved in this respect by June 1938, and both “Tir aux Pigeons” and “Shell” camps are both still marked as standing on a French map of 1945 (Fig. 8.4). As regards the Amanus Camp, Annie Davies, of the Friends of Armenia, wrote on October 17, 1938,<sup>50</sup> that a few months previously an order had been given that all the old huts in the camp should be demolished. This order had been obeyed, but about a month ago, word had been given that the refugees might stay for another six months. Directly those who had pulled down their huts heard this news, they started to re-erect them again in the old camp. Thus, the Amanus Camp survived into 1939, by which time new refugees were arriving from the Sanjak. Again, there are still huts shown standing on the French map of 1945.

**Table 8.7:** Huts remaining in Beirut, Nov. 9, 1936<sup>6</sup>

Quarter	Owner		Tenants		Total	
	Families	Persons	Families	Persons	Families	Persons
Hadjin	10	53	-	-	10	53
Marash	45	218	-	-	45	218
Quarantine	482	2411	96	460	578	2871
Trad	2	9	-	-	2	9
Sis	24	150	-	-	24	150
Adana	10	49	-	-	10	49
Sin-el-Fil & Dahr-el-Jamal	32	150	-	-	32	150
Tir aux Pigeons	140	314	34	115	174	429
Shell	16	66	-	-	16	66
Total	761	3420	130	575*	891	3995

**Table 8.8:** Huts remaining in Beirut, June 20, 1938<sup>7</sup>


Camp	Huts	Families		Total families	Families		
		Owners	Tenants		Prosperous	poor	destitute
Amanus	301	301	50	351	86	162	103
Sin-el-Fil	45	45	2	47	2	20	25
Tir aux Pigeons	125	125	48	173	19	63	91
Total	471	471	100	571	107	245	219

<sup>6</sup> *Source:* N.A., C.1524. \* 578 on original table.

<sup>7</sup> *Source:* Nansen Arch., C1958.

The response to this enforced demolition policy was similar to that in Aleppo.<sup>51</sup> The refugees formed Compatriotic Unions, for example from Marash, Hadjin and Adana, and made purchases direct from private-landowners on the outskirts of Beirut. In general, these purchases were made without the intervention of the Offices although in the case of Hadjin the Office was inscribed as owner of the new land having contributed a substantial amount of the purchase price. The Office limited itself to loans to the refugees for the purchase of property, or, most frequently, for the construction of their houses. Other purchases were made by groups of refugees irrespective of origin, for example the Trad quarter. A number were made by individuals, more prosperous, refugees, so that already, before 1929, when camp clearance began in earnest, Armenian homes had been constructed in the neighbourhood of the new quarters of Achrafié.<sup>52</sup> The Armenian General Benevolent Union, acting either through the Office, or on its own accord, contributed substantially to the transfer of population, providing funds for the quarters of Gullabachène and Parechène.<sup>53</sup> It was in one of these quarters, Gullabachène, that the Office built 26 apartments for the refugees, the only venture by the Office in construction after the heavy expense of the “Pavillons” of Achrafié. The intervention of the office had to cease on December 31, 1937. On that date the work for the poor and destitute refugees was transferred to the AGBU, an organisation which had already provided a substantial amount of the finance received by the Office, and which was to work in close collaboration with Jacob Künzler, of the Swiss Friends of the Armenians, who had already provided a number of small houses for widows with children in the new quarters.<sup>54</sup> It appears that Künzler was then able to purchase a piece of land in Bourj-Hammoud, on which he constructed 101 simple “pioneer houses.” Not all the refugees were able to move smoothly to their new quarters, however. The delay in moving the inhabitants of the Amanus Camp has already been noted.<sup>55</sup> These refugees had paid the deposit on a piece of land in 1935, but were unable to take possession of it as a neighbour was claiming the right of pre-emption. When, in 1937, the demolition of the camp was due to take place, they still had not obtained possession of their land, and on the intervention of the Armenians, supported by their ecclesiastical authorities, the Lebanese government annulled the municipal decision and put back the demolition until later. The refugees then won their case on March 1, 1938, but an appeal was made against this decision, which then had to return to the courts. Meanwhile the camp was again threatened with demolition, but again the Armenian religious authorities intervened and a further delay of six months was accorded, as has been described. As at Aleppo, those refugees who were not able to build a house for themselves in the new quarters were in many cases able to rent accommodation from the newly settled owners and future owners. (Table 8.9). Jalabert describes how this arrangement benefitted the future-owners:

Avoir une mission à étage est le rêve de tout nouveau propriétaire, car, du jour où il y a logé un locataire tout souci d’avenir est écarté, l’amortissement de la maison est assuré: ce sera le locataire qui aura payé pour le propriétaire.<sup>56</sup>



**Fig. 8.3:** Changes in the built-up area of East Beirut 1934/5-1939/41

In November, 1936, out of 14,759 refugees installed in the new Quarters 3598 were sub-tenants.<sup>57</sup>

Table 8.10 shows the progress of the settlement work in the new quarters up to the end of 1937, the last date for which reliable data are available. To aid in the identification of these quarters on the ground, three useful aids are available. There is, firstly, a map drawn up by Burnier, showing the outlines of the quarters constructed (and projected) at the end of 1931, to accompany his annual report on the installation of the refugees.<sup>58</sup> This indispensable map is not always accurate, but may be usefully employed in conjunction with a series of vertical air photographs of the new quarters contained in an illustrated album presented by Burnier to Marshall Fox of the Society of Friends.<sup>59</sup> This album contains also Burnier's annual report on the installation of the refugees to the end of 1934, and it is apparent that the aerial photographs are contemporary. Thirdly, in the archives of the Nansen Office are available large-scale plans of the quarters of "Pavillons", Trad, and Gullabachène.<sup>60</sup> Used in conjunction these three sources enable the precise location of the new Armenian quarters constructed in Beirut by 1934. These quarters are identified on Fig. 8.3 which shows the extension of the built-up area of east Beirut between 1922 and 1935. It is less easy to locate the quarters built after 1935, but they are probably represented by all the new constructions to the east of the Nahr Beirut marked on Fig 8.4. With the exception of the houses grouped as "Diverse", which appear to have been grouped in or

near the Quarantine Camp, the only new quarters built by 1934 which were actually within the city limits were Pavillons, Parcelle 603, Gebeili, Khalil Badaouy and Les Pentes. All the others were in the limits of the Municipality of Bourj-Hammoud. Thus, the transfer of the refugees from the camps to new quarters to the east involved the transfer of the bulk of them across the Nahr Beirut to the neighbouring municipality. Of the new quarters in Bourj-Hammoud, the location of one, Parechène, is uncertain, but the most likely location has been indicated, ascertained by process of elimination. It is not certain whether the area of building to the south-west of Parechène and to the west of Nor-Sis, adjoining both quarters, forms part of Parechène or Nor-Sis.

**Table 8.9:** Sub-tenants in the Armenian quarters of Beirut, Nov. 1936<sup>8</sup>

Quarter	“owners” (persons)	sub-tenants (persons)
Nor-Hadjin	772	823
Khalil Badaouy	203	27
Nor-Marash	2906	1185
Gebeili	1603	223
Parcelle 603	196	72
Pavillons	701	105
Les Pentes	62	31
Quarantine & Diverse	387	166
Trad	1150	461
Gullabachène	463	99
Sis	513	93
Parechène	212	150
Adana	815	163
Gullabachène 2	311	-
Tomarza	183	-
Aghabios	411	-
Sin-el-Fil & Dahr el-Jamal	257	-
Tir aux Pigeons	-	-
Shell	-	-
Nedjib Araman	16	-
Total	11,161	3598


**Table 8.10:** Progress of the settlement work in the new quarters of Beirut<sup>9</sup>

Quarter	Number of persons installed					
	1931	1932	1933	1934	At Nov. 1936	1937
Pavillons	607	607	650	674	806	700
Gebeili	1248	1371	1400	1439	1826	2031
Parcelle 603	322	352	350	239	268	292
Nor-Marash	2193	2704	3000	3625	4091	3751
Trad	578	1125	1225	1586	1611	1302
Nor Adana	64	396	500	656	978	505
Nor-Hadjin	203	876	1243	1354	1595	1752
Khalil Badaouy	131	182	190	61	230	56

<sup>8</sup> *Source:* As Table 8.7. *Note:* Persons inhabiting huts excluded.

<sup>9</sup> *Source:* Nansen Office Reports and Tables in N.A., C1584, C1524, C1598 and S.F., M.S. Vol. 216.

Les Pentès	-	35	50	80	93	113
Nor Sis	-	763	836	978	606	275
Parechène	-	287	456	547	362	499
Gullabachène	-	-	485	539	562	589
Diverse	-	-	127	110	58	153
Norachène	-	-	-	-	-	597
Sin el Fil	-	-	-	-	257	163
Tomarza	-	-	-	-	183	191
Yozgat	-	-	-	-	-	364
Gullabachène 2	-	-	-	-	311	-
Nedjib Araman	-	-	-	-	16	-
Aghabios	-	-	-	-	411	-
Quarantine	-	-	-	-	495	-
Total	5346	8698	10512	11888	14759	13333



**Fig. 8.5:** Development of the new Armenian quarters of Beirut, 1931-37  
(Sources: As Table 8.10)

It is clear from the Nansen Archives that, as at Aleppo, in the purchase of the office quarters, cheapness was a primary condition. The economic plight of the refugees, and their receipt of loans from the Office towards their own purchases and the construction of their houses indicates that this criterion remained

important throughout the transfer process. This may explain why again, as at Aleppo, the new quarters were constructed at a considerable distance from the centre of the city, in the Municipality of Bourj-Hammoud, with the exception of those on Achrafié and near the Quarantine Camp. Significantly perhaps, while the initial purchases by the Office, drawing on finance provided by the French High Commission, were made at Achrafié, the refugees turned to Bourj-Hammoud when purchasing for themselves. The Achrafié sites could, however, be purchased relatively cheaply for another reason. The new settlements straddled the malarial valley of the Nahr Beirut, and the eastern slopes of Achrafié where the first Nansen quarters were established, were precisely those slopes from which it had already been necessary to move the Amanus refugees to the Quarantine Camp. The siting of the new quarters was therefore not without criticism on three grounds.<sup>61</sup> Burnier was aware of this situation, but stressed that the river was due for improvement, subsequent to which the quarter of Achrafié should become one of the healthiest in the city.<sup>62</sup> Thus the Office was wisely buying malarial land cheaply in anticipation of urban improvement. This did not come soon enough to prevent a violent epidemic of malaria in the Gebeili quarter in 1930, which extended to all the quarters of Beirut under construction at Achrafié, and held up building and letting.<sup>63</sup> By 1932, malaria had considerably diminished, owing to preventive measures taken by the authorities,<sup>64</sup> but there were still sporadic outbreaks up to 1936.<sup>65</sup> Apart from cheapness, another motive for the purchase of land in Bourj-Hammoud may have been that, residing then outside the Beirut city limits, the refugees would gain immunity from municipal demolitions policy and would be able to put up their huts again until they were able to afford to build more substantial homes. In November 1936, there still remained a large number of huts in the new quarters<sup>66</sup> (45 containing 218 inhabitants in Nor-Marash alone), and it was not until a year later, as has been seen, that the municipality of Bourj-Hammoud began to require their demolition.

<b>Table 8.11:</b> The development of the new quarters of Beirut <sup>10</sup>							
Quarter		1931	1932	1933	1934	At Nov. 1936	1937
<b>Nor Adana</b>							
Owners	Families	10	111	115	112	170	?
	Persons	50	?	?	502	815	374
Tenants	Families	3	10	23	40	37	?
	Persons	14	?	?	154	163	131
Total	Families	13	121	138	152	207	?
	Persons	64	396	500	656	978	505
Houses built		10	111	115	112	170	77
<b>Khalil Badaouy</b>							
Owners	Families	33	43	45	11	35	?
	Persons	131	182	?	56	203	56

<sup>10</sup> *Source:* As Table 8.1.

Tenants	Families	0	0	15	1	5	0
	Persons	0	0	?	5	27	0
Total	Families	33	43	60	12	40	?
	Persons	131	182	190	61	230	56
<b>Pavillons</b>							
Owners	Families	155	155	155	145	143	?
	Persons	555	?	?	564	701	640
Tenants	Families	10	10	20	28	29	?
	Persons	52	?	?	110	105	60
Total	Families	165	165	175	173	172	?
	Persons	607	607	650	674	806	700
Houses built		160	160	160	160	161	160
<b>Nor-Marash</b>							
Owners	Families	400	512	515	621	583	?
	Persons	1604	?	?	2500	2906	2476
Tenants	Families	145	233	285	250	240	?
	Persons	589	?	?	1125	1185	1275
Total	Families	545	745	800	871	823	?
	Persons	2193	2704	3000	3625	4091	3751
Houses built		250	275	390	561	583	502
<b>Trad</b>							
Owners	Families	131	166	?	237	250	?
	Persons	509	?	?	1132	1150	955
Tenants	Families	23	135	?	95	95	?
	Persons	69	?	?	454	461	347
Total	Families	154	301	320	332	345	?
	Persons	578	1125	1225	1586	1611	1302
Houses built		130	166	176	248	250	206
<b>Diverse</b>							
Owners	Families	-	-	?	21	7	?
	Persons	-	-	?	69	34	121
Tenants	Families	-	-	?	15	5	?
	Persons	-	-	?	41	24	32
Total	Families	-	-	?	36	12	?
	Persons	-	-	127	110	58	153
Houses built		-	-	35	21	7	30
<b>Parechène</b>							
Owners	Families	-	58	?	82	76	?
	Persons	-	?	?	370	212	341
Tenants	Families	-	10	?	48	33	?
	Persons	-	?	?	177	150	158
Total	Families	-	68	108	130	109	?
	Persons	-	287	456	547	362	499
Houses built		-	58	71	82	74	68

<b>Parcelle 603</b>							
Owners	Families	63	63	60	52	59	?
	Persons	300	?	?	175	196	237
Tenants	Families	5	5	15	15	17	?
	Persons	22	?	?	64	72	55
Total	Families	68	68	75	67	76	?
	Persons	322	352	350	239	268	292
Houses built		55	60	60	52	59	53
<b>Nor-Sis</b>							
Owners	Families	-	170	187	197	121	?
	Persons	-	?	?	885	513	239
Tenants	Families	-	24	28	26	26	?
	Persons		?	?	93	93	36
Total	Families	-	194	215	223	147	?
	Persons	-	763	836	978	606	275
Houses built		-	59	66	193	121	54

A remarkable feature which emerges from Table 8.10 showing the progress of the settlement work, is the apparent decline in numbers settled between 1936 and 1937. This immediately casts doubt on the validity of the figures, possibly reflecting errors of tabulation, differences in the classes of inhabitants recorded, or the possible exclusion of some quarters from the 1937 totals. Otherwise, the decline would imply some movement out of the new quarters, possibly of those refugees now sufficiently wealthy to live in the city. An analysis of the development of the individual quarters throws more light on the nature of this decline. (Table 8.11, Fig. 8.5) A number show the expected continuous increase in population. The others are examined using the information available concerning the number of houses built and the number of families and persons of both owner-occupiers and sub-tenants. The apparently erratic development of Nor-Adana (after 1934), of "Khalil Badaouy", and of the houses listed under the title "Diverse" defies explanation without further information. In Parechène, the anomalously low population total in 1936 is not explained by the small reduction in the number of houses standing. It must rather be explained in terms of a reduction in mean family-size from 4.2 (1934) to 3.3 (1936), possibly resulting from a tabulating error. In fact, according to the data presented, mean family-size for owner-occupiers in 1936 was only 2.8! (c.f. 4.5 in 1934). Similarly, in the case of "Parcelle 603", there does appear to have been a reduction in the number of houses standing in 1934, but this alone cannot explain the decrease in population in 1934, which again must be explained in terms of a dramatic decrease in mean family size between 1933 (4.7) and 1934 (3.6) and 1936 (3.5). Such a dramatic decrease might possibly have resulted from a malaria epidemic, but may more likely be attributed to inaccuracies in the figures. The anomalously high population of "Pavillons" also reflects a change in mean family size from 3.9 (1934) to 4.7 (1936), and might again be attributed to inaccuracies in the

figures. In three quarters, however, (Nor-Marash, Trad and Nor-Sis) there does seem to have been a decrease in the number of houses standing sufficient to account for the fall of population in these quarters towards the end of the period, that in Nor-Sis being particularly dramatic. With the strong reservation that the figures may be misleading, it does seem that there was an exodus in the latter part of the period from these quarters, possibly a result of the more wealthy refugees (those perhaps who had been profiting longest from sub-tenants) moving out of Bourj-Hammoud into the city. The economic status of the refugees in the new quarters will be discussed shortly.

**Table 8.12:** The construction of new churches in the new quarters of Beirut<sup>11</sup>

Quarter	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1936
Pavillons	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gebeili	-	-	-	-	1(A)	2(A?)
Parcelle 603	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nor-Marash	-	3 (ACP)	3 (ACP)	3 (ACP)	3 (ACP)	3 (ACP)
Trad		-	-	-	1(P)	1(P)
Nor-Adana		-	-	-	-	-
Nor-Hadjin		-	-	1(A)	1(A)	1(A)
Khalil Badaouy		-	1(A)	1(A)	-	1(A)
Les Pentes			-	-	-	-
Nor Sis			-	1(A)	1(A)	1(A)
Parechène			-	-	1(A)	-
Gullabachène				-	-	-
Diverse				-	-	-
Norachène						-
Sin el Fil						-
Tomarza						-
Gullabachène 2						-
Nedjib Araman						-
Aghabios						-
Quarantine						1(?)

### *Social Structure of the New Quarters*

A remarkable feature of the structure of the new quarters was the reconstitution of communities based on town or district or origin, as a result of the participation in the resettlement process of the Compatriotic Unions. This was even more marked in Beirut than in Aleppo, the names of the new Armenian quarters (Hadjin, Marash, Sis, Adana etc.) reflecting the town of origin and striking the attention of the observer.<sup>67</sup> The community structure was reinforced by the opening of churches and schools in the new quarters. Table 8.12 lists the

<sup>11</sup> *Sources:* Nansen Office Reports in N.A., C1584, C 1524, and S.F., N.S. Vol. 216. *Explanation:* A=Armenian Apostolic, C= Armenian Catholic, P= Armenian Protestant.

churches established in the new quarters. A distinction may be drawn between the quarters in Beirut city whose inhabitants did not construct their own churches but used the churches of the town, and those new quarters in Bourj-Hammoud possessing their own churches. The distinction is not absolute. Within the city, the quarters of Quarantine, Gebeili and Nor-Hadjin had their own churches, while within Bourj-Hammoud, no church existed at Nor-Adana by 1936, and the inhabitants of Trad used initially the churches of nearby Nor-Marash, until 1933 the only Armenian churches in Bourj-Hammoud. The most recently established quarters in Bourj-Hammoud also still had no churches. It is interesting to note that, as at Aleppo, the Armenian Catholic church, which had previously ceded care of the Catholic Armenians to the Jesuits, succeeded in establishing itself in Nor-Marash in Bourj-Hammoud.

The opening of schools in the new quarters resembles that of the churches (Table 8.13}, with the same distinction between the quarters of Beirut city and Bourj-Hammoud. In general, however, schools were opened first and sometimes existed (as at Nor-Adana) where churches did not. It is interesting to observe that, when the refugees moved from the “Camp St. Michel”, the Jesuits moved their schools from the camp to Achrafié, that is near to the new Armenian Catholic quarter (“Parcelle 603”).<sup>68</sup> It is clear, as regards schools and churches, that the transfer of the refugees from their high density concentration in the camps to more extensive and more scattered quarters required the provision of an increased number of both.<sup>69</sup> A further indication of community structure comes from an index of retail-provision which may be calculated for each of the new quarters in 1936 (Table 8.14). In general, the highest index values (denoting low retail provision) are recorded by the quarters in Beirut city, suggesting the use of existing retail facilities in the city. The exceptions to this rule are Gebeili, Quarantine and Nor-Hadjin quarters, all of which also had greater provision of churches and schools than other quarters in Beirut city, suggesting more segregated communities. High index values are also recorded for the most recently established quarters in Bourj-Hammoud, where presumably an adequate retail structure had not time to be established. By contrast, low index values (denoting high retail-provision) characterise the long-established quarters of Bourj-Hammoud suggesting the necessity of establishing adequate retail provision in quarters far removed from the pre-existing retail facilities of the city. The exceptions in Bourj-Hammoud are the quarters of Trad and Nor-Adana. It is interesting that both of these quarters were also underprivileged in terms of church and school provision. One must assume that their inhabitants used the churches in the neighbouring Armenian quarters of Bourj-Hammoud, rather as the Armenians in Beirut city used the existing facilities there. Only Nor-Marash was under construction in Bourj-Hammoud before these two quarters, and its role in retail provision as in church and school provision would therefore appear very important. One may conclude as regards the spatial structure of the new quarters, that the quarters within the city were in general less segregated from the

indigenous population than the quarters in the Municipality of Bourj-Hammoud, where the communities were in general more self-sufficient, by implication more segregated, and where community reconstitution reached its fullest expression.

**Table 8.13:** The construction of schools in the new quarters of Beirut<sup>12</sup>

Quarter	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1936
Pavillons	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gebeili	-	-	3 (ACP)	2(AP)	2(AP)	3(AP?)
Parcelle 603	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nor-Marash	-	4 (ACPX)	3 (ACP)	3 (ACP)	3 (ACP)	3 (ACP)
Trad		1(A)	1(A)	2(AP)	3(ACP)	1(?)
Nor-Adana		-	1(A)	1(A)	1(A)	1(A)
Nor-Hadjin		1(?)	2(AP)	1(P)	2(P?)	1(?)
Khalil Badaouy		-	1(A)	1(A)	-	1(A)
Les Pentes			-	-	-	-
Nor-Sis			1(A)	1(A)	1(A)	1(A)
Paraehène			-	-	-	-
Gullabachène				-	-	-
Diverse				-	-	-
Sin el Fil						2(??)
Tomarza						-
Gullabachène 2						-
Nedjib Araman						-
Aghabios						-
Quarantine						1(?)

### *Living Conditions in the New Quarters*

As at Aleppo the living conditions of the refugees did not change overnight with their move to the new quarters. Refugees are reported falling into debt,<sup>70</sup> being obliged to borrow money to build their houses, according to Berron often at 10 to 20% interest. Ellen Chater of the “Save the Children Fund” wrote in August 1930,<sup>71</sup> “I heard only praise of the urban settlements from Armenians themselves except once or twice a statement that the houses were costing the refugees more than was really necessary.” The Armenians, in fact, continued to be vulnerable to economic fluctuations, leading to some delay in the payment of rents to, and the recuperation of loans from, the Nansen Office.<sup>72</sup> This, at least, is the more generous view of a situation which was also blamed on communist propaganda<sup>73</sup> and economic shrewdness. Burnier reported at the end of 1932 that a certain number of the Office’s tenants, though possessing sufficient resources, were making difficulties or even refusing to pay the amount due. They wished to

<sup>12</sup> **Sources:** As Table 8.12. **Explanation:** A= Armenian Apostolic, C= Armenian Catholic, P= Armenian Protestant, X= Private.

Quarter	1930			1931			1933			1934			1936			
	Workshops	Shops	Bakeries	Workshops	Shops	Bakeries	Workshops	Shops	Bakeries	Workshops	Shops	Bakeries	Workshops	Bakeries	Total	Index of retail provision
Pavillons	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	6	-	6	134.4
Gebeili	5	67	2	?	?	?	?	35	?	-	35	3	29	5	34	53.7
Parcelle 603	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	3	?	-	3	?	3	-	3	89.3
Nor-Marash	?	?	?	7	92	?	?	50	10	?	120	10	129	10	139	29.4
Trad				1	30	?	?	37	3	-	27	?	16	3	19	84.8
Nor-Adana				?	?	?	?	13	1	?	13	2	9	3	12	81.5
Nor-Hadjin				?	?	?	?	45	3	?	46	3	59	4	63	25.3
Khalil Badaouy				?	?	?	?	2	?	-	?	?	2	-	2	115
Les Pentes							?	?	?	-	?	?	-	-	-	?
Nor-Sis							?	10	1	-	16	?	16	3	19	31.9
Parechène							?	15	2	?	11	?	11	2	13	27.8
Gullabachène							?	3	?	-	8	?	19	3	22	25.5
Diverse							?	1	?	-	?	?	-	-	-	?
Sin el Fil													6	1	7	36.7
Tomarza													2	1	3	61
Gullabachène 2													3	-	3	103.7
Nedjib Araman													-	-	-	?
Aghabios													3	-	3	137
Quarantine													9	1	10	49.5

<sup>1</sup> Sources: As Table 8.12. Note: Index of retail-provision = population of quarters divided by total (shops+bakeries) in quarters.

pass as indigent and profit from the facilities which it was necessary to make available to those in trouble. At Beirut certain quarters had even wished to suspend all payments until an improvement in the situation. There was a propaganda campaign to persuade the tenants not to pay. This action was hardly succeeding, but it had been necessary to take action against sixteen of the most troublesome offenders for considerable delay in their payments.<sup>74</sup>

In view of the difficulties of finance encountered by the refugees in building their houses, it is not surprising that these should have been subject to criticism. Mr. Henry R. Aldridge, a contributor to *The Illustrated Carpenter and Builder* visited first the ready-built apartments of “Pavillons”, then a quarter containing houses built by the refugees themselves: “I was duly asked to approve of this as an excellent example of thrift. But instead, I noticed the poverty of the conceptions of the people... concerning the value of the two types of dwelling I had no doubt.”<sup>75</sup> This is rather unfair to the Armenians. The ready-built “Pavillons” proved unpopular, while the new houses built by the Armenians were considerably more substantial than the ramshackle huts from which they had moved. A number of them did, however, as observed remain in huts even in the new quarters, until at least as late as 1936. Information concerning water-supply, sewerage and health in the new quarters is unfortunately minimal, but this probably reflects the absence of criticism of arrangements which appear to have been relatively satisfactory.<sup>76</sup> The exception was, as noted, the malarial nature of the sites chosen, excusable on financial grounds. Otherwise, by 1936, all the new buildings were provided with septic ditches, a complete network of piped water was established in Achrafié by the end of 1933, and even by the end of 1931 the new quarters of Nor-Marash and Trad were receiving piped water from public fountains supplied by the Water Company. The supply of piped water, in particular, enabled the avoidance of the excesses of Aleppo, where an inadequate sewerage system existed alongside wells tapping groundwater.

### **Conclusions**

To conclude, then, the settlement experience of the Armenian refugees at Beirut mirrors that of the refugees at Aleppo, with minor differences. Whereas at Aleppo the transfers from camps to new quarters were the result of a confrontation with the landowners, at Beirut they appear initially to have been planned as a response to considerations of politics and hygiene. At this stage the Settlement Committee should have held the initiative, but in the event the initial transfers were made as a response to the need to rehouse refugees temporarily lodged in the quarantine buildings. After 1929 the Settlement Committee appears anyway to have lost this initiative, the Municipality now carrying through, as at Aleppo, a systematic demolitions policy. Within the new quarters, community reconstitution was even more marked at Beirut than Aleppo, and living conditions were more satisfactory, the provision of a piped water-supply at Beirut avoiding the most obvious risk of disease at Aleppo.

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> Ross, Fry & Sibley, p. 264; Mécérian (1961), p. 148; Poidebard (1926), p. 16; *F.A.*, 91, 2Q, 1924, p. 8 & Report by Marshall Fox, ca 1924 (S.F., F.F.M.A., Syria. S/3).
- <sup>2</sup> "Illustrated Report etc.-1934".
- <sup>3</sup> Mécérian (1961), p. 148.
- <sup>4</sup> Balian (1972), p. 218.
- <sup>5</sup> Naslian, *Vol. 2*, p. 343; Mécérian (1961), p. 148.
- <sup>6</sup> Mécérian (1961), p. 148.
- <sup>7</sup> Photographs contained in "Illustrated Report etc.... 1934".
- <sup>8</sup> *F.A.*, 91, 2Q, 1924, p. 8; Carle Report, p. 6; Jalabert (1934), p. 122.
- <sup>9</sup> Mécérian (1928)(2), p. 111; Jalabert (1934), pp. 122, 126.
- <sup>10</sup> *F.A.*, 89, 4Q, 1923, p. 19.
- <sup>11</sup> Mécérian (1961), p. 148.
- <sup>12</sup> Keuroghlian (1970), p. 22.
- <sup>13</sup> Burnier (1926), p. 98; "Rapport" (1925), p. 76; *F.A.*, 106, 1Q, 1928, p. 7.
- <sup>14</sup> Keuroghlian (1970), p. 15. On this question see also Burt Report; Report by Con.-Gen. Satow, May 11, 1926 (F.O. 371/11550); Burnier to Johnson, Aug. 7, 1926 (M.A. C1429) & Sahag II to the Governor of Lebanon, Nov. 28, 1925 (Arch.A.C.C.).
- <sup>15</sup> Mécérian (1928)(2), p. 111.
- <sup>16</sup> Keuroghlian (1970), p. 22; V.V. (1931), pp. 35-37; Mécérian (1924), p. 228; Mécérian (1928)(1), p. 157; Burt Report; Table of Nov. 9, 1936 (N.A. C1524).
- <sup>17</sup> Mécérian (1924), p. 227; Ross, Fry & Sibley, p. 264; *F.A.*, 89, 4Q, 1923, pp. 14-15.
- <sup>18</sup> Mécérian (1925), pp. 449-50; (1928)(1) p. 161; Naslian, *Vol. 2*, pp. 355-56.
- <sup>19</sup> Mécérian (1924), p. 228.
- <sup>20</sup> *F.A.*, 89, 4Q, 1923, p. 15, *Idem.*, 97, 4Q, 1925, p. 11.
- <sup>21</sup> Johnson (1938), pp. 329-30; Mécérian (1924), pp. 222-23, (1928)(1), p. 149, (1961), pp. 150-51; *F.A.*, *passim*; Bacon to Forster, Nov. 28, 1922; Report on the use of the Red Cross Special Relief Fund, Beirut, Feb. & March 1924, by Henry H. Riggs (both Arch.A.R.C.); Memorandum on the Problem of the Armenian Nation, by Bassil Matthews, 1924 (S.F., F.F.M.A. Syria. S/3); Burt Report; Report by Con.-Gen. Satow, May 11, 1926; "Rapport trimestriel de la délégation auprès de l'État du Grand-Liban," for the 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter of 1925 (Arch.Dip. S-L, Vol. 258).
- <sup>22</sup> "Rapport" (1922-23), p. 19.
- <sup>23</sup> *F.A.*, *passim*; Burt Report; Mécérian (1924), pp. 223-24; Report by Con.-Gen. Satow, May 11, 1926; Report on use of Red Cross Special Relief Fund; Dodge to Director, A.R.C., Nov. 12, 1923 (Arch.A.R.C.).
- <sup>24</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Oct. 13, 1926 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>25</sup> *Le Levant*, 5e ann., no. 2, nov.-déc. 1927, p. 8.
- <sup>26</sup> Mécérian (1924), pp. 223-24, (1961), pp. 148-49, 151; Bakhos (1932), pp. 22-23; *F.A.*, 89, 4Q, 1923, p. 19; St. John Ward to Bicknell, n.d., 1923; St. John Ward to Swift, Feb. 20, 1924 (Arch.A.R.C.); Report by Burnier; Duguet to Armenian subcommittee, Aug. 31, 1928 (N.A. C1430).
- <sup>27</sup> On clinics and medical care, see: Mécérian (1924), pp. 233-34, (1925), p. 440, (1928)(2), pp. 108-11; Poidebard (1926), pp. 16-22; Naslian, *Vol. 2*, p. 357; Ross, Fry & Sibley, p. 269; Alamuddin (1970), p. 155; Burt Report; Union of the Evangelical Churches etc. (1970), pp. 68-69; *F.A.*, 107, 2Q, 1928, p. 11, *Idem.* 1Q, 1931, p. 3, *Idem.* 125, Feb. 1933, p. 6, *Idem.* 127, Oct. 1933, p. 6.

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- <sup>28</sup> *F.A.*, 110, 1Q, 1929, p. 6, Idem. 114, 1Q, 1930, p. 2; Matthews Memo. (S.F.); Letter from Annie Davies of the "Friends of Armenia," June 20, 1929 (N.A. C1424).
- <sup>29</sup> *F.A.*, 119, 2Q, 1931, p. 7; Idem. 125, Feb. 1933, p. 4.
- <sup>30</sup> Arch.A.C.C.; *Massis*, Vol. 8, no. 2, Feb. 1936, pp. 18-19.
- <sup>31</sup> *F.A.*, 131, Feb. 1935, p. 2; *Université St. Joseph* (1931) Vol. 7, p. 24; Burnier to Sec.-Gen., Nansen Office, Dec. 4, 1931 (N.A. C1584).
- <sup>32</sup> Arch.Dip. Documents in course of classification.
- <sup>33</sup> *F.A.*, 101, 4Q, 1926, p. 13.
- <sup>34</sup> Arch.A.C.C.
- <sup>35</sup> N.E.R. Report (1921), p. 7, (1928), p. 17; Ross, Fry & Sibley, p. 270.
- <sup>36</sup> Poidebard (1926), pp. 18-22; Charles (1929), p. 81; *Université St. Joseph* (1931), Vol. 7, p. 25; Naslian, Vol. 2, p. 357.
- <sup>37</sup> Burnier Report, on May 1926 (N.A.).
- <sup>38</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Aug. 7, 1926 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>39</sup> *F.A.*, 104, 3Q, 1927, p. 1.
- <sup>40</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Aug. 7, 1926.
- <sup>41</sup> On the evolution of the settlement plans of the Nansen Office concerning Beirut, see N.A. C1429-C1431, C1583-C1585, C1524, C1598, R5638; "Illustrated Report etc. 1934" (S.F.).
- <sup>42</sup> Jalabert (1934), pp. 122-23.
- <sup>43</sup> Burnier to Johnson, June 5, 1928 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>44</sup> Burnier to Johnson, June 5, 1928 (N.A. C1430).
- <sup>45</sup> "Installations etc. 1931".
- <sup>46</sup> That a systematic demolitions policy was pursued emerges especially from *F.A.*, passim, from 1929. See also *Le Levant*, 10e ann., nos. 6-7, août, 1933, p. 2; *Massis*, Vol. 3, no. 3, Jan. 1921, pp. 66-67; Report by William Jessop of N.E.R. Foundation, Nov. 5, 1931 (S.F. MS, Vol. 174); and in N.A. see correspondence in C1598 and letter from Annie Davies, June 20, 1929 (N.A. C1424).
- <sup>47</sup> Ferrière, pp. 9-10.
- <sup>48</sup> On the fire and the response to it see Mécérian (1933); *F.A.*, 125, Feb., 1933, pp. 3, 7-8; "Installations etc. 1933" (N.A.).
- <sup>49</sup> Burnier to Coroni, Nov. 10, 1937 (N.A. C1598).
- <sup>50</sup> *F.A.*, 143, Feb. 1939, p. 6.
- <sup>51</sup> See references in N.A. under note 41.
- <sup>52</sup> *F.A.*, 110, 1Q, 1929, p. 4.
- <sup>53</sup> For a description of Parechène see Jalabert (1934), p. 125.
- <sup>54</sup> On the participation of Künzler see N.A. C1598; Fox (1937), p. 958; Alamuddin (1970), pp. 145-47.
- <sup>55</sup> On the difficulties of the Amanus Armenians see (in addition to *F.A.*, 143, Feb. 1939, p. 6) N.A. C1598.
- <sup>56</sup> Jalabert (1934), p. 125.
- <sup>57</sup> Table dated Nov. 9, 1936 (N.A. C1524).
- <sup>58</sup> N.A. C1585.
- <sup>59</sup> "Illustrated Report etc., 1934".
- <sup>60</sup> "Pavillons" (N.A. C1431); Trad (C1598), Gullabachène (C1585).
- <sup>61</sup> Extract from a letter out of Beirut, dated Aug. 30, 1927, which came to the attention of Johnson (N.A. C1429). See also Report by Dorothy Redgrave, of the "Friends of Armenia" (n.d. ca 1928) (N.A. C1430).

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- <sup>62</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Nov. 24, 1927 (N.A. C1430).
- <sup>63</sup> Report by Burnier, 1930 (N.A. C 1583).
- <sup>64</sup> "Installations etc. 1932," (N.A. C1584).
- <sup>65</sup> "Rapport du Président etc." (1936) (N.A. R5638).
- <sup>66</sup> Table dated Nov. 9, 1936 (N.A. C1524).
- <sup>67</sup> E.g. Jalabert (1934), p. 124.
- <sup>68</sup> Naslian, *Vol. 2*, pp. 355-56; Pallis, p. 17; *Univ. St. Joseph* (1931), Vol. 7, pp. 23-25; *Courriers*, mai 1937, déc., 1938 & juin-juillet 1939.
- <sup>69</sup> *F.A.*, 116, 3Q, 1930, p. 11.
- <sup>70</sup> *F.A.*, 116, 3Q, 1930, p. 11; *Idem.* 118, 1Q, 1931, p. 2; *Le Levant*, 10e ann., nos. 6-7, août, 1933, p. 2.
- <sup>71</sup> Chater Report, 1930.
- <sup>72</sup> "Installations etc...1931"; *Idem.* 1933; Central Armenian C'tee, Mtg. of Aug. 26, 1930. Progress report on the Settlement work in Syria (N.A. C1584).
- <sup>73</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Dec. 4, 1931 (N.A. C1584).
- <sup>74</sup> "Installations etc...1932".
- <sup>75</sup> Extract from *The Illustrated Carpenter and Builder*, Feb. 28, 1930, quoted in *F.A.* 115, 2Q, 1930, p. 17.
- <sup>76</sup> "Installations etc...1931", *Idem.* 1932, 1933; "Rapport du Président etc." (1936).



## URBAN SETTLEMENT: DAMASCUS, ALEXANDRETTA, AND CONCLUSIONS

### *DAMASCUS*

Damascus received Armenian refugees from Beirut, in 1921, and from Aleppo and Alexandretta in 1923. Subsequently there was a mass exodus of refugees to Beirut at the time of the Druze revolt, whose effects were as significant for the distribution of Armenians within the city as they were for the numbers remaining. In this respect the settlement of the refugees at Damascus differs from that at Beirut and Aleppo; in other respects, it was similar.

### *Distribution*

Once again, the Armenians settled partly in rented houses and khans in the city, and partly in camps on the outskirts. (Fig 9.1). There is some doubt, however, about the relative proportions in town and camps.<sup>1</sup> Burt (1925) notes 5000 in the camps, 8000 in the city, Consul Vaughan-Russell (1926), 6500 in each, while other sources note only about 10% of the refugees in houses, the rest in tents and huts. Information on the installation of the refugees is again inadequate. Tents appear to have been provided by the French,<sup>2</sup> but there is no information on the extent of official participation in the establishment of the camps. Within the city, Armenians are noted settling in Bab Touma and in Bab Charki near the Armenian Church,<sup>3</sup> both quarters lying in the Christian sector in the east of the old town. Vaughan-Russell describes the distribution of the refugees before the events of 1925 (Table 9.1).

Bab Charki (Outside the East Gate)	4200
Kadem (South of Damascus)	1000
Soufanié (East of Damascus)	800
Bustan el Salib (East of Damascus)	500
The remaining Armenians were scattered throughout the city in rented houses or Khans	6500
	13,000

Mécérián<sup>4</sup> describes Armenians also in the area of Baramké on the west of Damascus. The Bab Charki camp was located close to the Armenian Church; the others close to the Christian quarter outside Bab Touma. The exceptions are Baramké (about which little is known except that it was the station for the railway-line from Beirut) and Kadem, by the first railway-station south of Damascus, on a site which had previously been used as a trans-shipment point during the deportations of 1915. At the time of the troubles, these camps were abandoned, the Armenians taking refuge inside the city, or fleeing to Beirut.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Sources:* Report by Consul Vaughan-Russell, Damascus May 31, 1926 (FO371/11550).

Soufanié camp, however, was not totally abandoned; out of 800 Armenians, 200 - those who were too poor to leave - remained, to be joined by several others when barbed wire defences were erected around the city.<sup>6</sup>

### *Social Structure and Living Conditions*

Living conditions in the camps resembled those in Aleppo and Beirut.<sup>7</sup> Their community-structure is more obscure, but it is interesting that within the city there was again a strong Jesuit presence alongside the Armenian Catholics, the Jesuits running a boys' school.<sup>8</sup> The camps on the east of the city were close to the old Armenian Church of Bab Charki, and partly for this reason, and partly because most of the camps were soon extinguished in the troubles, the camps do not appear to have developed strongly their own community institutions. Shops were, however, established in the camps at an early date.

### *The Nansen Office Quarter*

Most of the camps, as observed, disappeared with the troubles, but a number of Armenians remained in camps in the Kassaa district. In 1929 over 100 families from Kassaa were transferred to a new quarter purchased by the Nansen Office. The circumstances of this transfer are relatively well documented. Joseph Burt had already, in 1925, observed that in one (un-named) camp at Damascus, the "Arab owner wants to turn out Armenians now they have put up houses."<sup>9</sup> In December, 1927, Consul Parr at Damascus received a letter from the lawyers of Mr. Philip Habra, a naturalised British subject, in reference to certain land owned by Habra in Kassaa near Bab Touma.

...He instructs us that he let this land to an Armenian for cultivation purposes some years ago, but shortly afterwards huts were erected thereon and these huts were occupied by other Armenians. Although our client has protested more huts have been built and occupied and at the present moment there are about fifty huts on the land occupied by different families of Armenians.

Our client has made repeated applications for possession so that he can build on the land and develop the same. Proceedings were taken on his behalf in the Local Courts and we understand an order has now been made directing the occupiers to give possession on the 1<sup>st</sup> March next.

Our client instructs us that representations have now been made by the Armenians to the French High Commissioner who has instituted enquiries locally..." (The Consul was then asked to protect the interests of Mr. Habra in the matter).<sup>10</sup>

The reference to "repeated applications for possession" suggests that Mr. Habra is the same owner as described by Burt in 1925. He was not apparently the sole owner requesting eviction, but according to Burnier he was the most intransigent.<sup>11</sup> It appears that the British Consul did intervene on his behalf, and as the Armenians had also appealed to the High Commission, the local delegate of the High Commission asked the government of the State of Syria to take measures to enable these families to establish themselves on domain land fulfilling the necessary conditions of hygiene and security. While the eviction of

the refugees appears as a result of this intervention to have been held in temporary abeyance, the government of the State of Syria set up a committee charged with finding a solution. This committee was slow in coming to a decision, but following the personal intervention of Burnier, the Nansen Office delegate, who had an interview with the Syrian head of state, Cheikh Taje ed Dine, on July 17, 1928, the committee reached a decision on July 21. It was resolved, firstly, that there was no land belonging to the state which would fulfil the necessary conditions (an opinion with which Burnier agreed), so that secondly, the government would buy the necessary land in the Christian quarter, from an owner who would be prepared to sell. The land would therefore be bought for the refugees by the Syrian state. To aid in the establishment of the new quarter, Burnier suggested to Geneva the allocation of £300 sterling for the construction of houses.<sup>12</sup> An immediate decision at Geneva was not possible, however, given the unfavourable views previously expressed by the settlement committee towards the settlement of refugees in the Damascus region.<sup>13</sup> The grant was not approved until Burnier could report to the settlement committee direct on August 31.<sup>14</sup> According to the report presented by Duguet and Burnier to this meeting the land envisaged was near the Christian quarter, and very close to the Armenian Church and schools.<sup>15</sup> Ultimately the Syrian government did not itself make this purchase, as it was not able, for political reasons, to concern itself specifically with the Armenians while being at the same time materially unable to respond to the requests from thousands of local families who had suffered grave losses during the Druze revolt. The money was therefore put at the disposal of Burnier,<sup>16</sup> and a title-deed records the purchase of land in Damascus by Burnier on January 17, 1929.<sup>17</sup> This land, outside the city walls, just south of Bab Charki, does appear to be the land originally envisaged by the Syrian government. (Fig. 9.1)

By the time that this purchase was made, the refugees were being threatened with expulsion,<sup>18</sup> but the refugees were slow in leaving the Habra lands. Up to June 25, 1929, only three refugees had rented lots on the Nansen land.<sup>19</sup> It appears that they were concerned about security, for on June 25 an Armenian deputation approached Consul Parr and protested that they were afraid to settle on the land outside the town limits allotted to them by the Government, because many of them had assisted the French during the rebellion and they feared the vengeance of the Syrians.<sup>20</sup> This feeling of insecurity was also reported by Dorothy Redgrave of the "Friends of Armenia."<sup>21</sup> Burnier took a more cynical view.<sup>22</sup> The delay, he argued, was caused by the hope of more favourable terms, which was held out by a priest and others coming from the Gregorian bishop, and by a certain individual (no details given). All this time, the eviction of the Armenians was being postponed by the French authorities. In these circumstances, Habra's lawyers again urged action by the British Consul.<sup>23</sup> Despite the purchase of new land for them, they insisted that the Armenians were still in occupation of the Habra land and had paid no rent or compensation for the use and occupation of the land to their client. Their client therefore desired to claim compensation in respect of the

loss he had sustained by reason of the refusal of the French authorities to comply with the order made by the Courts. Such action was not, however, necessary. The Damascus Police Commissioner was eventually given instructions to evict the Armenians from Habra's property on July 15, 1929.<sup>24</sup> According to Burnier,<sup>25</sup> faced with this deadline the refugees asked those who had fed them promises to fulfill them. They were unable to do so, and within a week all the lots on the Nansen land were taken. An additional bonus to the scheme came later when a survey made of the extent of the property revealed that an error had been made in its measurement and an additional tract of land was obtained in compensation from the former owners, which was made available for the settlement of sixty more families who were evicted from another quarter of the town.<sup>26</sup> Table 9.2 shows the progress of settlement in the Nansen Office Quarter.

**Table 9.2: Progress of settlement in the Nansen Office, Quarter of Bab Charki, Damascus<sup>2</sup>**

		1931	1932	1934	1937
Future-owners	Families	110	109	107	?
	Persons	353	?	550	641
Sub-tenants	Families	68	76	52	?
	Persons	256	?	150	163
Total	Families	178	185	162	?
	Persons	609	737	700	804

Apart from the Nansen Office Quarter, there was another notable attempt to provide accommodation for the refugees which, however, is less well documented. Mr. Hatcher Guendjian rented land in Zablatani on behalf of his refugee compatriots, and then sub-let it to the refugees such that this camp was named after him.<sup>27</sup> In the annual report by Burnier for 1930, reference is made to one camp still providing accommodation for about 70 families who are likely to be turned out.<sup>28</sup> It is likely that this statement refers to the refugees in Hatcher's camp, which was however still standing at the end of the period.

### *Social Structure and Living Conditions in the Nansen Office Quarter*

So little is known about the community structure and living conditions of the Armenians in Hatcher's Camp and within the city that comments should be confined to those within the Office Quarter. Even this quarter has not attracted in the literature as much comment as the major centres of Aleppo and Beirut, but in the absence of criticism, it may be assumed to have been relatively successful. The site of this quarter, as has been noted, was close to the Armenian church of Damascus in the east of the Christian quarter of the old town, (Fig. 9.1) but too much significance should not be attached to this, as the criteria of purchase of the Syrian government are not known (Burnier's purchase being apparently merely the purchase foreseen by the Syrian government). The agreement made between the office and the refugees was the rent-purchase agreement familiar from Aleppo and Beirut. Although the £300 intended to aid the Armenians in building their

<sup>2</sup> Sources: As Table 7.2.

new houses seems never to have arrived,<sup>29</sup> loans were made for building purposes to the most unfortunate Armenians, as “it was found that, for the most part, the population were in a very poor state due to the hardships they had suffered during recent years.”<sup>30</sup> As in the new quarters of Aleppo and Beirut, the new houses were a great improvement on the ramshackle huts. By the end of 1931 too water was supplied by three public-fountains and most of the houses were supplied by the Damascus Electricity Company.<sup>31</sup> There were no schools and churches in the quarter, the inhabitants using the nearby schools and church in the old town (as did the inhabitants of Achrafié in Beirut). Basic services were however assured by the establishment of shops within the quarter, twenty being listed in 1930.<sup>32</sup>

### ***Conclusion***

To conclude, the situation of the refugees at Damascus was fundamentally similar to that at Aleppo and Beirut, though at Damascus most of the camps were actually vacated during the troubles of 1925. A new quarter subsequently established by the Nansen Office was created in response to the eviction of Armenians remaining in the camps who had become de facto squatters as at Aleppo. Otherwise, in the establishment of Hatcher’s camp, there is evidence of the same inter-Armenian assistance already witnessed in Aleppo and Beirut.

### ***ALEXANDRETTA***

Alexandretta, which had a substantial indigenous Armenian population, received refugees in 1920 and 1921, but many of these refugees were dispersed elsewhere in 1922, so that, as at Damascus, a large section of the camps disappeared soon after their establishment.

### ***Initial Settlement and Living Conditions***

It is apparent that in 1920, there was official participation in the installation of the Armenians, a special camp being erected for the refugees.<sup>33</sup> Among these refugees were those from Ekbes, in Cilicia, whose Lazarist priest, Vincent Paskes, had left an account of their settlement.<sup>34</sup> They were initially made to camp outside the town near a large spring, the Military Governor of the town, Colonel Mensier, putting large military tents at their disposal. Later, the local authorities asked that the refugees leave this location for reasons of hygiene, and they were moved to a new camp to the east of the railway station where a dozen huts, 30 meters long, were provided for them. When in 1921, the number of refugees in Alexandretta increased dramatically, the newcomers seem to have practically all settled in camps surrounding the town. Unlike at Beirut and Aleppo (where the evidence is still weak), at Alexandretta there are no references to refugees living inside the town immediately after their arrival.

The conditions under which the Armenians at Alexandretta were expected to live were appalling, even after the French encouraged dispersal of refugees elsewhere. The refugee camps had, in fact “the disadvantage of being situated on

a malarial swamp,<sup>35</sup> a state of affairs which applied as much to the camp constructed in 1920 as to the others established later.<sup>36</sup> While the French had provided tents and then huts for the arrivals of 1920, it appears that they provided virtually nothing for the arrivals of 1921. This was despite the appeals of Rev. W. Lytle of the Irish Mission at Alexandretta, of the British Consul, petitioned by Annie Davies of the “Friends of Armenia,” of the Near East Relief, and also apparently despite the instructions of the High Commissioner.<sup>37</sup> Unable to find accommodation in the town, the Armenians camped in the surrounding marshes, in the middle of the winter rains. Shelter was improvised with tents sometimes made out of blankets. The “Friends of Armenia” provided wooden boards to put under mattresses to keep them dry, but some refugees lacked even a mattress.<sup>38</sup> Pastor Manoogian describes the scene in April 1922:

...the Armenian refugees ... had to pitch tents and build petty huts in the muddy, swampy plain around. ...Any small pieces of boards have been used to build the skeleton of these huts. Some with reeds or just anything to give some support. Any large or small piece of canvas, or common waterproof, or dirty sack or rusty tins have been good enough to cover parts of the huts. Most of the refugees have covered the roof as well as the side walls with reeds, or tied hay together or patched with canvas. You have to jump across or walk around a pool of green water in order to go from one tent to the other. To make passage from one hut to the other, several stones or boards or rusty tin water bottles of the soldiers have been placed to step on. If you stoop low enough to enter one of the huts you may see several boards used as a floor to save the bedding from the mud. Even now the ground of the tents is so near water that if you dig only one-third or two-thirds of a yard you reach it.<sup>39</sup>

Such conditions appear to have persisted among the refugees in the camps as long as they were built on the marshes. There were still Armenians lodged in miserable reed-huts in February 1929,<sup>40</sup> while in 1930 there were at Alexandretta “wretched housing conditions relieved by space and air lacking in other camps.”<sup>41</sup> As late as 1932, the majority of the refugees at Alexandretta were still installed in these camps.<sup>42</sup>

“L’état sanitaire est bon,” reported M. De Caix in April, 1922.<sup>43</sup> This extraordinary statement is contradicted by virtually every report on conditions in Alexandretta, which are unanimous in condemning conditions there as the most unhygienic in any of the urban camps in Syria.<sup>44</sup> Camped on the marshy ground surrounding the town, the refugees not only suffered from fever and rheumatism, but were extremely susceptible to malaria, for which the marshes provided an ideal breeding ground. This malaria was of a particularly virulent kind which sometimes proved fatal, especially to children. Births were in any case reduced by the debilitating effect of malaria on the women. Some medical care was provided in the early days by the Armenian Red Cross, and the Friends of Armenia. The camp appears to have remained in this unhealthy state at least until 1930.<sup>45</sup>

Information is lacking on the community structure of the camps, so it is not possible to evaluate the social constraints involved. The economic constraints

confining the Armenians to the camps appear to have been considerable. Unlike at Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo there seems to have been virtually no available accommodation within the town of Alexandretta which the Armenians could afford.<sup>46</sup> Confined therefore almost all to the camps, they could anticipate little improvement in their condition. Alexandretta town seems to have been quite unable to provide work for the thousands of refugees who descended on it, and this was one reason for the subsequent dispersal of refugees from the town. Even after this, however, out of 1350 refugee families in Alexandretta in 1927, 440 were described as destitute and 650 in need of aid.

### ***Resettlement***

There is no reference found to any rent paid by the Armenians for their land at Alexandretta, but they appear to have been at least partly settled on private land, unoccupied and marshy. Problems arose when this land was scheduled for reclamation. In December 1926, Duguet noted the precarious situation of the refugees.<sup>47</sup> One part of them was situated on the east of the town. Reclamation work was due to begin in spring 1927, on this marsh, which was in private ownership. By contrast, the south-west marsh, where other refugees were camped, was not yet under regular ownership, and this would fall to whoever should carry out the reclamation. When Major Johnson, of the Nansen Office, visited Alexandretta on his tour of inspection he considered an arrangement offered by the French Delegate to the Sanjak, M. Durieux, whereby the Office and the government would each contribute 50% to the cost of this reclamation, but no prompt action was taken.<sup>48</sup> Thus, by May 1927, when the works of reclamation were under way, the situation, as elsewhere, had become one of crisis. The reclamation of the marshes was obliging the refugees either to move their homes or to pay rent to the owners of the reclaimed land. This was creating endless difficulties and discussions which were embittering relations between the locals and the refugees. Burnier therefore submitted proposals for an urban quarter at Alexandretta, which had clearly been drawn up in close co-operation with the French authorities.<sup>49</sup> The quarter would be constructed on the site of the former military camp known as the "Camp des Marais" which had already been reclaimed. The land, of 75,000 square meters, would be made available by the town for the price of 375,000 francs, representing the cost of reclamation. But this plan could not be approved by Geneva, given that Alexandretta lay within "une zone dont la situation n'est pas absolument nette au point de vue politique,"<sup>50</sup> despite the fact that such objections were not only rejected by Burnier, but also by Duguet, on behalf of the Mandatory Power. The question appears then to have been dropped until fresh proposals were presented by Burnier in May 1928, which were again given lowest priority by Geneva. Notwithstanding this decision, however, this time Burnier went ahead and made the purchase, without the prior approval of Geneva. Again, this was as a response to a crisis created by the process of urban improvement. In accordance with its

policy of improving the salubrity of the town, the Municipality was planning to dam the stream which crossed it. This operation would necessitate the expulsion of 200 families whose huts were constructed on the banks of the stream, and who would then only be able to settle in the middle of the marshes. Burnier's emergency action was eventually approved by the Geneva committee. The land acquired was on the periphery of the town and bordering the roads from Aleppo and Arsouz. This was the only settlement work in Alexandretta undertaken by the office, for in 1931 it was decided that urban settlement would henceforth concern only Beirut and Alexandretta, the refugees of Alexandretta "se trouvant actuellement dans des conditions relativement favorables."<sup>51</sup>

The refugees were slow to take possession of their plots in the Nansen Office Quarter, claiming that they were too poor to build new houses with their own resources, and collection of rent was initially difficult. This reluctance was overcome by August 1930 but "the source of this difference was never satisfactorily traced."<sup>52</sup> It may possibly have been political. Table 9.3 shows the progress of the settlement work at Alexandretta. Although the new quarter appears to have been flooded during the winter rains of 1928, living conditions were improved, with more substantial dwellings replacing the former huts. Information on amenities is lacking, though the quarter had its own school and church by 1930. A number of shops were also established in the quarter, but the economic situation of the Armenians did not improve overnight. In mid-1938, out of the 64 heads of families in the quarter, 20 were unemployed, although by that time the economic situation in the Sanjak had, of course, been disturbed by political uncertainty. The parallel history of the remaining camp is rather obscure. There were certainly huts still standing in 1938,<sup>53</sup> though there is some evidence of participation by the authorities in reclamation and even settlement work.<sup>54</sup> But all was, in any case, to no avail. With the accession of the Sanjak to Turkey, its Armenian population, including that of Alexandretta town, fled southwards to constitute a new refugee problem elsewhere, among them the inhabitants of the Nansen Office Quarter.

		1928	1930	1932	1936	1937
Future-owners	Families	?	?	57	?	?
	Persons	?	?	?	?	295
Sub-tenants	Families	?	?	2	?	?
	Persons	?	?	?	?	34
Total	Families	?	63	59	64	?
	Persons	137	?	211	277	329

### **Conclusion**

The refugees to Alexandretta had, it appears, initially settled virtually entirely in camps outside the town, there being no references to initial settlement inside

<sup>3</sup> Sources: Nansen Office Reports in N.A. C1429, C1583, C1584, R5638, C1598.

the town. It seems that, as the influx of Armenians to Alexandretta was greater in proportion to the number of inhabitants in the town than at Beirut, Aleppo or Damascus, there was no accommodation available to the refugees within Alexandretta itself equivalent to that offered at the other three centres. Conditions in the camps were the worst encountered in any of the urban refugee camps in Syria and Lebanon, due to their situation on malarial, marshy land. These conditions persisted even after the French dispersed some refugees from Alexandretta in 1922. A new quarter was founded for the Armenians by the Nansen Office in 1928 in order to accommodate families threatened with expulsion by Municipal drainage operations, while other Armenians shifted their homes as the progressive reclamation of the marshes obliged them either to move or to pay rent to the owners of the reclaimed land. Thus, Alexandretta demonstrated once again the involuntary movement of the Armenians caused by Municipal improvement (as at Beirut) and the demands of the landowners (as at Aleppo and Damascus). The flight of the Armenians from Alexandretta upon the cession of the Sanjak ultimately rendered useless the work there of the Nansen Office.

### *Urban Settlements Conclusions*

The refugees who settled at Aleppo, Beirut, Damascus and Alexandretta seem to have been distributed initially almost evenly between town and "camp", though precise figures are lacking. The exception would appear to have been Alexandretta where it seems that, the influx being greater in proportion to the number of inhabitants than in other centers, there was no comparable accommodation available in the town itself, so that virtually all the refugees were obliged to settle in camps. Information is very limited on settlement within the towns. The Armenians found accommodation there in rented khans or houses or were housed by their employers. There may have been a tendency to occupy run-down accommodation in the city-center. Much more information is available on those who settled in the camps which provided the most spectacular manifestation of the Armenian presence and attracted most attention. Here a remarkable feature of their social structure was the existence of spatially distinct communities based on town or region of origin which were most noticeable in the camps of Aleppo, but also of Beirut.

Living conditions in the camps were unsatisfactory, even dangerous, reaching their worst expression on the malarial marshes of Alexandretta. While information on the formation of the camps is acutely lacking, settlement in these conditions appears to have resulted from the absence of available accommodation in the town at rents which the Armenians (or their sponsors) could afford. Subsequently the refugees appear to have been confined to the camps by both economic and social constraints. In general, the refugees in the camps appear to have formed the poorer part of the refugee population, that is those unable (or probably unwilling) to rent accommodation in the town and who enjoyed the

freedom from rent and tax which their situation in the camps as de facto squatters initially gave them. Their attachment to the camps was reinforced by their community reconstitution and by the provision of basic services in the camps that is the beginnings of rudimentary economic systems, providing even more social cohesion and vested interests in inertia.

During the inter-war period, the great bulk of the refugee population in the camps of Aleppo and Beirut was transferred from the camps to new quarters on the outskirts of the towns, while new quarters were established also in Damascus and Alexandretta. The transfers resulted from the desire of the landowners to evict from their property those refugees unable to pay rent, and from municipal improvement schemes. Only the initial transfers in Beirut could be regarded as part of a well co-ordinated demolition and resettlement scheme. Elsewhere the transfers often involved unnecessary hardship. Apart from the participation of the Nansen Office, one notable feature of the transfer process was inter-Armenian aid, especially the participation of Compatriotic Unions. One result of this was that the community reconstitution apparent in the camps was re-established in the new quarters, receiving its clearest expression in Beirut. The land acquired for rehousing the Armenians was required to be inexpensive, and consequently at Aleppo and Beirut was often far removed from the town centre. Living conditions were improved, although, particularly in Aleppo, some of the new quarters remained deprived of urban amenities. In the transfer of the quarters the economic status of the refugees was not transformed, and the deprivation they had previously experienced in terms of the squalid living conditions of the camps, was now expressed in terms of distance from the town centre and lack of urban amenities.

## ***CONCLUSIONS***

This final section brings together the conclusions of the individual chapters of the thesis to produce a model of the processes involved in Armenian settlement. This model forms the basis for a discussion of the ideas put forward in the Introduction concerning the significance of economic, social and political constraints on settlement and the extent of their interdependence. The principal weaknesses of the study are then discussed and proposals made as to how it might be improved or extended. Finally, the applicability of the conclusions of the study to other cases is considered, and suggestions are made regarding the approach to research in the general field of minority settlement in the Middle East.

First, however, it is necessary to recapitulate on the approach adopted to the study. The thesis has investigated the settlement of Armenian refugees in Syria and Lebanon between 1915 and 1939. It was conceived not so much as a refugee study, but as a study of the processes of minority settlement in the Middle East, for while the importance of the ethnic mosaic pattern in the area has long been recognised, there have been few studies of the processes involved in the evolution of this pattern. A study of the processes of Armenian settlement would enable an

assessment of the relative significance of ethnicity, economic status and political manipulation in determining the settlement pattern as well as test the writer's assumption of the interdependence of these constraints. It was judged impracticable to use field survey techniques in the study and it was necessary to rely on the documentary sources, which are numerous but in some cases of doubtful reliability. The approach adopted was part deductive - part inductive, involving the investigation of the sources for respectively economic, social and political constraints on the settlement process. In this investigation the Armenians were treated as a homogeneous unit although internal differences in settlement preferences were identified when revealed in the documents. While for purposes of analysis the principal constraints on settlement were investigated separately, and regional and urban patterns were differentiated, the object of the study was not to test one by one the significance of the various constraints discussed, but to construct an overall picture of the processes in operation against which their significance could ultimately be tested. It is this overall picture which will now be constructed.

Armenian refugees arrived in Syria and Lebanon in 1920, 1921, 1922-24 and 1929. They came principally to the coastal towns, especially Beirut, and to Alexandretta and Aleppo, the first two large towns on the routes from the north. Some of the 1929 arrivals came, however, directly to the growing settlements of north-east Syria. Some of the 1921 arrivals were dispersed to the interior by the French High Commission, in order to relieve congestion in the arrival points, and to spread them according to the economic absorptive capacity of the country. For similar economic reasons and possibly also to avoid offending Turkish susceptibilities, the French authorities dispersed more refugees from Alexandretta in 1922, and again dispersed some of the 1922-24 arrivals from Aleppo to Beirut and Damascus. This government-inspired dispersal was largely responsible for such movement of refugees as did take place from their arrival points during the period.

The pattern thus established, with its strong relationship to arrival points, its overwhelming concentration of Armenians in urban rather than rural settlements, and in particular their concentration in the principal centres of Aleppo, Beirut, Damascus and Alexandretta, persisted to a large extent for the rest of the study-period. This concentration and lack of dispersal seems to have been a function of both economic status and ethnicity. The Armenians had arrived in an economy which simply was not able to support them in the cities where employment in industry was actually decreasing. They were obliged there to accept employment, if available, in jobs of low economic status, where they were highly vulnerable to economic crises, and they seem to have been unable to afford the expense of movement and reinstallation on the land where, given the capital, the real opportunities lay. Within these cities, as an economically weak population they were obliged to find accommodation where they could. Inside the towns they found accommodation in rented khans and houses. Those unable or unwilling to

do this settled in camps outside the towns which developed into shanty-towns where living conditions were unsatisfactory and even dangerous. The Armenians who thus settled in the “camps” appear to have formed the poorer part of the refugee population, that is those unable to rent accommodation in the town and who enjoyed the freedom from rent and tax which their situation in the “camps” as de facto squatters initially gave them.

Concentration was maintained by the Armenian’s reluctance to disperse in small groups, due to their preoccupation with security and their desire to preserve their culture and community structure, which was maintained in the “camps” by the reconstitution of communities of origin. The provision of basic services in the “camps”, that is the beginnings of a rudimentary economic system, provided even more social cohesion and vested interests in inertia. The Armenians’ need for security was increased by local hostility. The Armenians had moved from one situation of competing nationalism in the Ottoman Empire to a country where they once again found themselves embroiled in a triangular relationship between French, Arabs and Armenians, all with conflicting national aspirations. In these circumstances, the Arab reaction to the Armenians was cool, sometimes openly hostile, an attitude based on ethnic, political and economic grounds which was particularly intense when the Armenians became identified with French interests. The relationship between Arabs and Armenians was consequently uneasy, although not in general marked by violence. The most bitter clashes, which occurred at Damascus and encouraged a mass movement of Armenians from that city to Beirut, were atypical in nature and effect. Generally, local hostility was more subtle in its influence on Armenian settlement. By increasing the Armenians’ need to concentrate for security it helped to stress their ethnic separateness, increase their impact on local economies and increase their dependence on French protection, all of which increased local hostility still further so that, other things being equal, the process of concentration became self-perpetuating. French attempts to use the Armenians politically increased Arab fears and exacerbated Arab-Armenian hostility, thus acting indirectly as a catalyst of the process of concentration and segregation.


One solution to the problem of overconcentration in urban “camps” was emigration, and a number of Armenians took this course. In addition, various schemes were suggested to settle the Armenians on the land, but these met with little success. Initial proposal of the Mandatory power, envisaging the small-scale dispersal of the Armenians, were frustrated by the Armenians’ reluctance to disperse. Karen Jeppe had more success with small-scale settlement, but to solve the problem plans were required on a scale which would require governmental action, and were persistently advocated by the philanthropic societies. The Mandatory Power was initially unwilling to commit finance to large-scale agricultural colonisation, but later accepted the co-operation of the League in a settlement scheme, the critical factor being probably the provision of finance by the League. Once begun, however, the scheme, which envisaged large-scale

agricultural settlement, was increasingly retarded and finally extinguished by the adoption of alternative schemes of urban resettlement, largely dictated by the development of housing crises in the principal centres of Armenian concentration. The scheme had anyway been hindered by lack of finance. The High Commission had not the necessary financial resources to commit to the scheme, while the local states had not the political will to commit them, even if available. Agricultural colonisation was expensive, and its abandonment in favor of urban resettlement came before a full program could be implemented. The scheme had been partly influenced by considerations of French policy, but any ambitious schemes of population transfer were quickly ruled out in order not to offend Arab susceptibilities and ultimately, of course, by the switch to urban resettlement. These settlements which did go ahead were located according to potential economic viability, and the Armenians' desire for security. Thus, the principal grouping of settlements was in the Sanjak of Alexandretta, a coastal region which was also an area of historic Armenian settlement. These villages were never an economic success, although ultimately this proved immaterial as the villagers in the Sanjak were obliged to flee with the cession of the region to Turkey.

Thus, the problem of overconcentration in the main cities continued, and indeed seems to have increased throughout the period. In these circumstances the Armenians in the "camps" came under increasing pressure to move, either from the landowners, who desired to evict from their property those refugees unable to pay rent, or from municipal improvement schemes. There was also a fear on the part of the Mandatory authorities that the squalid conditions under which the Armenians were living in the camps would encourage the growth of Communism. Thus, the great bulk of the refugee population in the "camps" of Aleppo and Beirut was transferred from the camps to new quarters on the outskirts of the towns, while new quarters were established also in Damascus and Alexandretta. Only the initial transfers in Beirut could be regarded as a well co-ordinated demolition and resettlement scheme. Elsewhere, despite the participation of the Nansen Office, the transfers often involved unnecessary hardship. The land for rehousing the Armenians had to be inexpensive and consequently at Aleppo and Beirut was often far removed from the town centre. Living conditions were improved although, particularly in Aleppo, some of the new quarters remained deprived of urban amenities. In the transfer of the quarters the economic status of the refugees was not transformed, for there was no real economic progress made in the country to permit this. The transfer was no real solution to the problem, and the deprivation which the Armenians had previously experienced in terms of the squalid living conditions of the "camps" was now expressed in terms of distance from the town centre and lack of urban amenities. One encouraging feature of the transfer process, however, was inter-Armenian aid, notably the participation of Compatriotic Unions, which resulted in the community reconstitution apparent in the "camps" being re-established in the new quarters, a tendency, which received

its clearest expression in Beirut. While the transfer process radically altered the position of the Armenians in the cities, its effect on the regional distribution was, of course, to perpetuate the status quo, that is to maintain the overwhelming concentration of the Armenians in the principal cities.

What light does this model of the settlement process shed on the hypotheses put forward in the Introduction regarding the significances of economic status, ethnicity, and political manipulation in determining settlement patterns, and their mutual interdependence? It is evident that severe economic constraints were operating to maintain ethnic concentration by inhibiting dispersal from the cities, while within the cities poverty relegated many of the Armenians to the “camps” from which they were subsequently unable to resist their expulsion and resettlement. Indeed it is appropriate to compare the situation of the Armenians in the “camps” not with the situation of an ethnic group like, say, the Jews of Damascus, but with the inhabitants of the bidonvilles of French North Africa who ironically were also attracting attention for the first time from French scholars in the 1930s.<sup>55</sup> In almost every respect, the situation of the Armenians in the “camps” was a classic bidonville situation, with the same problems of insecure or unregulated tenure, dismal living conditions and forced resettlement which have been observed in the Middle East and elsewhere in so many situations.<sup>56</sup> One may carry the comparison further in noting that the concentration of the Armenians in the cities made their migration to Syria and Lebanon, for a substantial but indeterminate number, like that of the inhabitants of the North African bidonvilles, a rural-urban migration. The migration appears in fact to have acted as an agent for social change, accelerating and condensing into a few years processes of urbanisation which would otherwise have taken much longer to accomplish. Apart from their larger urban component before migrating, only in the circumstances and manner of their arrival did the Armenians differ fundamentally from the inhabitants of the bidonvilles. Viewed in this light the settlement experiences of the Armenians were essentially a function of their low economic status within an economy, whose capacity to support its members was weak even without their presence. This is, of course, what one would reasonably expect from an impoverished refugee population. Whenever their “camps” became shanty-towns and part of the urban scene, whenever they ceased to be “refugees” and came to be regarded and regard themselves as Syrian or Lebanese Armenians, are matters of individual perception and political definition. The point is that, whatever the uniqueness of their titular status as “Armenians” or “refugees”, from the moment of their arrival in Syria and Lebanon the Armenians were inextricably linked to, and part of, the economic system of the receiving states, and subject to the constraints imposed by that system.



**Fig. 9.1:** Armenian “quarters” in Damascus, 1920-39

The indigenous population of equivalent economic status was of course subject to the same constraints. Thus, to commit finance to a scheme to aid the Armenians was to accord them, in comparison with the more impoverished members of the indigenous population, preferential status. Seen in this light one may view with more understanding the reluctance of the local population to allocate financial support to Armenian settlement. Indeed, this raises an important humanitarian question in cases of refugee relief. Should one endeavor to raise the level of the refugee population to that which it formerly enjoyed, possibly

privileged in comparison with the mean level of the receiving population? Or should one aim for a lowest common denominator, assuring subsistence, but ensuring a harsh struggle for economic well-being? Or should one give any assistance at all? After all, there is something at worst hypocritical, at best inconsistent and irrational, in the selective compassion shown to refugee relief, when thousands may die anonymously and uncared for from the malnutrition perpetuated by the normal operation of the world's economic system.

If economic constraints acted powerfully to inhibit dispersal and maintain concentration, they were, of course, not alone in this. As is apparent from the model presented, social constraints were operating in the same direction. Both were restrictive. But while economic constraints were wholly negative in character, social constraints exercised a more positive function. Thus, in terms of continuity of life-style and inter-aid the reconstitution of old communities, a characteristic of the "camps" which was maintained and solidified in the new quarters, was beneficial to the members concerned. This positive force for social cohesion should be contrasted with another force, that of insecurity, which also encouraged concentration. While in the Compatriotic Unions original regional or urban identity divided one Armenian from another, insecurity was a property common to all Armenians irrespective of origin. Just as past persecution had been directed at all Armenians collectively, just as the hostility of the local population was not directed specifically at the community from Marash or Gaziantep, but at all Armenians, so insecurity was felt by all Armenians collectively. There were in the clustering of the Armenians therefore two dimensions: the fear felt by all Armenians, and the inter-aid and continuity offered by the Compatriotic Unions. Without detailed sociological research it is not possible to assess the extent to which these dimensions were interdependent, but it does seem likely that the insecurity felt by the Armenians collectively would have helped to maintain the regional sub-groups, or indeed that the principal vehicle by which the Armenians sought the security they all required was the regionally-exclusive Compatriotic Union. The relationship between allegiance to ethnic group and sub-group is a fascinating question worthy of more research.

The existence of community groupings was, one might add, not an exclusive characteristic of the Armenians, but has been observed in many other bidonville situations. Once again, the relationship between the Armenian settlement and the "normal" processes of settlement of rural-urban migrants under rapid urbanisation is emphasised. In the bidonville situation "ethnic" sub-groups have been recognised as transient features by some writers, characteristic of "rural" life and disappearing with increasing urbanisation.<sup>57</sup> Adopting this viewpoint, the persistence of the Armenians' community groupings after the resettlement might be regarded perhaps as an indicator of the additional cohesion provided by their status as Armenians. An alternative view, however, and that preferred by the writer, would see these sub-groups not as transient features due to disappear with the last vestiges of "rural" life, but as a vital element in the process of migrant

adjustment, contributing in time to a new urban synthesis, in which ethnic sub-groups as long as they have this useful “urban” role to play.<sup>58</sup> This contradiction in views, of course, contains within it the very basic question of how much the social organisation of the immigrant ethnic group is conditioned independently by the desires of its members, how much by the constraints imposed by the society into which it moves. In fact, the question is redundant when ethnic social organisation is seen as the product of the interaction between the two, i.e., the aspirations of the minority group and the demands of the social environment. In the Armenian case, they imported their own insecurity, nationalism, culture and community structure, but within the host society they encountered both hostility and the problems of adjusting to a new life. Their concentration and refusal to disperse was partly a response to the interaction of these social forces.

Political manipulation, which the writer had postulated as potentially vital in a situation of such conflicting national aspirations, was less significant, being limited by the necessity for the French authorities to pay due regard to both Arab susceptibilities and financial considerations. The possibility of population juggling was eventually ruled out by the abandonment of the plans for agricultural resettlement and by the addition of alternative schemes of urban resettlement. These schemes however at least met French concern about the spread of Communism amongst the Armenians in the squalid conditions of the camps, considerations which seem to have been partly responsible for their adoption.

While economic constraints and ethnicity therefore played the dominant role in determining the Armenians’ settlement pattern, it is evident that these constraints were mutually interdependent. Both economic and social constraints, by acting in the same direction to inhibit dispersal and reinforce concentration, were mutually reinforcing. Thus, increasing concentration helped to foster Arab hostility to the Armenians not only as a compact ethnic group, but also because being concentrated, the Armenians had that much greater effect on the local economy. As already observed Arab hostility perpetuated Armenian insecurity and consequent concentration. Similarly, increasing concentration perpetuated the imbalance between the number of Armenians and number of economic opportunities, and hence the operation of economic constraints. Ultimately it was this situation which led to the demolition of the “camps” and the transfer of the Armenians to new quarters, a process which not only solidified the social structure and concentration which already existed, but also diverted funds from proposed plans of dispersal. In brief, while both economic and social constraints acted in favour of concentration rather than dispersal, concentration itself reinforced both constraints. Similar interdependence extended also to political action which as observed was severely curtailed by both economic and social constraints. Where attempted its effect was in general to exacerbate Arab-Armenian hostility (i.e., to reinforce social constraints) and thus to increase the desire for concentration and segregation. Otherwise, social and economic constraints seem to have partly dictated political action, for it was partly fear of

the growth of communism in the squalid conditions of the “camps” which prompted the French to switch their settlement policy from agricultural to urban settlement. Thus, in all respects the social, economic and political constraints on settlement were interdependent, and their principal effect was to maintain a self-perpetuating process of concentration and segregation.

The acknowledgment of this interdependence is related to a way of conceptualising the settlement process in which the Armenians are seen in their settlement as accommodating to the constraints and selective opportunities offered by the socio-economic environment into which they moved, and of which they formed a part. It is not intended here to ignore the Armenians’ decision-making process. It is acknowledged that the Armenians, where they acted independently, acted in accordance with their own perceptions of the socio-economic environment. But it is argued, through a study based where possible on an investigation of the decision-making process, that the mass behaviour of the Armenians was essentially dominated by certain constraints and opportunities generated by the interaction of all members of society as a whole. It is clear that the initial settlement pattern of the Armenians, being largely related to migration paths, was essentially unrelated to the opportunities and constraints presented by the socio-economic environment. The subsequent internal migration history of the Armenians may be therefore viewed as an attempt to achieve the most harmonious balance between the distribution of the Armenians and these constraints. This balance was not necessarily harmonious, it must be stressed, in terms of ethnic relations and conflict minimisation. Since the aspirations of the different decision-makers, French, Arab and Armenian, were to a certain extent mutually conflicting, the balance achieved in response to their interaction might in fact satisfy few aspirations, and might even generate conflict itself.

The achievement of an optimal balance between the distribution of the Armenians and environmental constraints was not, in fact, a realisable goal, for each time the Armenians moved location they modified the environment of which they formed a part, generating new attitudes and aspirations which had to be accommodated by more change. Change indeed was essential to the whole system. Thus, while the system might be always moving, towards an optimal balance, this situation could never be attained. In the Armenian case, this dynamism was represented by a self-perpetuating movement towards increasing concentration as time went on. While never static, therefore, the distribution of the Armenians had achieved an element of stability in that it was reinforcing itself. This did not mean that the ultimate situation was one of 100% concentration and segregation, however, for the degree of concentration might generate new attitudes and constraints before this stage were reached.

These, then, are our conclusions concerning the processes of Armenian settlement in Syria and Lebanon. How might they be refined? The major weaknesses of the study have already been acknowledged in the Introduction; the inability to use field-survey techniques, the inability to use Armenian sources,

and other sources lost or still closed, and the weaknesses of the documents consulted in accurately reflecting the decision-making process. It is clear that some, if not all, of these weaknesses could be eliminated by future students working in different circumstances. The major weakness of the study conceptually, however, seems to be the assumption that the Armenians behaved as a homogeneous unit. The danger of this assumption was acknowledged in the Introduction, and indeed, where possible, internal variations in settlement behaviour have been observed, based on politics, on religious divisions, or on regional sub-groups (Compatriotic Unions). However, systematic investigation of sub-group behaviour would only have been possible through the use of field-survey techniques, ruled out as impracticable. This is particularly unfortunate in the case of socio-economic class groups. While the conclusion that the Armenians were essentially a population of low economic status seems justified it must be acknowledged that the data available are heavily biased towards the Armenians in the “camps” or shanty-towns, subsequently resettled in the new quarters. Thus, the effect of economic constraints on Armenian settlement may have been overestimated. The Armenians clearly varied in status, as labourers, skilled artisans, or even doctors and dentists, for example, and it is unfortunate that it has not been possible to investigate the differential settlement preferences of these groups, leaving unanswered the questions raised in the Introduction regarding the assumed contemporary tendency for segregation to break down with increasing economic status. It would also have been desirable to investigate the role of the family in settlement. Little has been revealed beyond observations about the process of physical family reconstitution. The investigation of all these facets of Armenian behaviour would entail not only the use of field-survey techniques, but also a sharpening of focus, so that it is suggested that the best follow-up to the present thesis would be a study of the processes of settlement in one city (either Aleppo or Beirut) paying particular attention to the internal variations in settlement behaviour within the Armenian community, through the use of field-survey techniques.

With regard to minority settlement in the Middle East as a whole, it is really too early to generalise on the applicability of the processes identified. The relationship identified between ethnicity and economic status may occur in other Middle Eastern refugee situations, but this remains to be demonstrated. The study certainly shows the continued vitality of ethnicity as a social force in the Middle East in the early twentieth century. Equally it shows that the settlement pattern of a minority group must also be related to the situation of the members of that group within its regional economy. What is most important is that the study illustrates the benefits of focusing on process, and shows how this may be investigated in terms of the interaction of the minority group and the socio-economic environment into which it moved. More specifically certain useful areas for research might be identified.

First and foremost, studies of minority settlement patterns should focus, through the study of process, on the temporal development of those patterns. They should investigate at what time, by what route, and in what circumstances, the minority group in question arrived in the study-area, and the processes involved in its subsequent dispersal from its arrival points. They might consider if an existing pattern is long-established or not. If so, they might ask if the processes which sustain it are the same as those which created it, or whether the same pattern remains, but sustained by new processes. Studies of contemporary processes should reveal the direction to which the settlement pattern is moving; whether it is in process of complete transformation or if it is stable and self-perpetuating. If it is stable, they should ask if stability is likely if current processes continue, by investigating what counter-processes current processes will generate in the future. It seems doubtful that the processes identified will be unique to the Middle East, but cross-cultural comparisons are essential to verify this assertion.

In investigating process, studies should carefully define the exact basis of ethnicity in question, be it confessional group, tribe, township or region of origin or extended family. They should identify, where they exist, ethnic units functioning at different levels and establish how these are inter-related. The relationship between socio-economic class, ethnicity and segregation should be investigated, and how this changes with progressive improvements in economic status. Studies should consider the repercussions on settlement of the process of assimilation or rejection, or of the emergence of a specifically local (possibly national) minority-group identity, e.g., Lebanese Armenian as opposed to Lebanese Maronite or Soviet Armenian.

Studies might also consider the relationship between ethnic concentration, segregation and conflict. They might investigate which settlement situations are likely to generate conflict, which to preserve peace. They might ask whether segregation is harmful or beneficial, whether it is a response to conflict or a cause of conflict, or if the same degree of segregation could have the opposite effect in this respect. If a self-perpetuating situation of ethnic concentration and segregation were harmful to ethnic relations, one might study how it could be reversed, or indeed, if this has even been done successfully. Finally, one might ask if members of minority groups concentrated in large masses really are more secure than small dispersed groups.

The essential need in future studies, which underlies all these questions, however, is the study of process. The priority should be to investigate not past but current trends, and attention might usefully be directed towards the Palestinians and the diverse groups in the Lebanon. These studies of process should pay particular attention to the exact ethnic basis on which decisions are made, and should therefore use where possible field-survey techniques to investigate the decision-making process, and to enable where possible statistical analysis using techniques applied in social geographical studies outside the Middle East. All sorts of practical problems however stand in the way of the

researcher trying to study contemporary processes. Thus, while it is dangerous to assure uniformity of process in past and present, studies such as this one, on settlement in the relatively recent past, may yield useful points of comparison and lines for investigation. In this respect attention may be drawn once again to the use in this study of several documentary sources relatively unexploited by geographers (and unavailable to the researcher working in the present); the League of Nations archives and, in particular, the records and archives of the various philanthropic and religious societies involved in aid to the refugees and concerned with the welfare of the Christian minority populations. These sources of course may have useful applications to other aspects of social and economic geography. Whatever the sources used, however, particular attention should be focused on investigating the vital relationship between economic status and segregation which so far has attracted some comment but little detailed attention, and on the permanence or otherwise of ethnicity as a social force in the Middle East, a sociological question with considerable import for the geographer, who through his role in the study of the relationship between segregation and ethnic conflict may be able to make some contribution in this area.

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> Burt Report; Report by Consul Vaughan-Russell, Damascus, May 31, 1926 (F.O. 371/11550); St. John Ward to Bicknell, Nov. 29, 1925; Keeley to St. John Ward, March 20, 1924 (Arch.A.R.C.).
- <sup>2</sup> Report by Consul Palmer, Damascus, Sept. 8, 1923 (F.O. 371/9057).
- <sup>3</sup> Boyadjian (1958), pp. 117-20.
- <sup>4</sup> Mécérian (1961), p. 153. On the distribution of the Armenians in the camps see also references cited under note 1.
- <sup>5</sup> On the desertion of the camps see Mécérian (1961), p. 153, (1928)(1), p. 147; "Rapport" (1925), p. 32, (1926), p. 103; Charles (1929), p. 83; *F.A.* 99, 2Q, 1926, p. 20.
- <sup>6</sup> Report by Consul Vaughan-Russell, Damascus, May 31, 1926; Mécérian (1928)(1), p. 147, also notes the camp of Kassaa partially remaining.
- <sup>7</sup> See references cited under note 1. Also Poulleau, pp. 62-63.
- <sup>8</sup> On Jesuit activity see Mécérian (1925), p. 440; Naslian, *Vol. 2*, p. 358; *Courriers*, juin-juillet, 1939.
- <sup>9</sup> Burt Report.
- <sup>10</sup> Good, Good & Co., Sol'rs, to British Consul, Damascus, Dec. 7, 1927 (F.O. 371/13075).
- <sup>11</sup> Burnier to Johnson, n.d. (ca. July, 1928) (N.A. C1431).
- <sup>12</sup> *Idem*.
- <sup>13</sup> Johnson to Burnier, Aug. 9, 1928 (N.A. C1431).
- <sup>14</sup> Mtg. of Arm. Sub-C'tee, Aug. 31, 1928 (N.A. C1430).
- <sup>15</sup> N.A. C1430.
- <sup>16</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Jan. 30, 1929 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>17</sup> N.A. C1431.
- <sup>18</sup> Burnier to Johnson, Jan. 30, 1929; Pachalian to Johnson, March 15, 1929 (N.A. C1431).
- <sup>19</sup> "Rapport Mensuel, etc." July 17, 1929 by Burnier (N.A. C1429).

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- <sup>20</sup> Parr to Henderson, June 25, 1929 (F.O. 371/13805).
- <sup>21</sup> Report by Dorothy Redgrave, Nov. 1928 (N.A. C1431).
- <sup>22</sup> "Rapport Mensuel, etc." July 17, 1929.
- <sup>23</sup> Good, Good & Co., Sol'rs, to British Consul, Damascus, June 6, 1929 (F.O. 371/13805).
- <sup>24</sup> Consul Parr to Good, Good & Co., June 20, 1929 (F.O. 371/13805).
- <sup>25</sup> "Rapport Mensuel, etc." July 17, 1929.
- <sup>26</sup> Central Arm. C'tee, Mtg. of Aug. 26, 1930; Progress report on the settlement work in Syria (N.A. C1584).
- <sup>27</sup> Boyadjian (1958), pp. 117-20; Wajbeh Kainy (1958-59), pp. 32-35, and Interviews with members of the Armenian community of Damascus.
- <sup>28</sup> Report by Burnier, 1930; Charter Report. However Consul Mackereth, Damascus, reported 350 shacks still standing in Damascus in 1935 (F.O. 371/19676).
- <sup>29</sup> Pachalian to Johnson, March 15, 1929; Burnier to Johnson, April 4, 1929 (N.A. C1431).
- <sup>30</sup> C.A.C. Aug. 26, 1930; "Progress report, etc.".
- <sup>31</sup> "Installations etc. 1931".
- <sup>32</sup> Report by Burnier, 1930.
- <sup>33</sup> Du Véou, p. 259. And see F.O. 371/5210.
- <sup>34</sup> Arch.Laz.
- <sup>35</sup> Newman (1927), p. 488.
- <sup>36</sup> Arch.Laz.
- <sup>37</sup> F.A. 83, 1Q, 1922, p. 9; Davies to Gracey, Feb. 18, 1922 (F.O. 371/7873); Lytle to Russell, Feb. 18, 1922 (F.O. 371/7874).
- <sup>38</sup> F.A. 83, 1Q, 1922, pp. 8-10, Idem., 84, 2Q, 1922, p. 4.
- <sup>39</sup> F.O. 371/7874.
- <sup>40</sup> *Le Levant*, 6e ann., no. 6, juillet-août, 1929, p. 2.
- <sup>41</sup> F.A. 118, 1Q, 1931, p. 5.
- <sup>42</sup> 2e Bureau, p. 12.
- <sup>43</sup> De Caix to M.A.E., April 1, 1922 (Arch.Dip. S-L-C, Vol. 143).
- <sup>44</sup> Mécérian (1924), p. 223; Duguet (1928), p. 57; F.A. 83, 1Q, 1922, pp. 9-10; Idem. 84, 2Q, 1922, pp. 2-4; Burt Report, Arch.Laz.; Johnson Report, Dec. 18, 1926; letter from Manoogian, note 39; *Le Levant*, 6e ann., no. 6, juillet-août, 1929, p. 2.
- <sup>45</sup> *Le Levant*, 6e ann., no. 6, juillet-août, 1929, p. 2; F.A. 110, 1Q, 1929, p. 13, Idem. 118, 1Q, 1931, p. 5; Gracey Report, 1930.
- <sup>46</sup> F.A. 83, 1Q, 1922, p. 8. See also Ch. 4.
- <sup>47</sup> Duguet to N.C.F., Dec. 10, 1926 (N.A. C1429).
- <sup>48</sup> Ibid.; Johnson Report, Dec. 18, 1926.
- <sup>49</sup> On the establishment and development of the Nansen Office Quarter see correspondence and reports in N.A. C1429-C1431, C1583-C1585, C1524, passim.
- <sup>50</sup> Johnson to Burnier, June 14, 1927 (N.A. C1431).
- <sup>51</sup> International Nansen Office for Refugees, Council of Administration, 3<sup>rd</sup> Sess., 2<sup>nd</sup> Mtg., July 1, 1931, Minutes (N.A. C1584).
- <sup>52</sup> C.A.C. Mtg. of Aug. 26, 1930; Progress Report etc..
- <sup>53</sup> F.A. 141, July 1938, p. 2.
- <sup>54</sup> Jude, Burnier & Lubet, p. 176, L.o.N. Doc. A22.1935.XII; Charter Report, 1930.
- <sup>55</sup> Baron, R. Huot & Paye, L. (1936) "Conditions d'habitation des émigrants indigènes à Rabat", *Revue Africaine*, 79, pp. 875-98, and idem (1937); "Logements et loyers des travailleurs indigènes à Rabat-Salé", *Revue Africaine*, 81, pp. 723-42.

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<sup>56</sup> Adam, A. (1949-50), "Le bidonville de Ben Msik à Casablanca," *Annales de l'Institut d'Etudes Orientales d'Alger*, 8, pp. 61-199; Bourgey, A. & Phares, J. (1973), "Les bidonvilles de l'agglomérations de Beyrouth," *Rev. Géog. Lyon*, 48, pp. 107-39; Delisle, S. (n.d.) "Le Proletariat Marocain de Port-Lyautey," *Cahiers de l'Afrique et l'Asie*, 1, pp. 109-228; Descloîtres, R. et al. (1961), *L'Algérie des Bidonvilles* (Paris); Harrison, R.S. (1967), "Migrants in the City of Tripoli," *Geog. Rev.*, 57, pp. 397-423; Montangne, R. (n.d.) "Naissance du prolétariat marocain," *Cahiers de l'Afrique et l'Asie*, p. 3.

<sup>57</sup> See e.g. Adam, A. (1974), "Urbanisation et changement culturel au Maghreb," in Duchac, R. et al., *Ville et sociétés au Maghreb* (Aix-en-Provence), pp. 215-32; Naciri, M. (1963), "Salé: Etude de géographie urbaine," *Rev. de Géogr. Marocaine*, 3-4, pp. 13-82; Prenant, A. (1968), "Rapports villes-campagnes dans le Maghreb: l'exemple de l'Algérie," *Revue Tunisienne des sciences sociales*, 5, pp. 191-216; Sebag, P. (1958), "Le bidonville de Bourgel," *Cahiers de Tunisie*, 6, pp. 267-309.

<sup>58</sup> See in particular Karpas, K. (1976), *Rural Migration and Urbanisation in Turkey: The Geceköndü* (Cambridge).



## *Appendix*



## List of Orphanages for Armenians in Syria and Lebanon, 1920-1939<sup>1</sup>

- Ain Anoub:** Annie Davies of the “Friends of Armenia” temporarily established here an orphanage for children she brought from Alexandretta. In 1922 these orphans were moved to Broumana (FA., 84, 2Q, 1922, p. 2 and 85, 3Q, 1922, p. 1).
- Aleppo:** An orphanage for girls was run by the Armenian Catholic Sisters of the Immaculate Conception and was functioning in 1928 (Naslian, Vol. 2, pp. 675-76; Mécérian (1928)(1), p. 161). The Armenian National Union supported a large number of orphans in Aleppo immediately after the migrations with the support of N.E.R. Many of these orphans were removed to Lebanon by N.E.R. However, a number of orphans remained at Aleppo, and an orphanage was certainly run by the A.G.B.U. until ca 1930. Other institutions were “Badesparn”, a refuge for rescued Armenian girls, and an orphanage run by the Diarbakir Compatriotic Union. (Baurain, pp. 274, 277; FA. Passim; Arch. A.U.B., FO 371/9098; Rose, Fry & Sybley, p. 265; Burnier (1926), p. 101, and personal communication).
- Antélias:** An N.E.R. orphanage functioned at Antélias between 1919 and 1928 (personal communication; Burt report; N.E.R. Report (1928), p. 16; Rose, Fry & Sybley, p. 270).
- Beirut:** in 1924 Annie Davies moved her orphans from Broumana to the Jessie Taylor Memorial Orphanage at Beirut, which continued to function throughout the inter-war period (F.A. Passim). The Kelekian-Sissouan Orphanage was maintained by A.G.B.U. (Mécérian (1928)(2), p. 112; Naslian Vol. 2, p. 350; Rose, Fry & Sybley, p. 265; Krafft-Bonnard). An Armenian Catholic Orphanage also functioned at Beirut (Naslian, Vol. 2, pp. 673-75; Rose, Fry & Sybley, p. 270).
- Broumana:** Annie Davies housed her orphans from Ain Anoub here temporarily before their move to Beirut in 1924 (F.A. passim).
- Bzoumar:** Refugee orphans from Cilicia were temporarily housed in Bzoumar by the Armenian Catholic church before being transferred to the Kelekian Orphanage at Beirut (Naslian, Vol. 2, pp. 345-50).
- Chemlan:** An orphanage was run here by Miss M. W. Frearson from 1920 until at least 1938 (F.A. passim).
- Djounieh:** An orphanage at Djounieh was run by the Armenians themselves (Rose, Fry & Sybley, p. 265; personal communication). The N.E.R. also supported an orphanage there (N.E.R. Report 1922 and personal communication).
- Jbail:** An N.E.R. orphanage functioned at Jbail until 1926. In 1928 the property was transferred to a Danish Mission, which moved there its orphanage from Saida (Mécérian (1925), p. 440; Rose, Fry & Sybley, p. 270; Union, etc. p. 93; Pallis; F.A. 109, 4Q, 1928, p. 2 and personal communication).
- Maîmeltaine:** A N.E.R. training orphanage for boys operated at Maîmeltaine between 1922 and 1925 (N.E.R. Report 1922, and personal communication).

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<sup>1</sup> This list is not complete but contains the principal institutions noted in the sources.

- Nahr Ibrahim:** A N.E.R. training orphanage for boys functioned here until 1924 when it was obliged to close due to a malaria epidemic. The orphans were taken to Jbail and Antélias (Mécérian (1925), p. 440; N.E.R. Report 1922 and personal communication).
- Qassab:** After the closure of N.E.R. establishments in 1929, the Lepsius Deutsche Orient Mission took charge of about a hundred orphans who were still at Ghazir and transferred them to Qassab in 1930 (Bazantay, p. 49).
- Ghazir:** The N.E.R. orphanage was founded in 1919. When the orphanage was closed in 1929-30, the children who remained were moved to Jbail and Qassab (Mécérian (1925), p. 440; Rose, Fry & Sybley, p. 270; Naslian, Vol. 2, p. 350; Burt Report; Alamuddin, *passim*; N.E.R. Reports; personal communication). The Swiss Friends of Armenians continued work at Ghazir for the blind (Le Levant & F.A., *passim*; Burt Report; Pallis; Alamuddin, p. 135; Wieser, pp. 5-6).
- Saida:** At Saida were two orphanages, one run by N.E.R. closed by 1927, the other run by the Danish Mission. The latter had been transferred from Zouk. In 1928 it was once more moved to the buildings of the former N.E.R. orphanage of Jbail (Ross, Fry & Sybley, p. 270; Burt Report; Union, etc., p. 93; N.E.R. Report 1932; personal communication).
- Zouk:** The Danish Mission temporarily established an orphanage here before its transfer to Saida.

## List of Abbreviations

- A.C.A.S.R. Bulletin: American Committee, etc.
- Arc. A.C.C.: Archives of the Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia.
- Arch. A.N.U.: Archives of the Armenian National Union of Damascus.
- Arch. A.R.C.: Archives of the American Red Cross.
- Arch. A.U.B.: Archives of the American University of Beirut.
- Arch. Dip. S-L-C: Archives Diplomatiques, Série E, Levant, Syrie-Liban-Cilicie.
- Arch. L.R.C.S.: Archives of the League of Red Cross Societies.
- B.C.R. Erzerum (1911) etc.: Great Britain, House of Commons, Sessional Papers. Report for the year 1911 on the Trade of Erzerum, etc. (British Consular Reports).
- Berron Report: Present Situation and Future of the Armenians in Syria. Report and Project to be submitted to the Friends of Armenian People by Dr. Paul Berron (N.A. C1429).
- Bryce Report: Great Britain, House of Commons, Sessional Papers (1916). *The Treatment of Armenians*, etc.
- Burt Report: Preliminary Report on Armenian centers, visited in 1925 by Joseph Burt on behalf of the Society of Friends (N.A. C1425).
- Carle Report: League of Nations, Commission for the Protection of Women and Children in the Near East.
- Deuxième Bureau: France, Commandement Supérieur, etc.
- F.A.: *The Friend of Armenia*.
- F.O.: Great Britain, Foreign Office Records.
- G.B. Correspondence, etc. 1898: Great Britain, House of Commons, Sessional Papers (1898). *Correspondence respecting* etc.
- G.B. Turkey No. 3, etc. Great Britain, House of Commons, Sessional Papers. Turkey, No. 3, etc.
- Gracey Report: Report by G.F. Gracey on his mission to Syria as overseas representative of the Lord Mayor's (Armenian) Fund and the Save the Children Fund, 1930 (N.A. C1584).
- L.o.N. Doc.: League of Nations document. For full reference see under League of Nations in the bibliography where League reports are followed by their numbers.
- M.A.E.: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères.
- Min. Guerre: France, Ministère de la Guerre, etc.
- Murray's Handbook: Handbook for Travelers*, etc.
- N.A.: Archives of the Nansen Office for Refugees.
- N.E.R. Report: United States Senate. Report of the Near East Relief, etc.
- Nouvelles*: "La Detresse..." etc.
- O.J.L.N.*: League of Nations, Official Journal.
- P.M.C. Minutes: League of Nations, Minutes of the Sessions of the Permanent Mandates Committee.
- "Rapport": France, Haut Commissariat, etc.
- S.F.: Archives of the Society of Friends.
- Weakley: Great Britain, Board of Trade (1911), etc.
- W.O.: Great Britain, War Office Records.

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