

ARMENIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE LEBANESE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS DURING THE PRESIDENCIES OF CHARLES HELOU (1964-1970) AND SULEIMAN FRANGIEH (1970-1976)¹

ZAVEN MESSERLIAN

INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 1964 President Charles Helou was elected president of the Republic, after President Chehab refused the amendment of the constitution to permit his own re-election.

When President Helou came to the presidency on 23 September 1964, the Intelligence Department of the military forces, better known in Lebanon as the 'Deuxieme Bureau,' continued to be very powerful, and the Chehabists maintained their strength.

The legislative elections of 1968 took place on the fourth year of President Helou's six-year term of office (1964-1970). By then, electoral specialists like Iliya Harik considered that "in the 1968 elections, insidious pressures from the intelligence of the military forces (the Deuxieme Bureau) were strongly resisted by the civilian government with considerable success."²

The parliament which had been elected in 1968 elected Suleiman Frangieh (1970-1976), who was opposed to the 'Deuxieme Bureau,' by a majority of one vote, his own, in 1970.

After the parliament of 1968 had served its full term, legislative elections were held in 1972.

In this article, the Lebanese legislative elections of 1968 and, under separate heading, the legislative elections of 1972 will be analyzed with emphasis on the Armenian participation in the electoral districts of Beirut and Metn, where seats had been pre-allocated to the Armenian Community on the basis of the Electoral Law of 1960.

THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS OF 1968

Almost four years had passed since the legislative elections of 1964. Prior to the elections Prime Minister Rashid Karamé presented his resignation on February 5, 1968. The President of the Republic, Charles Helou, appointed Abdallah Yafi to form the new government, which would supervise the parliamentary elections. The Speaker of the House, Sabri Hamade, and the Kataeb (Phalangist) party leader, Pierre Gemayel, were against this appointment.³ However Yafi got the vote of confidence of the Parliament. The speaker abstained while the four Kataeb deputies denied their vote of confidence.⁴ The government announced by decree № 9434 on February 19, 1968 that the elections, which were to be held on the basis of the electoral law of 1960, would take place on four consecutive Sundays. The elections for Beirut would be held on March 24, 1968, and those of Mount Lebanon on April 7, 1968.⁵ The number of seats allotted to the Armenian Orthodox and Catholic communities remained unchanged. The term of the outgoing parliament was to end on May 3, 1968.

After the 1964 legislative elections, a major development had occurred within the Armenian community in 1965. After negotiations the Armenian political parties, had agreed to mark the 50th anniversary of the Genocide perpetrated on the Armenians together, under the auspices of the spiritual heads of the Armenian denominations.⁶ They organized a mass rally in the Chamoun sports stadium, where 85,000 Armenians assembled to commemorate the genocide, led by Catholicos Khoren I, Patriarch Iknadius-Bedros XVI of the Armenian Catholics and Rev. Hovhaness Aharonian, President of the Union of Armenian Evangelical Churches in the Near East.⁷ Haroutioun Jerejian of the Huntchag party, Dr. Yeghig Konialian of the Tashnag party, Me Hratchia Setrakian of the Ramgavar Azadagan party, patriarch Batanian and Khoren I addressed the multitude.

Apparently, judging from the newspapers of the period, alongside the Genocide commemoration, an understanding had also been reached to lessen press disputes and attacks on each other. In short, the general atmosphere was not like 1956 to 1963, when the community's internal strife was at a peak. On the other hand, the agreement reached to mark the genocide did not come to an accord on the Cilician See, the Armenian Orthodox Community administration, nor the legislative elections of Lebanon. All sides not only maintained their political ideology, but had their opposing views vis-à-vis Soviet Armenia.

After the six day Arab-Israeli war of 1967 and the bombardment of Beirut airport at the beginning of 1968, there was some polarization on the local political scene. Supporters of the former president Fouad Chehab, the *Nahj*, and supporters of the Christian opposition, the *Helf*, dominated the political scene.⁸

In view of the unchanged electoral law of 1960 and the creation of the *Helf*, the electoral situation in Beirut's First Constituency and Northern Metn, where Armenians were allotted seats, did not allow much of a contest in these districts as far as the Armenians were concerned. The Tashnag party, the allies of the Kataeb, found a safe place on their lists in both constituencies.

As early as the summer of 1967, the alliance of the Three (*Helf*) Gemayel, Chamoun and Eddé was known; in addition, there was talk of the renewal of the Kataeb-Tashnag alliance.

On August 29, 1967, the Central Committee of the Tashnag party in Lebanon met the political bureau of the Kataeb party and afterwards, in a communiqué published in *Aztag*, which had become the official organ of the party as of June 1, 1965, the Tashnag party declared that both parties had ideological similarities and broad possibilities of cooperation for the progress of Lebanon and her supreme interests. As far as the legislative elections were concerned, no final arrangement was made; however, it was decided to examine together each problem and, if possible, cooperate in that field.⁹

In late January 1968 and in February 1968, the Kataeb-Tashnag electoral alliance was proclaimed.¹⁰

Due to the strength of the alliance and the lack of strong Maronite candidates in Beirut, the Ramgavar Azadagan, along with the independents allied with them and, to a lesser degree, the Huntchag party were not motivated to participate wholeheartedly with candidates of their own in the elections. No one was mentioned, even as a possible candidate, by either party. The Ramgavars also seemed disinterested, and their newspaper, *Zartonk*, gave the electoral news of the country including that of the Beirut I and Northern Metn in a general manner. The whole electoral period especially that of Beirut was presented in a more or less low-key manner. The same was true for the Huntchag daily, *Ararad*, which complained about the anti-popular nature of the electoral law of 1960 and said, like in 1964, Armenian voters would be deprived of choosing their deputies.

On January 25, 1968 *Aztag* announced that the Central Committee of the Tashnag party in Lebanon and the Political Bureau of the Kataeb party had come to a final agreement on January 23, about the forthcoming legislative elections, in which they would participate with a united front in Beirut I and Northern Metn.¹¹

Between February 13 and 16 deputies Babikian and Der Kaloustian visited President Helou separately, apparently to discuss the forthcoming elections and hear the President's view.¹²

On February 20, *Aztag* announced that as the Central Committee of the Tashnag party in Lebanon and the Political Bureau of the Kataeb party had complete similarity of views on the matters of basic problems interesting Lebanon, once more they confirmed their complete agreement and their decision to cooperate in the forthcoming legislative elections.¹³

On February 23, the *Helf* agreed on the Northern Metn list, which was to include Selim Lahoud (Maronite), Maurice Gemayel (Maronite), Emile Salhab (Maronite), Michel Murr (Greek Orthodox) and André Tabourian (Armenian Orthodox), the latter as the candidate of the Tashnag party.¹⁴

There were pressures to replace Selim Lahoud with his brother Col. Fouad Lahoud, but this did not materialize.¹⁵

On March 6, the Tashnag party announced her candidates in Beirut and Metn. These were the deputies serving in the last parliament (i.e. Der Kaloustian, Babikian, Khanamirian and Tabourian). No mention was made about the Armenian Catholic candidate. This seat was left to Joseph Chader, the vice-president of the Kataeb party. However the announcement mentioned a lack of agreement for the Protestant candidate.¹⁶

Indeed, in their meeting of March 5, the Kataeb and Tashnags had opposing views on the matter of the Protestant candidate. The Kataeb insisted on party member Samir Ishaq, while the Tashnags insisted on the necessity of having an Armenian Protestant on the list.¹⁷ However on March 9, *Aztag* announced the list, which included Ishaq and not an Armenian.¹⁸

The list was composed of Pierre Gemayel (Maronite), Fouad Boutros (Greek Orthodox) Antoine Sehnaoui (Greek Catholic), Movses Der Kaloustian, Khatchig Babikian, Souren Khanamirian (Armenian Orthodox), Joseph Chader (Armenian Catholic), and Samir Ishaq (Protestant).¹⁹

The Armenian Evangelical Communal Council wanted to have a candidate of their own. However they did not present a candidate officially and declared so, on March 15, 1968.²⁰ An Armenian Evangelical businessman Edouard Loshkhajian presented his candidacy individually, publishing paid advertisements in *Zartok* and *Ayk*.²¹

The Arab Evangelical community, which had the majority of votes in the Protestant community's synod, favored Charles Saad. Loshkhajian in a cable sent to Rev. Dagher protested against the choice.²²

On February 23, *L'Orient* had mentioned that a second list was being formed in Beirut I with Nasri Maalouf (Greek Catholic), Michel Sassin (Greek Orthodox), Charles Saad (Protestant) and possibly Pierre Eddé (Maronite). According to the newspaper, these personalities, by making an alliance with the Huntchag party and independent candidates, could cause surprises. Kamal Jumblat, the leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, would give his support to this list, as would other political groups and in particular certain "upper circles" who did not take well to the electoral condition in Beirut I.²³ The next day *Le Jour* mentioned that Beirut I was outside the agreement of the *Helf*. *Le Jour* further wrote that four Armenian candidates from the Huntchag and other Armenian organizations or independents, would join the second list.²⁴ On February 28, *Ayk* mentioned that the Huntchag and Ramgavar candidates might enter the second list.²⁵ The next day *Ayk* announced that an Armenian Orthodox originally from Djebel Moussa, Apraham Kazanjian, would present his candidacy.²⁶ The latter was not a known, active member of the community.

Pierre Eddé did not present his candidacy. *Zartok* echoed rumors that Chamoun was pressuring former president Alfred Naccache to present himself in Beirut I as a Maronite candidate, but he did not.²⁷ It was rumored that the Huntchags had proposed poet Said Akel to present himself for the Maronite seat, but he had rejected the proposal. In the end no strong Maronite presented his candidacy; however one individual, Selim Wakim, presented his candidacy on an individual basis.

As late as March 8²⁸ and 9,²⁹ *Zartok* reported that Nasri Maalouf was in contact with Michel Sassin and the Huntchag party, but the Huntchag daily, *Ararad*, was silent on the matter.

On the last day for presenting candidacies, as there was no other Armenian Catholic candidate, Joseph Chader was considered elected.³⁰ The same happened to the Beirut I Tashnag candidates when, on the

deadline to withdraw candidacies, Apraham Kazanjian withdrew his candidacy, and Der Kaloustian, Babikian and Khanamirian were considered elected by default (*tazkieh*).³¹

In a series of editorials *Zartouk* wrote about the 1968 elections and on the Tashnag deputies. It said despite having 5 deputies, the Tashnag party and the Catholicosate of Antelias could not secure a permit for a silent march in Beirut on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Genocide of Armenians. Then it asked how the Tashnag Central Committee could appoint as its candidate Tabourian, a person who did not justify his mandate, and "had deceived the state, had forged accounts and was immersed in corruption and had become a bad example to all." It also attacked the selection as a candidate of Der Kaloustian, a person "who should have been retired after his condemnation by the higher court of Syria." The paper concluded that both could not be "authentic representatives" of the community.³²

Aztag did not reply to the above attacks and ignored them. After a month, in response to another attack not related to the elections, *Aztag* noted the anti-Tashnag campaign in *Zartouk*, but said they were sticking to the oral agreement of 1965, where they had agreed with their political opponents to be restrained in their respective presses and blamed the Ramgavar press for breaking their word.³³

On March 10, the newspapers mentioned that the candidates for the Protestant seat included, other than Ishaq, Saad and Loshkhajian, Yervant Abajian, Sami Haddad and Fouad Issa.³⁴

Nasri Maalouf, Michel Sassin and Charles Saad campaigned strongly against the non-elected members of the Gemayel list. They did not have any Maronite candidate on their list. The Huntchags and Ramgavars threw their support to this list.

On March 17, there were reports that Michel Sassin had demanded that the Minister of Interior move the polling centers out of schools, which were under Tashnag dominance.³⁵

Loshkhajian maintained his candidacy, but Abajian, Issa and Haddad withdrew theirs. Rev. Ibrahim Dagher announced on March 20, 1968 that the Evangelical Community Synod was neutral to the candidacies of Saad, Ishaq and Loshkhajian and did not endorse any amongst them.³⁶

Aztag strongly supported Gemayel, Boutros, Sehnaoui and Ishaq and twice published their pictures on the front page, urging supporters to vote

for them. A meeting was even held in Karm el Zeitoun on March 22 for them. Der Kaloustian, Khanamirian, Boutros, Sehnaoui, Ishaq and Kataeb representative Rashad Salamé were present.

The elections were held on March 24 in a calm atmosphere. In Beirut I there were 251 polling centers.³⁷ Only 27753 people voted, i.e. 28.6% of the electorate.³⁸

The official results for the contestants were:³⁹

Pierre Gemayel (Maronite)	24853
Samir Ishaq (Protestant)	15997
Michel Sassin (Greek Orthodox)	14821
Nasri Maalouf (Greek Orthodox)	14687
Fouad Bourtos (Greek Orthodox)	13744
Antoine Sehnaoui (Greek Catholic)	12485
Charles Saad (Protestant)	11302
Selim Wakim (Maronite)	1344
Joseph Abboud (Greek Catholic)	1111
Edouard Loshkhajian (Protestant)	680
Sami Zreik (Greek Catholic)	226

Gemayel, Michel Sassin, Nasri Maalouf and Samir Ishaq were elected as deputies, joining the Armenian candidates already considered elected as they were without any contenders.

An Armenian from the Latin community, Tovmas Misperian, who belonged to the Minorities, had presented his candidacy in Beirut II, (where one Sunnite, one Shiite and one Minority seats were allotted). He obtained 255 votes and lost to Farid Jebran who was elected with 8049 votes from among 7 contenders.⁴⁰

The elections of Nasri Maalouf and Michel Sassin were considered big electoral surprises by *Ayk* and *Le Soir*.⁴¹ The Huntchag daily *Ararad* presented their success as "our victorious candidates of the first constituency" and mentioned that Nasri Maalouf thanked the Armenian voters and especially the Huntchags, saying that he considered himself as their party's representative in the parliament.⁴² *Zartouk* announced the defeats of the Foreign and Justice Ministers and the successes of Sassin and Maalouf in big headlines.⁴³

L'Orient wrote that Fouad Boutros and Antoine Sehnaoui were the victims of an exaggerated confidence in party discipline and unity. The voters' turnout in Beirut I had been 29.7%, and in the polling booths,

where assistance was expected to appear, it had gone down to 15-20%. Khatchig Babikian's explanation that 35% of the Armenian voters' names were not on the electoral list is insufficient to explain the situation. This means that a party (i.e. the Tashnag) that is proud of its discipline had not kept its word. It was recalled that in the near past there had been rumors of divisions in the party, of American and Lebanese factions. What was done that Sunday was the victory of the first. The influential newspaper added that in Rmeil and Gemmeizé the Kataeb voters also had shifted their votes.⁴⁴

The Tashnag Central Committee of Lebanon replied on March 27, in *Aztag*, that (a) the Armenians had done their civic duty like all the other Lebanese communities, (b) the party had respected its commitments towards the list by giving more than 5000 votes (which was more than two-thirds of the Armenian voters) despite the fact that the Armenian candidates had been elected without contenders, (c) the made-up rumors about the supposed divisions within the Tashnag party were without foundation, and the Tashnag party in Lebanon had one policy, a Lebanese policy.⁴⁵

Lissan ul-Hal wrote that the success of Michel Sassin was due, first, to the fact that he had for a decade done services for the people, second, to the fact that the Tashnags, having secured the success of their candidates, showed indifference and did not work hard enough so that the number of their voters was very little.⁴⁶

Zartouk wrote that out of 39631 Armenian registered voters less than 19% had voted. The Armenian votes were distributed as follows:

Fouad Boutros 5017
Antoine Sehnaoui 4799
Michel Sassin 2477
Nasri Maalouf 2311

The paper added that the Ramgavars and their friends had voted for Sassin and Maalouf, and that *Aztag's* claims that they had given 5000 to Boutros and Sehnaoui are wrong. These 5000 include 1500 non-Tashnag Armenian votes (excluding the Ramgavar and their friends, from other patriots and Arabic-speaking Armenian Catholics). So the Tashnags had given 3500 votes, which meant that they did not respect their electoral promises. They had not made an adequate effort. *Zartouk* added that the identity cards of repatriated Armenians were not exploited this time, and if

the elections had been clean and there had been no outspoken favoritism by the state nor unpunished terrorism allowed, the Tashnag leadership could not have brought more than the announced result. In short they showed they were not trustworthy. The paper concluded that the non-Tashnag Armenians, without having candidates of their own, without receiving hundreds of thousands of Lebanese pounds, without any specific promise or engagement, had given almost the same number of votes as the Tashnags. They had worked silently and in a demonstration of protest, and *Aztag's* boast that their success would be completed by "the brilliant success of the remaining members of the list" was not realized.⁴⁷

Although as early as February 23, 1968, the formation of two opposing lists in Metn, one supported by the *Helf* and another, including the independent candidate Dikran Tosbath, opposing it were mentioned in other newspapers, Tosbath's *Ayk* did not publicize his candidacy until March 31, 1968.⁴⁸ *Aztag* in its turn announced on March 19, the lists of the *Helf* and the Tashnags in Northern Metn, called the Salvation Front, which had been officially announced only on the previous day.⁴⁹

Zartok in its electoral news column mentioned that the list comprising Gen. Jamil Lahoud, Joseph Khoury, Albert Moukheiber and Dikran Tosbath had more popularity than that of the *Helf*. In further electoral news *Zartok* mentioned that the majority of Armenian voters were with Tosbath and that he was gaining ground daily.⁵⁰ *Zartok* further mentioned that Tosbath had joined the strongest list.⁵¹ It further campaigned for Tosbath by publishing an interview with him and appealed to Metn Armenian voters to vote for⁵² Tosbath and Gen. Lahoud, adding that Tosbath would be a valuable representative in parliament.⁵³ The newspaper also published the list's group photo.⁵⁴

Aztag, on the other hand, stated that the people's heart in Metn was with their candidates of the Salvation Front.⁵⁵

Ararad had a similar approach to *Zartok*. In an electoral news column, the *Huntchag* daily mentioned that the Lahoud-Moukheiber list remained the strongest.⁵⁶ However in contrast to the *Ramgavar* daily, *Ararad* published Gen. Lahoud's picture⁵⁷ and appealed to Bourj Hammoud voters.⁵⁸ On April 6, *Ararad* appealed to its followers to go to the polling center and vote for Gen. Lahoud's list, whose members, including Tosbath, were mentioned.⁵⁹

There were conflicting news reports about Bourj Hammoud polling stations.

A request by Gen. Lahoud's list to the Minister of Interior, Suleiman Frangieh, to have some of the Bourj Hammoud polling centers moved elsewhere in the same area was turned down. Frangieh said that the state would guarantee the security of voters, so there was no need for change.⁶⁰

Later, on April 3, *Zartonk* announced in big headlines that the Minister of Interior, by his decree № 128 of April 2, had transferred upon Tosbath's request 21 of the 42 voting centers to Tekeyan and Noubarian schools, thus enabling Bourj Hammoud Armenians to approach the voting centers and vote for Tosbath without threat.⁶¹

Zartonk persisted in mentioning on the election day that the Bourj Hammoud voting centers indeed had been returned to Tekeyan and Noubarian schools.⁶²

In fact, some Bourj Hammoud polling centers of Armenian Orthodox voters were moved once more from Tekeyan school (of the Ramgavar) to their former locations in Apkarian and Aksor Kassarian schools (of the Tashnags). Only Armenian Catholic, Armenian Protestant, Sunnite, Shiite and Druze voting centers had remained in Tekeyan school.⁶³

Ayk wrote that Dikran Tosbath was presenting himself independently, referring to the fact that no Armenian party or movement had officially presented his candidacy. The newspaper mentioned that Auguste Bakhos had not been taken into the Lahoud-Moukheiber list; instead Khalil Abi Jaoudé had joined the list.⁶⁴

On April 4, *Ayk* published the list's group photo and spoke of the enthusiastic welcome given the list by Metniots. The newspaper regularly propagandized Tosbath.⁶⁵ In one article it said that when the Tashnag daily of Aleppo, *Arevelk*, "was condemning its innocent comrades, only Dikran Tosbath, stood against the atrocities and refused the accusations, and stated that the Armenian elements could not betray the countries in which they were and spy in favor of enemies." This was in reference to accusations brought against the Tashnag party in Syria in August 1961.⁶⁶

The Salvation Front held a meeting in Bourj Hammoud, in the presence of the candidates. Dr. Papken Papazian spoke in French, on behalf of the Tashnag party.⁶⁷

The elections were held on Sunday April 7, 1968, in general in a calm but tense atmosphere.

There were 83338 voters on the electoral list, 39,343 of whom voted, i.e. 47.2%.⁶⁸

The official results were as follows.⁶⁹

Maurice Gemayel 25876
Emile Salhab 25534
André Tabourian 24950
Michel Murr 24747
Selim Lahoud 23566
Dikran Tosbath 15829
Albert Moukheiber 15729
Joseph Khoury 14703
Jamil Lahoud 13818
Khalil Abi Jaoudé 13199
Auguste Bakhos 3480
Riad Abou Fadel 625
Jihad Abi Jaoudé 581
Elia Abou Shedid 1

Aztag gave the results of the 42 voting booths of Bourj Hammoud as follows.⁷⁰

André Tabourian 5081, Selim Lahoud 5029, Maurice Gemayel 4993, Emile Salhab 5011, Michel Murr 5021, Dikran Tosbath 961, Jamil Lahoud 971, Joseph Khoury 864, Albert Moukheiber 1025.

The Tashnag organ further declared that the above numbers showed that the Tashnag party, with its people, had voted *en masse* for all the members of the Salvation list, which gave a moral value to their victory.⁷¹

Ararad mentioned that for the first time in many years voting continued till 5 p.m. in Bourj Hammoud and that the voting was done in a comparatively calm manner.⁷² The newspaper complained that 90% of the polling centers were in the opponents' quarters and many could not reach the voting centers, while some could.⁷³ It further added that the Bourj Hammoud votes were not decisive in the Northern Metn elections. Had the Armenians abstained or had all voted for the defeated list, the result would have been the same (i.e. the *Help* list would have won).⁷⁴

Zartouk gave the electoral results without comments in view of the large difference between the two lists. A few days later the Ramgavar organ gave the information that had appeared in *Le Soir* and *Ayk* that in Jdeydé 1018 fraudulent votes had been attributed to the *Help* list.⁷⁵ It

further blamed the Tashnags for allying with the *Helf* and forgetting the 150,000 Armenians living in neighboring countries, as such an alliance would not be helpful to them. The Ramgavar daily said that out of the 5000 votes of Bourj Hammoud 1000 were non-Armenians, and 1018 votes were fraudulent, so the Tashnags had 2500 votes and their boastfulness was not justified.⁷⁶

Dikran Tosbath's response contrasted with his energetic campaign in 1964 against what he called "the fraud used to make him fail in becoming a deputy." In 1968, in view of the large difference of votes (about 9000 votes) by which his opponent had won, his newspapers announced the victory of the *Helf* in Mount Lebanon and played down his failure. In an editorial entitled "defeated but not hopeless", he praised President Helou, Minister of Internal Affairs Frangieh, and the fair elections. He wrote that the big victors were the *Helf* and Camille Chamoun. This victory was achieved by the alliance of the National Liberal Party, the Kataeb, the National Bloc and the Tashnag party in Northern Metn, and he asked who could blame them for their cooperation. The organized parties had won against individual candidates who, notwithstanding their strength, could not face such an alliance. He concluded that he would continue to serve his Lebanese Armenian compatriots.⁷⁷

THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS OF 1972

INTRODUCTION

After the 1968 legislative elections, there were some new trends in the Lebanese politics. After the six-day Arab-Israeli war of June 1967, the Palestinians living in Lebanon started using Lebanese territory for waging cross-border attacks on Israel. The latter retaliated with force. The majority of Christians of Lebanon, led by Gemayel's Kataeb Party, Chamoun's National Liberal Party and Raymond Eddé's National Bloc, wanted to halt the Palestinian attacks in order to stop the retaliations. They also opposed the armed presence of the Palestinians on Lebanese soil. The Moslems, on the whole, along with Jumblat's Progressive Socialist Party, supported the Palestinian struggle from within Lebanon's borders. This situation led to polarization in the country. The Lebanese Christian parties, which had already made a strong electoral alliance, the *Helf* in 1968, remained faithful to their alliance for a time. However, as the elections

approached, the Kataebs and National Liberal Party stood together and the National Bloc was left out. However, the Electoral Law of 1960, upon which were based also the 1964 and 1968 parliamentary elections, was such that each major religious group voted in its own areas; this prevented direct confrontation, except in mixed areas. In the 1970 presidential elections the parliament was split. Suleiman Frangieh won by 50 votes against 49 votes for Elias Sarkis, the Chehabist candidate. The Tashnag members of parliament had voted for Elias Sarkis, creating tense relations with President Frangieh for some time.

THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS OF 1972

As early as June 1971 pre-electoral activities were noted. Chamoun visited the Tashnag Central Committee of Lebanon on 9 June, while Moses Der Kaloustian visited President Frangieh on June 21, and the Kataebs visited the Tashnag Central Committee on June 22, 1971.

In August 1971, Raymond Eddé considered the *Helf* to be an alliance for electoral cooperation, while Gemayel considered it as a political front.⁷⁸ There was talk of Minister Henri Eddé standing as a candidate against Gemayel. The latter, when questioned whether well-known businessman Georges Abou Adal would replace Nasri Maalouf on the Tashnag-Kataeb-Sassin list, replied that Sassin, Maalouf and Abou Adal were negotiating to reach a conclusion. Gemayel further confirmed that his party had an unwritten agreement with Sassin but said nothing about the Tashnags. He also said there were rumors that former president Helou would be a candidate and, if Henri Eddé presented himself as a candidate, he would welcome this in a sporting spirit.⁷⁹

Newspaper speculations about the legislative elections were made in September 1971. *L'Orient-Le Jour* stated that the Tashnag Party wanted to designate the Armenian Catholic and Protestant candidates in Beirut I electoral district, if they were to support the Kataebs in Beirut and Metn. The newspaper mentioned a possible Kataeb-Michel Sassin and Nasri Maalouf list in Beirut I, stating that the Kataebs stood firm in their support for their vice-president and the Armenian Catholic deputy, Chader, while they seemed disposed to sacrifice their Protestant deputy Ishaq. The newspaper also mentioned the last campaigns of persuasion conducted to make Maalouf renounce his candidacy in favor of Abou Adal.⁸⁰ In November, the same newspaper restated the Tashnag demands, mentioned

Abou Adal's active campaign in Beirut I and stated that he was an important businessman who had links with President Frangieh. The newspaper unfolded three possibilities in Beirut I:

a) A single list composed of Kataeb, National Liberal and Tashnag candidates, to be elected unopposed.

b) The same list, opposed by independents led by Abou Adal, who as the authorities' man, would enjoy massive defection in his favor on the part of the Tashnags. Abou Adal's list would include Fouad Boutros.

c) A Kataeb-National Liberal Party list, that could look for Armenian allies, opposed by a Tashnag-National Bloc list. The Progressive Socialist Party would also support this list. The newspaper also mentioned the likelihood of a regrouping of Armenians, in a reference to the Huntchags and Ramgavars joining the Tashnags.⁸¹

Within the Armenian community, which had almost reached the peak of its influence due to its growth and multi-facet activities, a number of events had taken place in nearly each political party's circles.

The Tashnag Party celebrated with pomp, on November 27, 1971, its 81st anniversary, and the 43rd anniversary of its affiliate cultural organization, Hamazkayin, in the Phoenicia Hotel.⁸² The Ramgavars had cause to celebrate, as they inaugurated the Tekeyan Cultural Association's new building on November 2, 1971,⁸³ and celebrated their 50th anniversary in Cinema Byblos on November 7, 1971,⁸⁴ while the AGBU had its world president, Alex Manougian, visit Beirut and inaugurate the Alex Manougian Center in Wat-Wat quarter of Beirut on April 11, 1971. Manougian attended the 8th Navasartian sports games in the Sports City along with more than 20000 people, including Gemayel and Sassin, and celebrated the 65th anniversary of the AGBU and the 40th anniversary of the Armenian Youth Association at the UNESCO palace in Beirut.⁸⁵ Alex Manougian visited President Frangieh, with AGBU leaders, and attended a dinner in his honor, with the Armenian members of parliament present, upon their insistence.⁸⁶ The Huntchag Party had its sports activity, with the participation of 1200 Homenmen athletes, on November 21, 1971.⁸⁷ The Armenian Communists started to publish their *Gantch* weekly on February 20, 1971.

When the Tashnags demanded two additional parliamentary seats held by the Kataeb Party, the Kataebs made a virulent attack on them entitled "Some truths ignored on the legend of Armenians" in a supplement of

Amal their party organ, on 27 November. The article stated that in 1960 the Tashnags, who had enjoyed the support and complicity of the authorities, got 58% of the expressed Armenian votes against 42% for their Armenian opponents- Huntchag, Ramgavar and Independents. These opponents count the cream of the community amongst them, know perfect Arabic, and have close relations with the principal business sectors of the country, which are particularly influential in the political sphere. The paper added, if the state abstained from partiality towards the Tashnags, both sides would become equal.⁸⁸

The Kataebs further stated that a strong list in Metn had succeeded without the help of the Tashnags in Bourj Hammoud, as the partial elections of December 1971 had indicated. Then, the Tashnags had not taken sides out of neutrality and had abstained from voting, and Amin Gemayel won over Fouad Lahoud, supported by Chamoun and Eddé.⁸⁹

Despite their newspaper's attack, Pierre Gemayel and Chader attended the Tashnag reception at Phoenicia the same night. Others in attendance were Saeb Salam, Camille Chamoun, Raymond Eddé, Sheikh Khalil Khoury (leader of the Destouri Party), Sassin, vice-speaker Nassim Majdalani and Ministers Jamil Kebbé, Emil Bitar and Jaafar Charafeddine.⁹⁰ *L'Orient-Le Jour* said the presence of Gemayel and the Kataeb leaders somewhat attenuated the consequences of the article in *Amal* and left the door open to finding one another again.⁹¹

The Communist *Gantch* quoted from *L'Orient-Le Jour* the "real picture of Armenian electoral forces in the light of factual givens" by giving the detailed results of the 1960 elections as follows:⁹²

Denomination	# of electors	Actual voters	Gemayel	Eddé
Arm. Orth.	27841	10073	5872	4166
Arm. Cath.	4858	1764	1186	575
Arm. Prot.	2011	845	560	277

An electoral campaign seemed to be forthcoming, but all depended upon the formation of rival lists of more or less equal strength.

The Tashnag party elected a new Central Committee for Lebanon, composed of nine members which included, according to *L'Orient-Le Jour*, two factions of four each disputing the party leadership, and a neutral, Hratch Tourikian.⁹³

The new leadership counted Sarkis Zeitlian, Apraham Ashdjian, Melkon Eblighatian, Tsolag Tutelian, and others.⁹⁴

In late January, Raymond Eddé declared to the press that the Maronite seat of Beirut should go to his brother Pierre Eddé and that Pierre Gemayel should present his candidacy in Metn.⁹⁵ Gemayel replied that he would present his candidacy in Beirut and that Pierre Eddé could do so too in a sporting competition. He added, the formation of the list also depended on the National Liberal Party, whose candidates were Sassin and Maalouf.⁹⁶

The influential *Nahar* of Ghassan Tueni reported that Gemayel had declared that the Tashnags would cooperate with the *Helf* of the three (Gemayel, Chamoun, and Eddé) or two (Gemayel, Chamoun), but the Tashnags had mentioned that their Central Committee had not yet taken any decision.⁹⁷

Nahar wrote that the Tashnags were participating in the elections in the days of a president for whom they did not vote, and that President Frangieh, while receiving their congratulations and wishes that he "be the president of all without distinction to unite the domestic front," had replied that it was necessary to unite the Armenian ranks, whether they were Tashnags or non-Tashnags.⁹⁸

Nahar said when the Kataebs visited the Tashnag Central Committee in September 1971, the Tashnags did not reciprocate, and that was why in its New Year issue *Amal* wrote that the Tashnags play a secondary role in the elections. *Nahar* claimed 7 of the 9 members of the Tashnag Central Committee of Lebanon had Chehabist tendencies and were confused and waited for a decision to come "from above" (referring to the president) as they were accustomed. Furthermore, the Tashnags were worried that the suggestions from "above" would demand the uniting of the Armenian ranks and joint cooperation, so that the non-Tashnag Armenians might not fall into the lap of leftists and especially new Soviet friendship. The paper added that Raymond Eddé had proposed giving the Tashnags and other Armenian parties the Armenian Catholic and Protestant seats, on condition that they favored a united list in Beirut I and Metn. So, *Nahar* concluded, the Tashnags were in a dilemma whether they should collaborate with Eddé, in which case they would be required to form Armenian unity, as this would weaken their position in Beirut and Metn.⁹⁹

The newspaper, however, was not taking into account foreign influences in the formation of lists, as the Cold War was not over and

international rivalries existed, as they had in the late 50's or 60's, though not as acutely as before.

On February 3, 1972, Catholicos Khoren I, accompanied by the Prelate of the Armenian Orthodox community of Lebanon, Archbishop Dajad Ourfalian, and Bishop Ardavazt Terterian and Khatchig Babikian, visited President Frangieh "to talk about some matters concerning the Catholicosate and the Armenian community."¹⁰⁰

On February 9, 1972, *L'Orient-Le Jour* wrote in big headlines "the Tashnags postpone the selection of their allies." In a subtitle it said the Tashnags claimed to remain faithful to the Kataebs and National Liberal Party and claimed a fourth seat, that of the Protestant Samir Ishaq. The newspaper mentioned that on February 8, 1972 the demands were presented to former president Chamoun at Kazem el Khalil's residence. The Tashnags had 6000 votes in Beirut I and 4000 in Metn and wanted, further to the Protestant seat, that their Armenian candidates would not be drawn from friends of the party but should be party members; also they would not hear talk of a candidacy from the other Armenian parties. Chamoun replied he was not concerned in this affair, and invited the Tashnags to agree with the Kataebs on the Protestant seat.¹⁰¹ Chamoun, however, was involved in the selection of the candidates for the Greek Catholic seat, i.e. Maalouf and Abou Adal. The latter had acknowledged he would agree to Chamoun's arbitration.¹⁰² *Aztag* confirmed the meeting but did not give any details.¹⁰³ On February 13, the Tashnags met with Gemayel and examined the possibilities of future electoral cooperation.¹⁰⁴

Within 48 hours Chamoun selected Maalouf and suggested to Abou Adal that he run in Jezzine. Maalouf, before his selection as the Greek Catholic candidate on the Kataebs' list, accused Prime Minister Saeb Salam of working secretly against him. He said the Prime Minister and his rival Abou Adal could not deny this.¹⁰⁵

Meanwhile Raymond Eddé maintained contacts with Jumblat and the latter with the Huntchags for electoral purposes.¹⁰⁶

Indeed something was going on. Yenovk Balikian, a civil engineer and member of the AGBU's Armenian Youth Organization Antranik's central board, had established close relations over the years, as president of the Technical Committee of the Lebanese Basketball Federation, with Antoine Batlouny, secretary general of the same federation; they used to meet in deputy Nassim Majdalani's office. Batlouny was the personal secretary

and director of political affairs for Majdalani. Over the years Balikian had become acquainted with Nassim Majdalani, Saeb Salam, Abdel Latif Zein, and Frangieh and had established good relations with them. Above all he had earned the friendship of Majdalani, who had good knowledge of Armenian affairs. When Alex Manougian decided to come to Lebanon, Balikian had requested Majdalani to intervene with President Frangieh so he would honor Manougian with a medal. Majdalani secured the medal. Furthermore, he organized a meeting with the president for AGBU-AYA's leadership before Manougian's arrival in Beirut. The President received Dr. Yervant Jidejian, Dr. Antranik Manoukian, Yervant Demirjian, Ohannes Kassardjian (father-in-law of deputy Abdul Latif Zein), prof. Parounag Tovmassian and Balikian in the presence of Majdalani and Zein.

After Manougian's arrival a dinner was held in his honor at the Baabda presidential palace, and he was decorated with a medal of distinction.¹⁰⁷

Balikian states, "Majdalani asked to talk to our people, Ramgavar and Huntchags, to form an alliance to run for the parliamentary elections of 1972. He said, President Frangieh and the Government would help you this time and support you, to put an end to the Tashnag monopoly of power in the region, since they had not voted in favour of Frangieh. I passed the message to Me H[ratchia] Setrakian; we met Setrakian and Majdalani. Me Setrakian promised him that we would run for the elections. After consultations Me Setrakian informed me that Ramgavars and Huntchags would meet, and he asked me to be present at this meeting. The meeting took place in the Tekeyan Center. It was decided we had to contact Pierre Eddé and Georges Abou Adal to form an alliance. The commission to meet and follow the elections [campaign] was formed as follows: Ramgavars-Me H. Setrakian, Zaven Gosdanian, and Hagop Tavitian; Huntchags-H. Goujouny, Avedis Demirdjian and Avedis Patatian; and myself, as a friend of Majdalani or may be as a *chezok* (neutral)."

"We met Pierre Eddé. He accepted the proposal. After [a] few more meetings and technical discussions about past experiences, it was decided that he would propose the non-Armenian candidates [of the list]. We strongly advised him to consider Abou Adal as well."

"We had another meeting with Abou Adal. He was very pleased and even promised to help the campaign financially. We told him about our

meeting with Pierre Eddé. We continued having organizational meetings, planning details of campaign issues and finances."¹⁰⁸

On 14 February *Aztag* published the electoral platform of the Tashnag Party Central Committee.¹⁰⁹ It proclaimed that they would:

a) Safeguard the liberty, independence and territorial sovereignty of Lebanon as well as its democratic institutions.

b) Believe in the right of self-determination for all nations. Thus, Lebanon should help the Palestinian people by all possible means to restore justice.

c) Work towards the gradual completion of social and economic modes for the protection of the rights of the individual and all classes of the country. However, any political current should not exploit the unions for political purposes.

d) Make elementary education mandatory.

e) Plan for creating new jobs and employment opportunities, otherwise emigration of the educated would begin. Even then, this was a reality and this endangered our country's development.

f) Work towards a direct and proportional taxing system, where economic development should be maintained through scientific plans under state auspices.

g) Transform Lebanon into a center of freely developed cultures, sciences, arts, civilizations and social achievements, from which not only the Lebanese but all the Arab world and countries of the Middle East should benefit.

The newspaper also announced the Tashnags had had a meeting with Gemayel on February 13 and had met Raymond Eddé on February 16, while Abou Adal had visited the Tashnag club the same day and mentioned the possibility of the formation of a second list, with the participation of the National Bloc of Eddé.¹¹⁰ Obviously there was a lot of maneuvering, nothing was decided and alliances were not announced.

By then, the Ramgavar, Huntchag and the Front of Independent Lebanese of Armenian Origin (i.e. the Lebanese Armenian National Rally) in a united communiqué, proclaimed the formation of a common front and the intention to participate in the 1972 legislative elections with their own candidates. The communiqué said the Front would profit from President Frangieh's promise of the freedom of the elections.¹¹¹

It was stated that Raymond Eddé was trying to unite all the Armenian parties for electoral purposes, promising Tashnags and non-Tashnags six seats (4 Orthodox, 1 Catholic and 1 Protestant), if they would unite in one list led by his brother in Beirut I.¹¹²

In their electoral maneuvering on February 18 the Tashnags declared that they demanded both the Armenian Catholic and Protestant seats on a Kataeb-National Liberal-Tashnag (K-NL-T) list.¹¹³ The vice president of the Kataeb Party, who was the Kataeb Party Armenian Catholic candidate, was rumored to have been favored by the Armenian Catholic Patriarchate.¹¹⁴ He claimed these were just clever negotiation tactics, to get what the Tashnags really wanted (i.e. the Protestant seat), and blamed Raymond Eddé for formulating unacceptable demands and encouraging others to do the same. Gemayel rejected the demands but left the door open for an agreement.¹¹⁵ According to Dr. Eblighatian, when Gemayel refused to hand the Tashnags the Protestant seat, he told them, "instead of gaining one seat, there is the possible danger of losing the remaining four."¹¹⁶ Gemayel met the Tashnags again on February 22.

On the other hand, the Lebanese Armenian National Rally continued to meet Prime Minister Salam, Raymond and Pierre Eddé, Gemayel, Chamoun, Jumblat, Majdalani, Sassin and Maalouf, examining Beirut I and Metn electoral issues.¹¹⁷

Raymond Eddé suggested publicly that Gemayel move his candidacy to Metn and leave Beirut to his brother.¹¹⁸

At this stage the polemic of the Protestant seat came to a climax.

The Political Committee of the Armenian Evangelical Community replied to statements made by the National Protestant church leaders. The communiqué stated:

First, the Evangelical community in Lebanon numbered 26000, half of whom were Armenians. 3000 of these Armenian Evangelicals voted in the first district of Beirut in contrast to only 114 Arab Evangelicals.

Second, the Supreme Council of the Evangelical Churches in Lebanon in its last meeting had confirmed its previous decision, where it was clearly stated.

a) That it would not meddle in the designation of the candidate for the Evangelical (Protestant) seat.

b) That according to a decision taken in 1968 the candidate in the legislative elections of 1972 should be a member of the Armenian Evangelical Church.¹¹⁹

In response, the Kataebs published a photocopy of minutes signed in 1964 by both the Kataeb and Tashnag parties in the presence of Evangelical Community delegates; the only copy was held by Gemayel. The minutes said, since all Protestant MPs had been non-Armenian Protestants, in Beirut I the Armenian Evangelicals were the majority of the community and that it was "demanded that the next deputy be an Armenian Evangelical." The Kataebs said this was not a firm promise but a demand.¹²⁰

The Tashnags, in their 29 February meeting with the Kataebs, insisted that the Armenian Catholic candidate be selected according to the will of the Armenian Catholic community and, as 90% of the Protestant voters were Armenians in Beirut I, the Armenian Evangelical community should designate the Evangelical community's candidate. The Tashnags said in 1964 the Kataeb and in 1968 the Supreme Council of the community had given a written and official promise that the candidate would be Armenian in 1972.¹²¹

The Kataebs suggested a joint meeting of their Political Council and the Central Committee of the Tashnags to make a decision about the Tashnag demand. The Tashnags insisted that the Kataeb review their intransigence and understand the possible undesirable consequences of their refusal.¹²²

On March 2, the Armenian National Rally representatives met Pierre Eddé and discussed the potential candidates of Beirut I and Metn and the options of cooperation. Rally representatives stated they were determined to participate with candidates of their own and their public meeting would be in mid-March.¹²³

Chader declared on 2 March that the Kataebs and National Liberals insisted the Protestant seat should belong to an Arab Protestant and that the Kataebs refused to abandon the Protestant seat, even if this should create a divorce between them and the Tashnag Party. In such a case, they would cooperate with the Armenian National Rally. Chader said in Beirut I Armenian voters constituted 40% of the total voters and the remaining 60% were Christian, Muslim and Jewish voters. In 1960, 36% of the votes were cast by Armenain voters. 58% of the Armenian voters voted for the

Tashnag and 42% for the Lebanese Armenian Rally. Thus, if the Armenians count 40% and the number of deputies in Beirut I was 8, how could the Armenians demand 5 seats, leaving only 3 seats to the other communities? Logically the Armenians should have less than 4 seats, but they already had 3 Orthodox and one Catholic seat, which meant they had more than their rights. Chader emphasized that "the Tashnags at the most have 58% of the Armenian vote, plus they are not the representatives of all Armenians and want to force on us unacceptable conditions, besides inciting the discontent and anger of non-Armenian voters towards us."¹²⁴

Kataeb sources, commenting on the 29 February meeting, noted that Gemayel refused to give the Protestant seat to the Tashnag and told them, if they hoped to form a list with Pierre Eddé, Fouad Boutros and Abou Adal, it was up to them but they would be responsible for their divorce after 25 years of cooperation.¹²⁵

They added they believed Tashnag insistence was due to the fact that the Prime Minister was a supporter of Abou Adal, and from this perspective the government was with Abou Adal.¹²⁶

Furthermore, the Kataebs held the conviction that in Beirut I, if they cooperated with the Lebanese Armenian National Rally, their candidates would secure at least half of the Armenian votes. On the other hand, in Metn, where the Tashnags had 70-80% of the votes, in the 1971 by-election, despite the neutrality of the Tashnags, Amine Gemayel had won the election, so they hoped in Metn they could agree with Tosbath and lessen the advantage of the Armenian votes of the Tashnags.¹²⁷

At this stage there were new repercussions. Yenovk Balikian states:

"Mr. Majdalani informed me that there is a serious rift between Tashnags and [the] Kataeb/Chamoun group, specially on the Protestant candidacy. He said if things continued the way they were, you should start meeting the Kataeb and negotiate with them to form a new alliance."

He adds "through Berdj Setrakian (a nephew of Hratchia Setrakian) who was a close friend of Karim Pakradouny, they heard what the latter had told Setrakian", that they were annoyed with them and wanted to put an end to the Tashnag monopoly and their blackmail. He said if our Front wanted to discuss elections with the Kataebs, he would organize a meeting with the Kataeb leadership. We accepted the proposal."

"Our first meeting took place in the Kataeb headquarters. Pierre Gemayel, Joseph Chader, Karim Pakradouny and the whole Kataeb leadership were present; we were [represented by] Me Hratchia Setrakian, Zaven Gosdanian, Goujouny [Haroutune Djeredjian], [Avedis] Patatian and myself. It was a very cordial and friendly meeting. Agreement was reached that negotiations would continue and we would meet president Chamoun to achieve our goals."¹²⁸

On 3 March, *Lissan ul-Hal* interviewed Huntchag leader Djeredjian, who announced some "surprise novelties", that the Lebanese Armenian National Rally would nominate 5 candidates and leave the remaining 3 seats but would cooperate with them. He said there would be no cooperation with the Tashnags, and the Rally's first electoral public meeting would be held at the Sahagian Playing Field. Djeredjian added that the Rally representatives had visited President Frangieh and Prime Minister Salam, demanding the neutrality of the state, which, unlike previous authorities, did not support the Tashnags and had posted the polling centers in neutral areas. They had asked that out of 60 polling centers, 30 should be posted in the Electricity headquarters building, at the beginning of the Mar Mikhayel region, and the remaining in the Justice Court (*A'dliye*) at the Nahr Corniche. He added that if this was done, the Rally would bring 9500 votes, while the Tashnags could not come up with more than 8000 voters. It was not at all true that the Tashnag electors constituted the majority of Armenian voters; the contrary was true and this would appear after the forthcoming elections, if it was conducted in a free atmosphere. Finally Djeredjian said the Rally could cooperate with the Eddé-Boutros-Abou Adal front, or a Gemayel-Sassin-Chader-Maalouf front, on condition that the Armenians appointed their own candidates. Regarding Metn, he added that any Beirut I agreement would be valid in Metn too.¹²⁹

Balikian discloses what happened later on. "After some planning sessions with the Kataebs, we went to meet president Chamoun in his palace. Present were our delegation, the Kataebs headed by Chader, and the National Liberal Party [headed] by Chamoun, [accompanied by] Moussa Prince, their vice president. After three hours of extensive discussions, agreement was reached in principle. It was decided that every Friday we would meet, report to each other the progress made, and plan and prepare the declaration of Alliance and the Final Agreement.

"All details were discussed: finances, campaign strategies, even the location of the polling stations.

"A commission was formed to prepare the Agreement and declarations of the new alliance, [it was composed by] Moussa Prince, Joseph Chader, Pakradouny, H. Setrakian, and Goujouny.

"Pierre Eddé and Abu Adal were very annoyed and angry. They started negotiating with the Tashnags."¹³⁰

According to *L'Orient-Le Jour*, which was close to the Eddés, the Armenians, Tashnags on one side and the Lebanese National Rally on the other side, contacted Pierre Eddé.¹³¹ The latter, as it came to be known later on, tried hard to form a list headed by Eddé that included Abou Adal and Fouad Boutros and all the Armenian factions;¹³² four seats would go to the Tashnags and two to the Rally. Such a list would make it very difficult for Gemayel to form a list. Eddé always insisted in his public declarations that he had not yet taken a decision to run or not to run in the elections.¹³³

Ararad wrote that in trying to combine all the Armenian factions, Pierre Eddé would meet serious difficulties, as the conflicting Armenian sides might have irreconcilable differences of opinion.¹³⁴

Meanwhile, the Tashnag leadership, which was accustomed to accommodating the wishes of the president of the Republic in power, particularly since 1947, asked for an audience with President Frangieh.¹³⁵ The President had already received the Rally representatives, who had raised their complaints about the previous legislative elections, and the President had reaffirmed the neutrality of the state towards all the parties, insisting that it was determined to guarantee freedom of access to the polling stations.¹³⁶

The Tashnags were withholding their final answer to the National Bloc and the Kataebs until after meeting President Frangieh. The meeting that was supposed to be held on March 8 was postponed to March 10, 1972 at 10:30 am.¹³⁷ However in the end, President Frangieh expressed the wish that the meeting be held after the Tashnag had announced their list in Beirut I.¹³⁸ The president wanted to be seen as absolutely neutral and to show publicly that the presidency was not associated in one way or another with the formation of electoral alliances and the composition of lists.

However, Dr. Eblighatian, who had known President Frangieh since 1958, when he was in Latakia, said their intimate acquaintance had "unforeseen beneficial consequences." He mentions in his memoirs that

the Director General of the presidential palace, Boutros (whom he calls Pedro) Deeb, informed Eblighatian that he should see him. He went to Baabda (at an unspecified date) with Tsoleg Tutelian, and Deeb told them "the president brings to your attention that the complete defeat of the Kataebs would disturb a certain balance created in Lebanese political life, which may have negative consequences. The president is sure you understand his worries, but you are free to act according to your convictions."¹³⁹ In short, Frangieh wanted the alliance of the Tashnags with the Kataebs, but it was indirectly stated, away from the public eye.

Chamoun declared he was to meet the Tashnags and that he was in favor of dialogue with the other Armenian groups. He added that he hoped the state would be absolutely neutral and the Prime Minister Salam too.¹⁴⁰

Gemayel in his turn said that the Kataebs should consult their electorate in Beirut I and conform to their view and, at the same time, watch that they did not enter into conflict with the Tashnags.¹⁴¹

On March 8 *Ararad* claimed that the Kataebs and the National Liberals were trying to foil Eddé's attempts by meeting with both the Tashnag and the Lebanese Armenian National Rally. The Huntchag organ claimed the Rally continued contacts with both the Kataeb-National Liberal Alliance and with Pierre Eddé and his associates and despite offers, declined making a final agreement with any side. The paper added that in case Eddé ran for a seat, as had been announced by his brother Raymond on March 7, the struggle between the two Pierres would be tough and decisive, with the Armenian votes joining one side or being divided between them.¹⁴²

Meanwhile the issue of the Protestant candidate was debated. The Political Committee of the Supreme Council of the Evangelical Community in Lebanon met on March 6 and declared that the Committee representing the Arabic expression churches and the Committee representing the Armenian expression churches met and decided to form a single joint committee and support the candidate unanimously designated by the Committee. Gemayel agreed to meet their representatives on March 9.¹⁴³

Independent Armenian Evangelical candidate Edouard Loshkhadjian said Armenian Evangelical voters numbered 2831 and all the other Evangelicals numbered 740 in Beirut I. He added that the law makes no distinction between Armenian and non-Armenian Evangelicals and, since

the synod of the Evangelical Community in Lebanon had declared on March 18 1968 that Charles Saad, Samir Ishaq and Edouard Loshkhadjian belonged to the Evangelical community, to which their respective churches were attached, the Armenian Evangelicals had the right to present their candidacy for the community's seat.¹⁴⁴

On March 9, Chamoun and Gemayel studied the electoral situation in Beirut I, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of an eventual alliance with the Lebanese Armenian National Rally, in case of the persistence of a disagreement with the Tashnags and the refusal of the latter to cooperate with their former allies. Sassin also participated to this meeting with three other Kataeb leaders. Chamoun and Gemayel agreed to meet again after the audience of Tashnags with President Frangieh, which was to be held on March 10, but which was postponed once again. *L'Orient-Le Jour* added that the Tashnags had practically broken all their links with their former allies and had started contacts to join the opposing list. Maneuvring was at a climax on all sides.¹⁴⁵

Nahar called March 10 the "day of the Armenians."¹⁴⁶ *L'Orient-Le Jour* headlined "Les Armeniens Au Centre Des Tractations."¹⁴⁷

The Kataebs made a proposal to the Tashnags that a committee of arbitration, composed of Chamoun, Henry Pharaon and Movses Der Kaloustian, settle the issue of the Protestant candidate and assign a non-engaged candidate equally distant from both parties in conflict over the issue. The Kataebs further decided to wait for their response.¹⁴⁸ Chamoun went to the Tashnag headquarters and obtained from them a postponement of any final decision until March 13, 1972. Right afterwards a Tashnag delegation went to see Pierre Eddé in the presence of Abou Adal. Eddé once more insisted in trying to find a terrain of understanding between the Tashnags and their Armenian adversaries.¹⁴⁹

While the Tashnags were meeting with Eddé, a delegation of the Lebanese Armenian National Rally met with the Kataeb leaders at the Kataeb headquarters. The Kataeb leader seemed to minimize the importance of the meeting, when he declared, "It's natural that we meet; it's not the first nor the last meeting; we are ready to meet everyone."¹⁵⁰ According to *Ayk*, on March 10 Gemayel had declared, "If we do not reach an agreement with the Tashnags, we shall cooperate with other parties and groups, most probably with the Armenian Rally, but I think we shall not separate from the Tashnag Party."¹⁵¹ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, for its part, said the

meeting with the Rally constituted a Kataeb counter-attack on the intention ascribed to the Tashnags, that they would collaborate with the opposing list of Eddé and Abou Adal.¹⁵²

Both sides were using pressure tactics to achieve their goals. Meanwhile Jumblat advised the Huntchag leaders, who had come to seek his advice, not to join in any agreement with the Kataeb; he pushed them to agree to the pan-Armenian understanding put forth by Eddé.¹⁵³

Chader accused the Prime Minister of intervening in favor of Abou Adal and threatened to counter him in Beirut II and III electoral districts.¹⁵⁴

On March 13, Chamoun, the Kataeb and the Tashnags met as scheduled. The Tashnags reiterated their known demands about the Protestant seat, to assign the candidate in consultation with the Armenian Evangelical community. Chamoun promised to give his proposed solution on March 14.¹⁵⁵ A brief meeting with the Rally took place on March 14 as matters were not yet clear-cut.¹⁵⁶

Chamoun tried to gain time and said he would give his proposal-solution on March 16 and did his best on March 14 to prevent any rupture in the dialogue with the Tashnags. At 6 pm in the evening he received Hratch Tourigian and Tsolag Tutelian at Kazem Khalil's house. The meeting lasted only 20 minutes. Later, at 7 pm Sarkis Zeitlian, Melkon Eblighatian and Gemayel agreed that in the absence of an understanding they would delay any decision. At 7:30 pm a Kataeb delegation, led by Chader, Joseph Saade and Karim Pakradouny, met the Lebanese Armenian National Rally at their headquarters. There the latter said that on whichever list they entered they would demand all the Armenian Orthodox seats in Metn and Beirut (i.e. 4, thus excluding the Catholic and the Protestant seats). Both sides agreed to meet on March 16 again.¹⁵⁷ Meanwhile Raymond Eddé said a positive surprise of Tashnag alliances in Metn and Beirut would be announced.¹⁵⁸

Some newspapers attributed to Gemayel the position that the final solution acceptable to the Kataeb would be the Kataeb and Tashnags separately contesting the Protestant seat, after firmly agreeing on the seven other candidates. He said he was not ready to give the Protestant seat to the Armenians; however, he could give up his party candidate Ishaq and agree on a non-Armenian independent. Gemayel further stated that his list would beat a rival list if it included Eddé, Abou Adal and the Tashnags. Furthermore, he added, the polling centers in Beirut I were not placed in

impartial places; thus, he asked for their transfer, whether he cooperated with the Tashnags or the Rally.¹⁵⁹

On 16 March, the Chamoun-Tashnag meeting was held as scheduled, at Dory Chamoun's residence. Tashnags agreed to give Chamoun a blank signature on the matter of the Protestant candidate, after Chamoun had promised them that his solution would be in conformity with their aspirations and they would not regret having trusted him.¹⁶⁰

Balikian, states the following about the Rally's position:

"I was discussing the events with Majdalani. He ... [suggested] to push with the declaration and agreement [with the Kataebs and Chamoun]. He told me that there was a lot of pressure from foreign authorities to keep alive the old alliance – Kataeb, National Liberal and Tashnag. We started pressuring, to finalize the proposed declaration. Chamoun and Chader advised us to register our candidates ...[at] the Ministry of Internal affairs, because the time for registration was running out. Our bloc decided to advance the names of Dikran Tosbath, Garbis Shekerdjian and Yenovk Balikian... The names were registered [at the Ministry]."

"A meeting was arranged for the final signing of the agreement and the declarations of the new alliance of the National Liberal, Kataebs and Armenian Rally. The meeting took place in Tekeyan Center, Ramgavar headquarters. Present were Chader, Pakradouny, Moussa Prince (N.L. party vice-president), Goujouny, Demirdjian, Patatian, Setrakian, Gosdanian, Tavitian, Dikran Tosbath, Garbis Shekerdjian and Yenovk Balikian. Speeches were...[given], toasts were made, and the documents were put on the table for signature. Suddenly the door opened; one of our boys came in to tell Chader that he had a telephone call from Chamoun. Chader went out; there was silence in the room, suspense... ten minutes later Chader came in and said, 'Sorry there is an emergency meeting at the Kataebs headquarters; we must leave. We [shall] see you tomorrow.' Their delegation left. We were sure what Majdalani had told us was happening."¹⁶¹

Indeed, the Armenian Communist *Gantch* wrote, "It was not a secret for them that recently four CIA agents had arrived in Beirut, all experts in electoral affairs. Their mission was to intervene in the Lebanese elections. One of these four agents is a Tashnag Armenian, who sells weapons to various countries."¹⁶²

At 8 pm on March 17, in Kazim Khalil's office, Chamoun gave his judgment in favor of the Tashnags. In his statement he said that in the last three elections the Evangelicals had been represented by a non-Armenian, while the Armenian Protestants constituted a quarter of the Evangelical community. Through Charles Malik, they had sent him a list containing three names, one of whom was Armenian. So in order to settle the difference between the Kataeb and Tashnags, the latter party had the right to propose the candidacy of an Armenian Protestant.¹⁶³

Le Soir's title was "The Kataeb Sacrifice Ishaq", which was what they did.¹⁶⁴ *Le Soir* (as well as *L'Orient-Le Jour*) reported the Tashnag Party's candidate for the Protestant seat was renowned psychiatrist Dr. Antranik Manoukian.¹⁶⁵

On the eve of Chamoun's decision, a popular movement was initiated in Eshrefieh and Rmeil, against the withdrawal of Ishaq. 200-300 people gathered in front of Sassin's home on the evening of Chamoun's decision. They wanted Ishaq's candidacy to be retained. In fact, when the Kataeb Bureau was informed of Chamoun's decision, two opposing sides emerged: those who accepted it, and those who wanted to maintain Ishaq. At the end, Gemayel declared they had agreed with Chamoun's final decision, so they now had to accept it. He added the Tashnag problem concerned not only Beirut I, but they also had to take into account Metn. When Gemayel gave his acceptance, he requested a delay in the proclamation of Chamoun's decision in order to calm the strong reactions to Ishaq's being put aside. Chamoun told Gemayel he agreed to give the Tashnags the Protestant seat, on condition the candidate belonged to another Armenian party, if possible, the Ramgavar. This condition was to cut short the possibility of the formation of a second list with the Rally's participation. The Tashnags then advanced the name of Dr. Antranik Manoukian, vice chairman of the AGBU Lebanon District Committee, an organization, which is close to the Ramgavars. Ishaq conformed to his party's decision.¹⁶⁶

Late in the evening of Chamoun's decision, Abu Adal who had officially registered his candidacy, declared the electoral battle would continue and the study of his companions was under way.¹⁶⁷ The Rally also announced it would continue its campaign.¹⁶⁸ Raymond Eddé said the competition would be fierce in Beirut I. There would be no 'Deuxieme

Bureau' to support some candidates. The state was neutral, and the electoral battle would be held in a democratic climate.¹⁶⁹

However, Pierre Eddé's withdrawal from the electoral campaign, in which he had not publicly engaged, disrupted the chances of the formation of a viable second list in Beirut I. In his declaration Eddé said, since May 1947 the elected Armenian representatives had belonged to the Tashnag Party. The Rally had not been able to have a representative since 1943. He said he was with the Rally in 1960, after having allied with the Tashnags in 1957, and it seemed to him it was opportune to work for a formula of understanding between both Armenian formations. In consultations and discussions with both groups, he had seen the difficulties were not insurmountable, though they existed. He added that he had the hope of reaching an accord in the Lebanese context. Now that the Tashnags and Kataeb had agreed under the auspices of president Chamoun, he did not want to take part in the elections.¹⁷⁰

On March 19, *L'Orient-Le Jour* reported that within the next 48 hours, the second list would be formed in Beirut I, and it would be formed in collaboration with Abou Adal and the Armenian Rally. The two sides had met on March 18 and in principle an agreement had been reached.¹⁷¹ The French language newspaper said Chamoun had succeeded in grouping the rightists, when the leftists were agitating, as they had done before.¹⁷² These remarks alluded to the Lebanese electoral campaign in general.

On the Armenian front the Hunchag daily *Ararad* announced that the formation of a second list would soon be completed and that the Kataeb-Tashnag agreement was to the detriment of the interests of the Armenian community. It added that the agreement left a bad impression among Armenian and Arab circles. If an agreement had been reached in the Armenian community between all factions and a united list had been formed, the number of Armenian deputies would have increased to six, including one from the Armenian Evangelical community. The newspaper added that the Rally was in favor of such an agreement. Thus, the disappointment was great within the Armenian community.¹⁷³ Two days later *Ararad* headlined, "the Lebanese Armenian National Rally becomes the nucleus of Beirut I's second list, but the Lebanese Armenians unanimously demand concord." In the text it said the K-NL-T alliance was internally weak, because of contradictions and discord, which was the result of differences of opinion in the selection of candidates, which

continued despite the announcement of the agreement. The *Huntchag* daily further noted, even after the announcement of this agreement, the possibility of reaching an understanding between Armenian organizations was still considered probable. The aim of the Rally was to have electoral cooperation between Armenian factions to have the rights of the community realized.¹⁷⁴

Meanwhile about 1000 supporters of Fouad Boutros gathered in Eshrefieh, to demand that he register his candidacy.¹⁷⁵ However, the latter published a communiqué a few days later, on March 24, withdrawing from the race, blaming the electoral law of 1960, as well as partially blaming himself for that law.¹⁷⁶

Aztag wrote, "The Tashnag Party, in securing the right to designate the Evangelical candidate won the first phase of the electoral campaign for all Armenians and Lebanon."¹⁷⁷

Zartok, on March 25, considered Evangelical candidate Tony Saad, who had expressed the desire to join the Lebanese Armenian National Rally list "as a fortunate candidate". The paper added that in Saad's candidacy the possibility of a general accord was seen, as the Arab voters of Eshrefieh were determined to vote against the Tashnag list, since they felt that they should put an end to Tashnag conceit and all of them together would vote for the list on which there were no Tashnags.¹⁷⁸

On March 24, Dr. Manoukian issued a declaration announcing his cooperation with all other communities, and thanked Chamoun, Gemayel and the Tashnag Party for resolving the problem of the Evangelical candidate.¹⁷⁹ *Zartok*, whose editor Kersam Aharonian was an Armenian Evangelical and friend, as well as collaborator of Dr. Manoukian in AGBU, did not run a campaign against him, nor attack him by comments. He published Dr. Manoukian's declaration, deleting the reference to the Tashnag Party and some other paragraphs on March 25.¹⁸⁰ *Ayk* published Dr. Manoukian's declaration without any abbreviation.¹⁸¹

The candidacy of Manoukian caused an un-declared split in the ranks of the Rally, since he was associated with the Rally's independent group as AGBU vice-chairman in Lebanon.

The *Huntchag* daily wrote, "if we put aside the declaration of Dr. Manoukian's candidacy by a faction and the fact that it satisfies a faction, this arrangement can be considered positive for our community. Irrespective of who is today occupying the seat, satisfaction must be

shown that he [i.e. the Evangelical candidate] belongs to Armenians, and naturally Beirut I Armenian voters would prefer an Armenian candidate to any other candidate of a different community."¹⁸²

In contrast to *Zartok's* way of presenting Tony Saad's candidacy in its electoral news section, *Ararad* said the next day that the Rally was reluctant to accept any of the non-Armenian Protestant candidates on their list. The *Huntchag* daily said Dr. Manoukian did not belong to the faction in whose name he was presented and was known for his public activities and his responsibilities there (i.e. AGBU).¹⁸³

On March 23, newspapers published Metn deputy André Tabourian's short communiqué that the Tashnag Party had asked him not to present his candidacy in order to have a broader representation of the Armenian community, and that he had complied.¹⁸⁴ Newspapers also announced that the Tashnag Party had proposed the candidacy of Ara Yerevanian in Metn. His father, Kevork Yerevanian, was a well known *Huntchag*. Meanwhile in Beirut I the Tashnag Party had replaced Movses Der Kaloustian¹⁸⁵ with Dr. Melkon Eblighatian,¹⁸⁶ a member of the Central Committee in Lebanon, and had maintained the candidacies of Babikian and Khanamirian, both sympathizers but not party-members.¹⁸⁷ Dr. Eblighatian had been born in Istanbul in 1919 and had graduated as a medical doctor from St. Joseph University in Beirut. He had been a member of the Tashnag Party and was on the editorial boards of *Aztag*, the literary magazine *Pakin* and the medical magazine *Pejishk*. He was a member of the Central Council of the Cilician See, member of the Azounieh Armenian Sanatorium's Board, and member of the Central Committee of the Tashnag Party of Lebanon.

Ara Yerevanian had been born in Beirut in 1935 and had attended the Mekhitariste school and College de la Salle; he had a commerce diploma from Sacre Coeur College and since 1963 had been the honorary consul of Gabon. He was an industrialist and served on the Civil Council of the Armenian Orthodox Community in Lebanon.

On March 24, the *Huntchags* cheerfully welcomed Ara Yerevanian's candidacy calling him "The National Unity candidate in Metn."¹⁸⁸ On March 25 *Ararad* cheerfully proclaimed that Ara Yerevanian's candidacy had received "an enthusiastic reception" everywhere.¹⁸⁹

The newspaper gave his biography, leaving out the fact that he was a member of the Armenian Orthodox Community Civil Council which was

controlled by the Tashnags. Furthermore, it said Yerevanian had inherited his patriotism and love of service from his veteran Huntchag father and hoped that the spirit of mutual understanding would include all and gather them around the common interests and rights of the community. It concluded that all votes would concentrate on Metn's Armenian unity candidate.¹⁹⁰

On March 24 *Ararad* concluded that as the Tashnags had declared their Beirut I candidates, the formation of a second complete list was considered less probable. Perhaps individual and Arab candidates would continue the campaign.¹⁹¹ However on March 26 *Zartouk* was still writing that strong new candidates had come forth, were negotiating with the Lebanese-Armenian National Rally, and that on March 27 the situation would be clarified.¹⁹² As Fouad Boutros had withdrawn his candidacy, only Abou Adal, Tony Saad and former deputy Charles Saad were available as viable candidates.

In an editorial *Aztag* warned that the Tashnag Party's moderation should not be interpreted as escaping from the struggle, of which they were not afraid, but the reasons for a struggle were few and not strong.¹⁹³

On March 28, *Ayk* wrote that with Yerevanian's candidacy the Huntchag's were withdrawing from the electoral campaign and that Yerevanian's candidacy had become the cause of the division in the ranks of the Lebanese Armenian National Rally.¹⁹⁴

The Huntchag Party's acceptance of both Yerevanian and Manoukian was best explained by Kapriel Moloyan, a member of the Huntchag leadership. He held a meeting on March 24, with Edward Khojayan, an Armenian attaché of the Soviet embassy in Lebanon. The report of Khojayan given verbatim in translation is given below:

"The meeting touched mainly on pre-election issues. Regarding the position taken by the Hunchak Party toward the Dashnak Party proposal for the candidacy of Ara Yerevanian, Moloyan stated that the candidacy of Yerevanian had been put forward by the Hunchaks and that the latter were ready to fight for their candidate. In Moloyan's words, when it became evident that an agreement between Raymond Eddé, the Dashnaks and the Armenian Association (Hunchaks, Ramgavars, neutrals) was impossible and that with the passing of the Dashnaks to the Kataeb-Chamoun camp all possibilities of forming a second list in Beirut's First Electoral District had practically

disappeared, the Hunchak Party had accepted the Dashnak suggestion to include Ara Yerevanian in its list in the district of Metn. The Hunchak Party had agreed with that, supposedly, choosing one of the following two [options]: either to stay outside parliament for another four years or agree to cooperate with the Dashnaks during the period of the elections without making any concessions to the Dashnaks in the ideological sphere. Clarifying the causes behind the concessions made by the Dashnaks (we have in mind the inclusion of Yerevanian and Manoukian in the list), Moloyan said that a few days before the announcement of the lists of the Dashnaks in the Cilician Catholicosate, Butros Dib had phoned supposedly from the chancery of the President and stated directly to Catholicos Khoren I that the President wanted all strata of the Armenian population and not only the Dashnaks to be represented during the elections. Dib had supposedly told the Catholicos that, as the highest spiritual figure of the Armenian colony, he should do that. According to Moloyan, the Catholicos had kept the Dashnak Bureau informed of this conversation, and the latter had decided to include Yerevanian and Dr. Manoukian in the [candidacy] lists of the Dashnaktsutiun Party.¹⁹⁵

L'Orient-Le Jour announced that the official publication of the K-NL-T list was postponed to March 26. The Kataeb and the Tashnags had created a joint committee to run the electoral campaigns and to encourage the participation of pro-Tashnag voters, who might abstain if they had no serious opponents. Also they decided to ask for the transfer of polling centers from camps Charchabouk and Hajine, both areas of Hunchag influence.¹⁹⁶

The Tashnags denied that they had made an agreement with the Hunchags by choosing Yerevanian.¹⁹⁷ In his turn Haroutune Djeredjian declared Yerevanian was neutral, although his father had been a member of the Hunchag Party for forty years, so they would not campaign against him in Metn.¹⁹⁸

The list was unofficially declared on March 26 during a banquet the Tashnags gave at Cadmus Hotel in honor of outgoing deputy Ishaq (who did not attend). Gemayel announced the list in the presence of Chamoun: Gemayel (Maronite), Sassin (Greek Orthodox), Maalouf (Greek Catholic), Babikian, Khanamirian, Eblighatian (Armenian Orthodox), Chader (Armenian Catholic) and Manoukian (Protestant).¹⁹⁹

The Armenian Evangelical Community appealed to all the Lebanese Armenian Evangelicals to vote for Dr. Manoukian. The appeal was signed by the pastors of Beirut (Rev. Soghomon Nuyujukian), Eshrefieh (Rev. Hagop Sagherian), and Bourdj Hammoud (Rev. Hovhanness Agnerian).²⁰⁰ In a separate communiqué on March 21, 1972, the Political Committee of the Armenian Evangelical Community thanked all the personalities, especially the Tashnag Central Committee, for supporting them, allowing them to succeed in declaring the candidacy of an Armenian Evangelical personality for the Protestant seat.²⁰¹

The Lebanese Armenian National Rally's difficulties were told by Kersam Aharonian to Khojayan of the Soviet embassy in Lebanon. We give the latter's report in full.

"On 27 March 1972, E. R. Khojayan, the attaché to the Soviet embassy in Lebanon, met with Gersam Aharonian, the editor of the Ramkavar Party's organ and the deputy chairman of the Party. In relation to the pre-election situation, Aharonian said that he and his party were very worried about the situation that had emerged as a result of the shortsighted policy of the Hunchak Party. Aharonian thought that the Dashnaks had used a very cunning tactic calculated to split the Armenian Association [i.e. the Rally]. By including Yerevanian and Manoukian in its lists, the Dashnaks expected that they could thus satisfy the Hunchaks and the Ramkavars and secure an easy victory for their list because there could not be a second list in that case. In Aharonian's opinion, the Hunchaks should not have swallowed the Dashnak bait and declared that they would not fight against the candidacy of Yerevanian, because Yerevanian was presented in this case as a candidate from the Dashnak Party and not as a candidate from the Armenian colony [i.e. the community]. In Aharonian's opinion, the Hunchaks had by their conduct confirmed the Dashnak thesis that they represented the Armenian colony in Lebanon. Aharonian thought that it was possible to go to a compromise with the Dashnaks only if they had not appropriated all candidates but had negotiated with the Hunchaks and Ramkavars and had presented the candidates as if they were from the Armenian colony. However, nothing of this kind had happened and it turned out that the Dashnaks pressed on the Hunchaks and Ramkavars the candidacies of Yerevanian and Manoukian from the Dashnak Party. In Aharonian's

opinion, the conduct of the Hunchak Party was a stab in the back of the Armenian Association because, if the Hunchaks would not stand in the elections against the Dashnaks, that would be the end of the Association and all possibilities for the remaining parts of the Armenian colony to challenge the Dashnaks with a second list in the First Electoral District. There were hopes for a second list if the Hunchaks reevaluated their position.²⁰²

At this turn of events, Jumblat blamed Raymond Eddé for leaving Beirut I to the "Chamounists", as he termed the alliance there. He said, "on many occasions I proposed to him to form a list led by Pierre Eddé or Gabriel Khoury, with Fouad Boutros and the Lebanese Armenian National Rally, who held 45% of the Armenian votes, but he did not do so."²⁰³

Lissan ul-Hal predicted a strong electoral struggle in Beirut I as the March 31 electoral deadline for proposing candidacies approached. The newspaper reported that Pierre Eddé and Fouad Boutros were urged by electoral specialists to present their candidacies (although both had already declined to do so), as it was not unlikely that the Chamounists and Kataeb would split, that Chamoun might withdraw the candidacies of Sassin and Maalouf and a new list might be formed. *Lissan ul-Hal* added that all depended on the position to be adopted by the Lebanese National Armenian Rally, without which a second list was impossible.

The newspaper proposed that the Rally form a list without Maronite and Armenian Catholic candidates; that way Gemayel and Chader would be elected and would lead the Kataebs to a neutral position. Furthermore, as Arab voters felt dissatisfied with the Tashnags, they would vote for the Rally. It added that if they wanted to form a complete list, they could form it with either Sayed Akl, Henri Eddé, or former Minister Emile Bitar. The paper suggested the Rally propose its candidates before March 31.²⁰⁴

On March 31, when the chances were not good, if not hopeless, the Rally officially declared their candidates, former deputy Tosbath, industrialist-businessman Garbis Shekherdjian and Yenovk Balikian, an engineer, and member of the Central Board of AGBU's Armenian Youth Association-Antranik.²⁰⁵ However, the candidates' pictures and biographies were not given, and the information was given in a low key manner, in a few lines, in the electoral news section.

Le Soir, owned by Tosbath, saw a fierce but difficult battle ahead, with the formation of a five-member list led by Abou Adal and including the

candidates of the Rally.²⁰⁶ However, *Le Soir* added, the neutrality of the officials of the state assigned to the polling stations had to be secured, as Gemayel had demanded when he met the Rally leaders. Furthermore, Gemayel and Chader did not need Tashnag support, and it was not possible to mobilize the Kataeb in favor of the other candidates of the list, in particular the Evangelical candidate who had replaced Ishaq.²⁰⁷

L'Orient-Le Jour mentioned the registration of the Rally candidates and their intentions to challenge the Tashnags, perhaps hoping Dr. Manoukian's new problems with the Ministry of Interior would favor their candidate on a sufficiently strong list.²⁰⁸

Indeed, on the last day of registration Dr. Manoukian's candidacy faced some difficulty. The Ministry of the Interior, headed by Prime Minister Salam, referred his case to the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of the Interior said Dr. Manoukian's identity card identified him as Armenian Evangelical, while the seat was for an Evangelical.²⁰⁹

The problem arose on the final day of acceptance of candidacies by the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Justice gave its legal opinion at 10 pm. Only then did the Minister of the Interior declare that Armenian Evangelicals are members of the Evangelical community according to the status of the community and thus the candidacy of Dr. Manoukian was accepted. By that time a number of events had taken place.²¹⁰

The Kataeb Political Bureau had met in an emergency meeting and sent Chader to the Ministry of the Interior, instructing him to register Ishaq in case the candidacy of Dr. Manoukian was rejected on legal grounds. Gemayel had informed the Tashnags this was a precautionary measure and the Kataeb were bound by their agreement if the Ministry's decision was in favor of Dr. Manoukian. Chamoun also had met the Tashnags and newspapers reported that both sides had agreed to meet again to decide on an alternative, in case the Ministry rejected Dr. Manoukian's candidacy.²¹¹

There was even talk of the abandoning of electoral alliances if the Ministry rejected Dr. Manoukian's candidacy. At 2 pm Chamoun, Gemayel and seven members of Tashnag Central Committee had met Prime Minister Salam in his residence, where the latter declared he had submitted the matter to the Ministry of Justice and was waiting for their legal decision. Salam said Abou Adal had maintained his candidacy, whereupon Chamoun once more suggested he should move it to Jezzine, in south Lebanon.²¹²

Even after the late night acceptance of Dr. Manoukian's candidacy, Tony Saad declared he would contest the Ministry of Justice decision.²¹³ Abou Adal informed Chamoun he would maintain his candidacy in Beirut I.²¹⁴

Zartouk, Ararad, Ayk, and Le Soir, as concerned parties, did not publicize their candidates, except in brief lines in their electoral news columns.

In an editorial *Ayk* explained the reasons for the participation of the Rally candidates in the election. These points were:

First, to give meaning to democracy; this was lost when candidates reached parliament under the presidencies of Chehab and Helou, without voting.

Second, to reply to Frangieh's appeal that the "silent majority" should fully express its will, as the authorities had taken upon themselves to guarantee the honesty of the election.

Third, to give the voter a credit, which had been taken away long before.

The editorial announced the Rally candidates would immediately seal electoral alliances with influential candidates. It further appealed for a courageous stand by the voters.²¹⁵

At the closure of the candidacy registration, the Ministry of the Interior declared the following candidates in Beirut I in order of their registration.²¹⁶

Maronite: Selim Wakim, Michel Feghali, Camille Sleiman, Pierre Gemayel, and Michel Aoun.

Greek Catholic: Georges Abou Adal, Nasri Maalouf, Georges Haddad.

Greek Orthodox: Michel Sassin, Nicola Abdoushe, Emile Beshara Azar.

Protestant: Fouad Akkad, Antranik Manoukian, Antonios (Tony) Saad, Anis Jabbour, Edouard Loshkhadjian, Fouad Issa, Charles Saad.

Armenian Catholic: Carlo Dadourian, Joseph Chader, Jacques Joukhadarian.

Armenian Orthodox: Souren Khanamirian, Melkon Eblighatian, Khatchig Babikian, Tsolag Tutelian, Sarkis Djedikian, Dikran Tosbath, Yenovk Balikian, and Garbis Shekerdjian.

On April 2, *L'Orient-Le Jour* announced that the formation of a second list of five members was under study. It was to include Abou Adal,

the Lebanese Armenian National Rally candidates and Tony Saad; also, in case the latter persisted in running alone, Edouard Loshkhadjian would be taken in. The second list would not have Maronite, Greek Orthodox or Armenian Catholic candidates; in the hope of getting votes from Kataebs, Sassin or his supporters.²¹⁷ Abou Adal met the Rally candidate Tony Saad on April 4.²¹⁸

On the deadline for candidacy withdrawal, on April 5, there was talk of Abou Adal moving to Jezzine.²¹⁹ On that same day, the Rally, in an official communiqué, announced the withdrawal of its three candidates, as it was practically impossible to form a list, since many of the personalities who had joined them, had abandoned the "pursuit of the impossible" one after the other, announcing clearly their reasons for abandoning the campaign. This was an allusion to Pierre Eddé-Fouad Boutros and possibly to Abou Adal's withdrawal from Beirut I. The communiqué asked the state for a new electoral law giving equal chances to all, and it added that they had confidence that President Frangieh could do it.²²⁰

Ararad, said that as there were no strong and acceptable candidates from the non-Armenian communities, the efforts to form a second list had failed due to the undemocratic electoral law and the divisions of the electoral districts.²²¹ *Ararad* further stated that the list would not have been strong, it would be meaningless to give a purely Armenian nature to the elections, and it was excessive and useless to create conflict between Armenians.²²²

Aztag did not see it that way. It said the withdrawals reconfirmed the precedents of the last two elections (1964, 1968) and the force the Tashnag Party represented in Lebanese political life, its large mass and popular support. It concluded, "This great electoral success brings credit to all the Armenians of Lebanon."²²³

Aztag reported 40000 people attended the Homenetmen (the Tashnag affiliated sports association) sports festival with the participation of 3000 athletes. The presence of Prime Minister Salam, Catholicos Khoren I, and Chamoun was noted. This was a show of force before the elections.²²⁴

Apparently on the request of Chamoun, Henri Pharaon and other interested parties, the Greek Catholic Patriarch, Maximos V Hakim, came from Damascus and held a meeting at 9:15 pm on April 5, in Abou Adal's residence. The Patriarch had invited Nasri Maalouf, Gemayel, Sassin, Philip El Khazen, and Boulos Fayad to be present. The Patriarch

demanded and insisted that Abou Adal withdraw his candidacy from Beirut I. Abou Adal agreed, and he transferred his candidacy to Jezzine. Abou Adal in his declaration said that the K-NL-T list had strength in a district where the majority of the voters were Armenians and five out of the eight candidates on that list were Armenians. So it was practically impossible for an individual candidate to penetrate it. The Armenian Rally could have balanced the list, but it had withdrawn its candidates. He would have continued to struggle alone, but on the Patriarch's request and the insistence of religious and political personalities to avoid an electoral battle in Beirut I, he was withdrawing.²²⁵

Evangelical candidates Issa and Loshkhadjian withdrew in favor of Dr. Manoukian.

Unlike 1964 and 1968, there were no elections by default in Beirut I, as there were individual candidates (Wakim, Feghali, Suleiman, Haddad, Saad, Jabbour, Akkad, Azar, Abdoushe, Dadourian, Djedikian, and Tutelian)²²⁶ who, however, stood no serious chance of getting elected.

Aztag wrote that as the other Armenian candidates had withdrawn, Eblighatian, Babikian, and Khanamirian had practically been elected except that there was a person called Sarkis Hagop Djedikian, who maintained his candidacy although he was unknown and impossible to find.²²⁷ *Aztag* made no mention of Tutelian, who maintained his candidacy.

Zartonk wrote that after the withdrawal of the Rally candidates, the electoral campaign would not be fierce in Beirut I, although surprises might happen. It then mentioned those who had maintained their candidacies, including Tutelian, a member of the Tashnag Central Committee, who "was strangely maintaining his candidacy".²²⁸ The present writer believes this was a precautionary measure by the Tashnag Party, just in case of a mishap among the party candidates.

Tosbath wrote in *Le Soir* under the title "La Democratie De l'Absurde," that the pursuit of the impossible pushed Eddé, Boutros, the Lebanese Armenian National Rally and, at the last minute, Abou Adal, to abandon the electoral struggle. They had met the old taboos and the Kataeb-National Liberal and Tashnag barriers; they also blamed the 1960 electoral law and regretted that the Beirut I voters were deprived of expressing their will.²²⁹

In order to confront the indifference of voters who would not bother to go to the polling centers to vote, as there were no serious challengers and

the K-NL-T list would be elected by a small number of partisans, Maalouf invited Kataeb and Tashnag leaders to Hotel Cadmus on 6 April to launch their campaign immediately.²³⁰

On April 8, an appeal was published. Signed by Chamoun, Gemayel, and Zeitlian, it asked citizens to vote for their complete list, insisting that the obliteration of a name or a change was a serious injury to political principles, whose defenders and followers they were. The signatories concluded that the campaign had the nature of a referendum. The renewal of confidence in their alliance.²³¹

The same day deputy Tony Frangieh, the son of the President of the Republic, and those on his list, René Mouawad and Father Semaan Doueihy, gave a luncheon honoring Dr. Manoukian in Zghorta. Khanamirian represented the Armenian candidates. Others in attendance were representatives of the Tashnag Central Committee, Victor Moussa, Ministry of Information director Ramez Khazen and other personalities.²³² This seemed to be a reconciliation of the Frangieh clan with the Tashnag Party, after the bitterness created by the Tashnag votes in favor of Frangieh's opponent in the presidential elections of 1970 and/or an endorsement of Dr. Manoukian and the list he was on.

The next day president Frangieh visited Antelias on the occasion of Easter to congratulate Catholicos Khoren I and the Lebanese Armenian community. The Armenian candidates, Gemayel the outgoing Armenian deputies were present.²³³

Ararad wrote it was likely the Armenian electors would concentrate their votes on Dr. Manoukian *en masse*. There was a general disposition to defend the Armenian Evangelical candidate, against whom some "revengefulness" was seen in some sections of other communities that did not want to see Dr. Manoukian as an official list member.²³⁴ A few days later the Hunchag daily wrote that there were persistent rumors Tony Saad had the secret encouragement of Chamoun, and that non-Armenian partisans of the K-NL-T list, beginning with the supporters of Ishaq, would repeat the game of 1968, i.e. concentrate their votes in favor of the non-Armenian Evangelical candidate most likely to succeed.²³⁵ To calm such fears, on April 11 the NL candidate Sassin issued a brief appeal asking his supporters to vote for the complete list on which he was.²³⁶

On April 6 the Hunchag daily wrote about the Metn elections, saying it was certain that the only Armenian candidate would be Yerevanian,

around whom an Armenian national unity had been formed, and it was very likely that this national concord had already appointed him as a deputy, before the elections.²³⁷ *Ararad* announced that on April 7, Yerevanian, accompanied by Huntchag leaders, made a surprise visit to the Homenmen club, where 300 people were doing electoral work. The visit took the shape of an electoral meeting; the paper wrote that Yerevanian "highly appreciated the Huntchag farsighted and patient attitude, especially its national policy, and the spirit shown, thanks to which they would reach to praiseworthy results."²³⁸

On April 9, *Ayk* presented Sarkis Djedikian, who had forced the Armenian candidates not to be elected automatically without opponents (*tezkieh*) before the elections date under the title "The Ghost Candidate Sarkis Djedikian". The paper gave a brief biography of Djedikian. Born in Tripoli in 1921, he had transferred his registration to Medawar in 1959. Djedikian boasted of relations with Chamoun, Chehab and Frangieh. He further bragged "he was the one who prepared the 1958 revolution, as he had then severed his links with Chamoun. He added "he was neither a Socialist, nor a Fascist, nor a Communist, nor a Baathist, but an independent Lebanese and only Lebanon was valuable to him."²³⁹

In fact there was no serious opposition to the only list, with the possible exception of the Protestant candidate Tony Saad, who posed a vague threat. On the Tashnag side there was fear that the non-Armenian electorate, disturbed by their success in imposing an Armenian Protestant candidate on the K-NL-T list, would vote for Tony Saad. The appeal signed by the three party leaders of the only list tried to prevent that.

An electoral meeting took place in Sassin's residence, where further individual appeals by Chamoun and Gemayel were made, specifically calling their voters to vote for Dr. Manoukian. Chamoun said he considered himself the guarantor of the latter's candidacy and concluded that he could count on the Beirut I electorate in this matter.²⁴⁰

Aztag wrote that Dr. Manoukian was not the candidate of the Tashnag Party, but of the Evangelical community and of the Armenians in general, as was the case with the other partisan or non-partisan Armenian candidates.²⁴¹ *Ararad* reprinted the statement in its issue of 14 April.²⁴² *Aztag* had earlier reprinted an article from *Ararad* under the title of "The Opinion Of Others," entitled "Unity Within The Armenian Community To Defend The Armenian Evangelical Seat."²⁴³

L'Orient-Le Jour indicated Tony Saad was gaining ground among the disinterested. This was why the Armenian parties had taken precautions and had told their partisans not to vote until a previously set hour, to make sure their allies would honor their word.²⁴⁴

The Huntchags established three locations to help their sympathisers to vote for Dr. Manoukian. On April 15 Dr. Manoukian's picture and biography appeared in *Ararad*. It stated his AGBU role and presented him as the Armenian community candidate.²⁴⁵ That same day, Dr. Manoukian visited the Homenmen club, where Huntchag leader Djeredjian presented him to the audience, emphasizing his AGBU links, and instructed them to vote for Dr. Manoukian as the Armenian community's candidate. The latter thanked the Huntchag Party "for their sane national policy."²⁴⁶

Zartonk revealed in its editorial of April 11 that "a few weeks ago", when preliminary electoral activity was going on, a meeting of Ramgavar, Huntchag and Tashnag representatives had taken place. During the meeting the Huntchag and Ramgavar representatives informed the Tashnags "they were ready for serious compromise, in order to participate in the elections with a list of concordance, to defend the general interest of the community." However, the Tashnags, instead of choosing "a real and genuine agreement", were "led by partisan spirit" and took a decision that "deepened the dissensions" and did not lead to unity or concord. The Ramgavar daily added they did not want to express reservations about the candidacies of non-partisans under the Tashnag Party label, but wanted to indicate the partisan and rule-all spirit by which Tashnag leaders were led. The paper concluded they were in favor of an agreement, but not one of outward form only, particularly under the dictates of one side.²⁴⁷

Ararad wrote "it is glad to note that after initial inexplicable reservation, in different circles of the AGBU and especially the youth of the Armenian Youth Association Antranik [Club], vigorous work has begun to defend the candidacy of the Union's vice-president [Dr. Manoukian]. Especially significant is the position of AGBU Center and Presidency, who by letter have suggested to the Beirut [District] Committee that it adopt Dr. Manoukian's candidacy and support him."²⁴⁸

The Armenian Catholic Club also organized a gathering in the presence of all the Armenian candidates of the K-NL-T list in Beirut and Metn, including Joseph Chader. Levon Terzian spoke in Armenian and Me Jacques Joukhadarian (who had withdrawn his own candidacy) in Arabic.

Both, on behalf of their community, declared their support for the K-NL-T list.²⁴⁹

Electoral meetings took place at the Tashnag club in Zokak el Blat²⁵⁰ and in the courtyard of the Sophia Hagopian National College in Bourj Hammoud. At the latter meeting all the K-NL-T list candidates were present.²⁵¹

The elections took place on April 16 in Beirut I, in a calm atmosphere, as there was no serious opposition.

The number of Beirut I voters was 102693²⁵² of whom 34814 voted, thus 33.9%. 140 votes were annulled.²⁵³

Aztag announced their success under the title "The Glorious Victory Of The Armenian People. The K-NL-T list completely elected."²⁵⁴ *Ararad* headlined "A Victory Honoring The Armenians In Beirut."²⁵⁵ *Zartok* merely gave the results.

The official results were as follows:²⁵⁶

Peirre Gemayel 28589, Michel Sassin 30221, Nasib Maalouf 29729, Melkon Eblighatian 24744, Khatchig Babikian 25152, Souren Khanamirian 24863, Joseph Chader 27663, Dr. Antranig Manoukian 22861, Tony Saad 10778, Nicola Abdoushe 3567, Carlo Dadourian 2626, Selim Wakim 2348, George Haddad 2044, Camille Sleiman 1384, Sarkis Djedikian 285, Fouad Akkad 272, Michel Feghali 264, Anis Jabbour 246, Tsolag Tutelian 211, Emile Azar 40.

Aztag did not give nor mention Tutelian's result.

A difference of 3500-5500 votes was noted between the votes obtained by list leaders and the Armenian candidates. The difference between Dr. Manoukian's total and that of Sassin, who received the highest votes, was 7360 votes. Dr. Manoukian had 12083 more votes than his chief contender, Saad. It was apparent that many non-Armenian voters had erased the names of the Armenian candidates.

The Prelate of the Armenians of Lebanon, Archbishop Dadjad Ourfalian, accompanied by Bishop Terterian, the rector of the Seminary of the Cilician Catholicosate, Archbishop Hmayag Gedikian, vicar-general of the Armenian Catholic Patriarchate, the Political Bureau of the Armenian Evangelical Community congratulated the newly elected Armenian deputies at the Tashnag Club on April 20.²⁵⁷

After the elections of Beirut were over, the attention of the Armenians shifted to the elections in Northern Metn. The newspapers listed the

Armenian candidates registered at the Ministry of the Interior: Ara Yerevanian, Berdj Khanamirian and Noubar Nokhoudian.

On April 20, 1972, after a meeting at the Kataeb headquarters the list composed of Kataeb, National Liberal and the Tashnag Party was officially announced. The list included Amin Gemayel, Fouad Lahoud, Auguste Bakhos (Maronites), Michel Murr (Greek Orthodox) and Ara Yerevanian (Armenian Orthodox).²⁵⁸

L'Orient-Le Jour had reported on April 14 that the leader of the National Bloc had decided to leave the Armenian seat vacant on the list he sponsored.²⁵⁹ Tosbath wrote on April 23 that it was an illusion to think that by not taking an Armenian candidate they could secure the neutrality of the Tashnags.²⁶⁰

It was announced in the newspaper that Yerevanian had been admitted to both lists in Northern Metn (i.e. the Kataeb-National Liberal list on which he was, and also the list composed of Emile Salhab, Joseph Khoury, Asaad Ashkar (Maronites) and Albert Moukheiber (Greek Orthodox)).²⁶¹ Later on, the *Huntchag* daily claimed it was by their party's efforts that Yerevanian had been placed on the second list, thus securing for him all the non-Armenian votes.²⁶²

An electoral meeting was held in Bourj Hammoud on April 26. Garo Sassouni spoke in Armenian and Yerevanian in Arabic. The Tashnag Party stressed the importance of voting for the complete K-NL-T list.²⁶³

The *Huntchag* daily, unlike *Zartouk*, campaigned for Yerevanian, indicating "all Armenians are in agreement on the Armenian candidate of Metn."²⁶⁴ On April 26 in an editorial entitled "With All Armenians, For All Armenians" *Ararad* rejoiced at Yerevanian's candidacy, saying all Armenians without exception would vote for him and that "what shall take place will not be an election, but a referendum."²⁶⁵ On April 28, the newspaper indicated the location of the polling centers.²⁶⁶

The Communist *Gantch* advised its followers not to vote for the non-Armenian members of the list on which Yerevanian was, "as the Armenian people does not stand by and can not stand by sectarian and anti-Arab forces."²⁶⁷

Nokhoudian, for whom *Zartouk* did not campaign at all, withdrew from the elections.

The elections took place on 30 April in a calm manner. Out of 89735 registered voters, 45702 voted i.e. 50.9%. 145 votes were annulled.²⁶⁸

The official results were as follows:²⁶⁹

Ara Yerevanian 37190, Amin Gemayel 25207, Fouad Lahoud 23002, Auguste Bakhos 22387, Albert Moukheiber 22011, Michel Murr 21032, Emile Salhab 19263, Joseph Khoury 16767, Asaad Ashkar 16406, Mansour Azar 5854, Hanna Shidyaq 2479, Habib Sawaya 2046, Victor Moussa 838, Berdj Khanamirian 164, Nassib Lahoud 13, Jamil Lahoud 9, Riad Fadel 4, George Ashkar 3, Hafiz Abi Jaoudé 1.

Yerevanian, Gemayel, Lahoud, Bakhos and Moukheiber were proclaimed elected.

According to *Aztag* the Bourj Hammoud political center results were as follows: Yerevanian 6097, Gemayel 5350, Lahoud 5425, Auguste Bakhos 5315, Michel Murr 5440, Albert Moukheiber 530 and Berdj Khanamirian 3.²⁷⁰ Other sources reported that Moukheiber got 750 Armenian votes in all Metn, which contributed to his victory over Murr, by a difference of 979 votes.²⁷¹

Aztag and *Ararad* heralded the election of Yerevanian on May 3. The *Huntchag* daily published his picture with the subtitle "Ara Yerevanian, The National Concord Deputy,"²⁷² and in an editorial wrote that the elections of April 16 and 30 revealed the mood of concord and cooperation among all Armenian factions. The unity for Beirut's Evangelical and Metn's Orthodox seats created unity within the community for the defence of its rights and for it to come closer to general national interests, the elections proved this was possible.²⁷³

After the elections *Le Soir* wrote that it would be better to place all the Armenian votes in one district, as it was not possible to continue with the present situation. The newspaper added that the Kataeb-National Liberal list would not have been elected in Northern Metn without the Armenian votes.²⁷⁴

Zartouk in a series of editorials made a brief historical overview of the previous elections. It stated how the French mandatory authorities had failed their candidate, Meguerditch Messerlian, in 1943 and how, on May 25, 1947 in corrupt elections, the Tashnags had won. And now 25 years later, the Tashnags were admitting that the elections of 1947 "were the climax of forgeries and interventions", as they wrote this in *Aztag*. *Zartouk* mentioned Chamoun's bold interventions in 1953 and 1957 and claimed that in 1960, according to *Amal*, the Kataeb daily organ, the Rally had more actual Armenian voters than the Tashnags.²⁷⁵ Alluding to the

candidacies of Dr. Manoukian and Yerevanian, the paper questioned what objections the Ramgavars could have against them; they also appreciated one or two of the other Armenian candidates. However, what they objected to was that the candidates were presented as the candidates of the Tashnag Party instead of the community. Furthermore, all five deputies had given their written agreement to abide by the orders of the Tashnag Central Committee of Lebanon. The Ramgavar daily further criticized the "Lebanese Lebanon" doctrine and stated Lebanon was Arab, the majority of Lebanese Armenians would not follow Chamounism.²⁷⁶

Communist leader Artin Madeyan, wrote that the recent Tashnag electoral tactic of taking non-partisan candidates from the AGBU and from a Huntchag family, could not be called national unity, as they were presented as members of the Tashnag list while they could have been presented as Armenian national unity list members.²⁷⁷

Nonetheless, the legislative elections of 1972 did not create the atmosphere that the elections of 1947 and 1957 had created within the Armenian community. The Armenian political parties decided on 2 September 1974 to commemorate together the 60th anniversary of the Genocide perpetrated on the Armenians and cooperated together.

Soon after the elections of 1972 were over, Prime Minister Salam resigned to pave the way for the formation of a new government, again led by himself.

CONCLUSION

The legislative elections of 1968 during the presidency of Charles Helou and the legislative elections of 1972 during the presidency of Suleiman Frangieh were held in a calm atmosphere. Both elections were based on the 1960 electoral law, which put the majority of the Christian electorate in Beirut I. In this district the Kataeb-Tashnag electoral alliance was maintained and was joined by the National Liberal Party in 1972, thus creating an unbeatable list. By clever electoral maneuvering, the Tashnag Party secured the Protestant seat in Beirut I for an Armenian Evangelical who belonged to the AGBU circle in 1972. The Tashnag Party at first wanted to appropriate all the six seats Armenians could run for. However, President Frangieh wanted all Armenian sides to be represented in the Parliament. Eventually former President Chamoun, in his decision to grant the Protestant seat to the Tashnags, said an independent personality close

to the Ramgavars should be chosen to prevent the formation of a second list. Furthermore, the Lebanese Armenian National Rally ceased to exist when the Huntchag Party decided to support the selected Armenian Evangelical candidate and the Metn Armenian Orthodox candidate (whose father was a leading Huntchag Party member), although both candidates had been selected by the Lebanon Central Committee of the Tashnag Party. Thus, the latter party's candidates were not challenged by the Ramgavars and the independents, though with reluctance.

Although upset by the above, the Ramgavars and their allied Independents maintained contacts with the other Armenian political parties, agreeing in September 1974 to commemorate together and on a grand scale the 60th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide in April 1975.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ This study is the fifth in a series of articles by the author on Armenian participation in successive Lebanese legislative elections since 1934. The first four articles in this series were published in volumes 21, 22, 23, and 24 of the *Haigazian Armenological Review*.
- ² Iliya Harik, "Voting Behavior in Lebanon," in *Electoral Politics In The Middle East: Issues, Voters and Elites*, edited by Jacob M. Landau, Ergun Özbudun (Frank Tachau: London 1980), p. 148.
- ³ *Aztag*, 41st year, 13 February 1968, № 291 (10945).
- ⁴ *Aztag*, 41st year, 17 February 1968, № 295 (10949).
- ⁵ *Al-Jorida Al-Rasmiyeh Lil-Jamhuriyya Al-Lubnaniye*, special issue № 15, 19 February 1968.
- ⁶ On 12 February 1965 Catholicos Khoren I, Armenian Catholic patriarch, Iknadius-Bedros XVI Batanian, Rev. Hovhanness Aharonian, president of the Near East Union of Armenian Evangelical Churches, Haroutioun Djeredjian of the Huntchag Party, Me Hratchia Setrakian of the Ramgavar Azadagan Party and Dr. Yeghig Konialian of the Tashnag Party and other independent personalities agreed on a joint commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Genocide of Armenians. A committee was formed by Me Setrakian, Djeredjian, Dr. Yervant Jidejian, Me Khatchig Babikian, Prof. Taniel Wosgian, Dr. Yeghig Konialian, Pascal Paboudjian, Vahe Setian and Dr. Levon Aharonian to this effect. The first meeting was held at the Catholiassate of Antelias and later meetings at the Armenian Catholic Patriarchate (*Zartok*, 28th year, 14 February 1965, № 116 (8156)).
- ⁷ *L'Orient*, 41st year, 26 April 1965, № 12251, p. 1.
- ⁸ After negotiations former president Camille Chamoun, leader of the National Liberal Party, Raymond Eddé, leader of the Bloc National and Pierre Gemayel, leader of the Kataeb Party, had formed the Alliance of the Three, i.e. the *Helf* for political reasons.
- ⁹ *Aztag*, 41st year, 31 August 1967, № 152 (10806).
- ¹⁰ *Aztag*, 41st year, 25 January 1968, № 275 (10929) & 20 February 1968, № 297 (10951).
- ¹¹ *Aztag*, 41st year, 25 January 1968, № 275 (10929).

- ¹² *The Daily Star*, Beirut, February 16, 1968, p. 2; *L'Orient*, Beirut, February 17, 1968.
- ¹³ *Aztag*, 41st year, 20 February 1968, № 297 (10951).
- ¹⁴ *Aztag*, 41st year, 23 February 1968, p. 299 (10953).
- ¹⁵ *Aztag*, 41st year, 29 February 1968, № 304 (10958).
- ¹⁶ *Aztag*, 42nd year, 6 March 1968, № 2 (10963).
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁸ *Aztag*, 42nd year, 9 March 1968, № 5 (10966).
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*
- ²⁰ *Ayk*, 15th year, 15 March 1968, № 4630; *Aztag*, 42nd year, 15 March 1968, № 10 (10971).
- ²¹ *Ibid.*; *Zartok*, 31st year, 20 March 1968, № 146 (9096); *Ayk*, 15th year, 21 March 1968, № 4365.
- ²² *Ayk*, 15th year, 16 March 1968, № 4631.
- ²³ *L'Orient*, 23 February 1968, quoted in *Ararad*, 31st year, 23 February 1968, № 83 (7904).
- ²⁴ *Le Jour*, 24 February 1968, quoted in *Ararad*, 31st year, 24 February 1968, № 84 (7905).
- ²⁵ *Ayk*, 15th year, 28 February 1968, № 4616.
- ²⁶ *Ayk*, 15th year, 29 February 1968, № 4617.
- ²⁷ *Zartok*, 31st year, 1 March 1968, № 130 (9077).
- ²⁸ *Zartok*, 31st year, 8 March 1968, № 136 (9083).
- ²⁹ *Zartok*, 31st year, 9 March 1968, № 137 (9084).
- ³⁰ *Zartok*, 31st year, 10 March 1968, № 138 (9085).
- ³¹ *Aztag*, 42nd year, 14 March 1968, № 9 (10970).
- ³² *Zartok*, 31st year, 19 and 20 March 1968, № 145 (9092) and № 146 (9093).
- ³³ *Aztag*, 42nd year, 29 April 1968, № 46 (11007).
- ³⁴ *Zartok*, 31st year, 10 March 1968, № 138 (9089).
- ³⁵ *Zartok*, 31st year, 17 March 1968, № 144 (9095).
- ³⁶ *Zartok*, 31st year, 21 March 1968, № 147 (9097).
- ³⁷ *Zartok*, 31st year, 20 March 1968, № 146 (9096).
- ³⁸ Majed Khaled Majed, *Intikhabat Lubnaniya 1861-1992: Qawanin-Nataij* (Lebanese Elections 1861-1992: Legislations-Results) (Beirut: 1992), p. 160.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.* p. 161.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*
- ⁴¹ *Ayk*, 15th year, 26 March 1968, № 4639.
- ⁴² *Ararad*, 31st year, 26 March 1968, № 110 (7931).
- ⁴³ *Zartok*, 31st year, 26 March 1968, № 151 (9098).
- ⁴⁴ *L'Orient*, as quoted by *Zartok*, 27 March 1968, № 152 (9099).
- ⁴⁵ *Aztag*, 42nd year, 27 March 1968, № 20 (10981).
- ⁴⁶ *Lissan ul-Hal*, as quoted by *Zartok* 26 March 1968, № 151 (9098).
- ⁴⁷ *Zartok*, 31st year, 3 April 1968, № 158 (9105).
- ⁴⁸ *Ayk*, 16th year, 31 March 1968, № 4644.
- ⁴⁹ *Aztag*, 42nd year, 19 March 1968, № 13 (10974).
- ⁵⁰ *Zartok*, 31st year, 6 March 1968, № 134 (9081) and 9 March 1968, № 137 (9083).
- ⁵¹ *Zartok*, 31st year, 4 April 1969, No 159 (9106).
- ⁵² *Zartok*, 31st year, 5 April 1968, № 160 (9107).
- ⁵³ *Zartok*, 31st year, 6 April 1968, № 161 (9108).

- ⁵⁴ Zartok, 31st year, 5 April 1968, № 160 (9107).
- ⁵⁵ Aztag, 42nd year, 4 April 1968, № 27 (10988).
- ⁵⁶ Ararad, 31st year, 8 March 1968, № 95 (7916).
- ⁵⁷ Ararad, 31st year, 30 March 1968, № 114 (7935).
- ⁵⁸ Ararad, 31st year, 3 April 1968, № 117 (7938).
- ⁵⁹ Ararad, 31st year, 6 April 1968, № 120 (7941).
- ⁶⁰ Zartok, 31st year, 14 March 1968, № 141 (9089).
- ⁶¹ Zartok, 31st year, 3 April 1968, № 158 (9105).
- ⁶² Zartok, 31st year, 7 April 1968, № 162 (9109).
- ⁶³ Aztag, 42nd year, 6 April 1968, № 29 (10990).
- ⁶⁴ Ayk, 16th year, 31 March 1968, № 4644.
- ⁶⁵ Ayk, 16th year, 4 April 1968, № 4647.
- ⁶⁶ Ayk, 16th year, 5 April 1968, № 4648.
- ⁶⁷ Aztag, 42nd year, 5 April 1968, № 27 (10988).
- ⁶⁸ Majed, p. 169.
- ⁶⁹ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁰ Aztag, 42nd year, 8 April 1968, № 30 (10991).
- ⁷¹ *Ibid.*
- ⁷² Ararad, 31st year, 8 April 1968, № 121 (7942).
- ⁷³ Ararad, 31st year, 10 April 1968, № 123 (7944).
- ⁷⁴ Ararad, 31st year, 11 April 1968, № 124 (7945).
- ⁷⁵ *Le Soir*, 9 April 1968; *Ayk*, 16th year, 11 April 1968, № 4653; *Zartok*, 31st year, 10 April 1968, № 164 (9111).
- ⁷⁶ *Zartok*, 31st year, 13 April 1968, № 167 (9114).
- ⁷⁷ *Ayk*, 16th year, 9 April 1968, № 4651.
- ⁷⁸ *Aztag*, 45th year, No 143 (12015), 23 August 1971.
- ⁷⁹ *Ibid.*
- ⁸⁰ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, 7 September 1971.
- ⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 21 November 1971.
- ⁸² *Aztag*, 45th year, № 225 (12097), 29 November 1971.
- ⁸³ *Zartok*, 35th year, № 33 (10191), 3 November 1971.
- ⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, № 38 (10196), 9 November 1971.
- ⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, № 162 (10019), 14 April 1971 and № 165 (10022), 17 April 1971.
- ⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, № 164 (10021), 16 April 1971.
- ⁸⁷ *Ararad*, 35th year, № 9045 (13), 24 November 1971.
- ⁸⁸ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 167, 28 November 1971.
- ⁸⁹ *Ibid.*
- ⁹⁰ *Aztag*, 45th year, № 225 (12097), 29 November 1971.
- ⁹¹ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 167, 28 November 1971.
- ⁹² *Ganich* weekly, № 43 (3931) 11 December 1971, as quoted from *L'Orient-Le Jour* of 6 December 1971.
- ⁹³ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, 30 December 1971.
- ⁹⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁹⁵ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 224, 26 January 1972.

- ⁹⁶ *Ibid.*
- ⁹⁷ *Zartok*, 35th year, № 107 (10265), 2 February 1972, *L'Orient-Le Jour* № 231, 1 February 1972.
- ⁹⁸ *Zartok*, 35th year, № 107 (10265), 2 February 1972.
- ⁹⁹ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁰⁰ *Ayk*, 19th year, № 5712, 4 February 1972.
- ¹⁰¹ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 239, 9 February 1972.
- ¹⁰² *Ibid.*
- ¹⁰³ *Aztag*, 45th year, № 284 (12156), 9 February 1972.
- ¹⁰⁴ *Aztag*, 45th № 287 (12159), 14 February 1972.
- ¹⁰⁵ *Zartok*, 35th year, № 115 (10273), 12 February 1972.
- ¹⁰⁶ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 241, 11 February 1972.
- ¹⁰⁷ Correspondence with Yenovk Balikian, Los Angeles, 8 June 2004.
- ¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁰⁹ *Aztag*, 45th year, № 287 (12159), 14 February 1972; *Le Soir*, № 7723, 15 February 1972.
- ¹¹⁰ *Aztag*, 45th year, № 290 (12162), 17 February 1972.
- ¹¹¹ *Le Soir*, № 7723, 15 February 1972.
- ¹¹² *Bayrak*, 19 February 1972.
- ¹¹³ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 248, 18 February 1972.
- ¹¹⁴ *Sada Lubnan*, 19 February 1972.
- ¹¹⁵ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 248, 18 February 1972.
- ¹¹⁶ Dr. Melkon Eblighatian, *Kaghtagayanen Khorhrtaran* (From The Refugee Camp To The Parliament) (Aleppo: 1998), p. 291.
- ¹¹⁷ *Zartok*, 45th year, № 126 (10284), 25 February 1972.
- ¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*
- ¹¹⁹ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 255, 25 February 1972.
- ¹²⁰ *Ibid.* № 257, 27 February 1972. *Yeridasart Hay*, № 50, Beirut, 26 February 1972, p. 7 gave the full text of the 14 April 1964 meeting minutes.
- ¹²¹ *Aztag*, 45th year, № 301 (12173), 1 March 1972.
- ¹²² *Ibid.*
- ¹²³ *Zartok*, 35th year, № 132 (10290), 3 March 1972.
- ¹²⁴ *Ibid.*
- ¹²⁵ *Ibid.*
- ¹²⁶ *Ibid.*
- ¹²⁷ *Ibid.*
- ¹²⁸ Correspondence with Yenovk Balikian, Los Angeles, 8 June 2004.
- ¹²⁹ *Zartok*, 35th year, № 133 (10291), 4 March 1972.
- ¹³⁰ Correspondence with Yenovk Balikian, Los Angeles, 8 June 2004.
- ¹³¹ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 266, 7 March 1972.
- ¹³² *Ararad*, 35th year, № 9131 (93), 8 March 1972.
- ¹³³ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 266, 7 March 1972.
- ¹³⁴ *Ararad*, 35th year, № 9131 (93), 8 March 1972.
- ¹³⁵ *Ibid.*
- ¹³⁶ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 263, 4 March 1972.

- ¹³⁷ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 268, 9 March 1972; *Ayk*, 20th year, № 5741, 8 March 1972.
- ¹³⁸ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 269, 10 March 1972.
- ¹³⁹ Eblighatin, pp. 174-175, 298-299.
- ¹⁴⁰ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 268, 9 March 1972.
- ¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁴² *Ararad*, 35th year, № 9133 (95), 10 March 1972.
- ¹⁴³ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 268, 9 March 1972.
- ¹⁴⁴ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 268, 9 March 1972, published as paid communiqué. Also published in *Zartouk* and *Ararad*.
- ¹⁴⁵ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 269, 10 March 1972.
- ¹⁴⁶ *Nahar*, 39th year, № 11343, 11 March 1972.
- ¹⁴⁷ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 270, 11 March 1972.
- ¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.* The arbitration committee's composition was given in *L'Orient-Le Jour* № 272, 13 March 1972.
- ¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.* № 270, 11 March 1972.
- ¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁵¹ *Ayk*, 20th year, № 5745, 12 March 1972.
- ¹⁵² *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 270, 11 March 1972.
- ¹⁵³ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.* № 272, 3 March 1972.
- ¹⁵⁵ *Aztag*, 46th year, № 7 (12184), 14 March 1972.
- ¹⁵⁶ *L'Orient-Le Jour* № 273, 14 March 1972.
- ¹⁵⁷ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 274, 15 March 1972.
- ¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁵⁹ *The Daily Star*, 16 March 1972.
- ¹⁶⁰ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 276, 17 March 1972.
- ¹⁶¹ Correspondence with Yenovk Balikian, Los Angeles, 8 June 2004.
- ¹⁶² *Gantch* weekly, Beirut, № 58 (4018), 25 March 1972.
- ¹⁶³ *Le Soir*, № 7755, 18 March 1972; *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 277, 18 March 1972.
- ¹⁶⁴ *Le Soir*, № 7755, 18 March 1972.
- ¹⁶⁵ *Le Soir*, № 7755, 18 March 1972; *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 277, 18 March 1972, p. 1.
- ¹⁶⁶ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 277, 18 March 1972, p.3.
- ¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.* № 278, 19 March 1972.
- ¹⁶⁸ *Ararad*, 35th year, № 9141 (109), 19 March 1972.
- ¹⁶⁹ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 277, 18 March 1972, p.3.
- ¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1; *Ararad*, 35th year, 9141 (109), 19 March 1972; *Zartouk*, 35th year, № 146 (10304), 19 March 1972.
- ¹⁷¹ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 278, 19 March 1972.
- ¹⁷² *Ibid.* № 277, 18 March 1972, p. 3.
- ¹⁷³ *Ararad*, 35th year, 9141(109), 19 March 1972.
- ¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.* 9142 (110), 21 March 1972.
- ¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁷⁶ *Ararad*, 35th year, 25 March 1972, *L'Orient-Le Jour*, 25 March 1972.
- ¹⁷⁷ *Aztag*, 46th year, № 13 (12190), 21 March 1972.

- ¹⁷⁸ *Zartok*, 35th year, № 147(10305), 21 March 1972.
- ¹⁷⁹ *Aztag*, 46th year, № 16 (12193), 24 March 1972.
- ¹⁸⁰ *Zartok*, 35th year, № 151 (10309), 25 March 1972.
- ¹⁸¹ *Ayk*, 20th year, № 5757, 26 March 1972.
- ¹⁸² *Ararad*, 35th year, № 9143(111), 22 March 1972.
- ¹⁸³ *Ararad*, 35th year, № 9144 (112), 23 March 1972.
- ¹⁸⁴ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 281, 23 March 1972.
- ¹⁸⁵ Der Kaloustian was awarded a medal, Commander of the Cedars Order, by President Frangieh at an official reception on his retirement as a deputy after serving between 1943-1972 in the Lebanese Parliament (*Aztag*, 46th year, № 31 (12208), 12 April 1972).
- ¹⁸⁶ Eblighatian in his memoirs, (pp. 300-302) says the Central Committee of the Tashnag Party in Lebanon was delaying its selection of the Party candidate, so eventually the Tashnag Bureau's Representative H[rair] M[aroukhian] selected him. When he objected he was a physician, not a lawyer, and understood little classical Arabic, he was told "it is not necessary that you speak [in the parliament]."
- ¹⁸⁷ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 281, 23 March 1972.
- ¹⁸⁸ *Ararad*, 35th year, № 9145 (113), 24 March 1972.
- ¹⁸⁹ *Ararad*, 35th year, № 9146 (114), 25 March 1972.
- ¹⁹⁰ *Ararad*, 35th year, № 9145 (113), 24 March 1972.
- ¹⁹¹ *Ararad*, 35th year, № 9145 (113), 24 March 1972.
- ¹⁹² *Zartok*, 35th year, № 151 (10309), 26 March 1972.
- ¹⁹³ *Aztag*, 46th year, № 17 (12194), 25 March 1972.
- ¹⁹⁴ *Ayk*, 20th year, № 5758, 28 March 1972.
- ¹⁹⁵ Central Archives of the Most Recent History of the Republic of Armenia, fund 326, list 1, file 503, folio 34. The English translation of this Russian language document was provided to us by Ara Sanjian.
- ¹⁹⁶ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 283, 25 March 1972.
- ¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, № 285, 27 March 1972.
- ²⁰⁰ *Aztag*, 46th year № 18 (12195), 27 March 1972, also *Chanasser* bi-weekly, Beirut, 35th year, № 6, p. 121.
- ²⁰¹ *Chanasser* bi-weekly, Beirut, 35th year, № 6, 15 March 1972, P.122.
- ²⁰² Central Archives of the Most Recent History of the Republic of Armenia, fund 326, list 1, file 503, folio 56. The English translation of this Russian language document was also provided to us by Ara Sanjian.
- ²⁰³ *Zartok*, 35th year, № 156 (10314), 31 March 1972.
- ²⁰⁴ *Zartok*, 35th year, № 153 (10311), 28 March 1972, as quoted from *Lissan-ul-Hal*.
- ²⁰⁵ *Zartok*, 35th year, № 157 (10315), 1 April 1972; *Lissan-ul-Hal* had given in its issue of 25 March 1972, the names of Tosbath, Setrag Kassardjian and Shekerdjian as the candidates of the Rally.
- ²⁰⁶ *Le Soir*, 1 April 1972.
- ²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*
- ²⁰⁸ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 290, 1 April 1972.

- ²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*; *The Daily Star*, 1 April 1972.
- ²¹⁰ *Le Soir*, 1 April 1972.
- ²¹¹ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 290, 1 April 1972.
- ²¹² *Ibid.*
- ²¹³ *Le Soir*, 1 April 1972.
- ²¹⁴ *Ibid.*
- ²¹⁵ *Ayk*, 20th year, № 5763, 2 April 1972.
- ²¹⁶ *Zartok*, 35th year, № 158 (10316), 2 April 1972.
- ²¹⁷ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 291, 2 April 1972.
- ²¹⁸ *Ibid.* № 293, 5 April 1972.
- ²¹⁹ *Ibid.*
- ²²⁰ *Zartok*, 35th year, № 160 (10318), 6 April 1972; *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 294, 6 April 1972; *Ararad*, 35th year, № 9155 (123), 6 April 1972.
- ²²¹ *Ararad*, 35th year, № 9155 (123), 6 April 1972.
- ²²² *Ararad*, 35th year, № 9156 (124), 7 April 1972.
- ²²³ *Aztag*, 46th year, № 26 (12203), 6 April 1972.
- ²²⁴ *Aztag*, 46th year, № 24 (12201), 4 April 1972.
- ²²⁵ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 294, 6 April 1972.
- ²²⁶ *Ibid.*; also *Zartok*, 35th year, № 161 (10319), 7 April 1972.
- ²²⁷ *Aztag*, 46th year, № 26 (12203), 6 April 1972.
- ²²⁸ *Zartok*, 35th year, № 161 (10319), 7 April 1972.
- ²²⁹ *Zartok*, 35th year, № 162 (10320), 8 April 1972, as quoted from *Le Soir*.
- ²³⁰ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 295, 7 April 1972.
- ²³¹ *Aztag*, 46th year, № 28 (12205), 8 April 1972.
- ²³² *Ibid.*
- ²³³ *Aztag*, 46th year, № 29 (12206), 10 April 1972.
- ²³⁴ *Ararad*, 35th year, № 9155 (123), 6 April 1972.
- ²³⁵ *Ibid.*
- ²³⁶ *Aztag*, 46th year, № 30 (12207), 11 April 1972.
- ²³⁷ *Ararad*, 35th year, № 9155 (123), 6 April 1972.
- ²³⁸ *Ibid.* № 9156 (124), 7 April 1972.
- ²³⁹ *Ayk*, 20th year, № 5768, 9 April 1972.
- ²⁴⁰ *Aztag*, 46th year, № 33 (12210), 14 April 1972; *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 302, 14 April 1972.
- ²⁴¹ *Aztag*, 46th year, № 32 (12209), 13 April 1972.
- ²⁴² *Ararad*, 35th year, № 9162 (130), 14 April 1972.
- ²⁴³ *Aztag*, 46th year, № 31 (12208), 12 April 1972.
- ²⁴⁴ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 302, 14 April 1972.
- ²⁴⁵ *Ararad*, 35th year, № 9163 (131), 15 April 1972.
- ²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, № 9164 (132), 16 April 1972.
- ²⁴⁷ *Zartok*, 35th year, № 164 (10322), 11 April 1972.
- ²⁴⁸ *Ararad*, 35th year, № 9159 (127), 11 April 1972.
- ²⁴⁹ *Aztag*, 46th year, № 31 (12208), 12 April 1972; *Massis*, Beirut, № 17 (1211), 23 April 1972.
- ²⁵⁰ *Aztag*, 46th year, № 32 (12209), 13 April 1972.

- ²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, № 34 (12211), 15 April 1972.
- ²⁵² According to *L'Orient-Le Jour* (№ 295, 7 April 1972), the number of Beirut I voters was 98,992, distributed as follows: Armenian Orthodox 32910, Greek-Orthodox 16709, Maronites 13899, Greek Catholics 8046, Armenian Catholics 5352, Armenian Evangelicals 2749, Syrian Catholics 3082, Sunnites 6573, Shiites 1831, Jews 3558, Latins 2070.
- ²⁵³ Majed, p. 176.
- ²⁵⁴ *Aztag*, 46th year, № 35 (12212), 17 April 1972.
- ²⁵⁵ *Ararad*, 35th year, № 9165 (133), 18 April 1972.
- ²⁵⁶ Majed, p. 176.
- ²⁵⁷ *Aztag*, 46th year, № 39 (12216), 21 April 1972.
- ²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*
- ²⁵⁹ *L'Orient-Le Jour*, № 302, 14 April 1972.
- ²⁶⁰ *Ayk*, 20th year, № 5789, 23 April 1972.
- ²⁶¹ *Zartok*, 35th year, № 174 (10332), 22 April 1972.
- ²⁶² *Ararad*, 35th year, № 9180 (148), 7 May 1972.
- ²⁶³ *Aztag*, 46th year, № 43 (12220), 27 April 1972.
- ²⁶⁴ *Ararad*, 35th year, № 9170 (138), 23 April 1972.
- ²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 35th year, № 9171 (139), 26 April 1972.
- ²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, № 9173 (141), 28 April 1972.
- ²⁶⁷ *Gantch*, weekly, № 63 (4047), 29 April 1972.
- ²⁶⁸ Majed, p. 187.
- ²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*
- ²⁷⁰ *Aztag*, 46th year, № 46 (12223), 1 May 1972, p. 8.
- ²⁷¹ *Gantch*, weekly, № 64 (4053), 6 May 1972.
- ²⁷² *Ararad*, 35th year, № 9176 (144), 3 May 1972.
- ²⁷³ *Ibid.*
- ²⁷⁴ *Le Soir*, 3 May 1972.
- ²⁷⁵ *Zartok*, 35th year № 180 (10338), 30 April 1972.
- ²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 35th year № 176 (10334), 26 April 1972.
- ²⁷⁷ *Gantch*, weekly, № 72 (4101), 1 July 1972.

**ՀԱՅՈՑ ՄԱՄՆԱԿՑՈՒԹՒՆԸ ԼԻՐԱՆԱՆԻ
ՇԱՐԼ ՀԵԼՈՒԻ (1964-1970) ԵՒ
ՍԼԷՑՄԱՆ ՖՐԱՆՃԻԷԻ (1970-1976)
ՆԱԽԱԳԱՀՈՒԹԵԱՆ ԺԱՄԱՆԱԿԱՇՐՋԱՆԻ
ԽՈՐՀՐԴԱՐԱՆԱԿԱՆ ԸՆՏՐՈՒԹՒՆՆԵՐՈՒՆ
(Ամփոփում)**

ԶԱԻՆ ՄՍԸՐԼԵԱՆ

Հեղինակը՝ հիմնուելով ժամանակակից լիբանանահայ, առաւել՝ Լիբանանի մէջ լոյս տեսնող մի քանի արարատառ ու ֆրանսատառ լրագիրներու նիւթերուն, լիբանանահայ քաղաքական գործիչներու յատուկ ասուլիսներու ընթացքին հաղորդած բանաւոր վկայութիւններու, ինչպէս նաեւ անձնական նամակագրութեամբ կուտակած տեղեկութիւններու վրայ, հանգամանօրէն կը ներկայացնէ լիբանանահայ քաղաքական տարրեր խմբաւորումներու կեցումները 1968ին եւ 1972ին կայացած երկրի խորհրդարանական ընտրութիւններուն ընթացքին հայ Առաքելական ու հայ կաթողիկէ համայնքներուն յատկացուած երեսփոխանական աթոռներուն, ինչպէս նաեւ Լիբանանի Աւետարանական համայնքի երեսփոխանական աթոռին շուրջ ծաւալած պայքարին: Այս կապակցութեամբ, կը քննուին նաեւ Լիբանանի միւս համայնքները ներկայացնող թեկնածուներու հետ հայ քաղաքական հակամարտ հասանքներուն հաստատած ընտրական դաշինքները, այդ երկու ընտրութեանց ընթացքին պետական մարմիններու թոյլտուութեամբ տեղի ունեցած անօրինութիւններուն վերարարեալ ծաւալած բանավէճերը:

Ի տարրերութիւն նախորդ երեսփոխանական ընտրութիւններուն, որոշակի փոփոխութիւններ ի յայտ կու գան լիբանանահայ կուսակցութիւններու փոխյարարելութեանց մէջ, որոնց իրրեւ արդիւնք լիբանանահայ երեսփոխաններու շարքին կ'երևին ոչ-դաշնակցական շրջանակին մօտիկ կանգնած անձնաւորութիւններ պատճառ դառնալով ոչ-դաշնակցական շրջանակի երկատման:

Այդուհանդերձ, հայ քաղաքական կուսակցութիւնները միասնաբար կը նշեն Հայոց Ծեղասպանութեան Ծժամեակը Պէլլուի մէջ, 1975ին:

Յօդուանը շարունակութիւնն է Հայկազեան Հայագիտական Հանդէսի ԻԱ, ԻԲ, ԻԳ, ԻԴ հատորներուն մէջ, նոյն հեղինակէն լոյս տեսած ուսումնասիրութեան: