

WRITING ABOUT THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE

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Writing about the Armenian Genocide is a hard task; no one should doubt that. The topic is vast. A great number of people were involved on all sides. There were many and varied eyewitnesses. The political circumstances of the genocide were highly complex as well as being profoundly brutal. And no one should forget that today, eighty years after the genocide, the issue of the Armenian Genocide is still a strongly contested topic, primarily for political reasons.

For Armenians today, especially those belonging to families directly affected by the genocide, there is often a feeling of real anger that the events which caused the murder or exile of so many members of their families, and arguably the loss of much of their country, should lack general acknowledgement today. At the same time there is a legacy of deep trauma, sometimes leading to an unwillingness to talk or write about the events. The basic facts can become obscured, and emotions, natural to feel, have on occasion clouded clear and logical thought.

As for non-Armenians: their specialist academics in Europe and America, writing on matters connected with World War I and the Middle East, have most often entirely ignored the genocide. It appears to have been air-brushed out of history in the way that old Soviet photographs used to air-brush out pictures of 'once-people' who had become 'non-people'. Within a Soviet context this was accepted as a fact of life; but is hard to avoid a sense of disquiet, even anger, when the process is seen occurring in a European and American context — whereby, for reasons of expediency (usually but not entirely connected with present-day political matters), specialist writers have chosen to ignore, or cover up, or not to research, or to distort, what actually happened to Armenians in 1915-16. Europe and America are expected to maintain high standards of impartial research and writing; yet the subject has often been treated with haughty contempt — although there are rare exceptions. How then, Armenians may reasonably ask, can the essence of the truth about the Armenian Genocide get through to a serious academic and political constituency? How can the Soviet-type principle of the air-brush be ended, and some true knowledge attained?

Initially the Armenian Genocide was an accepted fact in political and academic circles in Europe and America. Militarily and politically, the circumstances of 1915-16 made it not difficult for this to be the case. Britain,

France and Russia were at war with the Ittihadist (or Young Turk) Ottoman Empire; America was involved through sentiment based on 80 years of missionary endeavour, and directly so on declaring war in 1917. No one questioned the reality of the destruction by the Constantinople authorities of the empire's Armenian population. All serious newspapers reported it; those nations with consular representation observed it; and statesmen took heed of it. Historians and scholars such as Gilbert Murray and H.A.L. Fisher endorsed the fact that it had occurred and indeed was occurring.⁽¹⁾ Only wartime restrictions on discussion prevented complete disclosure of what happened.

Yet even at this time, during and after World War I, there were elements to give warning that the situation might not last for ever. The British showed a limited inclination, in military and strategic circles, to end their support for the cause of the Turks, which dated back, in some form, to the 16th century: in 1583 Queen Elizabeth I had sent an ambassador to Constantinople, and had replenished the Ottoman arsenal with tin from Cornish mines and lead stripped from the roofs of churches destroyed during the Reformation. Some centuries later, in 1828, the British Prime Minister, perhaps recalling these events, described Ottoman Turkey as 'our ancient ally', and stigmatized the battle of Navarino (whereby Greece had won freedom from the Ottoman Empire) as an 'untoward event'. In the 16th century England had supported Ottoman Turkey in order to outflank Spain, and in the 19th century London's aim was either to prevent the spread of revolution, or to stop the expansion of the Russian Empire towards the Mediterranean. Religious motives, in the sense of automatic opposition to the Ottoman Empire because it was an Islamic power, were entirely irrelevant both to the England of Queen Elizabeth I and to the mercantile Britain of the last century. In both cases, commerce and strategy were the only real determinants of policy.⁽²⁾

At the time of the Armenian Genocide, it was not hard to find public figures who sought to re-establish Britain's traditional pro-Turkish position. There was Aubrey Herbert, a life-long supporter of the Turks, who in February 1915 had remarked with satisfaction, as he sailed from Alexandria to Dardanelles, «The whole ship's company is now Turkophile».⁽³⁾ (After the war Herbert was dispatched by the British police authorities to visit Talaat Pasha in Germany, and he later published an article exonerating Talaat and the Turks from responsibility for the Armenian Genocide, insisting that the blame should be fixed on Germany.)⁽⁴⁾ There was Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, who in 1919 supported the idea of one Turkish state stretching from Smyrna to Baku. Lloyd George peppered his speeches with sympathetic references to Armenians, but in 1918, in Cabinet, he expressed the hope that the Turks, and not the Russians, would be masters of Baku.⁽⁵⁾

Against the views of such men at or near the heart of the British establishment, the voices of such supporters of the Armenians as James Viscount Bryce and Arnold Toynbee were less representative and more transient. Bryce died in 1922, and Toynbee's sympathies turned towards the Turks from the early 1920s.⁽⁶⁾ The political atmosphere became unsympathetic for Armenians. It became much harder for them to get a fair hearing, and (in Britain at least) it has stayed thus to the present.

Proving a genocide is very hard indeed. Even European Jews have found it hard to contradict the persistent deniers of the Holocaust in a direct and watertight manner. Genocide is a massive and usually secret crime, not an ordinary part of policy, so its perpetrators do their utmost to conceal it, by issuing verbal orders only, and by (in the Young Turk/Ittihadist case) issuing two sets of orders, of which those issued in secret were the ones to be acted on. Texts, whether archival or printed, have to be searched and analysed very acutely, in order to prove a genocide. The strength and weakness of each source has to be assessed.

A number of sources for the Armenian Genocide have stood the test of time. The Toynbee/Bryce Blue Book, *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire*, was originally published (in 1916) as an item of war propaganda, as Turks and their sympathizers never tire of proclaiming; but all the documents within it are valid descriptions of what was happening.⁽⁷⁾ A substantial number of them come from neutral or pro-German sources. The validity of the individual documents cannot really be challenged, especially when it is given the backing of the de-coding appendix that Doniguian of Beirut added to its edition of 1972. (For a historian's purposes the Doniguian edition, with its appendix, is superior to the original 1916 edition.) There is the collection of documents prepared by Dr. Lepsius and published as *Deutschland und Armenien* in 1919, some of which were published in French edition in 1986.⁽⁸⁾

These must be counted among the basic building blocks for anyone writing about the Armenian Genocide. The facts within them need to be thoroughly known, and interrelated, by anyone seeking to describe what happened in 1915. It is not enough just to refer to them. They have to be known, closely, document by document.

Documentation is essential for writing convincing history. It is insufficient to utter some modish, post-modernist formula, such as «history is process», to mention the names of Foucault and Derrida, and to believe that thereby the Armenian Genocide is proved to the satisfaction of all departments of international history and foreign ministries worldwide, as well as in international courts of justice and tribunals. Proper history relies on soundly-based evidence and intelligent interpretation, not on modish vacuities.

But documentation does not mean unselectively presenting masses

of documents to prove a case. The most effective documents are not necessarily the longest. All sources must be convincingly elucidated (and if necessary their context must be clearly stated; it is counterproductive to quote material out of context), and their provenance must be clearly stated. Moreover the significant texts are not always unpublished. Important texts which relate to the Young Turk attitude towards Armenians have been available in Turkish for decades, Falih Rifki Atay's 1981 memoirs, *Zeytindağı*, are essential for understanding the Armenian genocide.⁽⁹⁾

When looking at the origins and reliability of a document or a published memoir the historian needs careful, even finely-tuned judgment. One should always be asking oneself: how convincing is this witness? How good is the source? In order to make a careful judgment, it is necessary to read around the subject as much as possible. A good general understanding of World War I is essential, including the Western Front. The local military, diplomatic and political circumstances have to be clearly known. The personal characteristics of the individuals concerned — whether politicians, soldiers or diplomats — have to be known too. A good historian cannot escape being to some extent a judge of character. One of the convincing aspects of US consul Leslie Davis's account of the genocidal proceedings at Kharput in 1915, published in 1986 as *The Slaughterhouse Province*, is that Davis was in no way partisan towards the Armenians. If anything he liked the Turks.

Thus history cannot avoid being infused with biography. It needs to be infused with bibliography too. The book by Mevlanzade Rifaat entitled *Türk İnkilabının iç yüzü* (The inner aspects of the Turkish revolution) has been presented as being an authentic record of the debates within the Young Turk revolution. The book is sensationalist. But is it authentic? What happened to the author? What was his agenda? How did he come to write his text, and where is the original text now? What was the book's actual publishing history, and who financed its appearance? These are important questions awaiting answers, and until they are given, no historian in the wider arena will wish to use *Türk İnkilabının iç yüzü*.⁽¹⁰⁾

The book focuses on another matter — the importance of having some familiarity with the Turkish language. This is for the purpose of reading texts already published, as well as for the possibility of exploring Ottoman archives. The same is true, but to a lesser extent, for the German language, for the reason that Germany and Austria were allies of the Ottoman Empire in 1914-18. Students of the Armenian Genocide need some German as well as Turkish. Again, the point is to read published texts, just as much as to explore archives of unpublished material. In trying to build up a convincing picture of the Armenian Genocide, it is not enough today, in 1995, in an era when so much historical material is being published, and so many archives have been opened, just to rely on material in the Armenian, English

and French languages — especially since Britain and France were enemies of the Ottoman Empire, and a certain amount of material in their languages can be construed not as impartial evidence but as tainted war propaganda.

In building up a picture of the Armenian Genocide, a writer should always wonder: what is the most convincing material to offer to a readership? Only the most convincing material, clearly portrayed, will end the principle of the air-brush, and re-unite the topic of the Armenian Genocide with the history of the modern Middle East and with our 20th century political consciousness. Personally, I have little doubt on the matter of evidence: it is the documents of the military men which count first. Just as an account of the September-December 1920 assault on the first Republic of Armenia is incomplete without the account of General Kiazim Karabekir, so I believe that the history of the genocide has to find a primary place for the commanders of the Ottoman Third Army, Generals Mahmud Kiamil Pasha and Vehib Pasha. To my knowledge, there are no documents or literary remains of the former (who was a committed anti-Armenian Ittihadist); but the more soldierly and less ideological Vehib Pasha did leave an important text. This was his testimony to the Mazhar Commission, which was set up in late 1918 to investigate the reasons for the Ottoman army's failure in the war. Vehib's testimony contains candid references to the activities of those Ittihad (Committee of Union and Progress) members who were active in Ottoman Armenia from the date of his appointment (February 1916).⁽¹¹⁾

Anyone planning today, in 1995, to write the history of the Armenian Genocide, should, I believe, start with Vehib Pasha's deposition. Ideally, it should be quoted and annotated in full. Thereby it would be impossible for any even partially responsible historian to ignore it. We might see articles analysing it in the *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, and perhaps *Middle Eastern Studies*. It would be a formidable piece of evidence.

Other military accounts should be sought out. Pomiankowski's memoirs have long been available.⁽¹²⁾ It would be interesting to see if there are any memoirs extant of General Posselt, German liaison officer in Erzerum in 1915. He is the man who described the behaviour of the Armenians there in April as *tadellos* — «perfect».⁽¹³⁾ This contradicts the idea that there was an «Armenian revolution», which is the claim of those who would justify or deny the Armenian Genocide. The testimony of the military (whether Turkish, German or Austrian) is vital for gaining a clear picture of the genocide.

Alongside, but in my opinion, after the testimony of the military, is the testimony of diplomats. Again, pride of the place should be given to German (and Austrian). A number of these are already in print, either in *Deutschland und Armenien* or in the 1986 French translation. As German ambassador, Baron von Wangenheim was close, but not as close as sometimes depicted, to Ittihadist policy. He was succeeded by Prince Hohenlohe,

who seems to have been somewhat ineffectual and basically passive. But his successor, Count Wolff-Metternich, was outspoken, and sent a devastating dispatch to Berlin on 30 June 1916, vividly highlighting the anti-Armenian policy of the Ittihadists, and describing the manner in which the party, the Committee of Union and Progress, was destroying the Armenian community, and was acting as a para-government alongside the actual Ottoman government.⁽¹⁴⁾

He made it clear that the Ittihad party was acting as a ginger-group to the government. This was an odd state of affairs between a party and a government; but it has to be examined and taken on board by anyone writing about the Armenian Genocide. Politics and political structures have to be confronted directly and unequivocally. I have often found Armenians reluctant to explore political issues, even in non-Armenian contexts, too deeply. Some even take refuge in Muslim-Christian religious differences to explain the genocide — a largely irrelevant issue. Perhaps Armenians avoid politics in the awareness of the less than happy outcome of political differences within their own community. But nevertheless this is a handicap which must be overcome, and the politics of the Ittihadist Ottoman Empire during the genocide must be expounded closely and fully. Count Wolff-Metternich's dispatch is a good starting point for such an exploration. After reading it, we are led to ask: what are the implications of having a government and a party dictatorship uneasily co-existing? How did it work?

Besides the dispatches of the ambassadors, the accounts furnished by the German consuls are important and relevant. The material sent by the consul in Erzerum, Max Erwin von Scheubner-Richter, is central here.

The dispatches of the ambassador and consuls of the United States are valuable too. However, the volume entitled *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* (published in England as *Secrets of the Bosphorus*) should preferably not be used at all, or only as a last resort, and for no more than secondary back-up of factual material gained elsewhere. We are again at the point where history intersects with bibliography. *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* has a very uncertain publishing history, and until its bibliographical origins have been subjected to a close and objective scrutiny, it should not be touched, except as a secondary source. Moreover there is much un-challengeable material in the US archives from consuls in Kharput, Trebizond, Aleppo and elsewhere, which is more significant than Morgenthau's material. So there is no point in using *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* in writing the history of the Armenian Genocide.

Turks and their supporters like to quote the dispatches of Admiral Mark Bristol. However Bristol was not in the Ottoman Empire during the genocide. He was posted there in August 1919. So his views (and prejudices) are not relevant to the issue of the Armenian Genocide — though his dispatches are worth reading for the purpose of gaining a view of the post-

war climate of opinion. Even US Ambassador Elkus was only posted to Constantinople in 1917, when most of the killing of Armenians had already been accomplished.

After the accounts of military and diplomats (all or most from the Central Powers), it is the turn of journalists to furnish evidence for the genocide. The testimony of the American Lewis Einstein is useful in this context; Einstein's book *Inside Constantinople* and his article «The Armenian Massacres» (published in the *Contemporary Review*, 1917) contain valuable details.⁽¹⁵⁾ Numerous eye-witness reports from the *New York Times* have been republished within the last two decades. Their significance is obvious. There were also useful accounts in British daily newspapers, especially the *Manchester Guardian*.

Within my system — which some may challenge — of the grading of evidence (that the military is superior to the diplomatic, which is in turn superior to the journalistic) there needs also to be a place for aid workers. There were a number of charitable foundations active in Anatolian Turkey in 1915-16, either of German origin (such as representatives of the *Deutscher Hilfsbund*) or from neutral Scandinavian countries. Their evidence needs to be assessed and given. It is possible that some of these organisations have archives which are still untapped to this day.

After elucidating as objectively as possible the facts about the Armenian Genocide, preferably using documentation from the Ottoman/German side, it can be helpful to include material from an account by an Armenian survivor, preferably one of those who has described the events in a reasonably clear and objective manner. A number of these personal histories have been published over last 15-20 years. They are unquestionably valuable, although they cannot of course be used as primary evidence. A reader who follows the story of a survivor will gain an insight into the appalling realities of day-to-day life in the wartime Ottoman Empire, under the conditions of Armenian deportation.

When the facts have thus been set down, with the use of both significant objective and subjective sources, a reader will then want to know why the terrible events happened. The average person finds it hard to assimilate merely factual historical information. He or she wants to know the reasons for those facts.

In order to give reasons, we need to adopt a similar method of careful research and analysis. It is entirely unacceptable for anyone to say (or even to think), «They were Turks. What do you expect?» That is not reasoning. It is also wrong in my opinion to say, «They were Moslems and we were Christians, and the Moslems have always wanted to kill Christians.» This assertion is historically incorrect about the position of Christians within Islam; and it overlooks the evidence that in a number of cases in 1915 local Muslim leaders sought clemency for Armenians. It also ignores the point

that the Committee of Union and Progress was basically an atheist, anti-religious political entity, which believed that Islam was no longer relevant to its state, and that the *umma* (community of believers) was a thing of the past.

However, the idea that the mass-killings were motivated by the ideology of pan-Turkism is, I believe, a useful line of enquiry, even if much more work needs to be done on it.

We could begin by considering the life and work of Zia Gökalp. (Again, biography intersects with history. One cannot avoid a careful look at personalities, personal histories and ideological positions.) In present-day Turkish historiography Zia is seen as a modernizer and westernizer. Is this a reasonable view? It is true that in his long and often turgid writings he looked for a modern identity first for Turkey/Ottoman and then for Turkey/Milli [Nationalist; Kemalist]. If there is one quality noticeable about Zia it is his ability to change views in accordance with his political masters. He wrote bloodthirsty expansionist poems when violence and expansionism were Ittihadist policy in 1914; but adopted a different, more moderate tone after the coming of Mustafa Kemal. Zia's work in 1914 shows with reasonable clarity that Armenia and Armenians were considered as obstacles to the grand design (the Turks' own *megali idea*) of unity with Central Asian Turks.

Besides Zia Gökalp there was Tekin Alp, whose 1915 book (published in Weimar) *Türkismus und Pantürkismus* was considered important enough for Britain to authorize an official translation in 1916.⁽¹⁶⁾ Again we have to ask ourselves: what did his views amount to, and how important were they for Enver and Talaat?

There is much else to explore in the origin and development of the ideology of pan-Turkism, notably the almost untouched subject of the life, writings and influence of Yusuf Akchurin (Akchura; Akchuraoglu, 1876-1939). The research needs to be done in a scholarly and objective manner, with biographical descriptions and analyses of texts in the manner that I have outlined. Large amounts of primary original material await elucidation. In this way the public's need to know why there was an Armenian Genocide will be satisfied, and the Armenian Genocide will assume a more embodied form in the minds of those who seek to understand our century.

The motive of pan-Turkism may also explain why the Armenian Genocide was operational throughout Anatolia and Turkish Armenia, but was not imposed rigorously (and sometimes not at all) in the Ottoman Empire's Arab lands. The hypothesis is that only the territories in and through which the pan-Turk link-up could be made were subject to Armenian deportation. This idea requires more research, but it is an interesting line of enquiry.

The idea that there was a civil war in progress in 1915 is a compara-

tively new invention, created by those who seek to deny the Armenian Genocide. It is absurd; but since it is taken seriously in university departments of Middle Eastern history, and among the foreign ministry officials with whom the members of such departments have such good relations, it needs to be taken seriously.

There is no evidence for a 1915 Armeno-Turkish civil war. In reality, the Armenians, according to all eye witnesses, were almost entirely an undefended urban or agrarian community. A few of them possessed some old weapons, and defended themselves as best they could against the government. But it is nonsensical to think that they constituted in any manner a force comparable to the massive armed resources of the Ottoman army and the militarized police of the ministry of the interior. Indeed, the Interior Ministry was further backed up by the power of the *chétés* or bands of the specially recruited Special Organization (**Teshkilat-i Makhsusiya**), whose designated purpose was the looting, raping and murdering of the Armenian population. The international academics who today support the air-brushed version through newspaper advertisements (a strange way for allegedly reputable academics to carry on their disciplines) have never engaged seriously with the issues either of the activities of the Ottoman Interior Ministry during 1915-16, or of The Special Organization, and its origins, purposes, leadership, constituents and actions. Both these topics are of central importance for any account written today of the genocide, and need to be researched using the best sources.

Another point that the Turkish deniers try to make today is that the Armenians were in a ferment of revolution in 1915, and that the Ottoman anti-Armenian measures were basically just the legitimate suppression of a wartime Armenian insurrection. Specifically, the events at Van in April-May 1915 are cited. The charge has to be taken seriously. There is no place for angry, dismissive rhetoric in its refutation. When the charge has been considered, it should be taken apart with the close accuracy and attention to detail typical of the method of proceeding of a calm and able lawyer. Care has to be taken in working out an accurate chronology of the events, and in precisely detailing the nature of the events — were they offensive or defensive? Emotional language should be avoided. In this way an accurate picture of the events at Van will be gained.

Continuing on the matter of details: to write convincingly of the Armenian Genocide, it is important always to be accurate about names, dates and places. As regards dates, we have to be sure which calendar we are using. About names: much confusion has been created by not clarifying the names of certain Turks. We all know about Enver, Talaat and Djemal. Some people know about Mahmud Kiamil and Vehib Pasha. But what about Halil (sometimes spelt Khalil)? There can be confusion, since there were two Halils. So it is important to distinguish between them, and always to use the style

adopted by the Turks after Mustafa Kemal had introduced the surname law in 1934. Thus we have Halil (Kut) and Halil (Mentese). Dates should also be given, where known, to avoid confusion: thus, Halil (Mentese) (1874-1948). Sometimes it is helpful to use old and new names side by side: thus, Carasso/Karasu, Angora/Ankara. Everything should be done to maximise clarity and minimise confusion.

A further point of terminology, which can do real damage to the case of Armenians (which is after all the case of truth and clarity), is the incorrect use of the name «Turkey». It is important to remember that «Turkey» as a diplomatic entity did not exist before 1923 or so. So when talking or writing of events, whether in 1895 or 1915 or 1918, we should talk of «the Ottoman Empire». «Ottoman Turkey» is permissible, but the term «Turkey» should be avoided, except when it is clearly being used as an alternative shorthand. The correct use of the term «the Ottoman Empire» has several benefits. It indicates to a reader (or listener) that the political entity was a multi-ethnic one; and to politically progressive people it suggests that, as with other empires, it needed de-colonization. If the term «Turkey» is incorrectly used for «the Ottoman Empire», the reader may think, «Turkey. For the Turks. Why not?» He or she will be inclined to think that the Armenians from the start had no authentic place in the Ottoman Empire's lands, and that far greater authenticity lay in Turkish habitation of the land which became Turkey. Hence the importance of always using the term «the Ottoman Empire» appropriately.

In this way, with good documentation from the best sources, balanced perhaps by some subjective accounts written by survivors, expressed in language of precision and accuracy, we can hope to make clear the nature of the Armenian Genocide, and to dispel the inaccurate and misleading air-brushed versions. In doing this we are not only paying a just homage to those who died; we are serving the causes of truth and clarity themselves.

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ՀԱՅԿԱԿԱՆ ՑԵՂԱՍՊԱՆՈՒԹԵԱՆ ՇՈՒՐՋ ԳՐԵԼՈՒ ՄԱՍԻՆ

(ԱՄՓՈՓՈՒՄ)

ՔՐԻՍՏՈՑԵԼՐ Ճ. ՈՒՈՔԸՐ

Անկասկած դժուար կատարելի գործ մըն է գրել Հայկական Ցեղասպանութեան մասին, նախ՝ որովհետեւ շա՛տ է ընդարձակ նիւթը, եւ բազմաթիւ են դերակատարները ջարդերուն: Ապա՛ կան անհամար ականատեսներ եւ յուշագրողներ: Իրականութեան մէջ բարդ էին ժամանակները եւ քիրտ՝ գործադրութիւնը ցեղասպանութեան: Աւելին՝ դժուար ընկալելի եւ լուծելի խնդիր է ցեղասպանութեան հարցը, որովհետեւ հայկական ջարդերուն առընչուած հայերուն համար այժմ գրեթէ անկարելի է չըլլալ զգացական եւ չկորսնցնել պաղարիւն դատումը եւ գնահատումը դէպքերուն:

Թէպէտեւ սկզբնական շրջանին ընդհանուր ֆանաչում գտած իրականութիւն մըն է Հայկական ցեղասպանութիւնը՝ սակայն ժամանակը կու գայ գայն հրելու ետ եւ անոր փոխան յաղթականներուն եւ մնացեալ բոլոր ժողովուրդներու սեղաններուն վրան

դնելու քաղաքական, տնտեսական, գինուորական եւ կայսերապաշտական գանազան նկատումները, եւ այդ ձեւով հրապարակ քաղաքական որոշ թիւ մը թրքատերներու, եւ դժուարին կացութեան մատնելու ընդունումն ու նաւաչումը Հայկական Տասնհինգին:

Այս իսկ պատճառով այժմ անհրաժեշտ է փաստել եւ փաստարկել անհերքելիութիւնը եւ վաւերականութիւնը Հայկական Ցեղասպանութեան: Առ այդ քննութեան սեղանին բերելու է փաստաթուղթերուն հետ յուշագրութիւններ, բանաւոր վկայութիւններ, ժամանակակիցներու թղթակցութիւններ, պետական արխիւային նիւթեր, եւ այն բոլոր մնացեալները որոնց առկայութիւնը օժանդակութիւն մըն է քննարկումին եւ վնիւնին համար Հայկական Տասնհինգին:

Սակայն հոս ալ անհրաժեշտ է ըլլալ զգոյշ եւ գիտնալ թէ ինչն^օ է գոյութեան կոչում տուեալ գործ մը, տուեալ փաստաթուղթ մը: Այսպէս՝ պէտք է գիտնալ թէ ինչն^օ եւ ի՞նչպէս հրապարակ իջան Թոյնայի/Պրայսի փաստաթուղթերու հատորը, եւ Լեփսիոսի հաւաքածոն գերման փաստաթուղթերու, որոնց բովանդակութիւնը կը մնայ անհերքելի: Ապա՝ անհրաժեշտ է մատչիլ թուրք գինուորականներու յուշագրութիւններուն, որոնցմէ՝ Քիւզլիմ Գարապեֆիի, Մահմուտ Քեմալիի, եւ Վեհիպ փաշայի: նոյնքան կարեւոր են յուշերը Յայիի Բըֆըրի եւ Մեվլանգատի: Ցետոյ՝ պէտք է դիմել տակաւին յուշագրութիւններուն գերման եւ աստրիացի գինուորականներուն, որոնց տէրութիւնները դաշնակիցներն էին Օսմանեան Կայսրութեան, եւ անոնց հետ նաեւ Փոմիւսեան վարչի: Պէտք չէ դեռ մտահան ընել յուշերը գանազան քաղաքագետներուն, որոնք մօտէն կամ հեռուէն աղբնուած կը մնան Համաշխարհային Առաջին Պատերազմին եւ անոր հետ՝ Հայկական Ցեղասպանութեան:

Այսուհանդերձ մեծ զգուշութեամբ մատչելու է օսմանեան պետական արխիւային նիւթերուն, որովհետեւ Հայկական Տասնհինգին գործադրութեան մէջ կայ երկակիութիւն մը փաստաթուղթերու, որոնցմէ յո՛կ մէկ տեսակն է որ գետնադուած կը մնայ արխիւներէն ներս, մինչ միւսը, որ ուղղակի կը հրահանգէր ջարդն ու սպանողը՝ փնացուած է արդէն. իսկ եթէ անհրաժեշտ է օգտագործել առկայ փաստաթուղթերը անհրաժեշտ է զանոնք կարգաւ տողընդմէջ, ուր միշտ թափնուած կը մնան որոշ նշմարտութիւններ:

Նոյնքան կարեւոր են արխիւային նիւթերն ամերիկեան, անգլիական, ֆրանսական, գերմանական, աստրիական եւ չեքոսլուակացի պետութիւններուն, եւ կրօնական գանազան առաքելութիւն-

ներուն: Այս վերջինները տակաւին կը մնան չպեղուած, եւ առ
այդ՝ կոյս եւ չօգտագործուած: Անհրաժեշտ է ձեռք գարնել կարգ
մը դեպքաններու եւ հիւպատոսներու յուշագրութիւններուն, սա-
կայն զգոյշ կերպով վարուելու է ամերիկեան դեպքան Մորկընթոյի
յուշագրութեան հետ եւ նախ գտնել թէ ինչո՞ւ եւ ի՞նչպէս գրուե-
ցան անոնք եւ տրուեցան լոյսին: Զգոյշ ըլլալու է նաեւ Ծովակալ
Մարք Պրիսթոյի հեռագիրներու օգտագործումին մէջ, եւ մի՛շտ
ալ նկատի առնելու է անոնց ժամանակագրութիւնը (գոր կամաւոր
կերպով կը մոռնայ թրքական պատմագրութիւնը) պարզօրէն անոր
համար, որ Պրիսթոյ Պոլիս հասաւ միայն 1919-ի Օգոստոսին, եւ
առ այդ Հայկական Տասնհինգի մասին իր իշխանութիւններուն
յղած հեռագիրները անմիջական կերպով չեն առընչուիր անոր՝
այլ յետագային կազմուած անձնական կարծիքներու հայելին են
եւ ո՛չ թէ ճշմարիտ իրականութեան: Այսպէս չէ՛ սակայն պարագան
Լեւոնիս Էյնսթայնի *Ներքին Պոլիսը* հատորին եւ «Հայկական ջարդե-
րը» յօդուածին (1917), որոնք կու տան յստակ մէկ պատկերը թուրք
պետական, ընկերային, տնտեսական եւ գիւտարական մթնոլոր-
տին, որուն մէջ տեղի ունեցաւ Հայկական Յեղասպանութիւնը:
Աւելի՛ եւս յստակ ընծայելու համար այս մթնոլորտը՝ այժմ ան-
հրաժեշտ է դիմել այն բոլոր թղթակցութիւններուն, որոնք կը
համընկնին ցեղասպանութեան շրջանին:

Սակայն լրիւ կերպով ընկալելի ընծայելու համար թուրք
ազգայնական, թրքական, համաթրքական եւ համաթուրանական
այն հոսանքները, որոնք մեծ դեր խաղացին ստեղծելու համար
հոգեկան եւ հոգեբանական եւ զգացական այս մթնոլորտը՝ տա-
կաւին անհրաժեշտ է անպայման սեղանի վրան ունենալ գործերը
Զիա Կեօքալփին, Թեփին Ալփին եւ Եուսուֆ Աֆչուրաօղլուին:
Նոյնքան կարեւոր է ուսումնասիրութիւնը անոնց կենսագրութեան
եւ անհատական կեանքին: Ի վերայ այս ամենայնի՝ պէտք չէ
մոռնալ Մասնաւոր Կազմակերպութիւնը գոր գոյութեան կոչեցին
Երիտասարդ-թուրք Կուսակցութիւնը եւ անոր կազմած պետու-
թիւնը, եւ որուն առաջնութիւնն էր աւարառումը, պղծումը եւ
սպանդը հայ ժողովուրդին:

Այս բոլորէն ետք, սակայն, երբ կը փորձուի գրել Հայկա-
կան Յեղասպանութեան մասին՝ ուշադիր պէտք է ըլլալ ճշգրտու-
թեանը անուններուն, տեղանուններուն եւ թուականներուն: Այս
բոլորին մէջ հետամուտ ըլլալու է ժամանակագրութեան եւ տրուող
թուականներու թրքական-արեւելեան եւ եւրոպական-արեւմտեան

տարբերակումին, եւ անուններու կրած փոփոխութիւններուն՝ մանաւանդ քեմալական շրջանէն ետք: Իրականութիւններ են այս բոլորը, զորոնք թրքական իշխանութիւններուն հետ պատմագրութիւնն ալ գիտակցօրէն կ'անտեսէ՝ յայտարարելու համար, որ Հայկական Տեղասպանութիւնը, ոչ՝ տեղափոխումը, կատարուեցաւ պարզօրէն հայերու յեղափոխութիւն ստեղծելու համար յառաջացուցած ըմբոստութիւններէն, մինչ, իրականութեան մէջ, կար ո՛չ հայկական յեղափոխութիւն եւ ոչ ալ որեւէ ըմբոստութիւն. նոյնիսկ Վանինը ինքնապաշտպանութիւն մըն էր անոպայ իշխանութեան մը եւ անոր բանակայիններուն դէմ: