

BRITAIN AND THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE: REFLECTIONS IN 1995

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Britain was among the first nations to recognize the Armenian Genocide. There was no official statement; such an openly, articulated recognition, then as now, would have been un-British, being too declarative and formalized. Britain does not function by giving formal declarations. But the publication in July 1916 of *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire* as a government Blue Book was a gesture as close as possible to what Britain could offer in the way of saying, "We acknowledge that the Armenians suffered a comprehensive and systematic campaign of persecution, displacement and murder in the years 1915 and 1916."

This was of course made possible by the fact that Britain was at war with the Ittihadist Ottoman Empire. The moment was right for an official exposure of Young Turk crimes against the Armenians. In the decade before 1914, Russia had joined Britain and France in the Triple Entente, thereby ending, at a stroke, eighty years of official British Russophobia and Turcophilism. Official Britain could thereby show friendship to the Armenians in 1916. But although policy changed, not all individual attitudes changed with it. Moreover it was always possible that the old Russophobic policy of the years 1828 to 1907 might recur.

Any careful study of British foreign policy in the 19th century cannot fail to take into account the wide-ranging pro-Ottoman Turkish attitudes of official Britain. There was the Duke of Wellington, who as prime minister in 1828 cursed the battle of Navarino, by which Greece had gained her freedom; there was the strange manner in which, in the 1850s, Ottoman Turkey was held by Whiggish, semi-liberal Britain to be the upholder of freedom against the tyranny of the Tsar - few wars in Britain's history have been so popular as the Crimean War. In the 1870s there was the crude devotion to extravagant imperialism, formulated jointly by Queen Victoria and Disraeli, which nearly brought Britain again into conflict with Russia, and which led directly to the treaty of Berlin, which was itself a building-block of the Armenian Genocide of

1915. Throughout this 80-year period the Ottoman Empire was seen as having interests in common with the British Empire, either as being opposed to revolution, or as being a counterweight to the expansion of Russia.

None of this can seriously be denied, and to pretend that Britain was in some mysterious way on the side of peoples such as the Armenians would be to utter systematic falsehoods. Moreover, it was not only the instinctive reactionaries who were key figures in this policy: in some ways British liberal figures of the 19th century travelled with the Ottomans: principally Gladstone, because he confused politics with religion, and each time he left office, despite his declared concern for Armenians, the Armenians themselves were in a worse position than when he entered it. Gladstone's concern for the Armenians belongs to the history of publicity and not to the history of policy. Curiously, two Tory (or Conservative) figures are among those whom I believe Armenians, might well recall today with, if not fondness, at least a measure of respect. One was George Canning, the British prime minister who triumphed in his sponsorship of the Anglo-French-Russian united squadron which destroyed the Ottoman fleet at Navarino and secured the freedom of Greece, a beacon of light to other nations seeking liberation from the Ottoman Empire. The other was Lord Salisbury, who understood the nature and the horror of the late-Hamidian Ottoman Empire, and though he did little (being too constrained by the system of alliances then in place), he was able to downgrade the importance of the Anatolian Ottoman Empire in Britain's global strategy. Salisbury's weakening of Anglo-Ottoman links made possible the Triple Entente of 1907.

In Britain, support for Turkey was based on strategic needs, principally of maintaining opposition to Russia. Other nations too showed significant support for Ottoman Turkey in the late 19th century: Russia, in the 1890s, in her most reactionary phase, supported the Ottoman Empire, since Constantinople was as repressive and opposed to freedom as she was herself. France became intoxicated by her large investments in the Ottoman tobacco monopoly, the Régie de Tabacs, as well as in the Ottoman Public Debt, and so refused to accede to the wishes of the other powers in forcing the sultan out of his palace in 1896. The German Kaiser ignored humanitarian issues, and fulsomely presented himself in the Ottoman Empire in 1898. One issue which was entirely missing in all these considerations was the matter of religion. The notion that Britain or any European nation should have been opposing Ottoman Turkey on the grounds of Christian-Muslim antagonism was just not there. When I have read the accounts of the time, with the exception of those written by some clergymen, I have found no record of the religious distinction as being relevant. The importance of this for us is that Armenians must put away, now and for ever, the idea that religion was or is a matter for bonding, or favouring, between the nations of Europe and the Armenian people. It was as irrelevant then as now to politics, and those who believe

in its relevance in global political considerations are mistaken.

Despite the ending of British traditional pro-Turkishness by the Triple Entente of 1907, many influential British people held on to old Turcophile ways: the diaries of Aubrey Herbert, and the novels of John Buchan, demonstrate that fact, as do the actions of the various British officers of the occupation forces in the Caucasus in 1918 and 1919. Their views should come as no surprise. They were a continuation of the imperial attitudes which were by then embedded in the national psyche.

Nevertheless in 1916 there were some instinctive and committed Liberals, who enabled the Armenian Genocide to become in part officially on the record. Principally we think of Lord Bryce, a capable and committed Liberal, who despite his imperial outlook never ceased to support the Armenian cause, and of the young scholar Arnold Toynbee. Toynbee, at the time he was editing the material for the *Blue Book*, had a cast of mind which was dedicated to the highest standards of impartial, documented research. His method was empirical; he (the editor) was the servant of the documents, and all serious political matters were given their full weight. The documents in that volume are virtually cast-iron in their accuracy and objectivity, and none of them can be challenged today. When we read the connecting material in the British *Blue Book*, written by Toynbee, we note the political clarity with which he details the shift of politics from the despotism of Abdul Hamid to the brief period of Liberty and Fraternity under the Ittihadists - brief but nevertheless genuine, and one for which the Turks should I believe be given credit - and on to the narrowing, brutalizing horizons of the centralized, managed pseudo-democracy of the Ittihadists as they imposed an ever-tighter despotism - more efficient (because more modern and technological) than that of the old sultan.

Toynbee knew all this, as well as the horror of what had happened in 1915-16. But, starting with his book *The Western Question* and continuing in his book *Turkey*, he was observed to change sides, and favour the Turkish version of events. Thereby he virtually destroyed the possibility of studying Armenia in Britain. Why did he in this manner ease the Armenian Genocide out of sight, at least as far as Britain was concerned, especially when the book he edited exposed it so forcefully? Partly, I believe, because he himself, Toynbee, grew to perceive himself to be more important than his material. He became the controller of the material, not its listening board. The texts and documents became less important, mere appendages to what he thought and felt. Although he was seeking to demonstrate a more mature outlook, yet he actually regressed to a condition akin to that of an impatient and controlling child. Toynbee abandoned the democratic fallibility of adulthood in favour of infantile omnipotence. He became drawn to odd, self-devised half-fantastic historical theories, in which he himself was an important player. And in the process his language lost the accuracy and pointedness it had held in 1916, in favour of blurred and grandiose

indistinctness.

Toynbee made possible the down-grading of awareness of the Armenian Genocide by confusing the terms 'the Ottoman Empire' and 'Turkey'. The former denotes, by its name alone, a multi-ethnic political entity, requiring, if one is a person of reasonably liberal outlook, some form of decolonization. The latter term, Turkey, implies a near-mono-ethnic decolonized nation state. Toynbee confused the two, as have many other writers on Turkey (and, curiously, Armenian writers on Armenians too), thereby giving a spurious legitimacy to the non-decolonized Ottoman Empire's control of its non-Turkish eastern regions, as well as allowing an interested outsider to think, 'Turkey. For the Turks. Why not?' It is I believe of great importance today that we always make a historiographical distinction between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey.

Fortunately Toynbee, although important, was only one of many in setting down the truth about the genocide, although he and the book he edited were of major importance, as were his later views which led to the eclipse of the Armenian Genocide as an issue. Besides historians and political figures, there were many charity workers and charity givers, and their work and generosity continued throughout the period of the armistice and even after the establishment of Soviet Armenia.

Initially in April 1916 a group of British charity workers set out (with the blessing of the British government) for Yerevan, travelling via Stockholm and Moscow. Of course, today we take for granted the presence of charitable workers in zones of war or disaster or great human need; but in 1916 such actions were quite new, and remarkable, if we consider that the war was not going well at that time. The dedicated work of such people as the Revd. Harold Buxton, and George Hodgkin, and later the Revd. H. W. Harcourt, as well as Dudley Northcote, should not be forgotten. They showed a consistency of endeavour and a genuine humility which was perhaps in contrast to the qualities displayed by historians and politicians. They too left accounts of the traumatized and suffering survivors of the Ittihadist genocide. In their work with the displaced people they instilled a sense of hope and work, when the appalling experiences endured by Ottoman Armenians were drawing them only to apathy and inertia, conditions familiarly observed in survivors from other human disasters.

Then began the long period of forgetting. Although Noel Buxton was fighting for some compensation for Armenian survivors of the genocide as late as 1928, in Britain and in other countries, the Armenian Genocide was largely consigned to oblivion. People did not wish to remember it, so they excised it from their minds. In Britain's public life the two elements which led to forgetting, despite the publication of the *Blue Book*, were apathy and changed political circumstances. British apathy came about because people wanted to forget the war and the deaths; and they were

suffering from what is known today as "compassion fatigue". The political circumstances were that, just as the Triple Entente had bewildered the Russophobes in 1907, so the post-World War I uncertainty, coupled with the rise of Soviet power and the need of Britain for oil for its fleet, led to a new atmosphere, antipathetic to Armenians.

Could any of this have been otherwise? Could the Armenian Genocide have stayed in the collective mind of the British public, rather than becoming washed into oblivion by the renewed need not to upset certain regional powers? Perhaps it could not; perhaps the odds were stacked against the Armenians. But I believe that the memory of the fate of the Armenians would have been given a greater chance of enduring if a volume, or more than one volume, had been issued, comprehensively detailing the Armenian people's sufferings during 1915 and 1916, using the best sources, giving lists of the guilty Ittihadist Turks, and doing so to the 1918 armistice and beyond. Apart from the British *Blue Book*, (which was incomplete, ending in early 1916, and hedged round with secrecy reflecting the security situation of the time), there was no comprehensive documentation of the terrible events of 1915-16. And without documentation, events quickly slip from the memory of those not personally involved.

I would add here that we may be seeing this process today, as regards Nagorno Karabagh. The ethnic cleansing of Getashen and Martunashen in April 1991 is in the process of being omitted from the official version of the events in Karabagh over the last seven years, because it lacks comprehensive and accurate documentation. It is in the process of becoming lost from the collective record of commonly acknowledged historical fact. Two books recently published in Britain that I have recently reviewed, one of which is not partisan against Armenians, do not record the facts about Getashen and Martunashen, though they amply record of misdeeds allegedly performed by the Armenians.

Despite the great sacrifices of Armenians in World War II, when the time came for a British verdict on the possibility of the retrocession of Kars and Ardahan to Soviet Armenia and Georgia, the British foreign secretary said, in a very uncertain speech, that there was 'no nationality problem in Armenia.' (By Armenia he meant Turkish Armenia.) This comment was trenchantly picked up by the great Orientalist, Professor V. Minorsky, who pointed out that Hitler had said earlier in the war 'Who today remembers the Armenians?' Minorsky sarcastically noted: 'It appears that massacres give a claim to the heritage of massacred persons.' He further commented we have now lived to hear a British foreign secretary declare that there was no nationality problem in Armenia.

Britain saw no basis for the claims made in 1946; the genocide remained air-brushed out of history, and the period of official and semi-official forgetting at a high

level continued. British travellers and historical writers with some access to official high levels occasionally made reference to Armenians. During the 1950s and 1960s the Cold War was at its height; Armenia was a forgotten topic, and off limits for political discussion. But while there was no official line, yet there were British writers who in a kind of Samizdat manner formulated and reflected views on Armenia at this time. Three immediately spring to mind: Freya Stark, Rose Macaulay and Patrick Kinross (Lord Kinross).

Dame Freya Stark was an author traveller and historian. She was apt to regard herself as a department of the British Foreign Office' and her books have a kind of orotund, oracular and lapidary style. Her 1966 book *Rome on the Euphrates: The Story of a Frontier* is quite a decent account of Rome's eastern frontier from 190 BC to AD 597. But in its preface she states the following: 'The unavoidable use of names such as Armenia and Kurdistan - countries now incorporated in Turkey, Iraq or Persia - has presented some difficulty, and it is well to explain that the references to them under their independent names are historical, and have no modern implication.'

Dame Freya, like many writers dealing with the Middle East, seems to have believed that Armenia was succeeded in statehood only by the Ottoman or Turkish realm. She ignores the fact that an imperial frontier, initially Ottoman-Qajar, latterly Ottoman-Romanov - ran through the middle of Armenia, and that Eastern Armenia even in 1966 lived on, as Soviet Armenia. She showed ignorance of Eastern Armenia, and political servility in her view of Western Armenia.

One can hardly fail to detect an echo in her own embarrassment of state sensitivities about the use of the words Armenia and Kurdistan. Dame Freya Stark was keen not to step outside the strait-jacket of state propaganda, in a manner as fluent as that of British communists echoing Stalin's decrees. Dictators and dictatorial regimes are almost always embarrassed by the use of words referring to countries or regimes they would rather forget, and Freya Stark sought to excuse herself by expressing a kind of shame at having to use the words Armenia and Kurdistan. We recall that at this time and later, ancient historians examining the sites of the provinces of Imperial Rome were compelled to use such terms as A Major and A Minor, in order to avoid using the word 'Armenia'.

Nevertheless, there were British writers who even at the height of the Cold War were not afraid to use the word Armenia, and were not cowed by state propaganda. One was the novelist and traveller Rose Macaulay, whose magnificent novel *The Towers of Trebizond* is a superb and witty evocation of the contrasts between the past and the present, and in which the Armenians are present, admittedly on the sidelines, but powerfully, nevertheless. This novel is admirably historical, and has a rich inner life. It is also entirely skeptical about state power and state coercion, and very far from the bland state propaganda often mistaken for history and historical writing;

therefore, perhaps, the Armenians appear to be accorded a full part.

The other writer who was not intimidated by Cold War prejudices was Patrick Kinross, Lord Kinross, the biographer of Atatürk. He was unafraid of upsetting the constituency for which he was to a great extent writing. Kinross's earlier book, *Within the Taurus*, contains fine passages on Armenian architecture, and the author treats with scorn official Turkish views on Armenia. The passages that Kinross writes on Ani are some of the best written on that magnificent site.

It is in his 1964 biography of Atatürk that Kinross springs a surprise. This is admittedly not a fully scholarly, footnoted work. But the author met a number of Mustafa Kemal's acquaintances, and the book holds a special place in the history of Turkey's sense of national identity in this century. Its publication was a kind of political event in its own right, not merely a book-launch. We might imagine that the author would repeat the Turkish national myth which Freya Stark found fitted so awkwardly with historical truth. But we would be wrong - and here we come full circle to the Armenian Genocide, for on page 100 of his book *Atatürk*, Kinross notes the hardship and near starvation that the Ottoman army had endured during the winter of 1916-17, and he ascribes the absence of food at that time in the countryside to 'the ironical reason that the Armenians had been massacred or deported en masse, leaving the land a virtual desert, without peasants to grow food or artisans to provide service.' Later, 'whole detachments were found in caves, dead from hunger and cold.' There is no exploration of the Armenian plight; but neither is there embarrassed cover-up, or Dame Freya Stark's Stalin-type subservience to an ideological myth.

Most of these viewpoints are present in Britain on the subject of Armenians today, thirty years later. You will find the 'tankies' - the purveyors of Stalin-type ideological purity, who prefer to ignore Armenians altogether, and if they have to make mention of them, they fluently declare that the Armenians were aggressors and terrorists in 1915. You will find writers who give some assent to Armenian views. Unfortunately there are no fiction writers with the vision, imagination or insight of Rose Macaulay. And in the universities in Britain (in contrast to Amsterdam, where Erik Jan Zürcher is professor), no academic concerned with Turkey is yet ready to tell even a small part of the truth about Armenia during World War I.

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Հազար իննհարիւր տասնվեցին հրատարակելով *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire* հատորը՝ Անգլիան եղաւ առաջին երկիրը, որ ընդունեցաւ ստուգութիւնը Հայկական Տասնհինգին: Սակայն ընդունիլ թէ Անգլիան միշտ ալ քիկունք մնաց ժողովուրդներու դատին՝ հիմնական սխալ մըն է: Ո՛չ միայն Տիգրայէլին՝ այլ անոր շահ Կլետսքընը նաեւ քրքամիտ էր, որուն համար հայութեան պաշտպանութիւնը միշտ ալ մնաց ո՛չ թէ քաղաքականութեան խնդիր՝ այլ մանաւանդ՝ քարոզչութեան:

Ինչպէս Անգլիոյ՝ նոյնպէս նաեւ եւրոպական կարգ մը այլ երկիրներու քրքամէտ քաղաքականութիւնը յառաջացաւ անոնց հակառու քաղաքականութենէն: Անգլիան հետեւեցաւ ռազմագիտական իր պահանջներուն, Ֆրանսան՝ տնտեսական իր շահարկումներուն, մինչ Գերմանիան հիմնովին մերժեց մարդասիրական տուեալները: Բոլորին մօտ ալ, սակայն, միշտ ալ անգոյ մնացին կրօնական նկատառումները: Սակայն հակառակ անգլիական քրքամէտութեան, որ տեսեց մինչեւ 1919, գտնուեցան Լորտ Պրայսի եւ Արնոլտ Թոյնսլիի նման ազատականներ, որոնք կարողացան քիկունք կանգնիլ հայութեան եւ Հայկական Հարցին: 1916ին լոյսին եկաւ Թոյնսլիի խմբագրած *The Treatment*, ուր յստակօրէն դրուել էին Հայկական Հարցը, անոր ընթացքն ու ճշմարտացիութիւնը: Այսուհանդերձ ժամանակի անցքին հետ նահանջ մը արձանագրեց Թոյնսլին, որուն համար հիմա իր անձը շատ անելի կարեւոր էր քան ճշմարտութիւնը փաստերուն: Անիկա վերածուել էր կեղրոնաձիգ անձնատրութեան մը, եւ նոյնիսկ շփոթող մը «Օսմանեան Կայսրութիւն» եւ «Թուրքիա» տարազները: Իրականութեան մէջ այս շփոթը կը տեսնուի հայ պատմաբաններու մօտ ալ: Թոյնսլին անցաւ նոյնիսկ քայլ մը առաջ եւ ինքզինքն ընծայեց տղայական եւ այդ ձեւով նպաստեց մոռացումին Հայկական Ցեղասպանութեան եւ Հարցին:

Սակայն Թոյնսլին միակը չէր որ խօսեցաւ Հայկական Տասնհինգի մասին: Կային նաեւ միջազգային բարեսիրական հաստատութիւններն ու անոնց ներկայացուցիչները, այսուհանդերձ՝ շարունակեց մոռացումի գործընթացը, ի՞նչ փոյթ որ Նոել Պաքսթընը շարունակեց մինչեւ 1928 մերթրեղմերթ յիշեցնել Հայկական Տասնհինգը եւ անկէ յառաջացած զանազան խնդիրները: Անգլիոյ մէջ մոռացումը ընծայուեցաւ իրաւ հիմնական երկու պատճառներով: Նախ՝ անգլիացին ուզեց մոռնալ պատերազմն ու անոր արհաւիրքները, եւ ապա՝ յետպատերազմեան անգլիական տնտեսական քաղաքականութիւնն եկաւ օժանդակելու անոր:

Հայկական Ցեղասպանութիւնը կարելի էր հեռու պահել մոռացումէ եթէ միայն հրա-

տարակույտի լաւապէս փաստագրուած, արհաւիրքն ու արհնույնը ցուցահանող, եւ ժողովորդի մը քայքայումը պատկերող գործեր: Չեղաւ այսպէս սակայն: Այժմ նոյնն է պարագան Արցախի համար ալ, որ մոռացումի մատնուելու վրայ է: Չկայ որեւէ գործ որ մանրամասնօրէն եւ քստմնեկի գիծերով ներկայացնէ 1991ի Ապրիլին ցեղային եւ ազգային մարազործումը Գետաշէնին եւ Մարտունաշէնին:

Այժմ հազիւ թէ կան քանի մը գործեր մոռացութեան տրուած հայութեան, Հայկական Հարցին եւ Հայկական Տասնհինգի մասին: Այս վերջիններուն յիշատակումը, նոյնիսկ իր ամենէն թեթեւակի ձեւին մէջ, կը կատարուի Տիկ. Ֆրէյա Սթարքի, Ռոզ Մարտիի եւ Փաթրիք Քինրոսի (Lorna Kinnross) կողմէ:

Իր *Rome on the Euphrates: The Story of a Frontier* (1966) գիրքին մէջ, Տիկ. Սթարք կը մոռնայ յիշել թէ Հայաստանն ու Քիրքիստանը կային երկէ, եւ այսօր բաժնուած կը մնան Թուրքիոյ, Իրաքի եւ Պարսկաստանի միջեւ, եւ առ այդ չեն դադրիր իրականութիւն ըլլալէ այսօր: Իրականութեան մէջ՝ անիկա կը մոռնայ որ այդ Հայաստան կոչուած հողամասին մէկ մասը Մովսէսական Հայաստանն էր իր գործին հրատարակութեան օրերուն: «Ասիկա ցոյց տուաւ տղիտութիւն մը Արեւելեան Հայաստանի մասին, եւ քաղաքական ստրկամտութիւն մը Արեւմտեան Հայաստանին»: Անգիտութիւն կամ տղիտութիւն: Տիկինը շատ է զգուշ դուրս չգալու համար Անգլիոյ պետական քաղաքականութեան բնութագրումն: Սակայն Ֆրէյա Սթարքի օրերուն կան նաեւ հնագէտներ, որոնք իրենց կատարած պեղումներու ներկայացումին ատեն կը խուսափին օգտագործել «Հայաստան» բառը ու զայն կը փոխանակեն A Major եւ A Minor եզրերով:

Վարսունականներու պաղ պատերազմի այն օրերուն, սակայն, կը գտնուին կարգ մը անգլիացի գրողներ եւ վիպագիրներ, որոնք չեն երկմտիր օգտագործելու «Հայաստան» անուանումը երկի Օսմանեան Կայսրութեան եւ այսօրուան Թուրքիոյ արեւելեան հողամասերուն համար: Այս վերջիններէն է վիպագիր եւ ճանապարհորդագիր Ռոզ Մարտին, որ *The Towers of Trebizond* սրանչելի իր վէպով կու տայ անորանալի ներկայութիւնը հայուն՝ Տրապիզոնի մէջ թէ այլուր: Վէպը որ գիտական գործ մը չէ բնաւ խորապէս պատմական է եւ անբողջականօրէն կ'առընչուի հայութեան եւ անոր հող հայրենիքին իրատեան եւ իրականութեան:

Փաթրիք Քինրոսն իր կարգին շատ մօտիկէն կը քալէ Մարտիին, եւ հեռու կը կենայ պաղ պատերազմին քաղաքական եւ հաշտարկուած ազդեցութիւններէն: Որպէս կենսագիրը Քենալ Արաքիւրքին՝ անիկա չի սակարկեր իր խօսքը հայ-թրքական յարաբերութիւններուն մասին: Արդէն 1946ին, *Within the Taurus* խորագրուած իր գործով անիկա ընդարձակ կերպով խօսեր էր հայուն մասին եւ անոր բնօրրանին, եւ սրանչելի էջեր նուիրեր Անիին եւ հայկական ճարտարապետութեան, այլ մանաւանդ անգոսներ թուրք պաշտօնական կեցածքը հայութեան հանդէպ եւ Հայաստանին: Իր *Atatürk* գործին մէջ՝ անիկա ոչ միայն կը խօսի թրքական բանակի ծախողութիւններուն եւ պարտութիւններուն մասին 1916–1917ի ճմբան՝ այլ մանաւանդ ցոյց կու տայ թէ ինչո՞ւ սննդեղէնի դժուարութիւններու մատնուեցան օսմանեան բանակները: Ըստ անոր՝ «հայերը ջարդուած էին կամ զանգուածաբար տարագրուած, բառացիօրէն անապատի վերածելով երկիրը, առանց գիւղացիներու՝ որոնք հաց արտադրէին, եւ արհեստատրներու՝ որոնք ապահովէին ծառայութիւնը: «[Յետագային] քարայրներու մէջ գտնուեցան ամբողջ զօրաբաժիններ որոնք մահացեր էին անսուղորթնէն»: Այսուհանդերձ՝ Քինրոս չի պեղեր այլերը Հայկական Տասնհինգին:

Այսօր առկա են այս բոլոր տեսակետերը հայութեան մասին եւ Հայկական Յեղա-
պանութեան, աւելին՝ կա'յնաւ այն կարծիքը թէ 1915ին հայերն էին ահաբեկիչները, թէ-
պէտեւ կան քանի մը գրողներ, որոնք կը կատարեն որոշ մէկ գնահատանքը հայկական
տեսակետին: Դժբախտաբար, սակայն, կը պակսին Մարտիի եւ Քինրոսի ատաղձն
գրողներ: