

ARMENIAN PARTICIPATION IN  
THE LEBANESE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS  
DURING THE PRESIDENCY OF  
FOUAD CHEHAB  
1958-1964

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General Fouad Chehab, the Commander-in-Chief of the Lebanese Army, was elected the third president of independent Lebanon on 31 July 1958. His election came in the midst of a six-month-long civil strife that lasted from May to October 1958. Incumbent President Camille Chamoun's political opponents had taken up arms in order to foil any possible constitutional amendment by the parliament elected in June 1957 that would allow his reelection for a second six-year term. Hence, this civil strife is also often described as an 'uprising' or a 'revolution' (*thawra*). Chehab was a compromise candidate to succeed Chamoun. He enjoyed the backing of the governments of both the United States of America (USA) and the United Arab Republic (UAR), a new political entity that had emerged through the merger of Egypt and Syria earlier that year.

Chehab assumed the presidency on 23 September, at the end of Chamoun's six-year constitutional term. The new president soon managed to calm the situation by forming on 15 October a new government, composed of four well-known Muslim and Christian politicians: Rashid Karamé (Prime Minister), Hussein Oweyni, Pierre Gemayel and Raymond Eddé. These ministers represented the former opposition National Union Front and the major Christian political groupings, the Phalangist (*Kataeb*) Party and the National Bloc, which had supported Chamoun. The new cabinet was, hence, acceptable to all the previously warring factions.

After passions had calmed down, Chehab's administration amended the electoral law in such a way as to permit all major communities to elect their own representatives. Thereafter, the president dissolved the parliament in April 1960, almost one full year before the expiration of its term, and proceeded with new legislative elections. Since some of the

leaders of the National Union Front had failed to get elected to parliament in 1957, its dissolution had been one of the front's major demands.

The parliament elected in 1960 served its full four-year term. The elections of 1964 were held on the basis of the same electoral law adopted in 1960. Thereafter, Chehab declined the request of many of his supporters to amend the constitution to allow his reelection for a second term and retired from public life.

In this article, the Lebanese legislative elections of 1960 and 1964 will be analyzed with emphasis on Armenian participation in the electoral districts of Beirut and Metn, where seats had been pre-allocated to the Armenian community. This study is the fourth in a series of articles by this author on Armenian participation in successive Lebanese legislative elections since 1934. The first three articles in this series were published in volumes 21, 22 and 23 of the *Haigazian Armenological Review*.<sup>1</sup>

#### THE ELECTIONS OF 1960

The Electoral Reform Bill was approved by the outgoing parliament on 20 April 1960, but only after having encountered some difficulties during its passage both in the various parliamentary committees and later during the plenary session.<sup>2</sup> The new electoral law was promulgated on 26 April. It provided for a secret ballot for the first time. The Chamber of Deputies was enlarged from 66 to 99 members, who would be elected from 26 multi-member constituencies across the country. The new electoral law also stipulated that each community would vote in separate polling booths, so that the voting preferences of each community would be apparent. Moreover, the deposit for the submission of candidacy was lowered from 5000 LL to 3000 LL. The candidate could not receive his deposit back unless he received 20 percent of the total votes cast in his/her constituency.<sup>3</sup>

Chehab dissolved the Chamber of Deputies on 4 May. It was announced that the legislative elections for the next parliament would be held in four stages from 12 June to 3 July 1960. Thereafter, the government of Karamé resigned on 14 May, and Premier Ahmed Daouk immediately formed a neutral, caretaker cabinet to supervise the elections. None of the members of this cabinet would run in the elections.<sup>4</sup>

The new electoral law divided Beirut into two major and one minor constituency in such a manner that it perpetuated the division of opinion which had been evident in the capital during the crisis of 1958. It grouped the major Christian denominations in Constituency I; and the Moslem Sunnite community in Constituency II.<sup>5</sup>

The same law allotted four seats to the Armenian Orthodox community: three in Beirut and one in Metn. Moreover, the Armenian Catholic community maintained its seat in Beirut. The three Armenian Orthodox deputies and the Armenian Catholic deputy would be elected by the voters of Constituency I, which comprised the quarters of Ashrefieh, Rmeil, Mudawar, Seifi, Marfaa and Minet el Hosn. Constituency I would also return one deputy from each of the following Christian communities: Greek Orthodox, Maronite, Greek Catholic and Protestant. It is noteworthy that the quarter of Minet el Hosn, where the majority of Lebanon's Jewish community was concentrated, was made part of Constituency I for the first time. It had previously been part of Ain Mraýsé, because of its geographical proximity to the latter. It was thought that the expected 3000 Jewish voters and the supporters of the Armenian Tashnag party would be crucial in deciding the outcome of the electoral race in Constituency I.<sup>6</sup>

According to the voter lists published earlier by the census office on 4 April, Beirut's First Constituency included 21,600 Armenian Orthodox, 16,459 Greek Orthodox, 13,654 Maronite, 8,861 Sunnite, 7,403 Armenian Catholic, 5,059 Greek Catholic, 5,121 Jewish, 3,161 Protestant, 2,702 Syrian-Catholic, 2,200 Shiite, 1,117 Latin, 748 Chaldean, 460 Syrian Orthodox, 152 Druze and 180 other voters from the country's other denominations.<sup>7</sup>

The heavily Armenian-populated district of Bourj Hammoud, north of Beirut, which had been a separate constituency in the previous two elections in 1953 and 1957, was now included in the constituency of Metn. The former constituency of Bourj Hammoud had included Jedeidé, Baoushrié, Sed-Baoushrié, Dekouani, Jesr Pasha, Sin el Fil and Bourj Hammoud (both Watani and Ermeni). However, the new electoral district of Bourj Hammoud within the broader constituency of Metn would now comprise only the Armenian sections, while the other sections of the former constituency of Bourj Hammoud would be joined to Metn proper.<sup>8</sup> The constituency of Metn would now return three Maronite, one Greek Orthodox and one Armenian Orthodox deputies.

The tense situation within the Armenian community, which had emerged as a consequence of the deep divisions regarding the election in 1956 of a new Catholicos of the Great House of Cilicia in Antelias, had continued to deteriorate after the legislative elections of 1957. The Lebanese Armenian National Rally, encompassing the anti-Tashnag groupings within the community, had maintained – through its representatives, Hratchia Chamlian and Noubar Toursarkissian – its membership in the opposition National Union Front throughout the crisis of 1958 and afterwards.<sup>9</sup> Armenian representatives were included in the National Union Front delegations, which visited King Saoud of Saudi Arabia in 1957 and President Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt (and, later, the UAR) in 1958 and 1959. The Lebanese Armenian National Rally welcomed the end of Chamoun's tenure and Chehab's election as his successor. A delegation composed of Hratchia Chamlian, Toursarkissian, Hratchia Setrakian, Ara Topdjian, and Nazareth Gharibian (Armen Gharib) paid a visit to congratulate the president-elect on 26 August 1958.<sup>10</sup> Three days later, another mixed, lay and clerical delegation of the self-styled Independent Armenian Community led by Dr. Yervant Djidedjian also congratulated Chehab on his election and informed him about the latest developments in the crisis within the Armenian community.<sup>11</sup>

The Tashnag party and its supporters, on the other hand, had stood by the legitimate government of Lebanon during the crisis of 1958. On 4 July, Archbishop Khoren Paroyan, the Armenian Orthodox Prelate of Lebanon, the Rev. Father Hrant Khatchadourian, Deputies Movses Der Kaloustian, Dikran Tosbath and Khatchig Babikian had visited Chamoun and assured him of their loyalty. This Armenian faction also supported Chehab's election, however, and later cooperated with his administration. On 2 August, a clerical delegation led by Catholicos Zareh I of Cilicia congratulated Chehab on his election.<sup>12</sup> Thereafter, following the formation of Karamé's four-member cabinet, a delegation presided over by Archbishop Khoren also congratulated the new prime minister on 23 October.<sup>13</sup> However, the critics of the Tashnag party continued to allege that the latter was continuing to support Chamoun, the Phalangists, and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), even after the expiration of Chamoun's mandate and the formation of Karamé's four-member cabinet.<sup>14</sup> However, during the legislative elections of 1960, the Tashnag

party opposed Chamoun. Therefore, the previous claim, even if true, applied to a relatively short period.

Despite the fact that the Hunchag, Ramgavar Azadagan and Tashnag parties had all issued separate official declarations in September 1958 proclaiming their support for Chehab and reasserting their conviction in the independence of Lebanon, the wave of fratricidal killings within the Armenian community, which had been occurring on the fringes of the Lebanese civil war, did not abate. These incidents ultimately claimed the lives of some 50 Armenians of various political convictions. The killings halted only after Raymond Eddé, the new Minister of the Interior, urged all three Armenian political parties in late November to start negotiations to reach a truce. A formal truce was signed on 7 December by Dr. Adour Kabakian (Tashnag), Kersam Aharonian (Ramgavar Azadagan) and Haroutiun Djeredjian (Hunchag). It provided for an end to mutual attacks in the press, the return to their homes of citizens who had escaped their neighborhoods fearing for their lives, and the rendering of assistance to the authorities so as to arrest the troublemakers.<sup>15</sup>

Following the end of the Lebanese civil war, the Lebanese Armenian National Rally continued to try and secure from the UAR authorities the official recognition of the "Independent Catholicossate of Cilicia" to be based in Damascus. The anti-Tashnags also hoped for a possible recognition of an Independent Armenian Community in Lebanon, now that their allies in the National Union Front had ascended to power, albeit in partnership with the Phalangists and the National Bloc, which were opposed to the formal division of the Armenian Orthodox community.<sup>16</sup>

The Tashnag party, which was on friendly terms with the Phalangists and the National Bloc, now made strenuous efforts to arrange a rapport with its former opponents in the National Union Front. George Mardikian, an American citizen close to the Tashnag leadership, but who also had good relations with Arab nationalist circles, arrived in the Middle East in 1959 and joined the Tashnag leaders in paying visits to a number of Arab nationalist leaders. The Tashnags stressed in these meetings their support for the cause of Arab nationalism, especially in light of President Nasser's recent public attacks on the Communists in Syria. After this realignment by the Tashnags, Tosbath remained the only Armenian deputy in the Lebanese parliament who continued to support Chamoun's newly formed opposition National Liberal Party. Tosbath thus parted ways with the

Tashnag party, the electoral support of which he had enjoyed both in 1953 and 1957.

On 17 May 1959, Chehab paid a formal visit to the Catholicosate of Antelias, a move which was interpreted to mean that no change in the status quo of the Armenian Church could be expected in Lebanon any time soon.<sup>17</sup> The Chehab administration continued to maintain cordial relations, however, with the leaders of the Lebanese Armenian National Rally. Less than a week after his visit to Antelias, Chehab received on 23 May a delegation representing the Huntchag and Ramgavar Azadagan parties and the Group of Independents. The delegation, led by Djidedjian, also included Topdjian, Gharibian, Setrakian, Yervant Demirdjian, Parounag Tovmassian, Dadjad Srabian, Pakarad Bakalian and Djeredjian.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, leaders from all factions within the Armenian community (Der Kaloustian, Babikian, Tosbath, Joseph Chader, Setrakian, Djeredjian and Hratchia Chamlian) were invited to Chehab's *iftar* during the Moslem holy month of Ramadan on 22 March 1960.<sup>19</sup>

Mutual attacks in the Armenian language press in Lebanon had touched upon the issue of the election even before the promulgation of the electoral law in April 1960. In February, the Ramgavar Azadagan *Zartonk* had demanded that six seats should be allocated to the Armenians in the newly proposed 99-member Chamber of Deputies. *Zartonk* based its argument on the population statistics of 1953 published by government, according to which the distribution of seats would be made. Five of these seats would be for the Armenian Orthodox, wrote *Zartonk*, and the sixth, for Armenian Catholics. The government had declared that the Armenian Orthodox community numbered 68,679 persons, while the Armenian Catholic community, 14,582. According to the draft electoral law that was being discussed at the time, every 14,308 persons would elect one deputy. *Zartonk* argued that the Armenian Orthodox community had the right to have five deputies because, after the allotment of four seats, there was still an excess of 11,477 persons. The Greek Orthodox community, on the other hand, counted 1553 persons less than the number required to have its allotted eleven seats in the next Chamber. The newspaper blamed the incumbent Armenian deputies, all members of or supported by the Tashnag party, for their carelessness in this matter and accused them of having failed the Armenian community.<sup>20</sup>

The Tashnag *Aztag* and Tosbath's *Ayk* resented this attack on the Armenian deputies. They explained that the Armenian deputies had failed to obtain six seats because the number of Lebanese Armenians was actually less than what the 1953 statistics showed; the numbers published by the government had also included those Armenians who had repatriated to Soviet Armenia in 1946-47.<sup>21</sup>

*Zartok* replied that there was no "legitimate justification" in what the Tashnag newspaper had written. It added that *Aztag* was "conspiring against the basic interests of our community by its attempt to veil the truth"; thousands of Maronites, who had also emigrated within the past 10-15 years, were still included in the 1953 statistics.<sup>22</sup> *Al-Anouar*, *Al-Jarida*, *L'Orient* and other newspapers echoed *Zartok's* demands. The leaders of the Lebanese Armenian National Rally formally presented the same demand to the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior.<sup>23</sup> However, the new electoral law ultimately failed to satisfy this Armenian request, and only five seats were allocated to the Armenian Orthodox and Catholic communities.<sup>24</sup>

In early March, *Zartok* had also published a series of editorials entitled "On the Margins of the Parliamentary Elections." The Ramgavar Azadagan newspaper stated that their basic principle was to avoid getting immersed in international politics. The Armenians of the Diaspora must not become a political instrument on the international arena. If an Armenian organization became a tool in the hands of foreigners, its position might strengthen, but it would also become associated with conspiracies and espionage. The newspaper continued:

International adventures are dangerous, and they endanger all our community by turning it into a suspicious element. We have stayed away from foreigners. We have led our followers based on the simple policy of refraining from international adventures, and they are, therefore, honest and loyal citizens of their Lebanese homeland.<sup>25</sup>

The newspaper added that the Ramgavar Azadagans unreservedly supported Chehab and his new political orientation.<sup>26</sup> They were as truly Lebanese as any other citizen and that, consequently, the rights of their community should not be disregarded. Their love for Armenia was no obstacle to their love of Lebanon, similar to the love of the Lebanese

overseas to their fatherland. The feelings of Armenians in Lebanon toward Soviet Armenia were not conditioned by the nature of the regime there. Because of their ideology and principles, the Ramgavar Azadagans could not be conciliated with Communist dictatorship. *Zartonk* added, however, that "regimes are temporary, but fatherlands are everlasting." In relation to the continuing disagreements among the Armenians in Lebanon, the newspaper declared that it was against the Tashnag autocracy in Antelias and was in favor of the administrative independence of the Cilician Catholicosate, outside the political influence of the Tashnag party.<sup>27</sup>

The Huntchag newspaper, *Ararad*, announced in turn that the party was joining its humble forces with those of its "Arab brothers" to defend the frontiers of Lebanon against aggressors, whether American or Soviet.<sup>28</sup> The Armenian-language Communist weekly, *Haratch*, immediately reproached the Huntchags by saying that the Red Army had no aggressive intentions toward Lebanon.<sup>29</sup>

On 7 April, the Huntchag and Ramgavar Azadagan parties, the Veraznount Association and the Group of Independents met under the presidency of Djidedjian to examine the electoral situations in Beirut's First Constituency and Metn. They decided to participate in the forthcoming legislative elections through a united front and added that they enjoyed the support of the overwhelming majority of Armenian voters in both constituencies. An electoral committee was formed to represent the front. It consisted of Djidedjian, Hratchia Chamlian (Independents), Djeredjian (Huntchag), Setrakian (Ramgavar Azadagan) and Vazken Bakalian (Veraznount).<sup>30</sup>

According to a Soviet diplomatic report filed from Beirut, Chehab met Djidedjian, the representative of the said front, and had a discussion with him concerning the pre-election campaign. Chehab reportedly said during this meeting that the Lebanese government and he personally were concerned that the interests of all Armenian political parties be met during the forthcoming parliamentary elections. Chehab also said that the government possessed information that what the Soviet embassy described as the Armenian progressive organizations (i.e. the anti-Tashnags) were waging a struggle against the interests of Lebanon. Chehab said that he had information that these organizations were trying secretly, without the knowledge of the Lebanese government, to repatriate a few thousand Armenians to Soviet Armenia and had supposedly already received the

Soviet entry visas. Chehab further informed Djidedjian that he had information that Armenian progressive organizations supported having close links with the Soviet Union, which was undesirable for the Lebanese government. Finally, Chehab had acknowledged having received this information from Tashnag leaders. According to the same report, Djidedjian had refuted these false rumors spread by the Tashnags. He had explained to Chehab that many Armenians, including himself, supported links with Etchmiadzin in Soviet Armenia as the religious center of the Armenians, but this did not mean that these Armenians had links with the Soviet Union. The Soviet embassy in Lebanon had been informed about this meeting by Setrakian. The latter probably had in turn been informed by Djidedjian. Moreover, Setrakian opined to the Soviet embassy staff that Tashnag leaders were trying through such provocative methods on the eve of elections to compromise the Armenian progressive organizations before the Lebanese leaders so as to prevent these organizations from having their candidates in the next Lebanese parliament.<sup>31</sup>

Meanwhile, Pierre Gemayel, the leader of the Phalangist Party, had decided to run as a candidate for the Maronite seat in Beirut's First Constituency. The party's vice-president, Joseph Chader, would run for the Armenian Catholic seat in the same constituency. As the Armenians had four of the eight seats on offer, in addition to the majority of the eligible voters in this constituency, the Phalangists, especially Chader, tried to include candidates supported by both the Tashnag party and the Lebanese Armenian National Rally on the Phalangist-backed list. The Phalangist intention was to avoid an electoral campaign because they believed that it would be impossible for any other party to form a rival list in this constituency without Armenian support. Djidedjian conferred with Chehab, Jemil Lahoud and Pierre Gemayel, who all said that they desired the formation of a single list in Beirut's First Constituency with the participation of both Tashnags and the Lebanese Armenian National Rally.

Negotiations between Djidedjian and Der Kaloustian began at the Phalangist club, in the presence of Pierre Gemayel and Chader. The issue at stake was the distribution of seats between the opposing Armenian factions. Since the Armenian Catholic seat was to be given to Chader as the Phalangist candidate, the participants in this meeting had to decide how to distribute the remaining three Armenian Orthodox seats in Beirut and the fourth Armenian Orthodox seat in Metn.<sup>32</sup>

*Zartouk* claimed that the Lebanese Armenian National Rally had agreed that two Armenian Orthodox seats be reserved for the Tashnag party: one in Beirut and the second in Metn, "despite the fact that the Tashnags are a minority." The remaining two Armenian Orthodox seats in Beirut would go to the Lebanese Armenian National Rally.<sup>33</sup>

When the Tashnags turned down this proposal, the Rally proposed reserving two seats for the Tashnags in Beirut, and the remaining third seat in Beirut and the seat in Metn for the Rally. For one of the Armenian Orthodox seats, the authorities had suggested the name of Dr. Sarkis Semmikian, formerly a physician in the Lebanese Army and a personal friend of Chehab, as a neutral candidate, acceptable both to the Tashnags and their rivals.<sup>34</sup> Djidedjian later claimed that he had accepted Semmikian's candidacy on the united list as one of the two candidates of the Lebanese Armenian Rally, despite the fact that Semmikian was unknown to the Armenian masses. According to Djidedjian, Der Kaloustian rejected this suggestion, however.<sup>35</sup> Der Kaloustian later denied the accuracy of all these newspaper reports concerning the positions taken by the Tashnag party.<sup>36</sup>

The Tashnags offered, instead, to reserve one seat for the Rally in Beirut, on condition that the latter would not submit candidates on any rival list, thus keeping the two other Armenian Orthodox seats in Beirut for the Tashnags. This agreement would not affect the Armenian Orthodox seat in Metn, where both the Tashnags and the Rally would be free to nominate their candidates and an open election campaign could ensue.<sup>37</sup>

The Rally proposed trying to reach agreement upon an independent candidate acceptable to both sides in Metn. This proposal was also turned down, whereupon Djidedjian finally agreed to accept one seat for the Rally in Beirut, while all the other seats would go to pro-Tashnag candidates. Der Kaloustian was ready to accept this compromise on behalf of the Tashnag party, subject to the approval of the Rally's candidate by the Tashnag District Committee of Lebanon.<sup>38</sup> This condition was unacceptable to the Rally, and hence the negotiations ended in failure.<sup>39</sup> Thereafter, *Aztag* wrote that part of the reasons behind the failure of the negotiations was that Djidedjian had not made a commitment that the Rally would not submit other candidates on rival lists.<sup>40</sup>

The anti-Tashnag newspapers, in turn, blamed Der Kaloustian and the Tashnag leadership for the failure of the negotiations. *Ararad* wrote that

the division within the Armenian community had occurred against the wishes of Chehab and Pierre Gemayel.<sup>41</sup> *Zartouk* added that Chehab and other political leaders had desired a just and acceptable agreement among the Armenian factions, and the responsibility for failing to reach such an agreement fell on the Tashnag party leadership.<sup>42</sup> The negotiations, which had began "upon the suggestion of influential Lebanese leaders," had revealed, according to *Zartouk*, that the Tashnag leadership considered its partisan interests superior to the interests of the Armenian community in general.<sup>43</sup>

In *Nayiri*, a weekly owned by Antranig Dzaroukian, a former member of the Tashnag party, Khosrov Tutundjian, another former Tashnag and a former deputy in the Lebanese Parliament, wrote that Armenians should agree on a single list. Such an agreement would diminish partisan strife and pave the way for a general Armenian concord to settle the continuing crisis of the Cilician Catholicosate, which had divided the people into two irreconcilable groupings. Tutundjian added that only a minority of party leaders were against such cooperation, and this only because these leaders feared losing their positions.<sup>44</sup>

After the failure of negotiations among the Armenian groupings, the Phalangists decided to go ahead in Beirut with a joint Phalangist-Tashnag list.<sup>45</sup> The names of candidates on their People's List were officially disclosed on 2 June. The list consisted of Pierre Gemayel (Maronite), Fouad Boutros (Greek Orthodox), Antoine Sehnaoui (Greek Catholic), Movses Der Kaloustian (Armenian Orthodox), Khatchig Babikian (Armenian Orthodox), Souren Khanamirian (Armenian Orthodox), Joseph Chader (Armenian Catholic) and Charles Saad (Protestant). Other influential candidates like Henri Pharaon (Greek Catholic), Boulos Fayad (Greek Orthodox) and Nassib Boulos (Protestant) were thus left out of the Phalangist-Tashnag list.<sup>46</sup>

Souren Khanamirian, born in Beirut in 1924, had attended an Armenian primary school and had then graduated from the Collège des Frères. He had thereafter received a university degree in law from the St. Joseph University in 1946. Khanamirian had later become a successful businessman and had served as the treasurer of the Beirut branch of the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU) in 1947-1951. He had also served on the Civil Council of the Armenian Orthodox community in Lebanon in 1957-1959 and on the Central Civil Council of the Cilician

Catholiossate from 1959. Khanamirian had been considered as a possible candidate by the Tashnag party in 1957.<sup>47</sup>

In the meantime, the Lebanese Armenian National Rally had also been exploring the possibility of joining forces opposed to the Phalangists. On 18 April, the Rally had used the opportunity of a sports festival organized by the Armenian Youth Association, the youth wing of the anti-Tashnag AGBU, to make a show of force. About 20,000 spectators attended the festival held at the Camille Chamoun Sports Complex. The event was held under the auspices of Prime Minister Karamé. Pierre Eddé of the National Bloc, the brother of Raymond, the Bloc's leader, was also present. Another such occasion for mobilization by the anti-Tashnag groupings was the 26th Inter-Club Games of Homenmen, a sporting organization affiliated with the Huntchag party. These games were also held on 18 April under the high patronage of the parliamentary speaker, Sabri Hamadé, and were presided over by Kamal Joumblat, the Druze leader of the Socialist Progressive Party. 6,000 people attended this event at the Sahagian Playing Field.<sup>48</sup>

Finally, the Lebanese Armenian National Rally and Pierre Eddé (on behalf of the National Bloc) issued a joint declaration on 27 May, announcing that the two sides had reached "full agreement" to wage a joint campaign in Beirut's First Constituency.<sup>49</sup> The said alliance established a National Front, which made the names of its candidates public on 30 May. The National Front list consisted of Pierre Eddé (Maronite), Michel Sassine (Greek Orthodox), Abdallah Khoury (Greek Catholic), Hratchia Chamlian (Armenian Orthodox), Vazken Bakalian (Armenian Orthodox), Mardiros Emile Iskenderian (Armenian Orthodox), Noubar Toursarkissian (Armenian Catholic) and Selim Addi (Protestant).<sup>50</sup>

Bakalian, running as a candidate for the first time, was a member of the Veraznount Association, a wealthy capitalist and a specialist in industrial engineering. He was also proficient in Arabic. Iskenderian had been the Huntchag candidate in 1943, but his relations with that party had cooled since then. Although he worked for the Ministry of Education and had been the Director of UNESCO Center in Beirut since 1954, Iskenderian was not forced to resign his post when he submitted his candidature for the elections. Iskenderian had also received a number of Lebanese, Iranian, Iraqi, Spanish and Greek decorations after 1943.<sup>51</sup> Finally, Selim Addi, the candidate for the Protestant seat, also had some

Armenian connections. A merchant by trade, Addi was married to an Armenian and spoke Armenian. He had formerly been a teacher at the Armenian Evangelical High School in Beirut and the AGBU Melkonian Educational Institute in Cyprus.<sup>52</sup>

After having announced his list, Pierre Eddé declared that he had worked hard to achieve the formation of a list which would represent all the political tendencies among the Armenians, but because that could not be done, his colleagues now had been forced to wage an electoral campaign against their wishes.<sup>53</sup> A couple of weeks later, Pierre Eddé stated in an appeal to the Armenian voters that the inter-party negotiations had failed because of Der Kaloustian's intransigence. He added that he had previously declared his readiness to stay out of the list if the cooperation of all Armenian organizations could be secured. This position had actually delayed the formation of both lists.<sup>54</sup>

Following the formation of the rival lists, *Ararad* stated that the Huntchags considered the government of Chehab as theirs and that they would stand by its side in the spirit of the slogan, "The Independence of Lebanon through the Unity of the Lebanese."<sup>55</sup>

For the first time in the history of legislative elections in Lebanon, an Armenian Evangelical, Dr. Papken Meguerditchian, submitted his candidature for the Evangelical seat in Beirut's First Constituency.<sup>56</sup> Meguerditchian was born in Marash (now in Turkey) in 1911. He received his M.D. degree from the American University of Beirut in 1936 and specialized in the USA, receiving diplomas from both the American College of Chest Physicians and the International College of Surgeons. Meguerditchian had been since 1939 the chief surgeon and head physician of the Armenian Sanatorium in the village of Azounieh. He was also a member of the Board of Haigazian College (now University), an Armenian Evangelical institution of higher learning in Beirut, and of the Lebanon Committee of the Calouste Gulbenkian international philanthropic foundation. Meguerditchian had also held numerous positions of responsibility within the Armenian Evangelical Community. Had the opposing Armenian parties reached an agreement to wage the elections through a single list, Meguerditchian could have been chosen as the neutral Evangelical candidate on that list. He maintained his candidature as an independent even after the negotiations between the opposing Armenian parties had failed.<sup>57</sup>

Among the other independent candidates who ran in Beirut's First Constituency were George Hanna (Greek Orthodox), the candidate of the pro-Communist Partisans of Peace, George Barbari (Greek Orthodox), Sami Zreyck (Greek Catholic), Michel Ghorayeb (Greek Catholic), Elias Noul (Greek Catholic), Fouad Moughabghab (Evangelical) and Selim Wakim (Maronite).

The Tashnags and the Phalangists also cooperated in Metn. The joint list that they presented in this constituency consisted of Maurice Gemayel (Maronite), Jemil Lahoud (Maronite), Edouard Abi Jaoudé (Maronite), Michel Murr (Greek Orthodox) and Vartkes Chamlian (Armenian Orthodox).<sup>58</sup>

Vartkes Chamlian, born in Beilan (the sandjak of Alexandretta) in 1928, had received his secondary education in the Armenian College (*Djemaran*) in 1940-47 and, then, at the Lycée Laïc des Garçons. He had received a degree in law from St. Joseph University in 1951 and had then practiced as a lawyer. He was hence proficient in Arabic. Chamlian had also been a member of the Educational Council of the Armenian Orthodox community in 1957-58 and was elected as a member from Bourj Hammoud of the Communal Council of the Armenian Orthodox community in 1960. Chamlian was a member of the Hamazkayin Cultural Association but claimed that he had never formally joined the Tashnag party.

Chamlian would hence contest Tosbath's seat. The latter had maintained his cooperation with Chamoun's National Liberal Party and was hence in opposition to Chehab's administration.<sup>59</sup> Negotiations between the National Liberal and the Phalangist parties had failed, and Chamoun now decided on May 27 to run against the Phalangists for one of the two Maronite seats in Metn. The ex-president's candidacy infuriated his former allies. The National Rally list, which Chamoun led, also consisted of Selim Lahoud (Maronite), Assad Achkar (Maronite), Albert Moukheiber (Greek Orthodox) and Dikran Tosbath (Armenian Orthodox).<sup>60</sup> Tosbath's candidacy was hence supported by the National Liberal Party, the National Bloc and the SSNP.<sup>61</sup>

The Lebanese Armenian National Rally decided not to campaign in Metn and concentrate its efforts in Beirut. However, Noubar Nokhoudian, who had run against Tosbath as the anti-Tashnag candidate in 1957, submitted his candidacy as an independent, without receiving any formal support on this occasion from the anti-Tashnag parties.<sup>62</sup> Nokhoudian

joined forces with the independent Greek Orthodox candidate, Gabriel Murr.

The period leading to the elections was tarnished by a wave of politically motivated killings that swept the Armenian quarters. The first victim was Yeghishé Kasbarian, a Huntchag, who was killed on 27 February.<sup>63</sup> Between 18 and 21 May, bombs were thrown at the houses of Huntchag sympathizers in Bourj Hammoud – Loussaper Madjarian, Sarkis Djulfayan, and Avedis Poshoghlian.<sup>64</sup> Simon Ateshparyan and George Ibrahim were assassinated on 22 May.<sup>65</sup> Finally, on 23 May, Khatcher Tchiftjian, a Tashnag sympathizer, was killed near Camp Charchabouk, and Bedros Mirzoyan was seriously wounded while he was in the Tashnag club of Ashrefieh.<sup>66</sup>

Following this wave of violence, the Armenian Orthodox prelate of Lebanon appealed to his community on 31 May to resort only to the ballot box as a weapon. He deplored the "sad and sorrowful incidents," which had occurred.<sup>67</sup> *Zartok* commented that the Ramgavar Azadagans agreed with the "thoughts expressed by Bishop Khoren" in this appeal, but the newspaper also added that "under his pen they sound false."<sup>68</sup>

In the meantime, Chehab had addressed the nation on 24 May suggesting to turn the forthcoming elections into a free, sincere and peaceful competition. Daouk, in turn, stressed the strict neutrality of his government in the elections.<sup>69</sup>

The electoral struggle between the Phalangists and the National Bloc, both having a largely Christian following, was bitter.<sup>70</sup> For their respective Armenian partners in Beirut and Metn, the electoral campaign focused on communal issues. The Tashnag party considered the elections as a phase in their anti-Communist campaign and wanted to protect the Tashnag-dominated Armenian Orthodox communal administration "from any mishap."<sup>71</sup> *Aztag* wrote that the so-called Lebanese Armenian National Rally "is a docile and obedient follower of Soviet policy [in Armenian life] and the loyal agent of the Red authorities of Yerevan in all national, political and ecclesiastic issues."<sup>72</sup> The newspaper reiterated that "the Tashnag party has stood at all times in the front ranks of the defenders against the Bolshevik danger to Beirut and Lebanon in general."<sup>73</sup> As regards the campaign in Metn, *Aztag* wrote, in an implicit criticism of Chamoun and Tosbath, that certain people were ascribing to themselves and boasting of the progress achieved by the municipality of Bourj

Hammoud.<sup>74</sup> The newspaper appealed to the followers of the Tashnag party to teach their opponents in this constituency a lesson because the opponents of the Tashnag party "are the servants of Bolshevism and wish your defeat."<sup>75</sup>

The Lebanese Armenian National Rally candidates, on the other hand, promised to establish, if elected, peace and national concord within the Armenian community, put an end to the ongoing fratricide and find a just solution to the crisis in the Armenian Church.<sup>76</sup> Djidedjian addressed a letter to *Aztag* on 8 June, denying categorically all Tashnag claims as regards the Lebanese Armenian National Rally and stating that the Rally "is composed of a group of respected capitalist personalities, as well as of the Huntchag and Ramgavar Azadagan parties and the Veraznount Association, and has no ties whatsoever with Communism."<sup>77</sup> *Zartouk's* editorial of 10 June also denied the charges made by *Aztag*.<sup>78</sup> Although *Zartouk* was opposed to both Tosbath and the Tashnags in the constituency of Metn, it wrote that the people attacked by *Aztag* for allegedly boasting of the progress made in Bourj Hammoud, were none other than Chamoun and Tosbath. *Zartouk* added, in an implicit reference to Vartkes Chamlian, that it was comprehensible that the Tashnags could run a "famous stranger" against Tosbath, but it was incomprehensible for them to be so ungrateful and insolent.<sup>79</sup> *Ayk* asked how Chamoun, the SSNP and Tosbath, formerly backed twice by the Tashnags as their candidate in Bourj Hammoud, could be Bolsheviks.<sup>80</sup> *Ararad*, in turn, wrote that "the view that whoever is not a Tashnag is a Communist is a sample of stereotypical Tashnag mentality."<sup>81</sup>

The Armenian Communists, who were outside the Lebanese Armenian National Rally, declared, in turn, that they were against the "candidates of American imperialism and the mercenary servants of Cairo [i.e. the government of President Nasser, who was persecuting the Communists in the UAR - Z.M.]."<sup>82</sup>

Since elections in Metn would be held before those in Beirut, the election campaign commenced earlier in that constituency. 10,000 supporters of the Tashnag-Phalangist lists in Beirut and Metn held a public meeting in the Nor Marash quarter of Bourj Hammoud at 6:30 p.m. on 3 June. All Phalangist and Tashnag candidates were present and addressed the rally. Moreover, Aram Sahagian also made a speech on behalf of the Tashnag party.<sup>83</sup>

On the other hand, Meguerditch Postadjian, a man of local influence, organized public gatherings honoring the National Rally candidates in the SSNP and National Liberal Party clubs in Bourj Hammoud on 4 June. These gatherings were attended by 10,000 people and were addressed by Tosbath and Moukheiber.<sup>84</sup>

On 5 June, Chehab paid his annual official visit to the Catholicosate in Antelias. He was accompanied by Daouk and ministers Edmond Gaspard and Hassan Awad Al-Mikdad. The Tashnag candidates running in the forthcoming elections and their allies, as well as Tosbath, were all present at the Catholicosate to greet the president.<sup>85</sup>

The elections in Metn were held from 7 a.m. to 5 p.m. on Sunday, 12 June. The atmosphere was in general orderly and calm. Of the 71,992 eligible voters, 34,206 cast their votes across 239 polling centers, 38 of which were in Bourj Hammoud. The voter turnout was, hence, 48 percent.<sup>86</sup>

The official results were as follows: Maurice Gemayel, 19337 votes; Jemil Lahoud, 18897; Camille Chamoun, 17252; Vartkes Chamlian, 17123; Assad Achkar, 16265; Albert Moukheiber, 16092; Edouard Abi Jaoudé, 15945; Dikran Tosbath, 15282; Michel Murr, 15064; Selim Lahoud, 13634; Gabriel Murr, 3197; Noubar Nokhoudian, 1512; Abdallah Khoury, 13.<sup>87</sup>

Maurice Gemayel, Jemil Lahoud and Vartkes Chamlian from the Phalangist-Tashnag backed People's List and Chamoun and Moukheiber from the so-called National Rally List were thus elected to the Chamber of Deputies.

The number of votes obtained by the various candidates in Bourj Hammoud was as follows: Jemil Lahoud, 4124; Maurice Gemayel, 4052; Vartkes Chamlian, 3940; Michel Murr, 3895; Edouard Abi Jaoudé, 3848; Camille Chamoun, 1186; Albert Moukheiber, 1050; Assad Achkar, 993; Dikran Tosbath, 908; Selim Lahoud, 668; Gabriel Murr, 77; Noubar Nokhoudian, 47.<sup>88</sup>

On the other hand, the number of votes obtained by the same candidates in the Armenian section of Bourj Hammoud was as follows: Jemil Lahoud, 3691; Maurice Gemayel, 3537; Vartkes Chamlian, 3482; Michel Murr, 3442; Edouard Abi Jaoudé, 3429; Camille Chamoun, 537; Albert Moukheiber, 410; Assad Achkar, 438; Dikran Tosbath, 418; Selim Lahoud, 221; Noubar Nokhoudian, 12.<sup>89</sup>

*Le Soir* and *Ayk* (both owned by Tosbath), *Al-Bina* and *Sada Loubnan* of the SSNP, *Telegraph* and *Raouad* alleged fraud.<sup>90</sup> Tosbath and his friends alleged interference by some organs of the Lebanese government in favor of the opposing list, arbitrary arrests of supporters of their list and an atmosphere of terror in Bourj Hammoud. They further claimed that the percentage of voters in Metn was lower than in 1957 but had greatly increased in Bourj Hammoud. Moreover, the number of Armenian voters in Bourj Hammoud was only 1500 – after the repatriation of thousands of Armenians to Soviet Armenia in 1946–47, and the results of the polling centers of Armenian voters in Bourj Hammoud had been announced *en bloc*.<sup>91</sup>

Tosbath declared that although 4638 persons had voted in the constituency of Bourj Hammoud in 1953, the sector of Bourj Hammoud in the constituency of Metn in the elections of 1960 included only what was previously known as the Armenian sector of Bourj Hammoud. In Sin el Fil, which had been part of the constituency of Bourj Hammoud in 1953, 665 electors had voted in favor of Tosbath and 863 in favor of Chamlian. In Dekouani, 318 electors had voted for Tosbath and 333 for Chamlian. In Mar Youssef, the polling center of Bourj Hammoud Watani, 177 electors had voted for Tosbath and 126 for Chamlian. Tosbath demanded that the Prime Minister subtract these 2402 votes from the total of 4638 votes cast in 1953 so that he could estimate the number of votes in the Armenian sector of Bourj Hammoud.<sup>92</sup>

Tosbath published in *Le Soir* an open letter addressed to Gaspard, the Minister of the Interior, claiming that he had visited Gaspard three days before election day to protest against the fact that the identity cards of the repatriated Armenians were going to be used during the elections. Tosbath had also protested against the lack of privacy, the open participation of the municipal employees in favor of the Phalangist-Tashnag list and the activity of terrorist gangs. Gaspard had assured him, wrote Tosbath, that the identity cards of the repatriated Armenians would not be used and that the number of voters in the Armenian sector of Bourj Hammoud and Sin el Fil could not exceed 2000. Tosbath claimed that, contrary to Gaspard's assurances, the identity cards of the repatriated Armenians were used on polling day, and that, despite the minister's declarations that the voters' lists of Bourj Hammoud could be consulted, this proved impossible. Tosbath challenged Gaspard to publish these lists if he was "a man of

courage." He concluded: "Je proclame sereinement, surement et sans passion, que votre Gouvernement a présidé à la plus grande escroquerie électorale jamais organisée au Liban."<sup>93</sup>

Tosbath also announced in bold headlines in both *Le Soir* and *Ayk* that "the maximum of Armenian votes available in Beirut is 11,000, of which 7,500 support the Armenian Democratic Front, allied with Pierre Eddé and 3500 back the Tashnags and their sympathizers." He added that any additional votes registered would be crooked votes.<sup>94</sup>

On 17 June, Gaspard, together with Commandant Toufic Jalbout, the Director-General of the Department of General Security, held a press conference in his office at the Seraglio to answer all the accusations brought against the government. To Tosbath's question as to the whereabouts of the identity cards of Armenians who had left Lebanon, Gaspard answered that they were in the archives of the État Civil (Personal Status Department) and had not been moved from there. As to Tosbath's other demand that these identity cards, over 9000 in number, be photocopied to make "comparisons and affirmations," Gaspard answered that he had to consult with others, although he had in principle full authority to grant permission.<sup>95</sup>

*Zartok* wrote that although the Lebanese Armenian National Rally did not participate in the elections in Metn, the Tashnag leadership had used all its "electoral specializations: fraud, terror, and illegality" against Tosbath. The Ramgavar Azadagan daily concluded that the elections may have been calm and peaceful in other areas of Metn, but the murder of a Huntchag, Roupén Karageuzian, was reported in the Armenian sector of Bourj Hammoud.<sup>96</sup> *Ararad* stated that "no government had been so partial" in that region.<sup>97</sup>

Gaspard gave the following answers to the accusations made by Tosbath: (a) the majority of voters in Bourj Hammoud supported the Tashnags. In 1951, Tosbath had received 121 votes as an independent candidate, while the Tashnag candidate had polled 951 votes. In 1953, Tosbath had received – as the Tashnag candidate – 2013 out of the total 2336 votes cast by Armenians. In 1960, Tosbath had received – again as an independent candidate – 438 votes, while the Tashnag candidate had obtained 3995 votes; (b) the high proportion of voters in 1960 was due to the presence of a specific Tashnag candidate; (c) even with this higher than usual turnout in Bourj Hammoud, the proportion of votes cast was

still only 31 percent, while the average voter turnout in the rest of Metn was 47 percent; (d) the identity cards of the repatriated Armenians were in the possession of the État Civil; (e) the État Civil had given only 200 new identity cards to Armenians, who had lost their old identity cards.<sup>98</sup>

*Aztag*, in turn, denied the allegation that 2300 of the Armenian votes cast in Bourj Hammoud had been fraudulent and that only 1162 votes had been legal. The Tashnag daily also wrote that if there had been identity cards of repatriated Armenians at their disposal, the party would have used them to prevent their defeat against Tosbath in 1951. *Aztag* added that the complainant had been elected through Tashnag support in 1953, and that no such identity cards had been used then. The newspaper concluded with a rhetorical question: "Why then would they be used this year?"<sup>99</sup> Tosbath had been elected automatically and no elections had been held in Bourj Hammoud in 1957 for he was the only candidate running in that constituency.

After the elections of Metn, when it had become known that the defeat of three candidates on Chamoun's National Rally list had been due to massive Armenian support in Bourj Hammoud for the candidates on the opposing list, some newspapers attacked the Armenians in general and the Tashnags in particular. Ghassan Tueni wrote in *An-Nahar*:

We, the Lebanese, so as to be able to represent Lebanon in parliament, are forced to apply to the Armenians and request their kind alms, and get inspiration from their orders and commands. This Arab country, which is called Lebanon, this country, which became the starting point of Arab civilization, has become one of the electoral constituencies of Armenia.<sup>100</sup>

Kesrouan Labaki, in turn, wrote in *Le Soir* that the membership of the Armenians in the Lebanese community could not be contested. It was also comprehensible that they had bonds outside Lebanon and they were, hence, concerned about the fate of Armenians living in the UAR and therefore supported President Nasser and those Lebanese whom Nasser backed. Labaki added, however, that he could less easily understand the fact that the Armenians did not take into consideration the sentiments and reactions of the non-Armenian Lebanese. Their links with the other Armenian communities spread all over the world made the Armenians of

Lebanon forget their membership in the Lebanese community. Labaki continued that the non-Armenians in Metn could not understand the fact that the Armenian Tashnags had voted against the preferences of the majority of the inhabitants of the constituency. The latter also could not understand the bitter struggle of the Tashnags against Chamoun, although the latter had helped them in the past more than himself or his sons. Labaki concluded his article as follows:

Nous n'avons pas compris et nous ne comprenons pas que les arméniens tachnags permettent à l'autorité de les utiliser dans la légalité et parfois dans l'illégalité leur imposer aux autres communautés libanaises des députés dont ces autres communautés ne veulent pas. Nous ne comprenons, nous ne pouvons pas comprendre en tout cas que les représentants du Metn à la Chambre soient désignés en fin de compte par un parti que ne veut obéir qu'à des considérations étrangères au Liban, par un parti qui est décidé à se ranger en toutes circonstances aux cotés du pouvoir par un parti qui n'hésite pas à recourir à la violence pour imposer ses vues à ses adversaires, par un parti qui peut accepter de se faire le complice d'une mystification.<sup>101</sup>

*Aztag* replied to Tueni's article that the latter did not think in this manner when he received Tashnag support during the elections of 1953 and 1957.<sup>102</sup>

The Tashnag party's Central Committee in Lebanon, in turn, addressed an appeal to all Lebanese on 17 June, stating that they were Lebanese and were proud to be the sons of this motherland. The party claimed that it had enjoyed the backing of the great majority of Armenian voters in all constituencies for the past 30 years and that the events in Bourj Hammoud had reaffirmed this fact yet again. It stated that the irresponsible claims made about the sympathies of voters in the First Constituency of Beirut were plainly blackmail. The party concluded its statement by saying that it never betrayed its allies.<sup>103</sup>

The Phalangists also defended in their newspaper, *Al-Amal*, the Tashnags and the Armenians in general.<sup>104</sup>

Tueni later clarified his above-quoted position in *An-Nahar* by stating the Armenians could not accept that certain Armenian parties were

transforming their community into an instrument of pressure and falsification. He added:

En fait, ce n'est ni M. Der Kaloustian, ni surtout M. Babikian, qui ont défendu les intérêts arméniens à la Chambre et au Gouvernement pendant de longues années, mais bien ceux qui aujourd'hui se trouvent poignardés dans le dos par leur anciens alliés...<sup>105</sup>

Meanwhile, during the campaign in Beirut's First Constituency, Pierre Eddé had protested against the transfer of three polling centers to the Mesrobian School, the Lebanese Armenian Relief Cross Center and the Karantina headquarters of the same organization respectively, all situated in quarters under Tashnag control.<sup>106</sup> *Ararad* claimed that 90 percent of the polling centers were situated in Karantina, which was under Tashnag control. The Huntchag newspaper demanded an equal distribution of polling centers across various neighborhoods. After Gaspard had promised to study the request,<sup>107</sup> only one change was affected by the government,<sup>108</sup> leading *Ararad* to complain: "When was such a partial government seen?"<sup>109</sup>

On 4 June, Pierre Eddé protested to the Prime Minister, the ministers of the Interior and Justice and the Chairman of Inspecting Services that, according to the newspaper, *Al-Siasa* No. 1011, 3 June 1960, the Director-General of the Ministry of the Interior had declared that he would not transfer the polling centers of the Armenian quarters because the Armenian candidates on Eddé's list "if not Communists, were Partisans of Peace." On behalf of the candidates of the National Front, which he led, Eddé demanded "immediate and public measures" against the Director-General because of the gravity of his "uncanonical act."<sup>110</sup>

Raymond Eddé declared in a press conference that Pierre Gemayel was relying on the authorities and was claiming that the army would back him. Eddé commented that if the Phalangists were strong, they would not rely on such measures. Eddé announced that the Phalangists claimed that Colonel Antoine Saad, the chief of the *Deuxième Bureau* (the Department of Army Intelligence), had sent one of his agents, Joseph Kilani, to organize their electoral rally in Rmeil. Eddé added that he could not believe that the *Deuxième Bureau* could allow itself to stray so far from its own duties so as to interfere in such matters.<sup>111</sup>

A few weeks before the first round of elections, Garo Sarrafian, the Secretary-General of the Lebanese Armenian National Rally and a member of the District Committee of the Ramgavar Azadagan Party in Lebanon, and Ara Topdjian, the principal of the AGBU Hovagimian-Manougian School for Boys and a leader in the Lebanese Armenian National Rally, were expelled from Lebanon for the duration of the elections. Sarrafian was of Syrian nationality; Topdjian, British.<sup>112</sup>

*Zartok* condemned the unfairness of this government move, reminding readers that Hovhannes Hovhannesian, a member of the Tashnag party's Central Bureau and an American citizen, who had come to Lebanon especially for the elections, had not been affected by the same measure. The newspaper deplored the partiality of the government, which, it claimed, had been proved by its expulsion of the Lebanese Armenian National Rally leaders, the concentration of polling centers in Tashnag clubs, the constant searches for so-called troublemakers in the anti-Tashnag quarters, and its conduct during the elections in Bourj Hammoud in the constituency of Metn. In Bourj Hammoud, the anti-Tashnag Armenians voting in Beirut were threatened and prevented from voting.<sup>113</sup> *Ararad*, in turn, wrote: "We ask for nothing else except the impartiality of the authorities."<sup>114</sup> Finally, Tosbath addressed an open letter to Jalbout, criticizing him for expelling "a distinguished professor," in an allusion to Topdjian, while others had not been expelled.<sup>115</sup>

On 14 June, a delegation of 200 women from the quarters of Hadjin, Bourj Hammoud and Charchabouk protested against the searches in their houses. They also demanded easy access to the polling centers on election day, which could be achieved through "the stopping of the terrorist activities of the Tashnag Party, the provocations of which will not remain unanswered, unless the government urgently takes the actions necessitated by the situation." Daouk, Gaspard and Colonel Noureddine Rifai, the Chief of the Internal Security Forces, had a formal discussion on measures to be adopted in the Armenian quarters.<sup>116</sup>

On 11 June, Der Kaloustian and Babikian visited Gaspard and requested that the government secure the transfer of voters who sympathized with them to the polling booths.<sup>117</sup> Previously, candidates Chader and Boutros had also requested the transfer of a polling center, and Gaspard had promised to "study the request."<sup>118</sup> There are no reports in the

newspapers published in the next few days whether Gaspard ordered any significant change.

Meanwhile, candidates on both lists were active in visiting community leaders, clubs and prominent families. The candidates on the People's List, led by Pierre Gemayel, visited the religious heads of the Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Protestant, Latin and Sunnite communities.<sup>119</sup> They also held public rallies in Rmeil and other locations. On 13 June, Armenian, pro-Tashnag independents organized a reception in honor of the People's List. Pro-Tashnag Vahe Setian and Tashnag leader Garo Sasouni addressed this gathering, held on the premises of the Armenian College.<sup>120</sup>

The candidates on the National Front list also visited the Maronite Patriarch and the Sunnite Mufti of the Lebanese Republic and the Homenmen and Zareh Noubar clubs as well as some prominent families living in the First Constituency.<sup>121</sup> On 5 June, the National Front candidates attended the annual sports festival of Sahagian School, held at the school's playing field, under the auspices of Kevork Yerevanian. Dr. Djidedjian, Mohsen Slim and Farid Jebran were present.<sup>122</sup>

*Aztag* wrote that "the victor of Metn cannot be defeated in Beirut and will not be defeated no matter how much power the opponents of the Tashnag party show."<sup>123</sup> The newspaper stated that the Tashnags were against Communists and Communist infiltration in all countries and they considered the Communist movement as an evil to be opposed in Armenian national life. The newspaper invited the people to vote for the Tashnag-backed candidates if they wanted to be respected as loyal and trustworthy elements in Lebanon. The voters should deny their votes to Communists and fellow travelers.<sup>124</sup>

On the other hand, *Zartonk's* editorial was entitled: "The Will of the Majority Must Win." It said that Der Kaloustian's clique was an obstacle in the way of Armenian national concord and that it must be defeated to pave the way for mutual understanding and cooperation.<sup>125</sup> *Ararad* and Simon Simonian's independent weekly, *Spurk*, also invited electors to vote for the National Front list. *Haratch*, in turn, appealed to its readers to vote for George Hanna, Pierre Eddé and the Armenian candidates on his list.<sup>126</sup> Finally, *Nayiri* wished success to Iskenderian "on behalf of all Armenian teachers in all the Armenian schools in Lebanon, on behalf of all who are partisans of solidarity, moderation and peace." This was an indirect

request to the readers to vote for Iskenderian.<sup>127</sup> Chamoun, who had opposed the Tashnags in Metn, also favored Pierre Eddé's list in Beirut.<sup>128</sup>

A few incidents did take place during the pre-election campaign period. On 10 June, Sarkis Milossian and Bedros Gasparian (both Huntchag) were attacked at Jeitaoui, leading to the arrest of a few Tashnags.<sup>129</sup> On 17 June, a few Tashnag sympathizers attacked a group of Ramgavar Azadagans on St. George Street.<sup>130</sup>

The elections in Beirut took place from 7 a.m. to 5 p.m. on Sunday, 19 June. Out of the 83,039 registered voters, only about 33,600 electors voted; there was a large measure of absenteeism.<sup>131</sup> The atmosphere, however, was generally calm. Observers reported that the government conducted the balloting with scrupulous fairness. The government had also taken strict security measures.<sup>132</sup> Nevertheless, Vartan Sarkissian, a Ramgavar Azadagan, was killed in the district of Karm el Zeitoun.<sup>133</sup> Moreover, observers revealed that votes had been bought openly on election day.<sup>134</sup> Raymond Eddé claimed to have caught a member of the *Deuxième Bureau* red-handed, when he was attempting to influence voters against his brother Pierre's list.<sup>135</sup>

It was estimated that between 8 and 10 a.m. on election day, about 30 percent of the eligible voters exercised their right to vote. This number had risen to 40-45 percent by noon and to 45-50 percent by 3 p.m.<sup>136</sup> By noon, observers were giving the Phalangist-Tashnag list an advantage of 3-4 thousand votes.<sup>137</sup> At 4 a.m. on 20 June, the results released from 211 polling centers (out of a total 234) gave Pierre Gemayel's list 19,857 votes, against 10,877 for Pierre Eddé's list.<sup>138</sup>

The Ministry of the Interior officially released the following final results at 11:15 a.m. on 20 June: Charles Saad, 22,339 votes; Joseph Chader, 21,765; Khatchig Babikian, 21,364; Pierre Gemayel, 21,283; Souren Khanamirian, 20,719; Fouad Boutros, 20,666; Antoine Sehnaoui, 20,484; Movses Der Kaloustian, 19,977; Pierre Eddé, 12,282; Abdallah Khoury, 12,224; Mardiros Emile Iskenderian, 11,700; Vazken Bakalian, 11,669; Hratchia Chamlian, 11,665; Noubar Toursarkissian, 11,197; Selim Addi, 10,451; Michel Sassine, 9,840; George Hanna, 2,693; Papken Meguerditchian, 326; Michel Ghorayeb, 301; Fouad Moughabghab, 252; George Barbari, 153; Elias Noul, 96; Sami Zreyck, 19; Selim Wakim, 9; and Boulos Fayad, 7.<sup>139</sup>

The organization, order, discipline and organized party work in the systematic campaigning of the Phalangist-Tashnag alliance had contributed to the victory of Gemayel's list.<sup>140</sup>

Most Moslem voters had voted in favor of Pierre Eddé's list, while the overwhelming majority of the Maronite and Jewish communities had voted in favor of Pierre Gemayel's list. Although the majority of voters belonging to the remaining communities had voted in favor of the Phalangist-Tashnag list, the difference between their votes and the votes received by the National Bloc-Lebanese Armenian National Rally list from among these communities was comparatively small. *Aztag* reported that the Tashnags had received 8000 votes from members of the Armenian community, as against 5000 votes for their opponents.<sup>141</sup> *Ararad* claimed, on the other hand, that the Huntchag-backed candidates had obtained 5500 votes.<sup>142</sup> The released results also revealed that the majority of the voters supporting the Lebanese Armenian National Rally had voted in favor of Sassine on Eddé's list, instead of the pro-Communist Hanna, as some circles had expected.<sup>143</sup>

The newspapers *Al-Anouar*, *Al-Amal* and *Aztag*, which had backed Gemayel's list, defended the authorities against the charges and accusations that they faced.<sup>144</sup> Outside Lebanon, *The Manchester Guardian*, *The New York Times*, *Newsweek* and *Time* considered the elections as regular,<sup>145</sup> while *France-Soir* wrote: "Une première injustice est déjà réparée, disent les Libanais. La truquage des élections de 1957 a été la vraie cause de la guerre civile de 1958."<sup>146</sup>

Meanwhile *Al-Joumhouriyya*, the mouthpiece of the National Bloc, wrote: "It is appropriate to conclude that the real winners of the competition are the Americans."<sup>147</sup>

*Ararad* described the elections in the First Constituency mockingly as "exemplary elections" or as Mr. Ahmed Daouk's "crucified liberty."<sup>148</sup> Both *Zartonk* and *Ararad* considered the results obtained by the Lebanese Armenian National Rally as "honorable," under the prevailing unfavorable conditions and atmosphere under which the voting had taken place in the First Constituency of Beirut.<sup>149</sup> *Zartonk* wrote that it was interested only in the results of the Armenian voters. The newspaper noted that 45 percent of the votes received by Pierre Eddé's list were cast by Armenian voters supporting the Lebanese Armenian National Rally, while only one-third of the votes obtained by Pierre Gemayel's list were from the Armenian

voters, i.e. members and sympathizers of the Tashnag party. *Zartonk* enumerated what it considered were the "unfavorable conditions": (a) upon the pretext of a mysterious crime, the Huntchag quarters of Hadjin and Khalil Bedewi were searched, while the Tashnag sector of Bourj Hammoud was left untouched; (b) Tashnag militants threatened Lebanese Armenian National Rally voters in the Tashnag-dominated quarters of Bourj Hammoud and Ashrefieh, advising them to abstain from voting; (c) the polling centers for Armenian voters were established in the Tashnag quarters and only a nominal change had been affected upon Eddé's protest; (d) Tashnag militants had used force to prevent hundreds of Lebanese Armenian National Rally voters from crossing the bridge joining Bourj Hammoud to Beirut, while the police had not intervened; (e) Vartan Sarkissian was killed by Tashnag gunmen at Karm el Zeitoun in an attempt to terrorize Lebanese Armenian National Rally voters; (f) the telephone lines connecting the campaign headquarters of the Lebanese Armenian National Rally were disconnected on two occasions; and (g) Tashnags used the identity cards of more than one thousand repatriated Armenians to cast fraudulent ballots. *Zartonk* concluded that, "despite these internal and external interventions, despite all the obstacles, and despite the terrible existing atmosphere, 5000 electors supporting the Lebanese Armenian National Rally had expressed their will" in favor of concord, mutual understanding and peaceful life within the Armenian community of Lebanon. The newspaper also reported that about 4000 Lebanese Armenian National Rally voters had been prevented from voting because of the fear spread by their opponents.<sup>150</sup>

*Ararad* wrote that the Lebanese Armenian National Rally had to struggle not only against their opponents, but also against the police who had imposed a military cordon around the Huntchag-dominated quarters. The newspaper complained further that 116 of the total 118 polling centers allotted to the Armenians were established in Tashnag quarters. *Ararad* added that their demand for equal distribution of polling centers had been disregarded. It remarked that the Tashnag voters did not dare to vote in the anti-Tashnag quarters. However, the Tashnags wanted the polling centers of Armenian voters to be placed in the Tashnag quarters, in an implicit allusion to the difficulty for their voters to reach polling centers in the anti-Tashnag quarters. The authorities had acquiesced to the Tashnag wishes, as "the Tashnags were weak." *Ararad* claimed that the Tashnag supporters

were all able to cast their votes, while only 60 percent of the anti-Tashnag voters had been able to vote in the Tashnag quarters. The newspaper concluded that the last legislative elections had proved that the anti-Tashnags were stronger than the Tashnags.<sup>151</sup>

*Haratch* complained that only the Armenian quarters in the eastern part of Beirut had been surrounded by a military cordon on 19 June. Despite this, Sarkissian was killed, and only 13,000 out of the total 34,000 Armenian eligible voters had cast their ballots. The weekly continued that the 62 percent of the Armenians who could not vote were supporters of the anti-Tashnag front. It added that the polling centers had been installed in Tashnag quarters; the identity cards of non-Tashnag Armenian voters in Bourj Hammoud had been taken away from them; Tashnag women had attacked other women supporting the Lebanese Armenian National Rally in Ashrefieh; and Armenian voters had shown their dislike of the Tashnag deputy Der Kaloustian, who had received 1387 votes less than Babikian, who was not formally a member of the Tashnag party.<sup>152</sup>

Labaki wrote in *Le Soir* that the boundaries of the constituencies in Beirut were arbitrary. He alleged that the authorities had envisaged dividing the capital into two big constituencies, one Christian and the other, Moslem. Because this clear cut confessional distribution had given rise to protests, however, a third constituency was also created. Nevertheless, fearing that the Armenian voters would not give a sufficient margin of security to the government-backed candidates, the authors of the new electoral law had attached the Jewish-Christian quarter of Minet el Hosn to the First Constituency.<sup>153</sup>

*Aztag* declared that the legislative elections had proved that the Armenians supported the Tashnag party.<sup>154</sup> *Aztag* also declared that during the three successive administrations of presidents Khoury, Chamoun, and Chehab, the Tashnag candidates had been victorious. The newspaper also noted that the opponents of the Tashnags forever nourished the hope that the power and influence of the Tashnag party was only tied to the support that the party allegedly received from the regime of the day.<sup>155</sup> Meanwhile, *Ararad* announced that the Huntchag party was allied with Joublat's Socialist Progressive Party, and that the Socialist deputies would equally be the Huntchag representatives in the next Parliament.<sup>156</sup>

After the elections, a tense atmosphere prevailed in the Armenian quarters. *Ararad* and *Zartonk* reported that Tashnags were forcing the

sympathizers of the Huntchag and Ramgavar Azadagan parties to leave Bourj Hammoud. They had created an atmosphere of terror in the Tiro and Sandjak quarters.<sup>157</sup> *Le Jour* reported that thirty Huntchag families had been forced to leave Bourj Hammoud.<sup>158</sup> On 28 June, *Zartonk* asked the Tashnags to put an end to this terrorism.<sup>159</sup> *L'Orient* reported that Gaspard had denied that Tashnags were driving Huntchags out of their homes by making threats.<sup>160</sup> *Zartonk* replied that, instead of denying the accusations, Gaspard should investigate the "tragic situation of this sector" and he would then discover that Tashnags were acting as if they had established a government within a government. The newspaper added that the Ramgavar Azadagans were expecting that Gaspard would put an end to "Tashnag terrorism."<sup>161</sup> Tosbath wrote in *Le Soir* that, despite Gaspard's denials, some shops in Nor Marash had been stoned and citizens stabbed.<sup>162</sup> *Aztag* considered these reports as "imaginary and fabricated" and aimed against "the peaceful district of Bourj Hammoud."<sup>163</sup> On 22 June, *Ayk* reported that Nahabed Nahabedian and Garo Khatchadourian had been injured,<sup>164</sup> while *Le Jour* reported that Sahag Boyadjian, a member of the Huntchag party, had been killed in Bourj Hammoud on 21 June.<sup>165</sup> A Tashnag party member was also killed during a retaliatory gunfight. On 3 July, *Ararad* reported that Arsen Baghdassarian and Abdallah Khatran had been killed in Bourj Hammoud. On 7 July, Garabed Gulvartian, a member of the Tashnag party, was killed at Hadjin, and this crime was condemned both by the Huntchag and Ramgavar Azadagan parties.<sup>166</sup> In retaliation, 18-year old Sarkis Semerdjian was murdered, and Souren Gidour was gravely injured.<sup>167</sup>

In response to this escalation of violence, the government decided to impose a military cordon around the Armenian quarters and conduct a search to arrest the wanted criminals. From 9 to 12 July, the Armenian quarters of Hadjin and Charchabouk were sealed off.<sup>168</sup> On 11 July, *Aztag* claimed that some 30 troublemakers were hiding there and their arrest warrants had remained unexecuted. This intervention by the security forces did indeed help end the wave of fratricides. *Ararad* protested, however, that, despite the government's decision, only the Huntchag quarters were under a military cordon, while the Tashnag quarter of Bourj Hammoud was not.<sup>169</sup> *Zartonk* commented that "the tragic point of the case is that out of the 31 wanted individuals, 25 are Tashnag criminals, who live in Bourj Hammoud, Karantina and Ashrefieh." The Ramgavar

Azadagan newspaper added that the murderers and terrorists of Karageuzian, Semerdjian, Sarkissian, and Gidour were to be found not in the quarters under military cordon, but in the Tashnag quarters.<sup>170</sup> The inhabitants of the Armenian quarters under a military cordon appealed to the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Interior, the Commander-in-Chief of the Lebanese Army and the Internal Security Forces, demanding impartial justice, the arrest of criminals and equality for all citizens. Appeals were also made to the Lebanese Red Cross.<sup>171</sup> When the cordon was finally lifted, *Zartouk* remarked caustically: "Now that the criminals have not been found in these quarters, will Mr. Gaspard search for them in Bourj Hammoud?"<sup>172</sup>

Labaki wrote in *Le Soir* that since 1943 the successive administrations of presidents Khoury, Chamoun and Chehab had relied upon and had in return backed the Tashnags. Labaki also mentioned that Tashnag candidates had figured on the government-supported lists since 1943, and that the Armenian deputies had either been Tashnags or their sympathizers. This fact has given the non-Tashnag Armenians of Lebanon the feeling of being bullied and frustrated. Labaki continued: "With the official patronage of the authorities and all the moral and material pressures which were exercised over the voters, the Tashnags were not able to give more than 8000 votes to Pierre Gemayel and his colleagues, while the non-Tashnag Armenians gave 5000 votes to the list of Pierre Eddé." The writer concluded that the Tashnags formed the majority, but experience dictated that it was better not to take into consideration the law of numbers as "it is not wise to permit an important mass of citizens to be systematically rejected and maintained in a sterile and more and more exasperating opposition." Labaki blamed the government for giving rise to this atmosphere of vendettas in the Armenian quarters, as all the seats reserved for the Armenian community had been won by the Tashnags, and the government had not attempted to reconcile the Armenians or attempted to maintain an equitable distribution of public offices among the various Armenian factions. The writer suggested that the state should treat all Armenians equally, and such an approach would put an end to the vendettas.<sup>173</sup>

On 11 April 1961, the favorable report of the Parliamentary Validating Committee, prepared by Deputy Bahij Takiéddin, the chairman of this committee, was approved, and all elected deputies were validated.<sup>174</sup>

Tosbath had lodged a protest with the Validating Committee, alleging illegality during the legislative elections of Metn through the use of the identity cards of repatriated Armenians in Bourj Hammoud. He now argued that Takieddin's report "officialized the illegality and fraud" of the elections of 1960. The report had maintained, *inter alia*, that the Chairman of the Validating Committee had written to the Director of the État Civil, requesting information on the whereabouts of the 9600 identity cards of the repatriated Armenians. He was informed that the identity cards of the repatriated Armenians in question were not at the État Civil. Tosbath underlined this passage in the report to argue that at least 4000 of these identity cards had been used in Bourj Hammoud and another 5000 in Beirut for the casting of false ballots.<sup>175</sup>

#### THE ELECTIONS OF 1964

On 19 February 1964, i.e. almost four years after the legislative elections of 1960, President Chehab dissolved the Lebanese parliament by Decree No. 5417. Article 2 of the said decree specified that the next legislative elections would be held on the basis of the same electoral law that had been applied in 1960. The seats allotted to the Armenian Orthodox and Catholic communities would, hence, remain the same as in 1960. The elections would be held in four stages, from 5 April to 3 May 1964. Elections in Beirut and Mount Lebanon would take place on the same day, 26 April.<sup>176</sup>

Prime Minister Rashid Karamé, who had been in office since 31 October 1961, resigned prior to the elections, and Hussein Oweyni, who had headed the government during the elections in 1951, was again appointed Prime Minister. The main task of Oweyni's government was to oversee the next elections.<sup>177</sup>

A few significant developments had taken place within the Armenian community since the elections of 1960. In August 1961, the authorities in the Syrian region of the UAR had announced the uncovering of "a secret organization" within the Tashnag party, which they had accused of "espionage."<sup>178</sup> 123 Tashnags were arrested, but most of them were soon set free. Even after the breakup of the UAR in September 1961, the new government of the Syrian Arab Republic pressed on with the charges and

continued the judicial process against the arrested Tashnags. In April 1962, the Syrian Military Court condemned Movses Der Kaloustian, one of the incumbent Armenian Orthodox deputies in Lebanon, to 15 years' imprisonment for contumacy "for espionage in favor of a foreign power." However, the Lebanese government considered that these charges were political in nature and refused to extradite Der Kaloustian to Syria.<sup>179</sup> The Tashnag party and Der Kaloustian personally would eventually recover from this reverse blow, but a good number of Armenians would leave Syria for Lebanon in the years following the charges made in August 1961 and the ensuing political trial.

After the sudden and untimely passing away of Catholicos Zareh I of Cilicia in February 1963, Archbishop Khoren Paroyan, the prelate of Armenians in Lebanon, was elected, first, as *locum tenens* and, later, as Catholicos on 5 May 1963. Those Armenian political parties and factions, which had opposed Zareh's election in 1956, continued not to recognize the legality of Catholicos Khoren I in his new position. However, Vazken I, the Catholicos of All Armenians residing in Etchmiadzin in Soviet Armenia, invited Catholicos Khoren I to meet him during his visit to the Armenian Patriarchate of Jerusalem in October 1963. Khoren accepted the invitation and proceeded to Jerusalem at the head of a clerical and lay delegation, which included incumbent Lebanese Deputy Khatchig Babikian, the chairman of the Central Civil Council of the Catholicosate of Cilicia. This delegation also included Aram Amassian, Roupen Mavisakalian, Hagop Terdjanian, Onnig Tcherkezian, Karnig Panian, Puzant Yeghiayan, Dr. Hovsep Yenikomshian, Kevork Yerevanian, Dr. Yeghig Konialian, Nazareth Gharibian (Armen Gharib) and Harry Burt. Hence, the delegation consisted of Tashnags, pro-Tashnag independents, neutrals and two Huntchags. This meeting in Jerusalem and the attendant brotherly embrace between the two Armenian catholicoi on 26 October amounted to an unconditional reconciliation between the two holy sees. It also signified recognition by Catholicos Vazken I of Khoren I as the legitimate Catholicos of Cilicia. Moreover, the two catholicoi also said a mass of requiem for the late Catholicos Zareh I, thus recognizing his legitimacy posthumously. Vazken I declared that they could not reach a practical solution to the existing problems. Khoren I, on the other hand, expressed his belief that all existing difficulties would be settled in time.

The Ramgavar Azadagan and Huntchag parties reluctantly followed Catholicos Vazken I's lead. *Zartok* commented that members of the clergy had solved the purely ecclesiastical part of the Armenian Church crisis. The Ramgavars considered the embrace as a happy beginning, and they expressed a simultaneous wish that the related political problems could also be resolved. Otherwise, the Jerusalem embrace, wrote *Zartok*, would unfortunately remain formal.<sup>180</sup>

As an early result of the positive atmosphere generated by the meeting in Jerusalem, the St. Haroutiun Armenian Orthodox church in Khalil Bedewi, within the Huntchag zone of influence, was re-opened on 29 December 1963. It had remained closed since February 1957, upon the demand of the Tashnag-dominated Armenian Prelacy of Lebanon.<sup>181</sup>

Archbishop Khat Atchabahian, the leader of those members of the brotherhood of the Cilician Catholicossate who had refused to acknowledge the election of Zareh I had suffered a deterioration in his health during the course of the year 1963. On 11 November, the ailing Khat sent a delegation to Antelias, consisting of Bishop Kenel Djeredjian and Father Kevork Garbisian as well as well-known personalities from the Independent Bloc, Dr. Yervant Djidedjian, Yervant Demirdjian, Garbis Nazarian, Dadjad Srabian, Hovhannes Kassardjian, Setrak Kassardjian, Pakrad Bakalian, Sarkis Shekerdjian, Dikran Zawzawatjian and Hagop Altounian to congratulate Catholicos Khoren I. The latter, in turn, sent Archbishop Dadjad Ourfalian, the new prelate of the Armenian Orthodox Diocese of Lebanon, and Archpriest Haroutiun Gebenlian to thank Khat for his congratulations. Finally, Khat returned to reside in the Catholicossate in Antelias on 31 December. All Armenian factions consented to this move. Khat was accompanied on his return by Archbishop Dadjad, Missak Azirian and Yerevanian. The Jerusalem embrace did not bring any changes on the political front, however.

In Beirut's First Constituency, Pierre Gemayel, the Phalangist leader, maintained in 1964 his party's electoral alliance with the Tashnags, which they had forged four years before. The support that these two parties enjoyed in this constituency was such that any joint list they submitted would be unbeatable. On 25 February, *Aztag* announced that there would be Phalangist-Tashnag cooperation in the Lebanese elections; the leaders of both parties had met on 24 February and decided to have a united front.<sup>182</sup>

Kesrouan Labaki wrote in both *Le Soir* and *Ayk* on 28 February that Pierre Gemayel, the leader of the Phalangists, is one of the authentic representatives of the Lebanese people and he should, hence, not be elected automatically – without actually facing any other rival. There were about 6000-7000 Armenian voters in Beirut's First Constituency, where Gemayel was expected to run again, and, if elections were not held there, he could then be seen as the deputy of the Armenians.<sup>183</sup>

*Ayk* announced on 10 March that the Huntchag and Ramgavar parties would form a united front, together with the Bloc of Independents.<sup>184</sup> Ten days later, on 20 March, when these two parties announced, however, that they had decided the day before to run together in the constituencies of Beirut I and Metn on 26 April, they made no mention of the Independents in their announcement.<sup>185</sup> Nevertheless, observers expected that the Independents close to the Huntchag-Ramgavar bloc would still support the united front.

The names of the possible Huntchag and Ramgavar Azadagan candidates were never made public. Unofficially, the names of Parounag Tovmassian or Hratchia Setrakian for the Ramgavars, and Haroutiun Djeredjian for the Huntchags were being circulated, together with those of Garbis Markarian for the Independents, Noubar Toursarkissian for the Armenian Catholics, and Dr. Antranig Manougian for the Evangelicals. It was expected that the United Front of Huntchags, Ramgavars and Independents would support Dikran Tosbath in the Metn elections. These groupings had backed Tosbath in 1951 but had withheld their support in 1953, 1957 and 1960.

It appeared that the Tashnags and the Phalangists would nominate the same candidates who had made a clean sweep in Beirut's First Constituency in 1960. The only disagreement that was leaked to the press was for the Evangelical seat. *Ayk* claimed that the Phalangists were insisting on having an Arab to run for the Evangelical seat. The Rev. Farid Audeh, the head of the Evangelical community in Lebanon, had presided over a meeting of the Evangelical Synod, in the absence of its Armenian members. The names of three Evangelical personalities, Charles Saad, Dr. Philippe Achkar and Elias Nassar, had been selected during that meeting as possible candidates. There was also another independent Evangelical candidate, Faouzi Chehadé.<sup>186</sup> Meanwhile, the Armenian Evangelicals also had a candidate in the person of Yervant Abadjian. They claimed that there

were 3500 Armenians among all the eligible Evangelical voters.<sup>187</sup> A few days later, *Ayk* rectified its earlier information, writing that the Evangelical Synod had held its meeting under the presidency of Rev. Audeh and had declared its strict neutrality towards the various candidates from their community.<sup>188</sup>

On 17 March, *Aztag* announced that the case of the Evangelical candidate remained unresolved. A number of Armenian Evangelical personalities, Yervant Gulesserian, Azad Haleblian and Karekin Yardemian, had sent a letter to Pierre Gemayel asking him to take their candidate, Abadjian, on his list, as the Armenian Evangelical community had 3500 votes, 80 percent of the total votes of the Evangelical community in Lebanon.<sup>189</sup> On 24 March, *Aztag* reported again that the problem of choosing the Evangelical candidate was still lingering.<sup>190</sup> On 1 April, *Aztag* finally announced the selection of Charles Saad as the Evangelical candidate on the Phalangist-Tashnag list.<sup>191</sup> A fortnight later, the Tashnag party's Central Committee in Lebanon explained that it had, with the representatives of the Armenian Evangelical community, demanded the Evangelical seat on the Phalangist-Tashnag list for the Armenian Evangelicals, but Saad had been selected "due to overall Lebanese interests and other considerations."<sup>192</sup>

Years later, in the heat of the electoral campaign of 1972, when the Evangelical seat was disputed between the Phalangists and the Tashnags, Pierre Gemayel published the minutes of a meeting he had held with Armenian Evangelical leaders on 14 April 1964. The published minutes made clear that the Phalangist and Tashnag parties had promised to consult the representatives of the Armenian Evangelicals before forming their next list, as well as to intervene with the leaders of the Evangelical community so that the rights of the Armenian Evangelicals would be respected on a par with those of non-Armenian Evangelicals, within the confines of the broader, general interests of the country as a whole.<sup>193</sup>

In mid-March, Lebanese newspapers claimed that former President Camille Chamoun intended to run in Beirut. *Ayk* announced that Chamoun had not yet taken any final decision in this regard.<sup>194</sup> On 21 March, *Ayk* revised this piece of information and wrote that there would be a separate electoral list in Beirut's First Constituency, led by Chamoun. It would also include representatives from the Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic communities, as well as the Huntchag-Ramgavar united front among the

Armenians. It would also receive support from neutral Armenian elements and, unofficially, from the Armenian Evangelicals, who were estimated to have 3000 voters.<sup>195</sup> On 25 March, *Ayk* announced that the Greek Orthodox candidate on Chamoun's list would be Ghassan Tuani, while the Greek Catholic seat would probably be filled by Henri Pharaon. In case the latter did not wish to run in these elections, he would give his full support to the candidacy of Nasri Maalouf.<sup>196</sup>

In the meantime, *Aztag* reported on 27 March that the electoral situation in Beirut's First Constituency remained unchanged. The formation of any rival list to the Tashnags and Phalangists was considered improbable, considering the electoral force and the popular support enjoyed by the latter. The Tashnag newspaper further claimed that the names of Pharaon and Djidedjian were being purposefully circulated as possible candidates on an eventual rival list, despite the fact that both personalities had categorically denied any intention of running in the elections.<sup>197</sup> The next day, *Aztag* announced that the Tashnag party had submitted four candidates for the upcoming elections: Movses Der Kaloustian, Khatchig Babikian and Souren Khanamirian in Beirut's First Constituency, and André Tabourian in Metn.<sup>198</sup>

*Ayk* announced on 1 April that the rival Chamoun-Pharaon list was on the verge of formation and that things would be clarified within the next 48 hours. Furthermore, the newspaper added that Kamal Joumblat was supporting Chamoun's list in Beirut.<sup>199</sup> If Chamoun submitted his candidacy in the capital, Joumblat would avoid having him as his arch-rival in Chamoun's native Chouf.

These optimistic predictions made by *Ayk* were, it seems, premature. The last day to submit the candidacies was 10 April, but, only 24 hours earlier, *Ayk* was still reporting that Chamoun had not yet decided where to submit his candidacy.<sup>200</sup> The matter was resolved on the last day. Chamoun submitted his candidacy in Chouf, thus ending all speculation on the formation of a rival list to the Phalangists and Tashnags in Beirut's First Constituency.<sup>201</sup> Chamoun feared that the pro-Tashnag Armenian votes would be used against him in an unfair way and he would fail to be elected in Beirut. He pointed at the abnormal choice of the location of polling booths for Armenian voters in Beirut and Metn. Their locations were evidently chosen in view of favoring one section of electors – the Tashnags – against their opponents. This inequitable distribution could

generate serious incidents if it was not modified in a fair and legal manner.<sup>202</sup> Chamoun spoke, of course, from experience; he had acted on similar lines during the legislative elections of 1957, when he was still president of the country.<sup>203</sup>

Following the nomination of the Tashnag candidates, *Ararad's* editorial claimed that the Huntchags had hoped that tolerance and cooperation would reign in various domains of Armenian community life after the Jerusalem embrace. They wanted to prevent conflict and solve all existing contradictions through reason. All Armenian circles had desired to see the participation of Armenians in the elections through a single list based on consensus. The Huntchag party wanted the formation of a single Armenian list so as to maintain calm within the Armenian community. In order to achieve this goal, the Huntchags had reduced their demands to a minimum, but they had only encountered stubbornness and indifference. That is why two opposing lists were in the process of being formed.<sup>204</sup>

However, once Chamoun announced his intention to run in the Chouf, no effective rival list could be formed against the People's List of the Phalangists and the Tashnags in Beirut's First Constituency. By the end of the deadline to submit nominations, there were no candidates to challenge the Maronite Gemayel, the Armenian Orthodox Der Kaloustian, Babikian and Khanamirian, as well as the Armenian Catholic Chader. They were hence considered *de facto* elected. Thereafter, individual candidates from the other communities began withdrawing from the race one by one. Abadjian pulled out his candidacy on 14 April. So did Dr. Sami Zreyck (Greek Catholic) and Haroutiun Tavitian. All three candidates declared their support for the People's List upon their withdrawal.<sup>205</sup> On 17 April, *Zartouk* and *Ararad* published a joint Ramgavar Azadagan-Huntchag communiqué dated 15 April 1964. It was entitled "A Necessary Explanation." The two parties declared that, as supporters of the democratic order, they had faithfully done their civic duty and had presented their views. In March, they had declared their intention to participate in the electoral campaign. However, the two parties were now confirming with regret that the unnatural conditions and atmosphere had denied them both to have their say through active participation in the voting process. The Maronite, Greek Catholic and other communities had not submitted rival candidates for unexplained reasons and, as a consequence, the Huntchag and Ramgavar parties had been deprived of the

possibility of participating in the elections.<sup>206</sup> *Ararad* had earlier attacked both Der Kaloustian and Tabourian. On 10 April, the Huntchag newspaper reminded readers that Der Kaloustian was condemned as an Israeli spymaster to 15 years' hard labor in Syria. It also argued the next day that it was unwise to have as an Armenian representative a personality who was known as an Israeli spy.<sup>207</sup> The last independent candidate to withdraw his candidacy in Beirut's First Constituency was Joseph Abboud (Greek Catholic). Thereafter, the Phalangist-Tashnag list faced no rivals.

On 19 April, this list was declared automatically elected. It consisted of Pierre Gemayel (Maronite), Fouad Boutros (Greek Orthodox), Antoine Sehnaoui (Greek Catholic), Movses Der Kaloustian (Armenian Orthodox), Khatchig Babikian (Armenian Orthodox), Souren Khanamirian (Armenian Orthodox), Joseph Chader (Armenian Catholic) and Charles Saad (Protestant).<sup>208</sup> The electoral committee approved their election on 21 April.<sup>209</sup>

In the constituency of Metn, *Aztag* had formally announced on 28 March Tabourian's candidacy on the People's List supported by the Phalangists and the Tashnags. The other members of this list were Maurice Gemayel (Maronite), Jemil Lahoud (Maronite), Khalil Abi Jaoudé (Maronite) and Michel Murr (Greek Orthodox). The Tashnag newspaper published Tabourian's picture and biography on 29 March.<sup>210</sup> Moreover, *Aztag* reported in its next issue that Tabourian had donated 5000 LL. (about \$1600) for the victims of a fire in Camp Tiro Sandjak.<sup>211</sup> No official explanation was offered on the Tashnag decision to replace Chamlian by Tabourian in the constituency of Metn.

Tabourian, born in Beirut in 1930, had graduated from the Broummana High School. He had later attended the American University of Beirut (AUB), New York University and Harvard University, receiving a master's degree in Business Administration. In 1951, Tabourian was elected Secretary-General of the AUB Alumni Association and, later, became the assistant of Emile Boustany, a famous businessman, parliamentarian and the president of the AUB Alumni Association.

*Aztag* reiterated on 15 April that the Armenians of Bourj Hammoud were with the People's List.<sup>212</sup> A campaign rally was held on Sunday, 19 April in Jal el Dib. Candidates Jemil Lahoud, Tabourian, Maurice Gemayel, Murr and Khalil Abi Jaoudé, elected deputies from Beirut, Pierre Gemayel, Der Kaloustian and Khanamirian, as well as Hagop

Ashdjian, the chairman of the municipality of Bourj Hammoud, were all present at this gathering. All the candidates addressed the crowd, estimated at about 10,000. Tabourian's speech was in Arabic.<sup>213</sup>

Tabourian's rival for the Armenian seat in Metn was to be the former deputy Dikran Tosbath. On 29 March, *Ayk* declared that Armenians would vote for Tosbath. The newspaper said Tosbath had served the Tashnags and the Hunchags, the Ramgavars and the Independents, both the ordinary party-members and the distinguished leaders of these parties. The newspaper invited the voters to back Tosbath "in the name of our interests and better days."<sup>214</sup>

The names of Tosbath's fellow candidates on the National Rally List were formally announced on 11 April. The list was composed of Victor Moussa (Maronite), Selim Lahoud (Maronite), Joseph Khoury (Maronite), Albert Moukheiber (Greek Orthodox) and Dikran Tosbath (Armenian Orthodox).<sup>215</sup>

On 16 April, *Zartok* published the declaration of the National Rally List in Metn, as well as the group picture of the members of this list. This initiative made obvious the Ramgavar preference for the success of this list.<sup>216</sup> The next day, *Ararad* also published the group picture of the National Rally List. Hence, the Hunchags had also indicated their support for this list.<sup>217</sup> *Ararad* had already criticized Tabourian's candidacy, as shown above, as early as April 10.

*Zartok* also launched a campaign against Tabourian on 23 April. The Ramgavar newspaper stated that Tabourian had given a cocktail party in Hotel Pheonicia in honor of the representative of the American Airways company on the day of the funeral of the late Catholicos Zareh I on 22 February 1963, against the advice of many invitees, who had suggested to him that he postpone the reception. *Zartok* stated that Tabourian, a man who had disrespected the memory of the late Zareh I, had now become the candidate of the Tashnag leadership. The newspaper claimed that Tabourian was an opportunist and questioned how ordinary Tashnags could vote for such an interest-seeking businessman. *Zartok* concluded that every Tashnag and non-Tashnag voter in Bourj Hammoud should consider it his/her duty to leave such an opportunist out of the next parliament.<sup>218</sup>

The next day, *Zartok* urged the people to vote for Tosbath. Within this context, the newspaper further ridiculed Tabourian and claimed that

the Tashnags had endorsed his candidacy in exchange for receiving from him a large sum. *Zartok* argued that Tosbath was well known within and outside Lebanon. He was a longstanding former parliamentarian and had often played an influential role in Lebanese political life. He had also been active in the life of the Armenian community, sometimes in agreement with the views of the Ramgavars, and, on other occasions, at odds with the latter. It was no secret, wrote *Zartok*, that the Ramgavars had been, in the past, in disagreement with Tosbath for a certain period and had criticized his actions. Tosbath had retaliated to such criticism in the past, but it was now the firm conviction of the Ramgavars that, in view of the current reality within the Armenian community, all Armenians in Metn should vote for Tosbath and the list that he was on.<sup>219</sup>

A couple of days later, *Zartok* again invited its readers to vote for the candidates on the National Rally List.<sup>220</sup> So did *Ararad*, urging the voters to go and vote in a disciplined and conscientious manner.<sup>221</sup>

*Aztag*, on the other hand, wrote on 25 April that the monolithic mass of Bourj Hammoud will stand by the Tashnag party. The newspaper underlined Tabourian's qualities and printed his photograph once again.<sup>222</sup>

The National Rally List had worries regarding the possibility of irregularities. On 12 March, Victor Moussa objected to the transfer of the polling booths nos. 24-31 from the Vahan Tekeyan school (which was owned by the pro-Ramgavar Tekeyan Cultural Association) and the Noubarian school at Camp Tiro to places which were under the influence of "a certain party," i.e. the Tashnags.<sup>223</sup> Moreover, on April 17, a few days before the elections, the candidates on the National Rally List met Prime Minister Oweyni and submitted a list of demands to rectify certain situations. The Prime Minister agreed with some of their suggestions, ordered some changes and promised to pay attention to their other requests.<sup>224</sup>

The elections in Metn were held generally in a calm atmosphere, except in Bourj Hammoud, where a tense atmosphere prevailed and some incidents took place. The total number of voters in Metn was 78,183, of whom 36,144 actually voted, i.e. the turnout was 46.2 percent.

The official results were as follows: André Tabourian, 18,283 votes; Albert Moukheiber, 18,054; Jemil Lahoud, 17,965; Dikran Tosbath, 17,861; Selim Lahoud, 17,586; Michel Murr, 17,379; Maurice Gemayel, 17,318; Khalil Abi Jaoudé, 16,953; Joseph Houry, 15,949; Victor

Moussa, 14,028; Emile Salhab, 5,346; George Abou Nader, 1,579; George Haoui, 908; and Samir Abi Jaoudé, 280.<sup>225</sup>

Hence, Jemil Lahoud, Maurice Gemayel and André Tabourian from the People's List and Selim Lahoud and Albert Moukheiber from the National Rally List were elected.

*Aztag's* headlines proclaimed "The Victory of Tashnangtsoutiun in Metn; André Tabourian Was Elected Receiving the Most Votes; the Armenians of Bourj Hammoud Stood by the Tashanag Party Like One Man." It was announced that Tabourian had received 3724 votes in Bourj Hammoud; Tosbath, 243.<sup>226</sup>

Since opposition leaders Chamoun and Raymond Eddé had been defeated in other constituencies in Mount Lebanon, opposition newspapers claimed that the authorities had exercised widespread fraud. Tosbath's protests and recriminations were particularly vociferous in his newspapers, *Le Soir* and *Ayk*. *Le Soir's* headline proclaimed, right after the elections, that "Le 26 avril 1964 a surclassé le 25 mai 1947," referring to the notoriously fraudulent elections of 1947. Tosbath wrote that he had struggled alone against the state and all its tools, against the state's parallel police forces (*les polices parallèles de l'Etat*), as well as against the Tashnags, the party of fascism and terror, which enjoyed state backing and protection. Tosbath reported that 400 Tashnag hoodlums had assaulted him personally twice on election day, first, at 8 a.m. in Camp Marash, where he had just one bodyguard with him and later, at 6 p.m. in Camp Trad, where he was with a group of five people. Tosbath alleged that the Tashnags wanted to kill him, as they knew that he had actually won the elections. He further stated that the next day, Monday, 27 April, the Tashnags had resorted to tricks to make him fail during the final count of votes in Jedeidé, the administrative center of the district of Metn. Tosbath argued that he had surpassed "the Tashnag party and the United States' embassy's 'electoral brain' by 1900 votes." He gave no further hint, however, about who exactly in the American embassy he had in mind. Moreover, Tosbath described Oweyni as a poor figure, who had no authority. Instead of sending the internal security forces to Bourj Hammoud, where in Tosbath's words "the Tashnag homiciders" had had free rein, the Prime Minister had sent the forces to Khalil Bedewi and Ashrefieh (both of them quarters within the city limits of Beirut), where no elections were being held.<sup>227</sup>

In another article in the same issue of *Le Soir*, Marc Riashy wrote: "Last Sunday, Bourj Hammoud behaved as an independent state. All the roads were closed to all citizens who were strangers to this state."<sup>228</sup>

This article was particularly resented by *Aztag*. The Tashnag daily immediately attacked Tosbath, the director of *Le Soir*, without however directly mentioning his name once. The newspaper also denounced Riashy's article, particularly the section where he had said: "We forgive all those, for whom we opened our doors, wanting them to share our roofs, our pains and joys," *Aztag* replied: "Did we attach Bourj Hammoud to Northern Metn, so that, according to the director of *Le Soir*, the inhabitants of Metn have come to accuse us of having failed their candidates during the elections? Had the opposite happened and had this same gentleman got elected as a deputy, would he have had the correct attitude of mind to declare that an unlawful act had been committed against the will of the Armenian people? Moreover, aren't the more than 15,000 citizens in Mount Lebanon, who voted for our colleagues on the same list, inhabitants of Metn? Furthermore, when will an end be put to the consideration, rooted in the mentality of some people, that Armenians are second-degree citizens in this land, not citizens of this country with equal rights and duties." *Aztag* stated that the Tashnag party had decided not to allow the Armenian people to be used in the circus of personal gains of adventurers." It mentioned that life in the Armenian community had hardly calmed down after the recent turbulent years and warned that there were people, who were willing to create a chaotic life in the community for their personal gain. *Aztag* said that the aim of the director of *Le Soir* was to create ferment, with a few bodyguards, in areas, where the Armenians had rejected his candidacy *en masse*.<sup>229</sup>

*Ayk* retorted, saying that "the Tashnags constitute a small number among the 100,000 Armenians in Lebanon. By what right are they speaking in the name of all Armenians? Who has given them this monopoly? Are the non-Tashnags perhaps Tartar, Coptic or Chechen? The results of the legislative elections in Bourj Hammoud on 26 April are not and will never be 'the expression of the collective will of the Armenian people.' *Ayk* stated further that the Tashnag leadership used fraudulent means because they feared and were certain that the majority of the Tashnags would vote for Tosbath. Tosbath was well known among all Armenians. He was also known within the Tashnag party, which had

benefited from his services for long years. Armenians would have voted for Tosbath had the hoodlums not forbidden them and if fraudulent votes had not been stuffed in ballot boxes wherever there were no proxies of Tosbath. *Ayk* asked rhetorically why the Tashnags were astonished, then, if the Lebanese got upset because of their illegal votes. These votes caused the failure not only of the Armenian candidate but also of other Lebanese Arab candidates.<sup>230</sup> *Ayk* further mentioned that, upon the request of Dr. Yervant Khatanassian, a member of the Tashnag party Bureau, Tosbath had written in *Le Soir* and *Ayk* that it was conceivable that the Tashnag party could spy for Israel, after such accusations had been made in Syria in August 1961. Moreover, Tosbath had demanded an Armenian ministerial seat in the Lebanese cabinet for years. He had turned Bourj Hammoud into a separate municipality, granted the latter a separate budget, appointed policemen, etc. The newspaper inquired what the Tashnags had done with their five deputies in the past few years.<sup>231</sup>

Tosbath wrote in *Le Soir* that he had complained to the Prime Minister that all the polling centers in Bourj Hammoud were in the Tashnag-dominated sectors. He had demanded that the freedom to vote be guaranteed, but, instead of deploying the internal security forces in Bourj Hammoud, they had sent those forces to Khalil Bedewi and Ashrefieh. Nevertheless, a number of acts of terror and beatings had taken place in Bourj Hammoud. Tosbath's representatives had also been beaten up and sent away from Bourj Hammoud. The curtains of the polling booths had been removed and the governor of the Mount Lebanon province, the *kaimakam* (district commissioner) of Metn, a considerable number of chairmen of municipalities and *mukhtars* (headmen) had all intervened in favor of the People's List. The municipality of Bourj Hammoud, its chairman, policemen and night guards had used the municipality's jeeps and cars to assist the Tashnag candidate.<sup>232</sup>

Mrs. Sirarpi Hagopian, who worked as secretary for the Association of Engineers, was Tosbath's proxy on ballot box no. 35 at the Giligian School in the quarter of Nor Adana. *Le Soir* reported that she was the only proxy of Tosbath who had stayed at her post, despite the many threats she had received. The other 33 proxies of Tosbath had all been molested, beaten and ejected from polling centers, while representatives of the authorities and the internal security forces had not intervened. Hagopian recounted in *Le Soir* all the threats she had received. She also disclosed that of the total

416 eligible voters on the electoral register in that polling station, only 53 had cast their votes, and seven of these voters had in fact backed Tosbath. This was seen as proof that in this polling station in Bourj Hammoud, where Tosbath's proxy was present, the proportion of votes in Tosbath's favor was 14 percent, far higher than the overall percentage of votes he had received, according to official figures, in Bourj Hammoud as a whole. *Le Soir* argued that the number of votes cast in favor of the People's List had been tripled and quadrupled in other polling stations, where no proxies of Tosbath and the National Rally List were present.<sup>233</sup>

Tosbath also complained to Afif Tibi, the chairman of the Press Association, that the Tashnags had forbidden the entry and distribution of *Ayk* in Bourj Hammoud. The salesmen of *Ayk* had been detained for a short while by the Tashnags, who had also confiscated and torn up the newspapers. Tibi promised to raise this issue with the authorities and advised Tosbath to trust the latter.<sup>234</sup>

Selim Lahoud, one of the elected deputies from the National Rally List, asserted that the elections had been full of irregularities.<sup>235</sup>

*Zartonk* and *Ararad* also alleged fraud. The Ramgavar daily printed the following headline: "The Armenian Voters in Bourj Hammoud Were Brutally Denied on Sunday the Possibility of Expressing Their Will." It reported people claiming that there were attacks, beatings and threats against men and women, both young and old, and especially against those proxies in the polling centers who were neither Tashnag party members nor appointed by the Tashnags. Internal security forces were stationed in Nor Hadjin, where no elections were being held, rather than in Bourj Hammoud. The *Zartonk* and *Ayk* issues of Sunday, 26 April were confiscated by Tashnags. *Zartonk* added that the state had permitted the Tashnags to act as they wished and it concluded that the Armenian voters had been deceived. The Ramgavar daily claimed further that Tashnag terrorists, both male and female, had created an atmosphere of fear. Democratic principles had been violated and human liberties, repressed.<sup>236</sup>

*Ararad's* headline was as follows: "They Cannot Fool Themselves." It also described the elections as a "scandal in Bourj Hammoud." The Hunchag newspaper said that the Tashnags had not hesitated to resort to old tactics in order to secure the success of their candidate. According to the old custom, they had centralized the location of the ballot boxes in their quarters of Bourj Hammoud, and the Armenian masses were not

allowed to approach these polling stations. Various well-known methods to terrorize the people through threats, repeated beatings, molestation of women, kidnappings and pressurizing the voters to prevent them from expressing their will had all been recorded yet again. The internal security forces, in the meantime, had been stationed in Jeitaoui, Khalil Bedewi and Hadjin, where no elections were taking place. *Ararad* concluded that this clear injustice was probably necessary so that Tabourian could deprive Tosbath of a worthy victory by receiving a few hundred votes more than his opponent. For the newspaper, there was no doubt that the outcome of this election would have been different had it been held under really free conditions and if the Armenian masses had had the possibility to vote.<sup>237</sup>

Such mutual attacks continued in *Ayk* and *Aztag* for a while, with *Zartok* and *Ararad* also participating in these acrimonious exchanges.

Months later, on 14 January 1965, Tosbath gave a press conference at the headquarters of the Press Association to explain in detail the fraud committed against him:

1. The governor of Mount Lebanon had appointed, by decree no. 965 of 19 April, the heads and secretaries of 234 polling stations, but 168 of these appointees were later changed upon the request of candidates favored by the government.

2. Tosbath's proxies could not enter the polling stations, despite having permits from the Ministry of Interior. Those proxies, who had insisted on exercising their right, had been attacked or detained. Tosbath referred to the report submitted on 14 August by the expert Mohammed Khalil Tabbara, who had been appointed by the Validating Committee of the Parliament. Tabbara had reported that he had embarked upon his task on 27 July, under the supervision of Adnan Nader, the secretary of the Validating Committee. Tabbara had checked all the official records of those polling stations, where the number of votes cast had surpassed the number of registered, eligible voters. He had discovered that polling center no. 7 in Zeghrin, polling centers nos. 20, 26, 33, 48 and 49 in Bourj Hammoud, polling center no. 77 in Bikfayya and polling center no. 169 in Shoueir all had more votes cast than the total number of eligible voters registered on their respective lists. Tosbath argued that Tabbara's report meant that the announced results of the vote were fraudulent.

3. In polling center no. 26 in Bourj Hammoud, Garabed Markarian had illegally signed in the place of 125 absentee voters, and the official record

of the results in this center had not been formally approved by Elie Tawil, the head of the government commission.

4. In polling center no. 25 in Bourj Hammoud, the voters' lists did not bear the signature of even one single voter. The voters' list consisted of 17 pages, while the official list provided by the *kaimakam* of Metn consisted only of seven pages.

5. In polling center no. 47 in Bourj Hammoud, the voters' lists were signed by Artin Churukian and Apraham Ashdjian, instead of the actual 111 voters who had cast their ballots.

6. In polling center no. 97 in Beit Shebab, the voters' lists were signed by one person and the actual ballots had disappeared.

7. In polling center no. 181 in Antoura, the voters' lists were not signed and the actual ballots had disappeared.

8. In polling center no. 194 in Ayn el Safsaf, Khalik Kfour, the chief assistant to the head of the government commission had signed in the place of 140 female voters.

9. The official records of the electoral proceedings in the polling centers nos. 1 and 3 in Antelias, nos. 16-20, 25-27, 32, 35, 39 and 50-53 in Bourj Hammoud, no. 108 in Beit Mery, no. 124 in Himlaya, nos. 134-135 in Dekouani, no. 145 in Zalka, nos. 159 and 161 in Sin el Fil, and no. 185 in Amarat Shalhoub did not bear any official signature.

10. In polling center no. 41 in Bourj Hammoud, the official records did not bear the signatures of Bastid Mounazam, the head of the government commission, and his chief assistant, Rashid Nader. Tosbath stated that, according to Article 49 of the electoral law, the voter must actually sign in the register after casting his/her ballot and that all the fraudulent votes cast in the instances mentioned above had been against him and in favor of his rival.

11. One of the candidates for the Maronite seat was Tomé Abi Jaoudé. He was also known as Samir Tomé, and there were ballots, where his name had been written as Samir Tomé, instead of Samir Tomé Abi Jaoudé. These ballots had also borne the names of Selim Lahoud, Moussa, Moukheiber and Tosbath, all candidates on the National Rally List, but the government-appointed commission in the polling station had decided that the name of Samir Tomé Abi Jaoudé had been written incorrectly and had cancelled all these ballots, thus causing the National Rally List to lose a significant number of votes because of this illegal measure.

Tosbath contended during his press conference that, if all the illegal votes described above were eliminated, he would have 1560 votes more than Tabourian. Tosbath added further that the official results released by the Ministry of the Interior had stated that the total number of votes cast in the constituency of Metn had been 36,214, of which 27 votes had been invalid. The officially admitted number of actual voters was, therefore, 36,187. Tosbath argued that if the votes received by Tabourian (18,283) and himself (17,861) were added, this would give a total of 36,144. However, a detailed study of the results from each of the polling stations indicated that 462 voters had not voted for either of the Armenian Orthodox candidates. If these 462 votes were added to votes registered for Tabourian and Tosbath, the total number of voters would increase to 36,606, which was inconsistent with the number 36,214 provided by the ministry. Hence, argued Tosbath, the authorities had provided 392 extra votes as a gift to ensure the success of Tabourian. This, said Tosbath, amounted to fraud in Tabourian's favor.

Tosbath said that he had formally protested on 25 May 1964 to the chairman and members of the Validating Committee of the parliament, citing in his letter all the mistakes, fraud and forgery that had been committed, but that no decision had been taken until the moment of his press conference.

The report on Tosbath's press conference was reprinted in both *Zartok* and *Ararad*, but was ignored by *Aztag*. Furthermore, both Ghassan Tueni in *An-Nahar* and Rushdi Maalouf in *Al Safa* backed Tosbath's position made during the press conference. Maalouf wrote that "Tosbath is the deputy."<sup>238</sup>

A spokesman of the Ministry of the Interior commented that the facts provided by Tosbath did not match the information at the government's disposal. Tosbath reiterated that the ministry spokesman had no right to interfere in this matter, as the issue was already in the hands of the Validating Committee.<sup>239</sup> On 18 July 1966, however, it was reported that the Validating Committee had approved the election of all the deputies elected, including Tabourian, in 1964.<sup>240</sup>

## CONCLUSION

President Chehab changed the electoral law after the civil strife of 1958 in such a manner that Christians would henceforward elect their own representatives and so would the Moslems, as they would each form the majority of voters in the electoral districts that returned deputies from their own faith. This new approach, which remained unchanged until the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975, made a great impact on elections in Beirut. The Phalangist party, which had spearheaded the Christian cause in East Beirut and elsewhere during the civil strife of 1958, now became the strongest electoral force in Beirut's largely Christian First Constituency. The lists of candidates that this party submitted, together with its local allies, including the Tashnag party, were victorious not only in 1960 and 1964, but also during the elections held under Presidents Charles Helou in 1968 and Suleiman Frangié in 1972.

The new electoral law, adopted prior to the elections in 1960, enabled the emergence of new faces in the legislature. Out of the 99 deputies elected in 1960, 50 were newcomers to the Lebanese parliament. On the other hand, 34 of the total 66 deputies elected in 1957 were not returned three years later.<sup>241</sup> However, the Armenian deputies elected in 1960 were mostly the same as in 1957. In Beirut, Der Kaloustian, Babikian and Chader were re-elected, while Khanamirian filled in the new Armenian Orthodox seat created when the number of deputies was raised by one-third. The only change in the Armenian Orthodox representation in the Chamber of Deputies was in the constituency of Metn, where Vartkes Chamlian replaced the incumbent Tosbath, who had lost the support of the Tashnags. The Tashnag candidates were successful in Beirut because they received about 8000 votes from the Armenian community, against 5500 Armenian votes cast for candidates backed by the rival Armenian political parties, the Huntchags and Ramgavar Azadagans.

There were in 1960 the usual charges of fraud by the defeated parties and allegations that the Tashnags had illegally used the identity cards of Armenians repatriated to Soviet Armenia in 1946-47. Petros A. Petrosian, the Armenian attaché at the Soviet Embassy in Lebanon gave credence to these fraud allegations. In a report to his government dated 18 March 1961, Petrosian wrote that during the last elections to the Lebanese Parliament, the Tashnags had snatched, with the obvious and active

support of the Lebanese government (starting with the President of the Republic himself), all five deputy seats allocated to the Armenians. According to Petrosian, such an unfair intervention by the Lebanese government had given rise to great dissatisfaction not only within the Armenian community but also among Arab circles in the country.<sup>242</sup>

In 1964, all attempts to form a rival list against the Phalangists and Tashnags in Beirut's First Constituency failed. The Huntchag and Ramgavar parties thereafter decided not to participate in the elections in Beirut. When all other individual candidates withdrew from the race, the Phalangist-Tashnag list was automatically declared the winner.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> The first part of this article, that dealing with the elections of 1960, is an updated version of part of my thesis, which was submitted in partial fulfillment for the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts in the History Department of the American University of Beirut in October 1963. The second part, which covers the elections of 1964, has been written especially for this issue of the *Haigazian Armenological Review*.

<sup>2</sup> *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, July 30-August 6, 1960, p. 17756A.

<sup>3</sup> Nicolas A. Ziadeh, "The Lebanese Elections, 1960", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Autumn 1960), p. 368; Lahd Khater, *Al-Intikhabat al-niyabiyya fi tarikh Lubnan* [The Parliamentary Elections in the History of Lebanon] (Beirut, 1996), p. 188.

<sup>4</sup> *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, July 30-August 6, 1960, p. 17756A.

<sup>5</sup> Ziadeh, p. 375.

<sup>6</sup> *L'Orient*, 36th year, no. 10413, 18 March 1960.

<sup>7</sup> *Zartouk*, 23rd year, no. 160 (6673), 6 April 1960; *Aztag*, 34th year, no. 82 (8509), 17 June 1960 and *Le Soir*, 14th year, no. 4154, 17 June 1960, p. 2 would later provide the following regional and gender breakdown for the total 83,039 voters in Beirut's First Constituency:

	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Mudawar	13207	13142
Ashrefieh	11394	11234
Rmeil	6166	8367
Seifi	2630	2914
Marfaa	1764	1647
Minet el Hosn	4027	4527

<sup>8</sup> *Le Soir*, 14th year, no. 4152, 15 June 1960.

<sup>9</sup> The last reference to the National Union Front in relation to Armenians made in the Lebanese-Armenian newspapers supporting the Armenian National Rally was on the occasion of a dinner given by Noubar Nokhoudian at the Federal Hotel in honor of the National Union Front on 17 April 1959. Nassim Majdalani, Mohammed Safieddin, Saeb

Salam, Chafik Mortada, Hassan Farhat, Rafik Naja, Farid Jebran, Habib Keyrouz, Habib Kenj, Fouad Aoun, Noubar Toursarkissian, Hratchia Chamlian, Hratchia Setrakian, Abdallah Yafi, Elias El Khoury, Fouad Khoury, Khodr Haraké, Lahoud Lahoud, Parounag Tovmassian, Yervant Demirdjian, Louis Ziadé and Setrak Kassardjian attended this banquet. Toursarkissian, Lahoud and Salam stressed in their respective speeches the necessity of maintaining the unity of the front; see *Zartouk*, 22nd year, no. 158 (6379), 21 April 1959.

The last reference in the newspapers consulted by this author to a political meeting by the National Union Front was made in *L'Orient*, 35th year, no. 9943, 27 November 1958. This meeting demanded the broadening of the four-member cabinet formed by Karamé. Among the participants of this meeting were Saeb Salam, Kamal Joumblat, Sabri Hamadé, Elias El Khoury, Fouad Ammoun, Rafik Naja, Suleiman Frangié, René Mouawad, Hratchia Chamlian, Noubar Toursarkissian and Maarouf Saad.

<sup>10</sup> *Haratch*, 2nd year, no. 35 (87), 31 August 1958, p. 4.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.* The anti-Tashnag clergy and political groupings within the Armenian communities in Lebanon and Syria had been attempting since October 1956 to separate themselves from the now Tashnag-dominated Catholicosate of Cilicia and set up an Independent Community of the Catholicosate of Cilicia. They had failed to receive any formal recognition from Chamoun's administration, however.

<sup>12</sup> *Aztag*, 32nd year, no. 124 (7929), 5 August 1958, p. 1; *Hask*, 27th year, nos. 8-9, August-September 1958, p. 366.

<sup>13</sup> *Aztag*, 32nd year, no. 188 (7998), 25 October 1958, p. 1; *Hask*, 27th year, nos. 10-11, October-November 1958, p. 444.

<sup>14</sup> Khosrov Tutundjian, *Piroyagan Shngoutiouné Yev Irav Tashnagsoutian Ughin (Arapagan Ashkharhi Verchin Tebkeru Louysin Dag)* [The Bankruptcy of the Bureau and the Real Political Line of Tashnagsutian (In Light of Recent Events in the Arab World)], Beirut: Sevan, 1959, pp. 93-94.

<sup>15</sup> *L'Orient*, 35th year, no. 9955, 9 December 1958; *Aztag*, 32nd year, no. 223 (8033), 13 December 1958, p. 1.

<sup>16</sup> Interview with Hratchia Setrakian, August 1962. In December 1958, former Prime Ministers Yafi and Salam, both leaders of the National Union Front, called on the local Ramgavar Azadagan and Huntchag clubs during their visit to Cairo. The Huntchags and Ramgavar Azadagans in Egypt gave receptions in honor of their Lebanese guests. Setrakian, who was visiting Cairo at the time, attended this reception.

<sup>17</sup> *L'Orient*, 35th year, no. 10110, 18 May 1959.

<sup>18</sup> *L'Orient*, 35th year, no. 10117, 25 May 1959.

<sup>19</sup> *Zartouk*, 23rd year, no. 150 (6663), 25 March 1960.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 23rd year, no. 128 (6641), 28 February 1960.

<sup>21</sup> *Aztag*, 34th year, no. 3 (8416), 8 March 1960; *Ayk*, 8th year, no. 2144, 8 March 1960.

<sup>22</sup> *Zartouk*, 23rd year, no. 143 (6656), 17 March 1960, p. 2.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 23rd year, no. 136 (6649), 9 March 1960; *Ayk*, 8th year, no. 2146, 10 March 1960.

<sup>24</sup> *L'Orient*, 36th year, no. 10451, 27 April 1960.

<sup>25</sup> *Zartouk*, 23rd year, no. 130 (6643), 2 March 1960, p. 2.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 23rd year, no. 131 (6644), 3 March 1960, p. 2.

- <sup>27</sup> Ibid., 23rd year, no. 132 (6645), 4 March 1960, p. 2.
- <sup>28</sup> *Ararad*, 23rd year, no. 118 (5486), 30 March 1960.
- <sup>29</sup> *Haratch*, 4th year, no. 15 (170), 10 April 1960.
- <sup>30</sup> *Zartok*, 23rd year, no. 163 (6676), 9 April 1960.
- <sup>31</sup> The Central Archives of the Most Recent History of the Republic of Armenia, Fund 326 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), list 1, file 282. The English translation of this Russian language document was provided to us by Ara Sanjian.
- <sup>32</sup> *Aztag*, 34th year, no. 79 (8492), 6 June 1960; *Spurk*, 2nd year, No. 21, 4 June 1960.
- <sup>33</sup> *Zartok*, 23rd year, no. 218 (6731), 15 June 1960.
- <sup>34</sup> Interviews with Souren Khanamirian and Hratchia Setrakian, August 1962.
- <sup>35</sup> *Spurk*, 2nd year, no. 21, 4 June 1960.
- <sup>36</sup> Interview with Movses Der Kaloustian, January 1962.
- <sup>37</sup> *Aztag*, 34th year, no. 79 (8492), 6 June 1960.
- <sup>38</sup> During an interview with the author in January 1962, Der Kaloustian said that the Tashnags were ready to accept one Rally candidate, but the latter had requested two seats out of the four on offer.
- <sup>39</sup> *Aztag*, 34th year, no. 79 (8492), 6 June 1960; *Spurk*, 2nd year, no. 22, 11 June 1960; *Zartok*, 23rd year, no. 218 (6731), 15 June 1960.
- <sup>40</sup> *Aztag*, 34th year, no. 84 (8497), 11 June 1960.
- <sup>41</sup> *Ararad*, 23rd year, no. 174 (5542), 5 June 1960.
- <sup>42</sup> *Zartok*, 23rd year, no. 215 (6728), 11 June 1960.
- <sup>43</sup> Ibid., 23rd year, no. 218 (6731), 15 June 1960.
- <sup>44</sup> *Nayiri*, 8th year, no. 4, 29 May 1960, p. 8.
- <sup>45</sup> *L'Orient*, 36th year, no. 10421, 26 March 1960. In May 1960 Shahin Shahin, a member of the Phalangist party, had been murdered at Sin el Fil, creating some tension. The murder was initially ascribed to the Huntchag party, which categorically denied having anything to do with it; see *Le Jour*, 24th year, No. 7735, 7 May 1960. The criminal investigation later concluded that the murder was non-political; see *Aztag*, 14th year, no. 52 (8465), 5 May 1960.
- <sup>46</sup> *Zartok*, 23rd year, no. 208 (6721), 3 June 1960; *Ararad*, 23rd year, no. 172 (5540), 3 June 1960; *Aztag*, 34th year, no. 79 (8492), 6 June 1960; *Ayk*, 8th year, no. 2217, 3 June 1960. Khanamirian told the author in an interview in August 1962 that he had worked hard to achieve a single Armenian list and had delayed accepting the Tashnag proposal to submit his own candidacy. Khanamirian and businessman André Tabourian had tried to have Vazken Bakalian as the Lebanese Armenian National Rally candidate on Gemayel's list. They had secured Der Kaloustian's approval, but the Rally refused to consent to the appointment of just one candidate and had required the right to nominate the candidates. Indeed, when the Phalangist-Tashnag list was first leaked unofficially in mid-May, it did not include Khanamirian's name; see *Le Jour*, 24th year, no. 7739, 12 May 1960.
- <sup>47</sup> Zaven Messerlian, 'Armenian Participation in the Lebanese Legislative Elections During the Presidency of Camille Chamoun, 1952-1958', *Haigazian Armenological Review*, Vol. 23 (2003), p. 275.
- <sup>48</sup> *L'Orient*, 36th year, no. 10444, 20 April 1960.

- <sup>49</sup> *Zartouk*, 23rd year, no. 200 (6713), 25 May 1960; *Ayk*, 8th year, no. 2211, 27 May 1960; *Ararad*, 23rd year, no. 166 (5534), 27 May 1960.
- <sup>50</sup> *Zartouk*, 23rd year, no. 206 (6719), 1 June 1960; *Aztag*, 34th year, no. 75 (8488), 1 June 1960; *Le Jour*, 24th year, no. 1759, 1 June 1960.
- <sup>51</sup> Interview with Mardiros Iskenderian, January 1962.
- <sup>52</sup> *Zartouk*, 23rd year, no. 6679, 13 April 1960 reported on Addi's candidacy and later formally supported his inclusion on Eddé's list.
- <sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 23rd year, no. 206 (6719), 1 June 1960.
- <sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 23rd year, no. 221 (6734), 18 June 1960.
- <sup>55</sup> *Ararad*, 23rd year, no. 171 (5539), 2 June 1960.
- <sup>56</sup> *Ayk*, 8th year, no. 2219, 5 June 1960.
- <sup>57</sup> *Zartouk*, 23rd year, no. 218 (6731), 15 June 1960, p. 4.
- <sup>58</sup> *Aztag*, 34th year, no. 76 (8489), 2 June and no. 80 (8493), 7 June 1960.
- <sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 34th year, no. 76 (8489), 2 June 1960.
- <sup>60</sup> *Ayk*, 8th year, no. 2212, 28 May 1960.
- <sup>61</sup> *L'Orient*, 36th year, no. 10415, 20 March 1960: interview with Dikran Tosbath, August 1962.
- <sup>62</sup> Interview with Hratchia Setrakian, August 1962.
- <sup>63</sup> *Zartouk*, 23rd year, no. 129 (6642), 1 March 1960.
- <sup>64</sup> *Ararad*, 23rd year, no. 164 (5532), 25 May 1960.
- <sup>65</sup> *Zartouk*, 23rd year, no. 200 (6713), 25 May 1960.
- <sup>66</sup> *Ayk*, 8th year, no. 2208, 24 May 1960.
- <sup>67</sup> *Aztag*, 34th year, no. 78 (8491), 4 June 1960.
- <sup>68</sup> *Zartouk*, 23rd year, no. 214 (6727), 10 June 1960.
- <sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, 23rd year, no. 200 (6713), 25 May 1960.
- <sup>70</sup> According to *L'Orient*, nos. 9943-9950, 27 November-4 December 1958, the strength of the Lebanese parties in Beirut in November-December 1958 was as follows: SSNP, 5500 members; Phalangists, 5000; Najjadé, 4000; National Bloc, 3392; Socialist Progressive Party, 500.
- <sup>71</sup> *Aztag*, 34th year, no. 83 (8496), 10 June 1960.
- <sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 34th year, no. 81 (8494), 8 June 1960.
- <sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 34th year, no. 82 (8495), 9 June 1960.
- <sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 34th year, no. 81 (8494), 8 June 1960.
- <sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 34th year, no. 84 (8494), 11 June 1960.
- <sup>76</sup> *Zartouk*, 23rd year, no. 222 (6735), 19 June 1960.
- <sup>77</sup> *Aztag*, 34th year, no. 84 (8497), 11 June 1960.
- <sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, 34th year, no. 46 (8459), 28 April 1960 had pointed out that, according to *Haratch*, the Communists sided with the Lebanese Armenian National Rally, although this was denied by *Zartouk*. A few days earlier, *Haratch*, 4th year, no. 17 (172), 24 April 1960 had written that "our not being in the Rally is not an obstacle to being against the Tashnags."
- <sup>79</sup> *Zartouk*, 23rd year, no. 213 (6726), 9 June 1960.
- <sup>80</sup> *Ayk*, 8th year, no. 2225, 12 June 1960.
- <sup>81</sup> *Ararad*, 23rd year, no. 179 (5547), 11 June 1960.

- <sup>82</sup> *Haratch*, 4th year, no. 23 (178), 5 June 1960.
- <sup>83</sup> *Aztag*, 34th year, no. 78 (8491), 4 June 1960.
- <sup>84</sup> *Ayk*, 8th year, no. 2219, 5 June 1960.
- <sup>85</sup> *Aztag*, 34th year, no. 79 (8492), 6 June 1960.
- <sup>86</sup> *Le Soir*, 14th year, no. 4150, 13 June 1960; *Aztag*, 34th year, no. 87 (8500), 15 June 1960.
- <sup>87</sup> *Le Soir*, 14th year, no. 4150, 13 June 1960.
- <sup>88</sup> *Aztag*, 34th year, no. 83 (8510), 18 June 1960.
- <sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, 34th year, no. 85 (8498), 13 June 1960, p. 4; *Le Soir*, 14th year, no. 4150, 13 June 1960 stated that Gemayel obtained 3547 votes; Murr, 3424; Selim Lahoud, 521; Achkar, 436; Moukheiber, 418; and Tosbath, 409. The other results were the same as those reported in *Aztag*.
- <sup>90</sup> Camille Chéhab, *Les élections législatives de 1960* (Beirut, 1960), p. 51.
- <sup>91</sup> *Le Soir*, 14th year, no. 4151, 14 June 1960. *Ayk*, 8th year, no. 2227, 15 June 1960, stated that the release of results of the first twenty ballot boxes had ceased from 11 p.m. on election night until 3 a.m. of 13 June.
- <sup>92</sup> *Le Soir*, 14th year, no. 4152, 15 June 1960.
- <sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 14th year, no. 4151, 14 June 1960; *Ayk*, 8th year, no. 2227, 15 June 1960.
- <sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*; *Ararad*, 23rd year, no. 174 (5542), 5 June 1960.
- <sup>95</sup> *Le Soir*, 14th year, no. 4154, 17 June 1960.
- <sup>96</sup> *Zartonk*, 23rd year, no. 218 (6731), 15 June 1960.
- <sup>97</sup> *Ararad*, 24th year, no. 182 (5549), 14 June 1960. *Ararad* apparently made a mistake on 14 June in registering the annual sequence numbers of its issues, printing 182 instead of 181; the issue of 12 June is numbered as 180 (5548), while the next issue, published on 14 June carries the sequence numbers 182 (5549).
- <sup>98</sup> *Aztag*, 34th year, no. 81 (8508), 16 June 1960; *Le Jour*, 24th year, no. 7776, 18 June 1960. *Aztag* apparently made a mistake on 16 June in registering both the annual and overall sequence numbers of its issues, printing 81 instead of 88 and 8508 instead of 8501; *Aztag's* issue of 15 June is numbered as 87 (8500), while the next issue, published on 16 June, carries the sequence numbers 81 (8508).
- <sup>99</sup> *Aztag*, 34th year, no. 81 (8508), 16 June 1960.
- <sup>100</sup> Quoted in *Aztag*, 34th year, no. 83 (8510), 18 June 1960 and *Le Soir*, 14th year, no. 4153, 16 June 1960.
- <sup>101</sup> *Le Soir*, 14th year, no. 4154, 17 June 1960. On 28 June, Daouk denied that there had been any interference in the elections on the part of the UAR.
- <sup>102</sup> *Aztag*, 34th year, no. 83 (8496), 10 June 1960. This Tashnag reply was also published in *L'Orient*, 36th year, no. 10501, 17 June 1960.
- <sup>103</sup> *Aztag*, 34th year, no. 83 (8510), 18 June 1960.
- <sup>104</sup> *Al-Amal*, 16 June 1960, as quoted in *Aztag*, 34th year, no. 82 (8509), 17 June 1960.
- <sup>105</sup> *Le Soir*, 14th year, no. 4155, 18 June 1960, p. 4.
- <sup>106</sup> *Zartonk*, 23rd year, no. 207 (6720), 2 June 1960.
- <sup>107</sup> *Ararad*, 23rd year, no. 173 (5541), 4 June 1960.
- <sup>108</sup> *Zartonk*, 23rd year, no. 224 (6737), 22 June 1960; *Aztag*, 34th year, no. 97 (8524), 5 July 1960.

- <sup>109</sup> *Ararad*, 23rd year, no. 178 (5546), 10 June 1960.
- <sup>110</sup> *Zartouk*, 23rd year, no. 209 (6722), 4 June 1960; *Ayk*, 6th year, no. 2219, 5 June 1960.
- <sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, 23rd year, no. 219 (6732), 25 June 1960.
- <sup>112</sup> Interview with Hratchia Setrakian, August 1962; *Le Jour*, 24th year, No. 7759, 1 June 1960, p. 5. The District Committee of the Ramgavar Azadagan Party in Lebanon announced in a communiqué on 3 July the expulsion of Garo Sarrafian from the party for his "anti-party conduct"; see *Zartouk*, 23rd year, no. 236 (6749), 6 July 1960. This announcement made no direct link between his expulsion from the country and his later expulsion from the party. Sarrafian and Topdjian both returned to Lebanon after the elections. Moreover, Sarrafian published in Beirut in 1962 a book entitled *RAG Getroni Magapouydzneri* [The Parasites of the Ramgavar Azadagan Party Headquarters], where he criticized the Central Committee of the party.
- <sup>113</sup> *Zartouk*, 23rd year, no. 219 (6732), 16 June 1960.
- <sup>114</sup> *Ararad*, 23rd year, no. 186 (5553), 18 June 1960.
- <sup>115</sup> *Le Soir*, 14th year, no. 4153, 16 June 1960; *Ayk*, 8th year, no. 2229, 17 June 1960. Tosbath also asked whether Jalbout was aware of the coercion exerted on Jewish voters to force them to vote for the totality of the government-backed list.
- <sup>116</sup> *Le Jour*, 24th year, no. 7773, 15 June 1960.
- <sup>117</sup> *Ararad*, 23rd year, no. 186 (5553), 18 June 1960.
- <sup>118</sup> *Aztag*, 34th year, no. 82 (8495), 9 June 1960.
- <sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, 34th year, no. 83 (8496), 10 June and no. 84 (8497), 11 June 1960.
- <sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, 34th year, no. 86 (8499), 14 June 1960.
- <sup>121</sup> *Zartouk*, 23rd year, no. 213 (6726), 9 June and no. 219 (6732), 16 June 1960; *Ayk*, 8th year, no. 2222, 8 June 1960; *Ararad*, 23rd year, no. 178 (5546), 10 June 1960; *Le Soir*, 14th year, no. 4153, 16 June 1960, p. 3.
- <sup>122</sup> *Ararad*, 23rd year, no. 175 (5543), 7 June 1960.
- <sup>123</sup> *Aztag*, 34th year, no. 86 (8499), 14 June 1960.
- <sup>124</sup> *Aztag*, 34th year, no. 82 (8509), 17 June and no. 83 (8510), 18 June 1960.
- <sup>125</sup> *Zartouk*, 23rd year, no. 222 (6735), 19 June 1960.
- <sup>126</sup> *Haratch*, 4th year, no. 25 (180), 18 June 1960.
- <sup>127</sup> *Nayiri*, 8th year, no. 7, 19 June 1960.
- <sup>128</sup> *Al-Bayrak*, 49th year, no. 8274, 16 June 1960.
- <sup>129</sup> *Le Jour*, 24th year, no. 7770, 12 June 1960.
- <sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*, 24th year, no. 7776, 18 June 1960.
- <sup>131</sup> *L'Orient*, 36th year, No. 10504, 20 June 1960.
- <sup>132</sup> All persons, both Lebanese nationals and foreigners, were required to carry with them their identity cards or passports. Foreigners, with the exception of diplomatic representatives and journalists, were forbidden to enter the polling stations until forty-eight hours after the release of results. Lebanese citizens were required to have special permits to leave the country. The army was instructed to shoot at anyone seen carrying arms; see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, July 30-August 6, 1960, p. 17556 A.
- <sup>133</sup> *L'Orient*, 36th year, no. 10504, 20 June 1960. Moreover, a police report of 20 June mentioned that an armed clash had occurred between Tashnags and the Sunnite Moslem Najjadé in Karantina, and a few arrests had been made after this incident; see *Zartouk*,

- 23rd year, no. 224 (6737), 22 June 1960.
- <sup>134</sup> Chehab, p. 36.
- <sup>135</sup> *L'Orient*, 36th year, no. 10504, 20 June 1960.
- <sup>136</sup> *Le Jour*, 24th year, no. 7778, 20 June 1960.
- <sup>137</sup> Chehab, p. 36.
- <sup>138</sup> *L'Orient*, 36th year, no. 10504, 20 June 1960.
- <sup>139</sup> *Le Soir*, 14th year, no. 4156, 20 June 1960; *L'Orient*, 36th year, no. 10505, 21 June 1960. Der Kaloustian showed the present writer in September 1962 a handwritten and sealed document from the Secretariat of the Parliament, dated 25 January 1961, according to which Der Kaloustian had received 20,829 votes, instead of the officially published number of 19,971. The distribution of these votes per quarter was, according to the said document, as follows: Mudawar, 5578; Ashrefieh, 5670; Rmeil, 4527; Seifi, 1884; Marfaa, 602; and Minet el Hosn, 2568. Der Kaloustian had earlier informed the present writer during an interview in January 1962 that about 900 Tashnag voters could not vote as their names were not placed on the voters' register.
- <sup>140</sup> Ziadeh, pp. 374-375; Chehab, p. 51.
- <sup>141</sup> *Aztag*, 34th year, no. 84 (8511), 20 June 1960.
- <sup>142</sup> *Ararad*, 23rd year, no. 193 (5560), 26 June 1960.
- <sup>143</sup> Petros A. Petrosian, the Armenian attaché at the Soviet Embassy in Lebanon complained to his government on 18 March 1961 that the Huntchags had ignored a decision by the United Armenian Front to support jointly the candidacy of Communists and had voted against the Communists; see the Central Archives of the Most Recent History of the Republic of Armenia, fund 326, list 1, file 287, folio 516. The English translation of this Russian language document was also provided to us by Ara Sanjian.
- <sup>144</sup> Chehab, p. 52.
- <sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 54.
- <sup>146</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 86.
- <sup>147</sup> Lebanese Public opinion held the view that the Phalangist-Tashnag list was favored by the Americans, and the National Bloc-Lebanese Armenian National Rally list, by the British.
- <sup>148</sup> *Ararad*, 23rd year, no. 188 (5555), 21 June 1960.
- <sup>149</sup> *Zartouk*, 23rd year, no. 223 (6736), 21 June 1960; *Ararad*, 23rd year, no. 188 (5555), 21 June 1960.
- <sup>150</sup> *Zartouk*, 23rd year, no. 224 (6737), 22 June and no. 225 (6738) 23 June 1960. *L'Orient*, 36th year, no. 10504, 20 June 1960, reported that four arrest warrants had been issued because of Sarkissian's murder, whom the newspaper described incorrectly as a member of the Huntchag party.
- <sup>151</sup> *Ararad*, 23rd year, no. 193 (5560), 26 June 1960.
- <sup>152</sup> *Haratch*, 4th year, no. 26 (181), 26 June 1960.
- <sup>153</sup> *Le Soir*, 14th year, no. 4158, 22 June 1960.
- <sup>154</sup> *Aztag*, 34th year, no. 85 (8512), 21 June 1960.
- <sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*, 34th year, no. 88 (8515), 24 June 1960.
- <sup>156</sup> *Ararad*, 23rd year, no. 191 (5558), 24 June 1960.

- <sup>157</sup> *Zartouk*, 23rd year, no. 229 (6742), 28 June 1960; *Ararad*, 23rd year, no. 197 (5564), 1 July 1960.
- <sup>158</sup> *Le Jour*, 24th year, no. 7793, 5 July 1960.
- <sup>159</sup> *Zartouk*, 23rd year, no. 229 (6742), 28 June 1960.
- <sup>160</sup> *L'Orient*, 35th year, no. 19503, 19 June 1960, quoted in *Zartouk*, 23rd year, no. 231 (6744), 30 June 1960.
- <sup>161</sup> *Zartouk*, 23rd year, no. 231 (6744), 30 June 1960.
- <sup>162</sup> *Le Soir*, 14th year, no. 4164, 1 July 1960.
- <sup>163</sup> *Aztag*, 34th year, no. 97 (8524), 5 July 1960.
- <sup>164</sup> *Ayk*, 8th year, no. 2232, 22 June 1960.
- <sup>165</sup> *Le Jour*, 23rd year, no. 7780, 22 June 1960.
- <sup>166</sup> *Aztag*, 34th year, no. 100 (8527), 8 July 1960; *Zartouk*, 23rd year, no. 238 (6751), 8 July 1960; *Ararad*, 23rd year, no. 203 (5570), 8 July 1960.
- <sup>167</sup> *Zartouk*, 23rd year, no. 239 (6752), 9 July 1960; *Ararad*, 23rd year, no. 204 (5571), 9 July 1960.
- <sup>168</sup> *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Autumn 1960), p. 445.
- <sup>169</sup> *Ararad*, 23rd year, no. 204 (5571), 10 July 1960.
- <sup>170</sup> *Zartouk*, 23rd year, no. 241 (6754), 12 July 1960.
- <sup>171</sup> *Ararad*, 23rd year, no. 206 (5573), 13 July 1960.
- <sup>172</sup> *Zartouk*, 23rd year, no. 242 (6755), 13 July 1960.
- <sup>173</sup> *Le Soir*, 14th year, no. 4174, 11 July 1960.
- <sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*, 15th year, no. 4407, 12 April 1961, p. 2.
- <sup>175</sup> *Ibid.*, 15th year, no. 4409, 14 April 1961.
- <sup>176</sup> Majed Khaled Majed, *Intikhabat Lubnaniyya 1861-1992: Qawanin – Nata'ij* [Lebanese Elections 1861-1992: Legislation – Results] (Beirut, 1992), p. 144.
- <sup>177</sup> *Ayk*, 11th year, no. 3320, 22 February 1964.
- <sup>178</sup> *L'Orient*, 38th year, no. 10906, 2 August 1961, p. 1.
- <sup>179</sup> *Ibid.*, 38th year, no. 11159, 15 April 1962, p. 8.
- <sup>180</sup> *Zartouk*, 27th year, no. 28 (7762), 27 October 1963.
- <sup>181</sup> *Aztag*, 37th year, no. 248 (9688), 30 December 1963; *Ararad*, 27th year, no. 43 (6638), 31 December 1963. For the circumstances of the closure of the St. Haroutian Church, see Messerlian, 'Armenian Participation in the Lebanese Legislative Elections During the Presidency of Camille Chamoun, 1952-1958', p. 275.
- <sup>182</sup> *Aztag*, 37th year, no. 293 (9733), 25 February 1964.
- <sup>183</sup> *Ayk*, 11th year, no. 3325, 28 February 1964.
- <sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*, 12th year, no. 3335, 10 March 1964.
- <sup>185</sup> *Zartouk*, 27th year, no. 146 (7880), 20 March 1964.
- <sup>186</sup> *Ayk*, 12th year, no. 3338, 14 March 1964.
- <sup>187</sup> *Ararad*, 27th year, no. 109 (6704), 21 March 1964.
- <sup>188</sup> *Ayk*, 12th year, no. 3342, 18 March 1964.
- <sup>189</sup> *Aztag*, 38th year, no. 11 (9751), 17 March 1964.
- <sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*, 38th year, no. 17 (9757), 24 March 1964.
- <sup>191</sup> *Ibid.*, 38th year, no. 22 (9762), 1 April 1964.
- <sup>192</sup> *Ibid.*, 38th year, no. 35 (9775), 15 April 1964.

- <sup>193</sup> *Yeridasart Hay*, No. 50, 26 February 1972, p. 6. The Armenian Evangelicals would claim in 1972 that this promise had not been kept in 1968.
- <sup>194</sup> *Ayk*, 12th year, no. 3342, 18 March 1964.
- <sup>195</sup> *Ibid.*, 12th year, no. 3344, 21 March 1964.
- <sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*, 12th year, no. 3347, 25 March 1964.
- <sup>197</sup> *Aztag*, 38th year, no. 20 (9760), 27 March 1964.
- <sup>198</sup> *Ibid.*, 38th year, no. 21 (9761), 28 March 1964. *Aztag* had already reported on 24 March that the Tashnags would join the Phalangists to form a joint list in Metn, and that Mr. Ara Tabourian would be the Tashnag candidate on that list; see *ibid.*, 38th year, no. 17 (9757), 24 March 1964. The printing of Tabourian's first name as Ara (instead of André) was obviously a mistake.
- <sup>199</sup> *Ayk*, 12th year, no. 3352, 1 April 1964.
- <sup>200</sup> *Ibid.*, 12th year, no. 3332, 9 April 1964. *Ayk* apparently made a mistake after 1 April in registering the overall sequence numbers of its issues; the issue of 1 April is numbered as 3352, while the issue published on 3 April carries the sequence number 3327.
- <sup>201</sup> *Ibid.*, 12th year, no. 3334, 11 April 1964.
- <sup>202</sup> *Magazine*, no. 382, 16 April 1964.
- <sup>203</sup> For details of the elections in 1957 see Messerlian, 'Armenian Participation in the Lebanese Legislative Elections During the Presidency of Camille Chamoun 1952-1958', pp. 289-290.
- <sup>204</sup> *Ararad*, 27th year, no. 119 (6714), 3 April 1964.
- <sup>205</sup> *Aztag*, 27th year, no. 35 (9775), 15 April 1964.
- <sup>206</sup> *Zartonk*, 27th year, no. 169 (7903), 17 April 1964; *Ararad*, 27th year, no. 131 (6726), 17 April 1964.
- <sup>207</sup> *Ararad*, 27th year, no. 125 (6720), 10 April and no. 126 (6721), 11 April 1964.
- <sup>208</sup> *Aztag*, 38th year, no. 39 (9779), 20 April 1964.
- <sup>209</sup> *Ibid.*, 38th year, no. 41 (9781), 22 April 1964.
- <sup>210</sup> *Ibid.*, 38th year, no. 21 (9761), 28 March 1964.
- <sup>211</sup> *Ibid.*, 38th year, no. 22 (9762), 1 April 1964.
- <sup>212</sup> *Ibid.*, 38th year, no. 35 (9775), 15 April 1964.
- <sup>213</sup> *Ibid.*, 38th year, no. 39 (9779), 20 April 1964.
- <sup>214</sup> *Ayk*, 12th year, no. 3351, 29 March 1964.
- <sup>215</sup> *Ibid.*, 12th year, no. 3335, 12 April 1964.
- <sup>216</sup> *Zartonk*, 27th year, no. 168 (7902), 16 April 1964.
- <sup>217</sup> *Ararad*, 27th year, no. 131 (6726), 17 April 1964.
- <sup>218</sup> *Zartonk*, 27th year, no. 174 (7908), 23 April 1964.
- <sup>219</sup> *Ibid.*, 27th year, no. 175 (7909), 24 April 1964.
- <sup>220</sup> *Ibid.*, 27th year, no. 176 (7910), 26 April 1964.
- <sup>221</sup> *Ararad*, 27th year, no. 138 (6733), 26 April 1964.
- <sup>222</sup> *Aztag*, 38th year, no. 43 (9783), 25 April 1964.
- <sup>223</sup> *Ayk*, 12th year, no. 3336, 12 March 1964.
- <sup>224</sup> *Ibid.*, 12th year, no. 3340, 18 April 1964.
- <sup>225</sup> Majed, p. 151.
- <sup>226</sup> *Aztag*, 38th year, no. 44 (9784), 27 April 1964.

- <sup>227</sup> *Le Soir*, 18th year, no. 5335, 28 April 1964. For the elections of 1947, see Zaven Messerlian, 'Armenian Participation in the Lebanese Legislative Elections During the Presidency of Bishara Khoury, 1943-1952', *Haigazian Armenological Review*, Vol. 22 (2002), pp. 274-286.
- <sup>228</sup> *Le Soir*, 18th year, no. 5335, 28 April 1964.
- <sup>229</sup> *Aztag*, 38th year, no. 47 (9787), 30 April 1964.
- <sup>230</sup> *Ayk*, 12th year, no. 3351, 3 May 1964.
- <sup>231</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>232</sup> *Le Soir*, 18th year, no. 5336, 29 April 1964.
- <sup>233</sup> *Ibid.*, 18th year, no. 5337, 30 April 1964.
- <sup>234</sup> *Ayk*, 12th year, no. 3354, 7 May 1964.
- <sup>235</sup> *Le Soir*, 18th year, no. 5336, 29 April 1964.
- <sup>236</sup> *Zartonk*, 27th year, no. 177 (7911), 28 April 1964.
- <sup>237</sup> *Ararad*, 27th year, no. 139 (6734), 28 April 1964.
- <sup>238</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>239</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>240</sup> *Le Soir*, 20th year, 18 July 1966.
- <sup>241</sup> Jacob M. Landau, 'Elections in Lebanon', *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (part 1), March 1961, p. 130.
- <sup>242</sup> The Central Archives of the Most Recent History of the Republic of Armenia, fund 326, list 1, file 287, folio 516.

**ՀԱՅՈՑ ՄԱՄՆԱԿՑՈՒԹԻՒՆԸ ԼԻՐԱՆԱՆԻ  
ՃՈՒԱՏ ԵՆՀԱՊԻ ՆԱԽԱԳԱՀՈՒԹԵԱՆ ԺԱՄԱՆԱԿԱՇՐՋԱՆԻ  
ԽՈՐՀՐԴԱՐԱՆԱԿԱՆ ԸՆՏՐՈՒԹԻՒՆՆԵՐՈՒՆ (1958-1964)  
(Ամփոփում)**

**ՉԱԻՆ ՄՍԸՐԼԵԱՆ**

Հեղինակը՝ Հիմնուելով ժամանակակից լիբանանահայ, առաւել՝ Լիբանանի մէջ լոյս տեսնող մի քանի արարատառ ու ֆրանսատա լրագիրներու նիւթերուն, ինչպէս նաև լիբանանահայ քաղաքական գործիչներու յատուկ ասուլիսներու ընթացքին հաղորդած բանաւոր վկայութիւններու վրայ, հանգամանօրէն կը ներկայացնէ լիբանանահայ քաղաքական տարբեր խմբաւորումներու կեցուածքը 1960ին եւ 1964ին կայացած երկրի խորհրդարանական ընտրութիւններուն ընթացքին հայ ուղղափառ ու կաթողիկէ համայնքներուն յատկացուած երեսփոխանական աթոռներուն շուրջ ծաւալած պայքարի ընթացքին, այս կազակցութեամբ Լիբանանի միւս համայնքները ներկայացնող թեկնածուներու հետ հայ քաղաքական հակամարտ հասանքներուն հաստատած ընտրական դաշինքները, այդ երկու ընտրութեանց ընթացքին պետական մարմիններու թոյլտուութեամբ տեղի ունեցած անօրինութիւններուն վերաբարեալ ծաւալած բանավէճերը:

TABLE INDICATING NUMBER OF VOTES CAST BY EACH COMMUNITY\*

	Greek Orthodox	Greek Catholic	Maronite	Arm. Orth.	Moslems (Sun.,Shiite, Druze)	Jews	All minorities (Ltin, Chald. Assyr.)	total	Gvt. Results
Gemayel	3917	1203	4305	5271	758	1052	2616	19122	21283
Sehnaoui	3477	1105	4071	5276	844	1058	2688	18519	20458
Boutros	3699	1097	4111	5221	939	1023	2609	18669	20666
Chader	4057	1214	4343	5311	780	1106	2899	19170	21765
DerKaloustian	3621	1137	4162	5283	775	1020	2726	18724	19977
Babikian	3886	1200	4261	5302	779	1059	2849	19336	21364
Khanamirian	3628	1140	4086	5284	773	1036	2765	18712	20719
Saad	4592	1252	4378	5264	922	1053	2908	20369	22339
Edde	2969	383	1079	3946	1928	75	1125	11505	12288
Khoury	3023	606	1156	3963	1759	49	1139	11593	12224
Sassine	2300	409	1032	2808	1563	70	1057	9239	9840
Toursarkissian	2466	320	970	3845	1780	24	941	10346	11197
Chamlian	2749	351	1020	3901	1813	57	1027	10918	11669
Bakalian	2754	365	1045	3761	1814	88	1039	10866	11665
Iskenderian	2734	350	998	3936	1795	68	988	10869	11700
Addi	1971	267	833	3812	1646	38	878	9445	10451
Hanna	779	57	162	1085	133	25	226	2467	2693
Ghorayeb	82	34	42	9	21	3	24	215	301
Megerditchian	11	11	2	117	49	20	34	244	326
Moughabghab	121	15	82	7	1	5	31	262	252
Berbari	79	6	37	8	11	-	8	149	153
Noul	16	12	3	30	2	-	23	86	96
Zreik	8	1	2	-	-	-	5	16	19
Wakim	5	1	2	-	-	-	1	9	9
Fayad	3	1	-	-	-	-	3	7	7
# of votes	6592	1594	5020	9143	2713	1127	3710		
# of registered voters	12874	3592	9251	24031	5101	3231	8449		

\*This Table was given to the present writer by Vahan Elmayan on behalf of the Ramgavar Azadagan Party. The Table was compiled by the available official government written reports. It is incomplete as the results of some polling centers were missing, nonetheless, it gives a general idea of the distribution of votes per community and candidate. When the present writer requested the results from Movses Der Kaloustian in January 1962, he informed that the Tashnag Party possessed the complete results but it could not be disclosed.

The first eight candidates constitute the Peoples' List, the second eight candidates constitute the National Front List, the remaining are independent candidates.