

GENOCIDE AND HUMANITARIAN RESISTANCE IN OTTOMAN ALEPPO, 1915-1916¹

A royal treasury is needed to alleviate these pains²
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A strict, narrow definition of resistance, and the use of the concepts of resistance and armed resistance interchangeably, stand as staples of Armenian genocide scholarship. But most Armenians did indeed resist - often without weapons - as soon as the arrests, deportations, and massacres started in April 1915. They organized a clandestine network of communication between the provinces, Constantinople, and the outside world, smuggling reports on developments that served as raw material for politicians, humanitarians, and newspapers. They created networks that procured, transferred, and distributed funds, food, and medication to deportees. They focused on upholding - as much as practicable - sanitary conditions in transit and concentrations camps. And the list goes on. These actions were conducted against the law or against the will of the Ottoman Turkish authorities, by loosely organized clandestine groups whose members continuously risked getting arrested or killed. In this essay, I explore the relief - and, later, resistance - efforts of a network of humanitarians in the city of Aleppo, emphasizing the leading role Armenians played in this network.

ALEPPO AS HUB OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF

The city of Aleppo constituted a major hub for deportation routes during the Armenian Genocide.³ Convoys that survived the treacherous journey reached the area beginning in May 1915. According to a document in the Aleppo Armenian Prelacy archives,⁴ 322 deportees from Zeytun⁵ arrived in Bab, north of the city, as early as 18 May.⁶ In a report dated 5 June, the US Consul in Aleppo, Jesse Jackson, explained:

There is a living stream of Armenians pouring into Aleppo from the surrounding towns and villages, the principal ones being Marash, Zeitoun, Hassanbeyli, Osmania, Baghtche, Adana, Dörtyol, Hadjin, etc. They all come under a heavy armed escort, usually from 300-500 at a time, and consist of old men, women and children; all the middle-aged and young men have been taken for military service. No animals are provided by the Government, and those who are not fortunate enough to have means of transport are forced to make the journey on foot.⁷

Often, deportees from a particular village or town gathered in a specific neighborhood or site in Aleppo before being broken up into groups by authorities. Deportees arriving from the village of Shar north of Hadjin, for example, mostly gathered in the Djemile neighborhood.⁸

The ten-thousand-strong Armenian community in Aleppo mobilized to assist the deportees when the first convoys arrived. The Prelacy of the Armenian Apostolic Church in Aleppo initially took *ad hoc* measures to support the new arrivals for a few days. The church ledgers indicate that between 19 and 24 May, the church had already assisted nearly 400 deportees, providing them with funds, food (bread, cheese, eggs, bulgur, yogurt, onions, and oil), and wood.⁹ On 24 May, the church launched a much more coordinated effort, inviting a group of community leaders to form the Council for Refugees (*Kaghtaganats joghov* in Armenian, henceforth, the council), tasked with “caring for the immediate financial, moral, and health needs” of the arriving Armenians.¹⁰ The city’s Armenian Evangelical and Catholic churches launched their own relief initiatives¹¹ and coordinated efforts as needed.¹² US Consul Jackson noticed this groundswell of support from the community early on, reporting to his superiors on 5 June that the deportees were being “taken care of locally by the sympathizing Armenian population of this city.”¹³ In another report, he noted, “Each religious community has a relief committee to care for its own.”¹⁴

THE DEMISE OF GOVERNOR CELAL BEY

Governor Celal Bey provided direct and indirect assistance to the Aleppo Armenians’ relief effort. He advocated for the deportees in his communication with the central authorities as well. As caravans of deportees arrived in the province, he continually pressed the Ministry of the Interior, asking for a concrete plan to ensure the dignified treatment of the deportees, beyond general and vague orders. In a telegram on 23 May, he explained that settling non-Muslims in Maarra and Rakka was “absolutely impossible,” because most of the population in the region was nomadic, and the areas available for settlement were close to wasteland. Thus the deportees would be subject to attacks by bandits. Moreover, he inquired about the manner in which settlement would be implemented, pointing out that while it would not be advisable to scatter the deportees in Muslim villages, the financial situation was not conducive to forming separate villages for the new arrivals.¹⁵ In a subsequent telegram, he posed a barrage of follow-up questions to the central authorities: Will new houses be built for the deportees, as there are no empty homes in these villages? Will the government provide the deportees with land? Will they receive assistance until they are settled? And how are these expenses

going to be covered?¹⁶ Celal Bey even lectured the central authorities that it was unbecoming for a state to leave the deportees hungry and without shelter.¹⁷ If Celal could not move the central authorities, he wielded significant sway over government officials in the province. The police chief Fikri Bey, for instance, was influenced by him.¹⁸ Together, they absorbed some of the pressure from central authorities which would have worsened the situation of the deportees in these early months.

Celal's attitude was partly shaped by his relationship with the Armenian church leadership, as well as his friendship with US Consul Jackson and a number of local Armenians, including the Mazlounian brothers Onnig and Armenak, known as "the barons" for the hotel of the same name they owned in Aleppo.¹⁹ Consul Jackson described his own relations with the governor as "brotherly": "During several years that Djelal Bey had been governor of Aleppo our weekly exchange of dinners, receptions and card parties had cemented our friendship until it had become almost brotherly, and was recognized throughout the province and even in all Syria."²⁰

Celal Bey's sympathy for the plight of the Armenians did not earn him many friends in the capital. The Minister of the Interior removed him from his position as governor in late June 1915 for his moderate policies, and for refusing to deport Armenians in his province. Jackson explained that Celal "was and had been for many years very friendly towards the Armenians, and because of the tremendous influence brought to bear on him locally, he at first ignored the instructions he received [to deport the Armenians], and which were repeated several times, and finally flatly refused to be an instrument in such an atrocious proceeding. Naturally this could have but one result, and that was his removal."²¹ In his memoirs, Celal Bey himself traced his dismissal to his resistance to deporting Armenians from Aleppo.

Beirut governor Bekir Sami Bey replaced Celal Bey in Aleppo, while the latter was designated governor of Konya. The news of Celal Bey's removal sent shockwaves across the camps and settlement areas in the province, leaving the Armenian community leadership grief-stricken. Prior to Celal Bey's departure for Konya, Catholicos Sahag met with him one last time, and appealed to him to do his utmost to assist the 5000-6000 deportees in Konya. Celal Bey promised not only to help the deportees in Konya - a promise he kept - but to advocate for the deportees in general during his next visit to Constantinople.²² The Catholicos mourned his departure:

The transfer of Celal Bey to Konya added one more pain to all my pains. He was wholeheartedly against the policy of deportation. He suffered as much as we did about the unprecedented misery [of the deportees] but couldn't remedy it.

In the end, *the military* made him a victim of his sentiments, as some proudly announced after his departure.

The race of anguish and suffering [i.e. the Armenians] was afflicted with an irremediable loss with His Excellency's departure. During his last visit, he left almost in tears, and seeing deportees in the narthex of the church, he declared: I would have preferred to be sucked into the earth than see this suffering.²³

The government's actions in Aleppo province soon grew more violent, as the German Consul Walter Rossler reported:

As was to be expected after the dismissal of the local Vali Djelal Bey, the deportation has now been extended to the coastal strip of the Vilayet [of] Aleppo. According to news from an Armenian source, the order for the clearance of Alexandretta, Antioch, Harem, Beilan, Soukluk [Sovuk Oluk], Kessab and other towns has been given, but only a short term of notice has been granted for carrying this out.²⁴

THE CATHOLICOS IN ALEPPO

The arrival of Catholicos Sahag Khabayan in Aleppo a few weeks prior to Celal Bey's dismissal had intensified efforts to intervene with the authorities on behalf of the deportees. In response to appeals by the Catholicos, Cemal Pasha sent him a telegram on 21 June asking whether there were violations of the property and honor of the deportees and, if so, requesting a report about these. Cemal also noted that efforts would be made to assist the deportees by whatever means possible.²⁵ The Catholicos had a copy of the telegram delivered to the council, requesting the preparation of "an extensive and elaborated report" as soon as possible about the "theft of property and violation of the honor" of Armenians on the deportation routes, with the names of the perpetrators, if possible. The minutes of the council's regular session note that additional reports about the needs of the deportees would also be included in the folder the Catholicos would hand to Cemal Pasha when the latter arrived in Aleppo shortly.²⁶ Chairman Fr. Haroutyun was entrusted with preparing the report on the difficulties faced by the deportees en route, as well as the inconsistencies in the distribution of aid by the local authorities.²⁷

The Catholicos met with the deputy commander of the Fourth Army, Fahrettin (Fakhri) Türkkan Pasha²⁸ on 26 June. Lamenting the deplorable state of the deportees, he implored the deputy commander to consider what had been done so far as a lesson and sufficient punishment and to halt the deportation of Armenians from other parts of Cilicia like Adana and Sis. Fahrettin Pasha told the Catholicos that Cemal Pasha "is categorically opposed

to the ongoing deportation.”²⁹ The Catholicos met with Cemal Pasha himself, in the presence of Governor Celal Bey, who was still in town, three days later.³⁰ He got a very different message. According to the Catholicos, after listening intently to the two men’s reports, Cemal Pasha burst out in anger “mixing together Van, Dört Yol, and Zeytun”:

The government recognizes Armenians as Armenians, it does not differentiate between bandit, party-member, or Caucasian and Cilician; it considers all of them the enemy, as much of an enemy as the Russian, the British, and the French... It is the final decision of the Council of Ministers to destroy the hearths of the political parties and to completely empty areas heavily populated by Armenians...³¹

As the conversation continued, Cemal was all over the map. He stated flatly that what Fahrettin Pasha had told the Catholicos about him being “categorically opposed to the deportations” was part of his earlier plan, which had not been accepted by the Council of Ministers. He added, “Had it not been for my explicit and threatening statements and had the agitated Muslims not been reined in, horrible massacres could have happened, just like they did in Diyarbakir,” where tens of thousands were massacred.³² The Catholicos met with Cemal Pasha again the following week, on 2 and 4 July, and discussions now proceeded in a “calmer” manner.³³ The commander of the Fourth Army promised to investigate crimes committed against the deportees, and to punish by death those responsible. The Catholicos also received permission from Cemal to send priests to the various concentration camps and settlement areas for “spiritual needs.”³⁴

Having secured the relevant authorization documents from Cemal through the efforts of the Catholicos, the council dispatched Fr. Sahag, a priest from Kilis, and Iskender Effendi, a pharmacist, to the camps in and around Der Zor, providing the delegates with a check for 60 liras to be cashed upon arrival in Der Zor. The two were asked to make stops at Bab and Mumbuj on their way, and they were given 10 liras to be distributed among refugees in Bab and 15 liras among those in Mumbuj. The council also sent Fr. Khachadour to the deportees in Idlib, Maarra, and Riha, providing him with 25 liras to be distributed to the deportees, and an additional five liras for travel expenses.³⁵ In addition to bringing food and medicine, these visits to camps and settlement areas in remote towns and villages were an opportunity for the council to acquire first-hand information about the plight of the deportees and to address their problems. Going beyond the “spiritual needs” of the deportees, the council essentially engaged in illegal activities that undermined the central authorities’ aims. If caught, the emissaries risked becoming targets of the central authorities. And indeed, the Ministry of the Interior sent a

telegram to the Aleppo Governorate notifying them that Fr. Sahag and pharmacist Sarkis [Iskender Effendi], who carried documents from Aleppo authorizing them to visit Der Zor, were illegally distributing money to the deportees there.³⁶ This was followed by a telegram to Der Zor asking the authorities to send the two back to Aleppo immediately.³⁷ Fr. Sahag returned to Aleppo³⁸ and reported his observations to the council.³⁹ The Catholicos communicated the details to Rossler, who in turn passed the information on to the Imperial Chancellor, speaking of deaths in the hundreds and food scarcity. “In order to protect themselves from starvation, the deportees have had to sell more than 30 of their children,” he wrote.⁴⁰

Dispatching to Der Zor emissaries who sought to maintain the deportees’ health constituted council action that openly contravened the restrictions imposed by central authorities. This incident was one of the first indicators that the central authorities aimed to crack down on relief efforts in the entire region. Within a few months, the Armenian relief network would be forced to go underground and continue its efforts against the will of the state.

Trying desperately to alleviate the suffering of his flock and prevent further deportations and massacres, the Catholicos also appealed to the German ambassador in Constantinople. His letter, while cautious and overly laudatory of the “gracious” Ottoman Empire, argued against “the false opinion that is held here and there that the Armenians would not wish for Germany’s success.” He noted that “the good or bad opinion of the Armenians [about Germany] has no influence on the power and glory of the victorious German people. But the widespread suspicion which rests on the Armenians causes our *unhappy, dying people* [emphasis added] one of its greatest griefs.” The Catholicos’s letter was, in essence, a plea for help from the Germans, although he was careful to underline that “[m]y letter is neither a complaint nor a plea... for as Turkish subjects we can only turn to the Ottoman government to handle our difficulties.”⁴¹ Thus, he concluded:

In the hope that Your Excellency will believe the truth of my letter, I request that Your Excellency uses his great influence to direct this suspicion away from us, which is one of the greatest of our many griefs.

We ask Your Excellency to continue intervening on our behalf as you have done in the past. We pray for Your Excellency’s and your wife’s precious life, for the Ottoman government and for the powerful empire allied with it.⁴²

The much needed interventions never came. The appeals of German consuls and the ambassador to Berlin were repeatedly silenced from above, so as not to jeopardize Germany’s alliance with the Ottomans in war time. In a response to the German ambassador who demanded that Berlin confront the

Ottomans, the Chancellor responded, “Our only aim is to keep Turkey on our side until the end of the war, no matter whether as a result Armenians do perish or not.”⁴³ The Catholicos, and the Armenian deportees, were indeed left to perish.

FROM RELIEF EFFORTS TO HUMANITARIAN RESISTANCE

The situation changed drastically in spring 1915. Having deported most of the empire’s Armenian population, the central authorities now focused their attention on the survivors who had managed to reach Syria, enacting a series of swift actions. A number of high level meetings and consultations in the region, the formation of the Sub-Directorate for Deportees in Aleppo, the dispatch of officials to the city to oversee the re-deportation process, the replacement of the governor twice (and finally with an Armenophobe), the crackdown on the leadership of the community (particularly the banishment of the Catholicos to Jerusalem), the decisions to remove all Armenian deportees from the city and to ban the entry of newly-arriving convoys, were far from disparate, unrelated actions crammed into a few weeks. They point to a sustained effort by the central authorities to neutralize organized Armenian response to their policies and deal with what they perceived to be a demographic problem created by the arrival of tens of thousands of survivors.⁴⁴ However, it was circumstances on the ground - particularly the spread of typhus - that prompted military and civilian authorities to accelerate the re-deportation process, as ridding the province of diseased deportees was considered a military necessity. For the authorities, the deportees had become a serious health hazard for both the population of Aleppo and the military supply lines in the area. They had to be removed quickly. The argument of military necessity was now used once again to deport Armenians - who wouldn’t have been in such a condition had they not been forcibly removed from their homes and sent on death marches in the first place, also under the pretext of “military necessity.” Thus, the re-deportation of Armenians from Aleppo city picked up pace in fall 1915 due to the confluence of a number of factors.⁴⁵

Initially, the efforts of a relief network stretching from Aleppo all the way to the camps in Ras ul-Ain and Der Zor had received the blessing of the local and regional authorities. Yet the crackdown on humanitarian relief efforts in the fall of 1915 gradually forced these efforts to go underground and evolve into humanitarian resistance. Adapting to the seismic shifts in policy in late 1915 and 1916, this struggle saved the lives of thousands and tried to keep deportee morale high in the concentration camps by establishing a secret communication network across camps, circulating handwritten newspapers, and distributing food and medication clandestinely.⁴⁶ This loose, underground,

Armenian-led resistance network coordinated the efforts of Armenian clergymen, dignitaries, doctors, and nurses, as well as western humanitarians and local Muslims and Christians; helped anchor and support thousands in Aleppo in 1915-1917; and saved the lives of thousands of others elsewhere in Syria.

Rev. Hovhannes Eskijian's life - and death - typifies the sacrifices made by members of this network. "My dear Badveli [Reverend], barely out of bed from his sickness, disregarding the personal hardships and peril to his own life, relentlessly labored day and night to save other lives. Together we pressed ourselves to the very limit of our endurance. All our time, energy, effort, sleep, food, clothing, and other material possessions we put on the line in behalf of this wretched, miserable mass of torn and battered humanity," wrote Rev. Eskijian's wife in a letter in 1919.⁴⁷ Until his death in March 1916, Rev. Eskijian, the pastor of the Emmanuel Armenian Evangelical Church in Aleppo, provided food, shelter, and medication to deportees arriving in the city, risking his own life in the process. His health was failing him, and the Ottoman Turkish authorities were tracking his movements. The former got to him first. He died at the age of 34 from typhoid he had contracted from deportees.

Rev. Eskijian, like other Armenian leaders in the network, received considerable support from missionaries and diplomats, but he - more than western humanitarians - was at the forefront of the effort, shouldering the bulk of the burden, and taking the greatest risks.

ANNIHILATION IN THE DESERT

The liquidation of camps occurred in two distinct phases. The camps around Aleppo were shut down beginning in the winter of 1915, and the deportees were driven either towards Ras-ul Ain or the lower Euphrates, while the camps in Ras ul-Ain and along the river were emptied, often brutally, from the spring of 1916, with the survivors being marched to Der Zor. The emptying of the Dipsi camp is a case in point. In late April 1916, some twenty gendarmes were dispatched from Meskeneh to liquidate Dipsi. Considering the condition of most prisoners, emptying the camp and sending everyone downstream was not easy. The gendarmes set fire to tents and assaulted deportees to force them to move. 'The wealthy and the poor had to be re-deported.... Within half an hour, the convoy was on its way to Abu Harar. Horrible crimes were committed that day... many died of beatings and other were burned alive', recounted Armenian survivor Krikor Ankut.⁴⁸ A 'cemeterial silence' reigned in Dipsi on 7 June 1916 when Ankut passed through on his way from Abu Harar back to Meskeneh. Only the gendarme station stood there, amid a sea of scattered objects.⁴⁹ Shortly thereafter,

survivor Yeghisheh Hazarabedian journeyed through Dipsi and observed a ‘place that had once been a staging area for deportees but now stood abandoned’, with only a few orphans left behind, begging for food from travellers and deportees.⁵⁰ The situation of children, many of whom were orphaned, was no less terrible in this camp than it was elsewhere along the Euphrates line. When pitching their tents, the Seropians were surrounded by children begging for food. Seropian also witnessed a group of emaciated children gathered around the corpse of a dead mule, tearing apart and eating its meat.⁵¹

The liquidation of the Ottoman camps was followed by further massacres. Most of the deportees who survived the camp system perished in two waves of violence in Ras ul-Ain (March 1916) and Der Zor (August 1916). Estimates vary, but conservative figures indicate some 30,000 killed in the former, and up to 200,000 in the latter.⁵² Thousands of others survived primarily through the efforts of the Armenian-led humanitarian resistance network that operated in the triangle formed by Aleppo, Ras ul-Ain, and Der Zor,⁵³ while thousands more, mostly women and children, were saved from the carnage by tribesmen in the region who forced them to become their wives, workers, and sex slaves.

ARMENIAN AGENCY

Much of the scholarship on humanitarian efforts during the Armenian Genocide focuses on the role played by western relief efforts, where missionaries and consuls emerge as selfless heroes protecting and saving thousands of Armenians against opposition from the Ottoman authorities. “That the missionaries helped between 1 and 2 million Armenians testified to their commitment and ability to deliver a stricken people from deprivation and death,” wrote scholar Suzanne Moranian.⁵⁴ The genocide “spawned extraordinary heroism on the part of American foreign service officers—from consuls posted to remote areas to the U.S. ambassador in Constantinople,” asserted scholar Peter Balakian.⁵⁵ Historian Hans-Lukas Kieser noted how the Ottoman authorities “could not destroy this international humanitarian resistance that was, interestingly enough, also supported by German diplomats on the ground, even after the United States entered the war.”⁵⁶ What remains neglected in scholarly inquiry is Armenian agency. I argue that this humanitarian resistance waged in the Ottoman Empire was driven by Armenians. Western missionaries and diplomats provided significant support and sustenance, but it was the Ottoman Armenians themselves who led the resistance effort and shouldered the largest share of the burden.

Until the end of World War I, and even in the years that followed, the relief network continued to support the thousands of deportees who had managed, one way or another, to disappear into the fabric of the metropolis or seek

refuge in orphanages and community centers, escaping re-deportation to the desert. Thanks, in large part, to the efforts of the Aleppo Armenian community, thousands of Armenians survived the genocide and rebuilt their lives in the diaspora.⁵⁷

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Much of what appears in this paper is based on my PhD dissertation. I would like to thank my dissertation committee, comprised of Taner Akçam, Debórah Dwork, and Raymond Kévorkian, for their mentorship, counsel, and thorough critique of my work. I am also grateful to Vahé Tachjian, Ara Sanjian, Marc Mamigonian, and George Aghjayan, for providing me with or pointing me to key sources.
- ² From the Catholicos's report on his meetings with Cemal Pasha in June 1915, as cited in Puzant Yeghiayan, *Jamanagagagits Badmutiun Gatoghigosutian Hayots Giligio, 1914-1972* [Contemporary History of the Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia, 1914-1972], Antelias, Lebanon, Catholicosate of Cilicia Press, 1975, p. 51.
- ³ For a brief scholarly examination focusing on Aleppo's role as a hub during the Armenian Genocide, see: Raymond Kévorkian "Alep, Centre du Dispositif Génocidaire et des Operations de Secours aux Déportés," in Lévon Nordiguian (ed.), *Vartan Derounian, Mémoire Arménienne: Photographies du Camp de Réfugiés d'Alep, 1922-1936*, Beirut, Presse de l'Université Saint Joseph, 2010, pp. 15-23.
- ⁴ For an overview of the minutes and reports in these archives, see: Vahram Shemmassian, "Humanitarian Intervention by the Armenian Prelacy of Aleppo during the First Months of the Genocide," *Journal of the Society for Armenian Studies*, Volume 22 (2013), pp. 127-152.
- ⁵ For a detailed examination of the chain of events that culminated in the deportation of the Armenians of Zeytun, see: Aram Arkun, "Zeytun and the Commencement of the Armenian Genocide," in Ronald Grigor Suny, Fatma Müge Göçek, and Norman M. Naimark, eds., *A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 221-243.
- ⁶ Armenian National Council, List of Armenians around Aleppo, Folder 41, 14-15. All dates are according to the Gregorian calendar.
- ⁷ NA/RG59/867.4016/77 Consul Jackson to Ambassador Morgenthau on 5 June 1918, in Ara Sarafian, ed., *United States Official Records on the Armenian Genocide*, London, Gomidas Institute, 2004, p. 57.
- ⁸ Krikor Tatoulian, *Anteghvardz Kaghdnikner* [Buried Secrets], Beirut, Atlas Press, 1967, p. 90. For the full text of a letter detailing the deportation from Shar to Aleppo, written down on June 19, 1915 by Father Vrtanes Karadaghian, and addressed to the Catholicos of Sis, see Antranig Dakessian, "Shari Deghahanutiune" [The Deportation of Shar], *Haigazian Armenological Review*, Vol. 35, 2015, pp. 645-654.
- ⁹ Beginning in May 1915, and for the duration of WWI, the Prelacy of the Armenian Apostolic Church in Aleppo maintained records of its income and expenses, which stand testament to its tremendous humanitarian relief effort (Armenian National Council, Council Records for Refugees, Folder 22, 3).

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- ¹⁰ Armenian National Council, Council Records for Refugees, Folder 38, minutes of Session 1.
- ¹¹ The humanitarian resistance and relief efforts by Reverend Hovhannes Eskijian, pastor of the Emmanuel Evangelical Church in the city, is the focus of Hilmar Kaiser's *At the Crossroad of Der Zor: Death, Survival, and Humanitarian Resistance in Aleppo, 1915-1917*, London, Gomidas Institute, 2002. For its part, the Armenian Catholic Church of Aleppo cared for 3000 deportees, "who are lodged in different localities and fed by the local church community," according to Jackson (NA/RG59/867.4016/219 Enclosure No. 4 with dispatch No. 382 to Embassy, Constantinople. Report by Consul Jackson sent to Ambassador Morgenthau on 29 September 1918, in Sarafian, p. 314).
- ¹² The Armenian Protestant Church also provided financial support to the council. On June 24, for example, the council received a donation of 80 liras from the Protestant community in the city (Armenian National Council, Records of Council for Refugees, Folder 38, minutes of Session 22).
- ¹³ NA/RG59/867.4016/77 Report by Consul Jackson sent to Ambassador Morgenthau on 5 June 1915 (Sarafian, p. 57).
- ¹⁴ NA/RG59/867.4016/219 Consul Jackson to Ambassador Morgenthau on 29 September 1918 (Sarafian, p. 308).
- ¹⁵ BOA DHL.ŞFR: 469/117 Telegram from Celal Bey to the Ministry of the Interior dated 23 May 1915.
- ¹⁶ BOA DHL.ŞFR: 470/74 Telegram from Celal Bey to the Ministry of the Interior dated 25 May 1915.
- ¹⁷ BOA DHL.ŞFR: 471/112 Telegram from Celal Bey to the Ministry of the Interior dated 6 May 1915.
- ¹⁸ Aram Andonian, *Medz Vodjire* (The Great Crime), Boston, Bahag Publishing, 1921, p. 27.
- ¹⁹ Ibid. The Baron Hotel played a prominent role in the humanitarian resistance mounted by Armenians and others in the ensuing months, thanks to the privileged position of the Mazlounian brothers who hosted, wined, and dined officers from the Fourth Ottoman Army and provincial officials of every rank. Andonian explains that the Baron Hotel was more like a government building, where the governor, police chief, and other officials gathered (Andonian, p. 28).
- ²⁰ NA/RG59/867.4016/373 Detailed report on "Armenian Atrocities" by Consul Jackson sent to the Secretary of State on 4 March 1918 (Sarafian, p. 586).
- ²¹ Ibid., p. 585.
- ²² Yeghiayan, p. 47.
- ²³ Catholicosate of Cilicia Archives, Folder 100/1, 299, as cited in Yeghiayan, p. 47. Emphasis in original.
- ²⁴ DE/PA-AA; R14087; A23991 Report sent by Rossler to the Imperial Chancellor on 27 July 1915, in Wolfgang Gust, ed., *The Armenian Genocide, Evidence from the German Foreign Office Archives, 1915-1916*, New York, Oxford, Berghahn Books, 2014, pp. 265-269.

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- ²⁵ A copy of the telegram is attached to the minutes of the meeting (Council Records, Folder 38, Session 17).
- ²⁶ Council Records, Folder 38, Session 17.
- ²⁷ Council Records, Folder 38, Session 19.
- ²⁸ Fahrettin Pasha gained legendary status for his defense of Medina during the city's siege (1916-January 1919) Martin Strohmeier, "Fakhri (Fahrettin) Paşa and the End of Ottoman Rule in Medina (1916-1919)," *Turkish Historical Review*, Vol. 4:2, pp. 192-223.
- ²⁹ Yeghiayan, p. 50.
- ³⁰ Soon thereafter, Celal would be removed from his post for resisting deportation orders.
- ³¹ From the Catholicos's account of the meeting (Cilician Catholicosate archives, Folder 100/1, 4950/95), as cited in Yeghiayan, p. 50.
- ³² Ibid. For more on these mass murders, see Uğur Ü. Üngör, "A Reign of Terror: CUP Rule in Diyarbakir Province, 1913-1923," University of Amsterdam, Department of History M.A. thesis, June 2005.
- ³³ From the Catholicos's report on his meetings with Cemal Pasha in June 1915, as cited in Yeghiayan, p. 51. The gist of the discussions in the meetings between Cemal and the Catholicos is also provided in documents from the German archives (Kaiser, "Regional Resistance to Central Government Policies," *Journal of Genocide Research*, 12: 3 [2010], pp. 191-192).
- ³⁴ Yeghiayan, p. 51.
- ³⁵ Council Records, Folder 38, Session 22.
- ³⁶ BOA DH. ŞFR 54-A/71. BOA DH. ŞFR 54-A/71 Telegram from the Interior Ministry's General Security Directorate to Aleppo Province on 22 July 1915.
- ³⁷ BOA DH. ŞFR., 54-A/91. Telegram from Talat to Zor district on 24 July 1915.
- ³⁸ Kaiser notes that Der Zor governor Ali Suat Bey escorted Fr. Sahag and pharmacist Sarkis from Ras ul-Ain to Aleppo "thereby assuring their safe return" (Kaiser, *The Extermination of Armenians in the Diyarbakir Region*, Istanbul, Bilgi University, 2014, p. 385.
- ³⁹ DE/PA-AA; R14087; A24525 Telegraphic report sent by Rossler to the Imperial Chancellor on July 31, 1915, in Gust, pp. 275-276.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid.
- ⁴¹ DE/PA-AA; BoKon/170; A53a, 4217 Letter from Catholicos Sahak II to the German Ambassador in Constantinople on June 30, 1915, in Gust, pp. 227-228.
- ⁴² Ibid.
- ⁴³ DE/PA-AA; R14089; A36184 Letter from the German Ambassador in Constantinople to the Imperial Chancellor on 7 December 1915, and the Chancellor's response in Gust, pp. 490-492.
- ⁴⁴ A telegram issued by the ministry of the interior on 18 October 1915 indicated that there were 30,000 deportees in Aleppo city alone awaiting re-deportation (BOA DH. EUM, 2 Şb. 68/80). Tens of thousands had already been deported to Bab, Mumbuj, and Maarra, or farther to Urfa, Zor, and Mosul (BOA DH. EUM, 2 Şb. 68/76 Telegram from Governor Bekir Sami to Interior Ministry on 5 September 1915).

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- ⁴⁵ For a detailed treatment of these factors, see: Khatchig Mouradian, "Genocide and Humanitarian Resistance in Ottoman Syria, 1915-1917" (PhD dissertation, Clark University, 2015). Parts of the introductory chapter appeared in Khatchig Mouradian, "Genocide and Humanitarian Resistance in Ottoman Syria, 1915-1916," *Études Arméniennes Contemporaines*, vol. 7 (2016).
- ⁴⁶ For an examination of concentration camps during the Armenian Genocide, see Khatchig Mouradian, "The Meskeneh Concentration Camp, 1915-1917: A Case Study of Power, Collaboration, and Humanitarian Resistance during the Armenian Genocide," *Journal of the Society of Armenian Studies*, Vol. 24 (2015).
- ⁴⁷ Letter from Gulenia Danielian Eskijian to Esther Barsumian, 13 February 1919, Eskijian Family Private Archives.
- ⁴⁸ BNU/Andonian, Folder 57: Dipsi, 'The Deportations of the Armenians of Dipsi', p. 3. Hagop Arsenian talks about a similar practice of setting fire to tents in the next camp, Abuharar (Arsenian, *Towards Golgotha: The Memoirs of Hagop Arsenian, a Genocide Survivor*, trans. Arda Arsenian Ekmekji, Beirut, 2011, p. 119).
- ⁴⁹ Ibid.
- ⁵⁰ Kazanjian (ed.), *The Cilician Armenian Ordeal*, p. 294.
- ⁵¹ See Hagop A. Seropian, *Yegherni husheres* [My Memoir of the Great Crime], Antranik Dakessian (ed.), Beirut, 2005, p. 140.
- ⁵² For a narrative of the massacres in Der Zor, see Kévorkian, *The Armenian Genocide*, pp. 662-70.
- ⁵³ For an exploration of humanitarian resistance during the Armenian genocide, see Mouradian, 'Genocide and Humanitarian Resistance'. For the efforts of Reverend Hovhannes Eskijian, see Kaiser, *At the Crossroad*.
- ⁵⁴ Suzanne E. Moranian, "The Armenian Genocide and American Missionary Relief Efforts," in Jay Winter, ed., *America and the Armenian Genocide of 1915*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 213.
- ⁵⁵ Peter Balakian, *The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America's Response*, New York, Harper Collins, 2003, p. xvi.
- ⁵⁶ Hans-Lukas Kieser, *A Quest for Belonging: Anatolia beyond Empire and Nation (19th -21st Centuries)*, Istanbul, Isis, 2007, p. 48.
- ⁵⁷ In a number of articles published since the conference at Haigazian University in 2015, I situate the resistance waged by Armenians in Ottoman Syria within the broader context of resistance literature and the scholarship on civilian internment. See, for example, Khatchig Mouradian, "'The Very Limit of our Endurance': Unarmed Resistance in Ottoman Syria during WWI," in Hans-Lukas Kieser, Margaret Anderson, and Seyhan Bayraktar, Thomas Schmutz, eds., *End of the Ottomans: The Genocide of 1915 and the Politics of Turkish Nationalism*, London, I.B Tauris, 2018; and Khatchig Mouradian, "Internment and Destruction: Concentration Camps during the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1917," in Panikos Panayi, Stefan Manz, and Matthew Stibbe, eds., *Internment during the First World War: A Mass Global Phenomenon*, Routledge Studies in First World War History, 2018.

Ցեղասպանություն և Մարդկային Ընդդիմություն
Օսմանեան Հալեպի Մէջ՝ 1915-1916ին
(Ամփոփում)

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Ձեկոյցը կը քննարկէ Հայոց Ցեղասպանութեան ընթացքին զոհերու դիմադրական գործունէութեան զանազան դրսեւորումները՝ 1915-16ին:

Ձերբակալութեանց, տեղահանութեանց եւ ջարդերու գործողութիւններուն զուգահեռ նկատելի կը դառնան զոհերու կողմէ այլեայլ դիմադրական արարքներ, որոնցմէ այստեղ լուսարձակի տակ կ'առնուին ոչ-զինեալ դիմադրական արարքները:

Հեղինակը լուսարձակի տակ կ'առնէ օսմանեան գաւառներուն, Պոլսոյ եւ արտասահմանի միջեւ գործող ընդատակեայ հաղորդակցութեանց ցանցեր, որոնցմով արտաքին աշխարհ կը մաքսանենգուէին՝ ջարդերուն մասին տեղեկագրեր: Ասոնք հումք կը ծառայէին արտասահմանի հայ թէ օտար մամուլի դէմքերուն, օտար քաղաքական գործիչներուն՝ բացայայտելու Օսմանեան Կայսրութեան մէջ հայոց դէմ կատարուող ջարդերը, մանրամասնելու դէպքերուն եւ կոտորածներուն, արմատահանութիւններուն, քանդումներուն տարողութիւնը են.: Միւս կողմէն, այս ցանցերով նաեւ արտասահմանէն կը փոխանցուէին նիւթական նպաստներ, ապա գաւառներ եւ գաղթակայաններ կը յղուէին ասոնք՝ սնունդ գնելու, բժշկական հոգածութեան եւ գոյատեւումի նպատակներով:

Հեղինակը կ'ընդգծէ որ աքսորավայրերուն, գաւառին եւ Պոլսոյ միջեւ հաղորդակցութեանց այս ցանցերուն կենսական օղակ կը հանդիսանար Հալեպը, ու կը ներկայացնէ այս ցանցերուն առնչուած անձերու եւ խնդիրներու մութ ծալքերը: Կը պարզուի նաեւ, որ ընդատակեայ մարդկային այս ցանցերով ոչ միայն օտար, այլեւ հայ աջակցութիւն եւ նպաստ կը կատարուէր ցեղասպանութեան դիմադրութեան համար: