

David L. Phillips, *Unsilencing the Past: Track Two Diplomacy and Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation*, New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2005. ISBN 1-84545-007-8. Hardcover. 168 pp.

To review *Unsilencing the Past*, David Phillips's book about his endeavor to bring Turks and Armenians, and Azeris and Armenians together, is a rewarding experience, particularly for those who are interested in Armenian-Turkish reconciliation and the impact of the Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K) conflict on Armenian-Turkish relations.

The author reveals firsthand information about the *Track Two Program on Turkey and the Caucasus* that was initiated during the Clinton administration, and the creation of the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC), "the program's centerpiece" (p. 3), on July 9, 2001. He also conveys to the reader his objectives to bring Armenians and Turks together "to confront a tormented past and explore future cooperation" and dialogue (p. 1). In addition, Phillips, as TARC's Chairman, stresses that he aimed at promoting mutual understanding and good will between Armenians and Turks and the establishment of better relations between Armenia and Turkey. He believes that the *Track Two Program on Turkey and the Caucasus* would create a "context for civil society to develop mutual understanding with the goal of transferring their insights to decision-makers and shaping public opinion" (p. 1). Within this context, the author scrutinizes the cultural, economic, academic, and educational aspects through which TARC could enhance cooperation between Armenians and Turks and build trust. TARC could also issue policy recommendations to the concerned governments. He believes that TARC could be the best initiative to foster dialogue and cooperation, and ultimately peace building, between Armenians and Turks. The book narrates and analyses all these themes concurrently.

Unsilencing the Past is not an academic book based on research. It does not have a conceptual approach to explain the various themes mentioned in the book. For example, the author does not present various approaches to negotiation and mediation of conflicts. Instead, he emphasizes Track Two diplomacy as an approach to break the logjam of non-dialogue between Armenians and Turks. Probably, Armenian-Turkish dialogue would never have succeeded without the plethora of Track Two diplomatic initiatives. Phillips gives a detailed explanation of the positions of TARC's Armenian and Turkish members and assesses their fundamentally different expectations of the Commission. "The Armenians saw TARC as a vehicle for approaching Turkish elites and initiating a dialogue about the genocide" (p. 53). They also focused on opening Turkey's eastern border and establishing diplomatic relations with Ankara, irrespective of the N-K conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Further, Andranik Mihranian, an Armenian member of TARC, insisted that TARC should address the 1915 genocide committed by Turks against the Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire. In one

of the meetings of TARC he said: "culture is nice but we need to come to an understanding on the genocide and other issues that divide us", otherwise, he warned, "we will continue to raise genocide in parliaments around the world" (p. 52).

On the other hand, TARC's Turkish members did not want to discuss the genocide issue. Instead, they preferred to encourage cultural and economic projects that would demonstrate contact and cooperation between the two peoples. They were convinced that dialogue would contribute to empathy and enable Turks "to develop an increased appreciation for the suffering of Armenians" in the Ottoman Empire in World War I. Therefore, "TARC's Turkish members fueled the belief that Ankara was using TARC to deter genocide recognition by the international community" (p. 62). Gunduz Aktan, a Turkish member of TARC, maintained that "none of the Turkish participants considered the events of 1915-1916 as genocide" (p. 53). He added: "We certainly consider them terrible events, but they do not fall within the definition of genocide accepted under international humanitarian law" (p. 29). Gunduz's viewpoints have been typical of the official stance of the Turkish government, which considers that the killings of hundreds of thousands of Armenians took place amid the general unrest of World War I. Therefore, the allegations that the Armenians were subjected to planned and systematic killings in the Ottoman Empire are groundless and do not correspond to reality.

The book is not divided into chapters. Instead, the author uses descriptive headings to depict the political, diplomatic, security, economic, and humanitarian concerns and developments that he shared with TARC's Armenian and Turkish members. Moreover, Phillips shows profound knowledge about Armenian-Turkish issues and the deep distrust that the two peoples have toward each other. He also stresses that reconciliation and peace building between Armenians and Turks can not be established without the resolution of the N-K conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, since the Azeris consider themselves Turks. Hence, the participation of Ozdem Sanberk, another Turkish member of TARC, "ensured that Baku's interest would be looked after" (p. 39). Indeed, Ozdem did not hesitate to raise the issue of the Azerbaijani territories occupied by the N-K Armenians and the return of the Azerbaijani refugees to their homes. Since Azerbaijan's independence in 1991, Ankara has linked "normalization of relations with Armenia to a settlement of the dispute over N-K" (p. 53). Turkey has refused to establish diplomatic relations and open its border with Armenia until the latter recognizes Baku's sovereignty over N-K. Ankara has also set a new precondition for the normalization of relations with Armenia, demanding that Azerbaijan be granted a land corridor to its Nakhichevan exclave under a future peace agreement. This last precondition is not explicitly mentioned in the book. On the other hand, Vartan Oskanian, Armenia's foreign minister, has stated that "bilateral relations [with Turkey] should not be taken hostage by Azerbaijani-Armenian disputes, and Turkey should not link formation of ties with us to Azerbaijani issues" (p. 85).

Throughout the book, Phillips highlights that Track Two diplomacy could lead to cooperation and good will between Armenians and Turks and contribute to the development of peace between Armenia and Turkey. The author stresses that reconciliation is a process and "it would take time to change the demonization of Turks by Armenians and the stereotyping of Armenians by Turks" (p. 32). The reconciliation process would be oriented toward the future. Reconciliation not only tries to find solutions to the underlying causes of the conflict but also works to change the relationship between adversaries from that of hostility and resentment to friendship and harmony.

Hence, truth and reconciliation between Armenians and Turks would entail honest acknowledgement of the injury each party had inflicted on the other, readiness to apologize, and commitment to redress past grievances that caused the conflict and provide compensation for the damage caused to a certain extent. As a consequence of these processes, healing of the past wounds generated by the conflict would become possible.

Within this context, acknowledging the past becomes crucial for Armenians and Turks. According to Vanik Volkan, a Turkish member of TARC, "it is impossible to achieve reconciliation without addressing the psychological needs of both the victim and victimizer" (p. 46). Phillips also quotes Dr. Annie Kalayjian, an Armenian sociologist, who believes that "the explicit expression of remorse has enormous healing value, but the victim must not be passive in pursuing it" (p. 44). She further writes that "forgiving the perpetrator breaks the cycle of anger, accusation, and recrimination. Many Armenians confuse forgiveness with forgetting" (p. 44). Hence, it is important to stress that truth and reconciliation should be directed toward both offenders and victims. Forgiveness does not imply forgetting. Truth and reconciliation must ensure that the past is not forgotten but remains alive in the memory of the Armenian nation. In regard to the Turkish perspective, "the Republic of Turkey" should not be "a country with selective memory" (p. 45). To achieve truth and reconciliation the Turkish people should not endorse what Gunduz said in the book, that "we Turks do not look to our past" (p. 44). It is important to stress that denial of the past would not be in the interest of the new Turkish generation. Denial of the Armenian genocide as Van Krikorian, an Armenian member of TARC, said "would not tell the story of righteous Turks who saved Armenians" in the course of events in World War I (p. 53). To remain silent or indifferent means that genocide can happen again.

To elaborate more on the genocide issue, we refer to Taner Akcam, a Turkish sociologist and historian, who challenges his country's position on the genocide issue. Akcam believes that Turkey's "resistance to historical dialogue is not the position of the majority of people in Turkey". According to a survey that was conducted by scholars "61 percent of Turks believe it is time for public discussion of what the survey called the accusation of genocide."¹ In this context, the statement of Ilter Turkmen, a Turkish member of TARC, on the wrongs of the past and whether Turkey would acknowledge them or not is extremely constructive for

reconciliation. Ilter said: "Turkey does not have courageous politicians; we can not leave the job to them. They are not up to it. We should focus on shaping public opinion" (p. 48).

From the hot debates of TARC's Turkish and Armenian members during the meetings that they conducted to enhance dialogue, one could conclude that reconciliation would not happen without justice. Without justice peace can not be promoted. There are no miracle solutions for dealing with the repressive past and satisfying both sides to the conflict. Retributive justice could not work because it is punitive and does not encourage empathy on the part of the offender. To promote healing, the victim's needs and rights should be addressed. Also, an equal concern and commitment to victims and victimizers should be shown. Further, victimizers should be encouraged to understand the harm they caused and accept their obligations. Hence, a restorative justice is needed because it promotes healing and reconciliation in the future.

From the story of TRAC, it is apparent that its Armenian and Turkish members in particular, and the two peoples in general, lacked social capital, that is a culture of trust and cooperation that makes collective action possible and effective. Social capital is an important precondition for a sustainable peace. Although TARC had no official status, as Phillips clarifies, it was welcomed by the Turkish press in general and initially supported by the government of Armenia and many Armenians in both the homeland and diaspora. Further, Phillips gives us important evidence that the governments of Armenia and Turkey were aware of the preparatory work to create the TARC. However, "a controversy began swirling around TARC" (p. 61). "TARC became a bone of contention between parties" in both Armenia and the diaspora who were "vying for power and influence" (p. 61). Indeed, in Armenia, the political opposition to President Kocharian's leadership criticized the government and "maintained that TARC's existence was used to deter international criticism of Turkey". Further, "TARC was attacked as a pawn of the US government, and TARC members were labeled traitors" (p. 61). Hence, it was obvious that Kocharian's government "instead of standing by its commitments, ran for cover" (p. 61).

Within this context, Phillips skillfully highlights the negative role of the Armenian nationalist Dashnak Party, which undermined TARC's efforts because "if reconciliation occurs they [the Dashnaks] have no reason to exist" (p. 61). Since 1998 the Dashnak Party has been supporting President Kocharian, a native of N-K and a war hero, who came to power after forcing former President Ter-Petrossian to resign. Ter-Petrossian, who was a moderate, believed that Armenia and Turkey should normalize relations because newly independent Armenia and N-K would be unable to develop economically if they had closed borders with Turkey. Unfortunately, in 1998 Ter-Petrossian was accused of being a traitor upon his attempt to reach a compromise solution with Azerbaijan. Ter-Petrossian intended to resolve the conflict between Karabakh Armenians and Azerbaijan by returning the Azerbaijani occupied territories around N-K as a first step, and later

negotiating over the political status of N-K. It is important to stress that Armenia has been negotiating with the government of Azerbaijan because Baku has rejected negotiating with the Karabakh Armenian leadership. Baku believes that to negotiate with the Karabakh Armenian leadership would mean to accept Armenian sovereignty over N-K.

With regard to the Turkish stance, the initial "right signals" (p. 57) sent to the press by TARC's Turkish members did not last long. TARC's Turkish members did not want to discuss the genocide issue. Instead, they preferred to progress on other core issues, such as cultural cooperation, before reconciliation. Another core issue was to call on Ankara to lift its visa restrictions and introduce new procedures enabling Armenians to enter Turkey. However, through his comments in the media Gunduz Aktan, who enjoyed the support of the Turkish establishment, created acrimony between TARC's Armenian and Turkish members. Further, in a panel discussion on Armenian-Turkish relations at a conference held by the Assembly of Turkish American Associations (ATAA) in Washington, DC, he did not hesitate to say that "the Republic of Turkey will never recognize the Armenian genocide" (p. 63). Within this context, Phillips successfully assesses the position of TARC's Turkish members as "uncompromising". He said: "they resisted use of the term genocide in TARC documents. To them using the word meant admitting the fact" (p. 64). From the aforementioned, it is reasonable to assume that the governments of Armenia and Turkey were unready to pay the high political cost of holding TARC meetings, given the hostile attitudes and feelings of both Armenian and Turkish societies towards each other.

In addition to social capital, there is a need to address the security dimension, which is also important for the transformation of conflict and creation of a sustainable peace environment. Throughout the story of TARC, the issue of the security dimension is also raised and examined by Phillips. Concerning real and perceived security between Armenia and Turkey Phillips refers to certain internal and external confidence-building or security-building measures that would contribute to security.

Internally, cultural cooperation, holding joint conferences, economic projects, business, media, journalist exchange programs, women's magazine, academic activities, Armenian-Turkish parliamentary cooperation, tourism, and introducing a new visa regime would contribute to people-to-people contacts and pave the way for further steps between Armenia and Turkey. Within this context, Track Two between Armenians and Azeris "was even more difficult than between Armenians and Turks". Former Azerbaijani President "Haidar Aliev actively discouraged Track Two activities, and the Azerbaijani parliament passed legislation forbidding it" (p. 80). However, some Armenian-Azeri activities, such as workshops for collaborative problem solving and meetings between Armenian and Azeri members of parliament, were successfully conducted. The only ingredient necessary for enhancing real and perceived security between Karabakh Armenians and Azerbaijan is the cease-fire agreement that was reached in Bishkek on May 12,

1994 under the aegis of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Interparliamentary Assembly.² Baku has been unwilling to examine normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan before the withdrawal of the Karabakh army from the Azerbaijani occupied territories around N-K and the return of N-K to Azerbaijani sovereignty.

Externally, for the transformation of conflict, the conditions of a sustainable peace environment in the south Caucasus should also be created. Regional security arrangements are also important. Internal and external peace is indivisible. Within this context, Phillips refers to the efforts of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),³ which has been trying to find a compromise peace agreement for the N-K conflict. The OSCE Minsk Group,⁴ with its three co-Chairs of the USA, France, and Russia, has been mediating the N-K conflict. Phillips highlights the high-level pressure the US State Department put on the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan for talks at Key West, Florida, in April 2001. Now it becomes evident that the US aimed not only to resolve the N-K conflict but also to create regional security in the south Caucasus. To accomplish its aim, the US encouraged regional integration and economic development between the south Caucasian states (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan) and Turkey. Phillips reveals important evidence that "if the negotiations [at Key-West] stalled, Track Two between Armenians and Azeris would be a safety net cushioning negative implications" (p. 75). No book on the N-K conflict and its peace process has ever examined the importance of Track Two diplomacy as an approach for peace building and eliminating nationalist discourse. Unfortunately, instead of projecting a new and compelling image of the future, both Presidents, Kocharian and Aliev, "were impediments to their countries' democratic development" (p. 81).

If TARC's creation was a major US foreign policy development for the Clinton administration, "its importance diminished drastically after September 11, 2001" (p. 83). In September 2000 as a consequence of introducing House Resolution (HR) 596, the "Armenian Genocide Resolution" (p. 27), Armenian-Turkish discussions were launched to create TARC. Later, when the House of Representatives was to vote on the passage of HR 596, President Clinton called the House Speaker, Dennis Hastert, "and asked him to pull the Resolution" from the House floor. The reason behind Clinton's intervention was that he "invoked national security concerns about terrorism and emphasised the need for Turkey's assistance in meeting threats to American interests in the Middle East" (p. 34). Turkey had always expressed concern about parliamentary resolutions recognizing the Armenian genocide, and maintained that Turks would not negotiate with the Armenians under duress. Therefore, the "withdrawal of HR 596 triggered Ankara's interest in addressing Turkish-Armenian issues once and for all" (p. 34).

Phillips continues and stresses that TARC was affected by geopolitical events. For example, the Iraq war hindered Armenian-Turkish dialogue. The Iraq war "also influenced the Bush administration's approach to Turkey and its willingness to press Ankara on Armenian issues" (p. 121). Indeed, the Bush Administration

did not want to antagonize Ankara because Turkey's geographical position was extremely crucial for the US forces to invade northern Iraq. Hence, the Pentagon pressed for permission to transit US forces to Iraq. However, "when Ankara rebuked Washington and war proceeded without Turkey's involvement, angry administration officials were all too willing to bash Turkey and include Armenia among its grievances" (p. 121). American-Turkish relations further deteriorated when the Turkish General Staff "demanded a written guarantee that Turkish troops would be allowed to occupy northern Iraq" (p. 125) in return for approval from Turkey's Grand National Assembly for the use of Turkish territory to transit US forces to Iraq. Apparently, Turkey's intentions to control northern Iraq stemmed from Ankara's fears that a de-facto independent Iraqi Kurdistan "would inspire Turkey's restive Kurdish minority to seek something similar" (p. 122). In addition, Turkey envisioned that invading northern Iraq would also mean controlling the rich Kirkuk oil fields. However, the US warned Turkey against military adventures in northern Iraq. Probably, Turkey wanted to signal that as a regional power, it should have a say in political and economic developments in the Middle East, Asia, and the Caucasus. Turkey has been a gateway to the south Caucasus and Central Asia. In short, Ankara's lack of cooperation with the US, as a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally, angered a number of legislators in Congress. As a result of the anti-Turkish mood that dominated in Congress, it "launched several initiatives concerning the Armenian genocide". For example, "House Resolution 193 commemorated the Genocide Convention and mentioned the Jewish Holocaust as well as the Armenian, Cambodian, and Rwandan genocides" (p. 127). Apparently, Congress used the genocide issue as a lever to exert political pressure on Turkey to comply with US policies. Aktan considered the Congress bills as "payback". He asked, "do you think that the Congress would even be considering the measure if our parliament had allowed the US to use Turkish soil as a springboard for a northern front into Iraq?" (p. 127).

To sum up, from the geopolitical events that created the context in which TARC was conducting dialogue, it becomes clear that the Armenian genocide became a politicized issue. When American and Turkish political and economic interests diverged, the US administration used the Armenian genocide issue to exert pressure on Turkey to comply with US policies in the Middle East. This happened in the years 2001 and 2002. Initially, TARC's creation was a priority on the US political agenda. However, after the September 11 events and with the Iraq war, the US promoted its strategic interests in the Middle East and the Caucasus and failed to keep its commitment to peace building between Armenians and Turks. Had the US kept its high-level commitment to resolve the N-K conflict, as demonstrated in the Key-West talks in Florida in April 2001, Armenian-Turkish rapprochement would have progressed. However, we should not ignore the fact that the governments of Azerbaijan and Turkey on the one hand and the government of Armenia on the other hand also hindered TARC's efforts.

TARC intended to unsilence the past to pave the way for structured dialogue and reconciliation between the Armenian and Turkish societies. The achievement of this goal was difficult because TARC faced an ethical dilemma. As the Armenian and Turkish members of TARC tried to leave their trenches carefully and image the future, they confronted the Armenian genocide issue. Therefore, truth was a prerequisite to progress. Further, a balance was to be sought between amnesty and accountability. In this context, "every society has the unalienable right to know the truth about past events, as well as the motives and circumstances in which aberrant crimes came to be committed, in order to prevent repetition" (p. 94). On the other hand, revealing the truth was not simple for TARC because both sides, the Armenians and Turks, have their own version of the truth.

Phillips narrates how he tried to narrow the gaps between TARC's members. Hence, an agreement was reached between the Armenian and Turkish members of TARC to seek a legal analysis by the International Court of Transitional Justice (ICTJ) on the applicability of the 1948 UN Genocide Convention to the Armenian genocide. A major concern of TARC's Turkish members was that the ICTJ study would not consider "legislative intent" which means "to apply the spirit of the Convention to events that occurred prior to the treaty coming into force" (p. 105). From a Turkish perspective, the 1948 Genocide Convention does not apply retroactively. A retroactive application would oblige Turkey to pay material and territorial compensation to the Armenian people. Also, "the killings of Armenians do not constitute genocide because the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire made up a political group fighting for national independence" (p. 109). On the other hand, from an Armenian perspective, the genocide of 1915 was perpetrated, organized, and systematically executed by the Turks to exterminate the Armenian minority living in the Ottoman Empire. Hence, Armenia should seek material and territorial compensation.

Phillips emphasizes that the legal analysis of the ICTJ generally pleased TARC's Armenian and Turkish members. The ICTJ's analysis stated that the Genocide Convention "could not be applied retroactively thereby obviating any territorial or financial claims under the Convention" (p. 113). However, it found that the 1915 events "constituted genocide" as defined by the Convention (p. 114). Apparently, TARC did not intend to dwell on the ICTJ's analysis. But as Phillips indicates, "since the genocide issue cast shadow over every discussion", TARC "needed to find a creative way to address it" (p. 116). According to Ustun, a Turkish member of TARC, the ICTJ's analysis "gets Turkey off the hook. It gives us [Turks] an excellent way out. The glass is half full for both sides" (p. 115).

In this context, we should stress that striking a balance between the demands of justice and political prudence is difficult. Therefore, the ICTJ's analysis was not to fully satisfy both sides. If reconciliation were to take place, a painful cost-benefit analysis would be needed. Phillips should have explicitly emphasized this point. The governments of Armenia and Turkey should understand that if the goal

of reconciliation is to be attained, then all political costs and gains, amnesty and retribution, must be balanced against each other.

Turkey "knew that a messy dustup with Armenia would hurt its goal of joining the European Union (EU)" (p. 33). Turkey should also improve its human rights record and grant the minorities living within its borders their socio-cultural and political rights. Closed borders and no diplomatic relations with Armenia would allow Russia, "Turkey's historic rival in the Black Sea region, to exert greater influence in the south Caucasus" (p. 33). Moreover, Russia would use the N-K conflict as a lever to keep its influence in Armenia and manipulate both Armenians and Azeris. Hence, dealing with the past is an inescapable task for the arguably democratic regime of Turkey. Turkey's democracy can not become stronger without achieving reconciliation. Therefore, to argue that the annihilation of the 1.5 million ethnic Armenians in the Ottoman Empire during World War I was not genocide simply because the UN Genocide Convention on the punishment and prevention of the crime of genocide was adopted only in 1948 would harm Turkey's democracy. Within this context, Dr. Tessa Hofmann argues, that if this were true, we would have to "delete the Shoah of the European Jewry from the lists of genocide as well."⁵ Further, Turkey should not silence the past by consistently denying the Armenian genocide. Turkey can ensure a better democratic future through acknowledging past wrongs and creating truth commissions. The Armenian genocide is historically documented and does not need a commission of historians to prove whether there was genocide or not. It is out of the scope of this review to comment on and examine the history of the Armenian genocide and Turkish attempts to deny it.

Phillips ends his narrative by referring to the agreement of April 14, 2004 reached between TARC's members to stop their work as a reconciliation commission. With no bilateral talks between Armenia and Turkey, and with the waning of the US pressure on Ankara to open the Turkish-Armenian border, TARC was unable to exist any longer. The *Track Two Program on Turkey and the Caucasus* was initiated not as a substitute for official diplomacy but to establish contacts with various officials to influence policy. From the story of TARC, it seems that TARC suffered "when the US government neglected its [i.e.TARC's] efforts because American priorities lay elsewhere". Phillips also says, "honest self-criticism leads me to believe that we relied too much on US officials to support our efforts" (p. 148). However, Phillips does not leave the reader hanging in the air. There is an epilogue in the book to inform the reader that TARC succeeded in establishing a structured dialogue between Armenians and Turks. TARC also "catalyzed diplomatic contact between Turkish and Armenian officials, laid the foundation for addressing the genocide issue, and brought a principled, treaty-based approach to opening the border" between Armenia and Turkey (p. 148).

Unsilencing the Past should be read as a primary source on the TARC story. It is also an eyewitness account of the distrust and hatred between Armenians and Turks. It depicts accurately the obstacles that TARC tried to overcome. In addition,

Phillips objectively presents the Turkish, Azerbaijani, and Armenian perspectives on the reconciliation issue. Phillips intends to say that without realizing a balance between amnesty and retribution, and without creating trust between Turks, Azerbaijanis, and Armenians, a sustainable peace and economic development can not be achieved in the south Caucasus. Hence, any peace plan by the OSCE is doomed to fail. Within this context, we believe that Phillips should have referred in more detail to the fact that Turkish-Armenian reconciliation can not be achieved without seriously addressing the security dimension of the conflict. The physical security of the Armenian people has been at stake. More elaboration on this dimension would enable the reader to better understand the nature of the conflict and assess the political leverage of the regional powers on the direct participants in the conflict.

Phillips's firsthand information and analyses are extremely useful in understanding the dynamics of Track Two diplomacy in conflict resolution. Other Track Two specialists may find some missing elements in this book, but for those who followed TARC's creation in newspapers and other secondary accounts, the book is an indispensable source. Track Two practitioners, academics, and general readers who wish to understand Turkish-Armenian reconciliation and the impact of the N-K conflict on Turkish-Armenian relations should definitely read this profound, interesting, and challenging book.

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ENDNOTES

- ¹ Belinda Cooper, "Turks Breach Wall of Silence on Armenians," *The New York Times*, 6 March 2004.
- ² The CIS was created in December 1991 by the three Slavic states, Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine. By the end of that month the remaining Union-Republics of the Former Soviet Union joined the CIS except for the Baltic states and Georgia.
- ³ The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), established in 1975, was renamed OSCE at its Budapest Summit on 5-6 December 1994.
- ⁴ The Minsk Group, consisting of eleven countries (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Germany, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, France, Italy, the Russian Federation, USA, and Turkey), was formed by the CSCE in 1992 to find a negotiated solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
- ⁵ Tessa Hofmann, *Armenian Weekly Online*, 10-16 May 2003. Posted at <http://www.armenianweekly.com>