

# THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE : A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS<sup>(1)</sup>

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## Introduction

Genocide is the highest and most extreme form of violence perpetrated against a group of human beings on the basis of their national, ethnic, racial, or religious identity with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, their very existence. It is committed in the name of nationalism or ethnic and racial superiority that is used to justify the systematic and deadly use of force against a particular minority population.

This paper examines the use of such brute force against the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire that led to the massacre of 1.5 million Armenians in 1915 — the first mass genocide of the 20th century committed against a people with the premeditated purpose of exterminating an entire ethnic population.<sup>(2)</sup>

Why were the Armenians singled out from among a large number of ethnic groups residing in far corners of the Ottoman Empire — from Albanians and Bulgarians in the West to Arabs and Kurds in the East, as well as numerous other ethnic groups, including Circassians, Lazs, Alevis, Greeks, and Jews? What were the factors that led to this selection that culminated in attempts at the extermination of an entire group of people? What structural conditions contributed to the execution of a planned genocide of an otherwise peaceful people who had been the inhabitants of vast territories in Eastern Anatolia for centuries? Why did the Turkish government resort to such extreme measures to wipe out an entire population in its drive to annihilate the Armenians of Ottoman Turkey?

There are a number of specific explanations addressing these questions — ranging from pan-Turkic expansionism to that of retaliation against armed uprising in the east, and a combination of other factors peculiar to the position of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, such as the strong presence of Armenians at high levels of the Ottoman state bureaucracy and the prosperous economic position of some segments of the Armenian population tied to Europe and other centers of Western imperialism. Nationalist ideology promoted by the late Ottoman (Young Turk) state which emerged in the early twentieth century is generally viewed as evolving within the context of a combination of these factors.

The implications of the analysis presented in this paper go beyond attempts at understanding the Armenian Genocide as such; they help place in proper perspective the subsequent rise of nationalism in post-Ottoman Turkey and the continued oppression of the other ethnic minorities in Turkey, including the Kurds, the Greeks, and the Jews, as well as the Armenians. Moreover, an analysis of the sources of extreme nationalism and ethnic conflict in late Ottoman society and modern Turkey may help us understand the phenomenon of nationalism in general and its rise in societies undergoing a similar experience elsewhere in the world today.

### The Position of Ethnic Minorities in Ottoman Turkey with Focus on the Armenian Community

Ethnic minorities, made up of Armenians, Greeks, Jews, and numerous other national groups situated throughout the Ottoman Empire, played an important role in the Ottoman social structure. Concentrated mainly in Istanbul and Izmir, the Greeks, the Armenians, and, to a lesser extent, the Jews, had already obtained a commanding lead in Ottoman trade and finance by the late 18th century.<sup>(3)</sup> As the ethnic population grew in size over the decades, their position further improved and began to play a dominant role in key branches of the Ottoman economy by the end of the 19th century. In the Ottoman capital, Istanbul, Armenians, Greeks, and Jews together constituted upwards of half the population of the city during this period. Of the one million inhabitants of Istanbul, 500,000 were Turks, 400,000 Armenians and Greeks, and 100,000 Jews and Europeans.<sup>(4)</sup>

The number of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire during this period has been estimated at about 2.5 million, with over 80 % living in rural areas, mainly in eastern Anatolia and in the Adana and Marash regions in the south.<sup>(5)</sup> In the main urban center, Istanbul, Armenians numbered some 200,000 at the beginning of this century. Izmir on the west coast, Erzerum, Kars, and Van in the east, Sivas and Amasya in the northcentral region, and Adana, Mersin, Diyarbakir, and Marash in the southeast were other, less populated urban centers of Anatolia where Armenians were concentrated; they ranged from 10,000 to 100,000 in each of these medium-sized cities, with many more residing within each of the *vilayets*, or provinces.<sup>(6)</sup> The remainder of the Armenian population lived in small towns and villages throughout eastern and southern Anatolia, where they made a living by tilling their small plots of land. Only a small percentage of the Armenian population was made up of large landowners, while the vast majority was made up of peasants cultivating their own few acres of land.<sup>(7)</sup>

In the cities and urban centers, such as Istanbul and its adjacent municipalities, a different class structure prevailed: here, merchants, bankers, manufacturers and middlemen played an important role, despite the fact

that most Armenian city dwellers were either small business owners, craftsmen, or common laborers.<sup>(8)</sup> Among these, «the real power», writes one observer, «was held by an oligarchy comprised of wealthy conservative elements». ... «This oligarchy», we are told, «was drawn from the *amira* class, which consisted of bankers, rich merchants, and government officials».<sup>(9)</sup> By the early 19th century, the Armenian elite played a dominant role within the Armenian community, and was very influential in the Ottoman power structure as well, due in large part to their strategic position within the economy and state administration. The bankers, constituting the dominant element of this elite, played a direct role in the empire's economy: they collected taxes, made loans to the state, insured funds against losses, and dominated foreign exchange and commercial operations, which brought them into close contact with Europe and the West.<sup>(10)</sup>

Another group of Armenian magnates consisted of high government officials in charge of various state institutions or departments and as head of numerous economic enterprises (e.g., the customs, mint, powder works, mines, army supplies, etc.). The presence of Armenians in various branches of the Ottoman government was widespread and extended to different professions directly under the jurisdiction of the central government.<sup>(11)</sup> It included the Imperial Palace, the educational system, health, public works, and foreign affairs, to mention a few of the key administrative posts and professional assignments sanctioned by the state. The pivotal position of this select segment of the Armenian population in the Ottoman state, economy, and society brought them to centers of power and influence within the Empire.

### Ethnic Rivalry and the Rise of Turkish Nationalism

The expansion of the economic power of ethnic minorities — in particular, Armenians — during the 19th century began to be felt by the Turkish population in both urban and rural areas, as the non-Muslim ethnic groups — Greeks, Armenians, and Jews — began to dominate the commercial and financial activities of the empire and bought up much of the cultivatable land in the rural areas, while outcompeting their Turkish business rivals in the cities and towns where Turks were the dominant force previously.<sup>(12)</sup> As wealth was transferred from Turkish to Armenian or Greek and to a lesser extent Jewish hands, the widening gap between the Turks and these minority ethnic groups led to resentment against the prosperous sectors of the non-Muslim population who increasingly occupied the center stage in the economy and society.

In eastern Turkey, M. S. Lazarev reports that «Armenians occupied key positions in trade and business, which facilitated anti-Armenian agitation among the ... Muslim masses, and in the first place the Kurds. For example, in the *vilayet* [province] of Sivas (where Armenians formed 35 percent

of the population), out of 166 large importers 125 were Armenians; out of 37 bankers 32 were Armenians, and out of 9,800 small traders 6,800 were Armenians. Armenians owned 130 of 150 industrial enterprises. In the *vilayet* of Van, Armenians held 98 percent of the trade, [and] 80 percent of the agriculture ... There were 18 large merchants, all Armenian, 50 moneylenders (30 Armenians and 20 Turks), 20 money-changers, all Armenians, 1,100 craftsmen (1,020 Armenians and 80 Turks), 50 *rentiers* (20 Armenians and 30 Turks), 80 vegetable merchants (50 Armenians and 30 Turks), 200 fruit merchants, all Armenians. All members of the liberal professions — physicians, pharmacists, lawyers, etc. were Armenians».<sup>(13)</sup>

In the western region of the empire — in Izmir, Brusa, and elsewhere — the situation was similar. According to a report by the British Foreign Office, In Izmir the general improvement «however is more generally to the advantage of the Christian races who are ... buying up the Turks.» ... The Turks, handicapped by conscription, «fall into the hands of some Christian usurious banker [Armenian, Greek, or occasionally European] to whom the whole property or estate is soon sacrificed ... in the immediate vicinity of Smyrna very few Turkish landed proprietors remain.»<sup>(14)</sup>

Further west, «every one who has any familiarity with the Aeolic and Ionian coasts,» reports British author W. M. Ramsay, «knows of many a flourishing Greek village, which not so many years ago was empty or peopled by Turks. The Turks are losing, or have in places lost, their hold on the coast and on the valleys that open on the coast... As the railway goes inland, the Greek element goes with it and even in front of it.»<sup>(15)</sup>

«This feeling of being overwhelmed and driven out caused much resentment among Turks,» writes Issawi, «and helps to account for the intense bitterness and violence in the struggle between Turks, Armenians, Greeks in the period from 1895 to 1923.»<sup>(16)</sup>

The prominence of the Armenian *amiras* within Ottoman society led to much bitterness among broad segments of the Turkish population, especially the nationalist elements within it, based primarily among the nationalist intelligentsia and generals and officers in the military. Such bitterness against wealthy Armenians soon turned into a generalized resentment against the Armenian community as a whole and gave rise to the brutal repression of Armenians that led to the massacres of 1894-96.<sup>(17)</sup>

The periodic looting and destruction of Armenian neighborhoods, the killings of large numbers of Armenians in selective and orchestrated massacres sanctioned by the government,<sup>(18)</sup> and the absence of Western intervention to halt the atrocities committed against the Armenian population set the stage for full-scale repression of the Armenian community with the rise to power of the Young Turk nationalists led by Enver, Çemal, and Talat

Pashas in the first decade of the twentieth century and thus cleared the way for the final solution to the Armenian Question — the extermination of 1.5 million Armenians in 1915.<sup>(19)</sup>

### Ultra-Nationalism and the 1915 Genocide of Armenians in Ottoman Turkey

Although numerous attempts in bringing about an Armenian national uprising in the east led to severe repression and massacres of thousands of Armenians at the end of the 19th century,<sup>(20)</sup> the turning point for the very survival of the Armenian community in Ottoman Turkey was the Young Turk revolution of 1908. «From the revolution's beginning,» writes Paul Saba, «oppressed nations within the empire seized the occasion to declare their independence, while foreign powers sought to take advantage of Turkish internal disorder for their own gain.»<sup>(21)</sup>

In 1908, Bulgaria announced its independence; soon after Crete revolted to unite with Greece. Austro-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in 1911-12 Italy invaded and conquered Libya. Finally, in 1913, a united Balkan alliance drove the Turks out of Macedonia. Within the remnants of the empire other oppressed nationalities, including the Armenians and the Arab peoples, were demanding greater autonomy or self-determination.<sup>(22)</sup>

It was within this context of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of the Turkish nationalist forces to salvage the pieces of the crumbling empire that the Young Turk reaction took its most ruthless form.

Turkey jolted toward military dictatorship, and Turkification became the dominant ideology in leading CUP [Committee of Union and Progress] and government circles. Pan-Turkism, as theorized by the CUP, was an extreme expression of the contradictory and ambivalent response of Turkish nationalists to Western penetration and its destructive impact on the unity of the Ottoman Empire... Racialism, chauvinism, militarism, and disregard for much of traditional Islam were all features of Pan-Turkism. Taken together, this combination of ideological elements foreshadowed a similar ideology which was to emerge in Germany in the 1920s: Nazism.<sup>(23)</sup>

«Pan-Turkish theorists», Saba points out, «conceptualized Turks as a master race, and envisioned the forcible creation of a great empire («Turan») of all «Turo-Aryan» peoples throughout Asia. Russia, the Slavic peoples and Armenians were all seen as obstacles to this goal.»<sup>(24)</sup>

The Turks were to be united in a new purified state in which there would be no place for «alien» peoples. The CUP's efforts at popular mobilization of the Turkish masses on the basis of nationalist appeals, racial intolerance and Nazi-like cults of the Turk's pagan past created a climate of growing intolerance for all minority peoples within the empire.<sup>(25)</sup>

Within this context of the ideology of Pan-Turkish nationalist expansionism to the east, the Ottoman Empire entered World War I and hoped to overrun Russia as part of its strategy to reconquer ancient Turan. «**Within two weeks of the campaign, however, 80 percent of the troops [of the Third Army] had been killed either by Russian forces or by the terrible Caucasian winter.**»<sup>(26)</sup>

Defeated in battle, the Young Turks determined to strike at an easier target. In early February 1915, the Central Council of the Committee of Union and Progress decided upon the systematic extermination of all Armenians within the Ottoman Empire. Armenian sympathy for Russia and their illegal possession of arms provided the pretexts, while the absence of allied observers in the area, as a result of the war, provided the opportunity for Turkish reaction to strike its blow virtually unobserved.

Saba continues:

«**Planned, supervised and directed at every level by the Committee of Union and Progress with a fierce blend of racial fanaticism and 20th century rationalism, unrestrained by remorse or conscience, the same pattern of extermination was employed throughout the Armenian provinces. It was a pattern which, in many respects, foreshadowed the holocaust visited upon European Jewry by Nazis.**»<sup>(27)</sup>

Thus the first genocide of the 20th century unfolded in full force and continued until it consumed the lives of 1.5 million Armenians. One of the bloodiest massacres in history, the Armenian genocide witnessed the rape, assault, plunder, and murder of an entire population with the premeditated, ultra-nationalist objective of wiping out the Armenian community of Ottoman Turkey.<sup>(28)</sup>

This act of planned genocide perpetrated against the Armenian people nearly achieved its stated aims, as most of the estimated 1.5 to 2 million Armenian inhabitants of Ottoman Turkey were exterminated through mass murder or marched to their death in the Syrian desert and the eastern plains. Less than 15 percent of the prewar Armenian population was able to escape the horror of the genocide and take refuge in Russia or other surrounding states, while after the final collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of the new Turkish state in 1923, there were less than 100,000 Armenians remaining in the entire country.<sup>(29)</sup>

### Some Concluding Observations

The questions raised in the above analysis lead us to draw some conclusions on the nature and causes of ethnic conflict and rivalry between Armenians and Turks at the turn of the century that came to be defined as the Armenian Question.

The Young Turk government's ultra-nationalist projection of power, extending to territories beyond that controlled by the Ottoman central state,

was an attempt for the establishment of a greater Turkish Empire that reclaimed its historic central Asian heritage. The question of pan-Turkic expansionism to the east, then, must be seen in this context of the nationalist project, where ethnic conflict and rivalries were promoted to achieve imperial ends. It is, therefore, entirely logical to view the hostilities generated between Armenians and Kurds in eastern Turkey as part of the Young Turk campaign to suppress ethnic rebellions by way of setting the two groups against each other and thereby to clear the way for further Turkish territorial expansion.

The Armenians became the first victims of this political design; the Kurds, too, were to follow as victims of this plan in due course. The argument that the Young Turks used the Kurds against the Armenians and then planned to move against the Kurds to clear the way for Turkish expansion to this territory and beyond, as part of their campaign to establish a greater central Asian Turkish Empire, seems to make sense within the context of the actual developments there during this period.

Caught between these currents of global, regional, and national power-politics and standing in the way of the parties who wanted to use them to advance their own interests, the Armenians paid a heavy price for this political design in the form of mass deportations, massacres, and annihilation of nearly all of their people. It is clear that outside powers were heavily involved in the final phase of the collapse and disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, whose territories were later directly occupied by the Western imperialist powers during World War I. The particular position of the Armenians in this power struggle, identified as friend or foe by one or another of the contending forces in this conflict, cost the Armenians some 1.5 million lives.

The Greeks and especially the Jews, mainly residing in large urban centers like Istanbul and Izmir did not have any territorial claims; nor were they seen as standing in the way of Turkish expansionist plans. Likewise, the Ottoman provinces in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula did not interfere with the Young Turks' ultra-nationalist vision, as they were too far from centers of power and control in this period of Ottoman decline and decay; hence these regions were easily acquired by the European powers and turned into outposts of Western imperialism — the spoils being divided between France and Britain, the two dominant world powers at the time. The Greek invasion of western Turkey and the subsequent defeat of Greece in bloody battles in Izmir and elsewhere along the western coast of Turkey did result in the deaths of a large number of Greeks in Turkey during the war, but the existence of a Greek homeland provided «a way out» of a similar situation by mass deportations of Greeks to Greece, hence escaping a large-scale massacre.

The Armenians were accorded no such protection from the advancing Ottoman forces, who, through direct government orders from the center, moved in with full force to remove the Armenians from their historic homeland. The forced marches, killings, and wholesale massacre of entire villages populated by Armenians marked the beginning of the first genocide of the twentieth century — a genocide planned to exterminate an entire ethnic population who, according to those in power, stood in the path of the Turkish national project.

All the accusations of the Young Turk government leveled against the Armenians in Ottoman Turkey («collaboration with foreign powers», «disloyalty to the state», «widespread armed uprisings», «conspiracy to overthrow the Ottoman state», and so forth) are refuted by Armenian scholars and the Armenian community at large, who point to the peaceful nature of the Armenian population of Turkey — an ethnic enclave that made great contributions to the Ottoman state and society for centuries and were historically acknowledged as such even by a succession of Ottoman governments until the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Thus, whatever the motives of the Turkish government at the time, the Armenians were not and could not be the source of any such hostilities and had no reason for being so, as they occupied a prominent economic, political, and cultural position in the Ottoman domain; the deadly predicament of Armenians during this period originated in and was the result of an emergent nationalist force that used the excuse of «the Armenian threat» to control and dominate a fragile empire which had entered a period of decline and decay due to its own insertion into, and the resultant contradictions of, the world economy and polity.

The mass killings of some 1.5 million people in a premeditated manner, violating every precept of human morality, could not be justified under any circumstance, for whatever reason. The Turkish governments over the past eight decades have, as has the present government of Turkey, denied that such a massacre ever took place; the hundreds of thousands of Armenians who died during this period in various eastern provinces of the empire are said to have been the victims of war that inflicted casualties and death on both sides.<sup>(30)</sup> But the 1.5 million Armenians who died in 1915 — an undisputed fact widely accepted in the international community — could not have vanished into thin air. Just as the premeditated genocide of some six million Jews by the Hitler regime in Germany during World War II cannot be accepted as «casualties of war,» the massacre of one and a half million Armenians cannot be washed away as the consequence of «wartime hostilities.»

Today we commemorate the 80th anniversary of this bloody episode in modern history and honor the memory of those who lost their lives in

the hands of the perpetrators of this systematic massacre that came to be known as the first mass genocide of the twentieth century. If we are to learn any lessons from such events and prevent a similar occurrence of mass genocide in the future, we must become cognizant of the ill use to which the excuse of war is put as a cover for nationalist or global designs to disarm and exterminate a people who block such self-serving ultra-nationalist and reactionary objectives in different historical and geographic contexts — whether in Bosnia, Nazi Germany, or, as in the case of the Armenians, in Ottoman Turkey.

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6. «A study» (dissertation). See also Karpat, *Ottoman Population*, p. 51-55, and Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities*, New York, 1983, pp. 47-88 for various contradictory estimates of the Armenian population by the Armenian Patriarchate and the Ottoman Government, as well as independent European sources.
7. Christopher J. Walker, *Armenia : The Survival of a Nation*, New York, 1980, pp. 94-95.
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9. Louise Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement*, Berkeley, 1967, p. 43.
  10. As Artinian points out, «by the middle of the nineteenth century there were over thirty Armenian firms in London and Manchester with their headquarters located either in Smyrna [Izmir] or Istanbul». See «A study» (dissertation), p. 7. See also, Walker.
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  13. M. S. Lazarev, *Kurdistan i Kurdskaia Problema*, Moskva, 1964, in Issawi, *The Economic History of Turkey*, p. 67. An Austrian source which provides more details on the number of Armenians in the Sivas province engaged in various businesses confirms this, while being slightly at variance with Lazarev's figures in two instances. Namely, the number of Armenian large importers is reported here as being 141 (instead of 125) out of 166, and the Armenian owners of industrial enterprises 127 (instead of 130) out of 150. See Freiherrn M. Kapri, *Die Historische und Kulturelle Bedeutung des armenischen Volkes*, Wien, 1913, s. 65-67.
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  18. According to Langer, «blood was shed in the capital [Istanbul] itself; in the provinces there were massacres at Trebizond and many other places... It is perfectly obvious that the Sultan [Abdul Hamit] was determined to end the Armenian Question by exterminating the Armenians.» See William L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902*, Vol. 1, New York, 1935, p. 203.
  19. For a documentation of the Armenian holocaust and the extent of the massacres, see Brande-Lewis, *op. cit.*, Dadrian, «The Naim-Andonian documents», p. 272; Chaliand-Ternon, *op. cit.*; and Permanent People's Tribunal, *op. cit.*
  20. The events that sparked the massacres of 1894-1896 include the uprising of Armenians in Talori, in the Vilayet of Bitlis, where Ottoman troops were sent to quell the revolt, a vast demonstration in August 1895, and the armed occupation of the Ottoman Bank by Armenian revolutionaries in September 1896. See Wilson, pp. 481-509.
  21. Paul Saba, «The Armenian National Question», in Berch Berberoglu [ed.], *Power and Stability in the Middle East*, London, 1989, p. 188.
  22. On this point see also Akaby Nassibian, *Britain and the Armenian Question, 1915-1923*, New York, 1984, p. 26.
  23. Saba, p. 189.
  24. *Ibid.*
  25. *Ibid.*
  26. *Ibid.*, pp. 189-190.
  27. *Ibid.*, p. 190.
  28. For an extended bibliographic compilation of historical sources on the Armenian genocide, see Richard G. Hovhannissian, *The Armenian Holocaust*, Cambridge, Mass., 1978; Dadrian, «The Naim-Andonian documents», pp. 311-360. See also, Chaliand-Ternon, *op. cit.*, and Permanent Peoples' Tribunal, *op. cit.*
  29. Walker, p. 230, Paul Saba points out that in terms of the very survival of Armenians as an ethnic group, the year 1915 was one of disaster for the Armenians. Before the war it was estimated that there were between 1,500,000 and 2,000,000 Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. By 1916, some 250,000 had managed to flee to Russia and escape the car-

- nage. Another 1,000,000 were killed, half of them women and children. Of the approximately 600,000 survivors, about 200,000 were forcibly converted to Islam. The remaining 400,000, mostly in refugee and concentration camps, suffered a wretched existence. Some 50,000 to 100,000 of these were killed during the Turkish invasion of the Caucasus in May-September 1918, while approximately 250,000 were murdered in 1919-1923 during post-war attempts by survivors to return to their homes. See Saba, pp. 190-191.
30. See the position of the Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara, in Permanent Peoples' Tribunal, *op. cit.*, pp. 132-167.

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ՊԵՐՃ ՊԵՐՊԵՐՕՂԼՈՒ

Այլ ժողովուրդներու դէմ ի գործ դրուած ցեղասպանութիւնը խորագոյն եւ ամենէն քայքայիչ մէկ ձեւն է այն քրտութեան, որ կը գործադրուի լրիւ կամ մասնակի կերպով՝ քանդելու համար անոնց գոյութիւնը, երբ անոնք կը ներկայացնեն ցեղային, ժողովրդային, կրօնական կամ տնտեսական անհատականութիւն: Այսպիսի գործունէութեան մը պարագային է որ կը յառաջանայ յորձքը հարցումներուն, որոնք կու գան միաձուլուելու լո՛կ մէկ հատին մէջ. — ինչո՞ւ այս ցեղասպանութիւնը մի միայն հայերու գոյութեան դէմ:

Պերճ Պերպերօղլուն կը փորձէ պատասխանել մէկ հատիկ այս հարցումին՝ քննութեան ենթարկելով ընկերային, տնտեսական, կրօնական եւ մշակութային դրութիւնը Օսմանեան Կայսրութեան, որուն վրան յետագային կու գայ աւելնալու խնդիրը Օսմանեան Կայսրութեան արեւմուտքի մէջ կրած հողային կորուստներուն, որուն որպէս հակադարձութիւն՝ քաղաքական, տնտեսական, հողային, ժողովրդային եւ այլազան ուրիշ պատճառներէ խթանուած բիլադրանքը արեւելքի մէջ հիմնելի թուրա-

նական կայսրութեան մը: Այս մէկն արդէն ցեղապաշտական ծրագիրն է Երիտասարդ-բրժութեան՝ ըլլալէ ետք ծրագիրը համիտեան քաղաքականութեան, որ կը միտէր օսմանի աշխարհէն ներս ստեղծել ցեղայնօրէն եւ կրօնական կերպով զուտ բրժական կայսրութիւն մը:

Այս ծրագիրին իրագործումին հրայրքը կը սրի աւելի փոքրամասնութիւններուն եւ մանաւանդ հայութեան ունեցած տնտեսական գերիշխող ուժին եւ անկէ յառաջացած պետական, առետրական, նարտարարութեան եւ մշակութային պատճառներով ալ, որ գուցէ նոյնքան առկայ է նաեւ յոյնին համար եւ հրեային: Սակայն երբ հրեան կը յաջողի կծկուիլ իր մորթէն ներս եւ յոյնը իր դէմքը կը դարձնէ իր անկախ պետականութեան՝ անհրաժեշտ պարագային մեկնելու համար իր հայրենիք՝ հայր կը մնայ անպաշտպան եւ արեւմուտքի մեծ պետութիւնները չեն որ պիտի գան պաշտպան կանգնելու անոր, իրականութիւն մը որ շուտով կ'ընկալուի թուրքին կողմէ, որ հիմա արեւմուտքի իր կորուստներուն վրէժը լուծելու կը ձեռնարկէ դառնալով արեւելք: Սակայն հայն է որ կ'արգելակէ իր յառաջընթացը, ուստի անիկա կ'որոշէ մաքրել հրապարակը եւ քանալ ուղին դէպի Թուրան՝ Կեդրոնական Ասիա: Արդիւնքը բնաջնջումն է արեւմտահայութեան՝ կորուստովը թուրքիաբնակ երկու միլիոնէ աւելի հայութեան մէկ ու կէս միլիոնին: Այս մէկը ցեղապաշտութիւն է արդէն, եւ քանակորդ դարու պետականօրէն կազմակերպուած առաջին ցեղասպանութիւնը, որուն միջոցով է որ թուրքը կը փորձէ փրկել զինուորականօրէն թէ տնտեսական կերպով անկումէ անկում մեկնող իր կայսրութիւնը:

Մնացեալը խօսք է միայն, եւ կայ ո՛չ մէկ պատճառաբանութիւն յայտարարելու այսօր, թէ մէկ ու կէս միլիոն հայերու կորուստը արդիւնքն էր պատերազմական կորուստներուն, եւ ոչ ալ կարելի է պնդել, թէ անիկա հետեւանքն էր պատերազմական բռնամամնքի: Իրականութեան մէջ՝ պատերազմին իրականութիւնը ծածկ մըն էր սփոթելու համար իրականութիւնն ու նշմարտութիւնը: