

ARMENIAN POLITICAL THINKING BEFORE AND AFTER THE YOUNG TURK REVOLUTION¹

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ABSTRACT

This paper aims to examine the attitude of Ottoman Armenian society and its political elites towards the idea of Ottomanism and the Constitutional Regime in the Second Constitutional Period (i.e. after 1908) when, for the first time, an atmosphere of political pluralism was being experienced in the Ottoman Empire.

Dominant nationalist historiography in Turkey regards the Ottoman Armenians as a monolithic entity organized around a certain political rhetoric; namely, as the absolute supporters of Armenian independence and separation from the Ottoman State.

In this paper we will show that Ottoman Armenians did not constitute a monolithic society and held different views. Furthermore, we will avoid essentialist generalizations, re-construct the above-mentioned period, and examine the views of diverse Armenian groups. For instance, the policy of Ottomanism was adopted as a broad protective umbrella by Armenian political movements and political elites.

INTRODUCTION

Today, the “Armenian Question” is an over-loaded political issue. As a result of struggling nationalisms, the “sides” of the debate often tend to present a “selective history,”² which either ignores or distorts historical facts, and often falls into anachronisms in order to underpin their views. In fact, these sides are obsessed with justifying an established Armenian or Turkish attitude. Indeed, there is an abundance of reductionist studies describing either Turks as murderers or Armenians as traitors. These studies lack the necessary feeling of empathy and ignore the pains or the priorities of the other side. Further research and analysis of the historical events of the different periods in Armenian-Turkish relations may provide us with important evidence to see that the picture is not as the reductionist, essentialist and nationalist perspectives have depicted.

Traditional Turkish historiography regards Armenian political activities during the Hamidian era as a direct consequence of imperialist interference in Ottoman affairs aimed at weakening the state by creating unrest. These historiographers argue that the Western imperial powers of the time manipulated the Armenians, who lived in peace and harmony in

the Ottoman Empire alongside other ethnicities and who had been known as the “faithful nation” (*millet-i sadıka*) because of their loyalty to the Ottoman state. In order to challenge its territorial integrity and acquire a foothold in the Ottoman state, these imperial powers pushed the Ottoman Armenians to establish secret organizations, armed the Armenians and initiated terrorist activities with the aim of creating an independent Armenia in the eastern *vilayets*.

Though the assumptions of these formulations are true to some extent, they clearly ignore the real problems of the Ottoman Armenians, especially the rural Armenian communities. As Vincent Lima points out, the Armenian revolutionaries “generally hoped that a certain amount of self-reliance combined with European support would lead to fundamental improvements in the lot of Armenians, just as this combination had worked for the Christian peoples in the west of the Empire.”³ Indeed, although some Armenian revolutionaries fought for an independent Armenia in the eastern *vilayets*, most of them struggled against Hamidian despotism, which created unbearable conditions for most of the Armenian population. Furthermore, especially after the 1890s, some Armenian organizations cooperated with other revolutionary organizations, such as the Young Turks, in order to overthrow the Sultan and establish constitutional rule. For such cooperation to function, the Armenians had to reshape their demands, including calls for an independent Armenian state, and declare their respect for the territorial integrity of the Ottoman state after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908.

In the second half of the 1890s, for instance, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) became increasingly uneasy about the western imperialist projects in Eastern Anatolia and sought for a more reliable relationship with western leftist movements.⁴ The publication of the well-known periodical *Pro-Armenia* under the leadership of Jean Jaurès with the help of some important leftist European intellectuals in Paris is a direct result of this relationship.⁵ Thus, as of the second half of the 1890s the ARF searched for a common base of co-operation with other Ottoman revolutionary groups, and especially with the Young Turks. These contacts, however, remained unfruitful. The main reasons for this setback were the insistence of the ARF on European intervention and revolutionary methods, which were unacceptable to the Young Turks led by Ahmet Rıza.⁶ The 1907 ARF congress made a radical turn and re-designed its aims for Ottoman Armenia. It called for “Political and social freedom, based on local autonomy and federative ties, *within the boundaries of a democratic Ottoman state*, in which all elections take place on the basis of a general, equal, direct, secret, and proportional suffrage, *without discrimination by*

race, religion, or gender” (emphases are mine).⁷ The policy changes ushered in such co-operation.

In fact, especially after the Young Turk Revolution, all Armenian political organizations in the Empire declared their support for the new regime, ceased armed struggle and were transformed into legal political parties. Nevertheless, this cooperative approach and the extent of the transformation of their principles are generally ignored by mainstream Turkish historiography.

Esat Uras, for instance, one of the most important Turkish historians of Armenian-Turkish relations proficient in Armenian, writes:

After the proclamation of constitutional rule on July 23, 1908, there was an artificial silence in the [Armenian] committee activities. The leaders of the committees declared in their written statements and speeches that they would only work for the defense of constitutional rule by transforming their activities into a legal and legitimate form. ...The committees which showed such a sincere façade to the government while the excitement of the first days were fading, slowly took up their previous activities again, benefiting from both the weakness of the government and the permissiveness of the circumstances.⁸

Another scholar, Kâmurân Gürün, who wrote a detailed history of the Armenian Question, never mentioned the legalization process that Armenian parties and organizations underwent. He presented them merely as terrorist organizations that aimed at creating an independent Armenia. While examining the constitutional period - which is very important for understanding the evolution of the revolutionary Armenian organizations into legal political parties - he ignores such transformations and relationships between Armenian and other Ottoman political parties. He examines the Adana massacres of April 1909 and the negotiations of the 1914 Reform Agreement for the eastern *vilayets* only from the perspective of steps taken to create an independent Armenian state.⁹ Clearly, he tries to convince the reader that in the second constitutional period Armenian political organizations aimed only at creating an independent national state through terror tactics - i.e. Adana event - and international diplomacy - i.e. the 1914 Reform Agreement. Such a narrative, disregarding the general Armenian sympathy for constitutional rule, and the peaceful resolution to the ethnic conflicts between Armenian and Muslim communities arising mostly from land and public security issues, serves only as a would-be justification of the massacres of 1915.

Yılmaz Öztuna, whose article examined the political environment of the Armenian Question, takes up the question with the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878 and never refers to any sort of unrest before that date. Öztuna claims that the Armenians lived in peace before western imperialist

intervention, which is very typical of the defensive Turkish position. Regarding Article 61 of the Berlin Agreement,¹⁰ Öztuna writes:

In such a vast territory, in which the population was sparsely settled, living in tribal communities in the villages, and in which important cities were rare, it was impossible to initiate a reform in favor of this minority even if the Ottomans wanted it. It would end up making the Armenians and Muslims adversaries. This, in fact, happened as a result. Although the Armenians, like all other non-Muslim minorities, had good relations with the Muslim majority until that time, grudges and hatred would appear between them. Then, what did the Western states, which were pushing for such a reform, want?¹¹

In Öztuna's article the only reference to the political developments in the constitutional period labels constitutional rule as a "euphoria of democracy" (*demokrasi furyası*): "It was like all the bans were removed, such that, the ARF and the SDHP societies, *which were Armenian terrorist organizations*, opened new branches with legal signboards in many cities of the empire. They turned their buildings into stores of guns and ammunition" (emphases are mine).¹²

Contrary to Öztuna's views, contemporary international literature on the issue clearly shows that the emergence of the "Armenian Question" was considerably earlier than its appearance in the international diplomacy of the last quarter of the 19th century, after the intervention of powerful European states. The emergence of the question can be roughly divided into different phases: a) the "re-conquering" of the eastern *vilayets* in the 1830s by the Ottoman central state in order to dismantle the Kurdish domains that were experiencing considerable autonomy and settle the nomadic Kurds; b) the Tanzimat reforms after 1839, which aimed at reaching a peak of modernization and usually created serious fiscal pressure, especially for the non-Muslims of the eastern *vilayets* because of double taxation by the state and the Kurdish tribes; c) the migration into Anatolia of hundreds of thousands of Muslims escaping from Russian rule, which started with the Crimean War in 1854-56 (and even earlier, to 1829, after the Treaty of Adrianople) and continued for decades. This exacerbated the land conflicts between Muslim and non-Muslim communities.¹³

The emergence of the Armenian political parties and their transformation into legal parties after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 was one of the most important phases of the Armenian Question and the Armenian-Turkish relations. Today, as seen in the instances above, most of the scholars in Turkey - focusing mainly on justification of the massacres and deportations of 1915 - look at historical events and their development from a perspective influenced or "damaged" by the 1915 events. They

ignore the impressive changes that the Armenian political movements underwent after the 1908 Revolution. Studying the period without assessing the cooperation or common political agendas of the Armenian parties and the Young Turks before and after the Young Turk Revolution distorts the facts and portrays Armenian political activities as only terrorist attacks against the Sultan and the territorial integrity of the state. Such an approach fails to explain why, for instance, Tevfik Fikret, a prominent intellectual and poet would write a poem on the unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Sultan Abdülhamid by Armenian revolutionaries in July 1905. Obviously, Armenian-Turkish relations were very complicated and need a closer and deeper examination:

O sacred explosion, O revengeful smoke
Who and what you are?
Who are the reason for this attack? For what?
There are thousands watching over you, but you are not there;
You look like an invisible but savior's hand.
O glorious hunter, you didn't lay your trap in vain;
You fired, but unfortunately could not hit!
The ignoble having fun by crushing a nation,
Owes his joy gratefully to a moment of delay.¹⁴

A precise assessment of the emergence of the Armenian Question and the legitimized political organizations, alongside the priorities of the Ottoman state, are necessary to understand this transformation and more generally the political conditions in which these activities took place. Thus, one needs to understand the most influential line of activity among the Armenians in the second constitutional period until 1915, of which the ARF as a political party and Krikor Zohrab as an ideologist and an independent Ottoman-Armenian intellectual were the most influential representatives.¹⁵

Troshag (flag), the official organ of the Geneva-based ARF, expressed very intense emotions towards Fikret after the assassination attempt: "The hatred which accumulated inside us came out with a great explosion and shook the Yıldız and its environs! One minute later, a few steps nearer... The owner of the crown would have fallen without breath with all his camarilla."¹⁶

Dramatically, opposing the views of Fikret and *Troshag*, *Arevelian Mamul* (Eastern Press), an Armenian journal of İzmir, exalted Sultan's salvation from the bomb through prayers: "Asdvadz Bahe Mer Veh. Sultane: Hulis Ute Orvan Vad Ararke" (God Save Our Grand Sultan: Bad Event of Eight of July).¹⁷

ARMENIAN COMMUNITY, ARMENIAN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES AND THE OTTOMAN STATE IN THE 19TH CENTURY

Armenians in the Ottoman Empire constituted a multi-layered heterogeneous entity, both horizontally and vertically. Their concerns varied depending on certain regional or social characteristics. In order to understand the “Armenian Question” and the diverse dimensions of Ottoman Armenian life in the 19th century it is important to take into account the huge social, cultural and economic peculiarities of big cities such as İstanbul or İzmir, or in those *vilayets* populated by Armenians such as Garin (Erzurum), Paghesh (Bitlis), Daron (Muş), and Vasbouragan (Van), or the villages of different sizes on the peripheries of these cities.

a) Geographical and Social Differences

The Armenian *millet*¹⁸ which was organized under the leadership of the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople in 1461 by a *ferman* (imperial decree) of Sultan Mehmed II, had significant geographic, economic and social differences within itself: the peasants in the countryside, the *esnaf* or the people of traditional crafts in small towns, the owners and the workers in the small factories or workshops, the population in the big cities dealing with crafts or trade, and merchants traveling throughout the empire, etc.

Anaide Ter Minassian describes the similarities between Armenians living in the Ottoman and Russian empires in the 19th century. According to Ter Minassian, the Armenian people commonly had a social structure with a “broad peasant base, a relatively developed middle class, a national clergy, and no nobility.” The Armenian middle class was made up of traditional artisans, traders in villages and small towns, the caste of artisans and bazaar merchants in the cities, intellectuals and well-to-do members of liberal professions.

According to Ronald Grigor Suny, in the 19th century, the Armenians were a nation divided in two major ways: geographically and by social class.¹⁹ Geographically, the Armenians of Armenia were divided by the frontier among the Persian, Ottoman and Russian Empires. “But more than a geographical separation,”²⁰ this division had important social, cultural, and economic effects. In the late 19th century the Ottoman Armenians were “poorer,” “less well-educated,” “less urbanized,” and more “backward,” than their brethren in Russian Armenia. The rural population of the eastern *vilayets* had little contact with the urban, commercial Armenian elite,²¹ and was frequently threatened by Kurdish, or newcoming Muslim immigrant neighbors.²² Suny concludes that: “Both Turkish and Russian Armenians lived in stratified societies, the elites of which were urban, cosmopolitan, educated, while the majority lived in a culture of poverty bounded by the limits of village life.”²³

In a nutshell, the Armenians of the Ottoman and Russian Empires, were grouped in social classes and lived in dissimilar conditions due to the diverse economic development of their countries. Likewise, the life-styles, expectations, aims, world perceptions, and most importantly, interests of different Armenian social classes varied. Consequently, it is impossible to present Armenian society in the 19th century as homogeneous. Statements that the “Armenians were aiming at this” or “Armenians were doing that,” are historically groundless, and more importantly, essentialist. Interestingly, although the geographic divisions among the Armenians played an important role in determining their political attitudes, it was the Russian or Caucasian Armenians who paid attention to the problems of their brethren living in the eastern *vilayets* of the Ottoman Empire, rather than the Armenians of İstanbul or İzmir, who shared the same dialect and the same country.

b) The Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople

Although the Armenian *millet* was over different regions, from east (i.e. Kars, Van) to west (i.e. Kütahya, İzmit), from north (i.e. Trabzon, Kastamonu) to south (i. e. Adana, Aleppo) at the beginning of the 19th century, the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople was the most important center of its internal organization and administration. The traditional system of *zimmi*²⁴ which was based on a rough separation of the non-Muslims from Muslims, gave the Patriarch broad authority, which went far beyond religious power and acquired a social aspect too.

The Patriarchate was the center that granted civil rights of divorce and inheritance. The Patriarchate was also the only authority that could permit the printing of various kinds of books.²⁵ It collected *azkayeen durk* (national tax) from the Armenian subjects of the Empire. A quotation from an article of Garabed Utudjian (1823-1904), an influential journalist and the founder of the most effective Armenian magazine of the period published in İstanbul, *Masis* (1852-1908), might show the authority the Patriarchate exercised over its nation.

In those days, the name of the Patriarchate was terrifying. When a porter came to a man and said “Come here, the *vekil hayrsourp* (holy father) wants you!” the spit in the man’s mouth would dry, and he would start to tremble due to his fear. It was impossible to oppose. The porter carried a hooked chain under his coat; if anyone resisted, he would fasten the chain around his neck and pull along him by force like a dog; nobody could save that miserable man from the porter’s hands. [When they got to the Patriarchate] it was out of question to utter any word to the *vekil hayrsourp*. Without any long prologue, he applied force to the baron or

agha who had a grand *kalpak* or a nice coat, and ‘honored’ him with 25-30 strokes of a cane.²⁶

The new bureaucracy made serious reforms to modernize the state apparatus and daily life, as the political environment of the *Tanzimat* period provided a convenient milieu for the realization of innovative ideas in the Armenian community. The power the Armenian Patriarchate wielded over the Armenians was harsh. It generated distress and uneasiness, especially among the middle classes of the big cities and the upcoming Armenian intelligentsia. This civil and “secular” opposition movement against both the clergy and the wealthier class, who controlled the Patriarchate or at least co-operated with the clergy, made the transformation of the balance of power possible. It was the intellectual structure of this opposition movement that generated attention to the problems of the Armenians of Anatolia. However, this movement - although aware of the sufferings of the rural Armenian population - avoided developing strategies to address their problems.

c) *Amiras, Esnafs*, and the “Young Armenians”

During the period between the 17th century and the second half of the 19th century, the master of the Patriarchate was not the Patriarch or the higher echelons of the religious hierarchy. Wealthy Armenians, called *amira*²⁷ thanks to their economic status, held the power to dominate and control the administrative affairs of the Patriarchate. The *amiras* had strong ties with the Ottoman state administration and mostly occupied high offices in the state bureaucracy. The *sarrafs*, who supplied cash to the tax collectors and the state, the directors of the imperial mint (*darphane emini*), the chief masters of architecture (*hassa mimari*), the heads of the imperial gunpowder factories (*barutcubaşı*), the heads of the imperial bakery (*ekmekçibaşı*), the heads of the imperial jewelry (*kuyumcubaşı*) and others were mostly members of the Armenian *amira* families. Because of the recurring debt crises of the Patriarchate, the *amiras* supplied money to the Patriarchate. The *amira* class played a role similar to charitable and benevolent associations or philanthropic societies. They founded schools, orphanages, hospitals, and churches in the capital. Thanks to these activities they presented themselves as the leaders of the nation, chose patriarchs among the archbishops who would defend their economic and political interests, and subverted those who acted against their interests.²⁸

As of the late 18th century, due to their rising economic power and customary bonding, the Armenian *esnafs* - the “middle class” of the Armenian population in the capital - gained a foothold on the administrative stage, especially in the local neighborhood assemblies (*taghagan khorhurt*) which were traditionally organized around churches.

The history of Armenian Constantinople in the 19th century is usually presented by both religious and lay Armenian historians as a history of class struggle between two classes.²⁹ This contest between the *amiras* and *esnafs* is described as the motor of change and progress. That is true especially when the process through which the *esnafs* became increasingly involved in national problems is taken into consideration. When the *esnafs* demanded participation in the administration of the Patriarchate, and consequently in the affairs of the whole *millet*, the *amiras* feared losing ground and violently opposed them. The conflict lasted for decades and ended in the 1850s, when a small but effective group, the young generation of Europe-educated intellectuals, entered as a third class into the arena against the *amiras*.

Unlike the *esnafs* and *amiras*, the world view of these “Young Armenians”³⁰ was not limited to their class interests or participation in the decision making mechanisms of the Patriarchate. They were aware of the problems of the modernization process carried out during the *Tanzimat* era in the Ottoman state and the conditions of the Armenians in the rural Anatolian areas. According to their interpretation, the only way to “rescue” both the state and the *millet* was “re-organization.” They stressed the need for “modern” apparatuses such as a constitution, elections, and parliament. They considered education crucial for the transformation of society and founded the *Araratian Engerutiun* (Ararat Society) in Paris, in 1849, aiming at the development of the Armenian educational system in the Ottoman Empire. The charter of the association proclaimed the project’s broad scope from the capital to Anatolia. The “elitist” perspective of the charter distinguished the movement from the Caucasian Armenians’ class-based perspective.

Only the elite of a nation can comprehend the true significance of the word “nation”... It is because of ignorance that our nation has reached this miserable condition... the happiness of a nation can only come through education... The aim of the Araratian Engerutiun is to bring progress to the Armenian nation and to provide for all its needs...³¹

The publishers of the charter, who were Armenian educated youths from diverse universities of Europe and mostly came from higher and middle class Armenian families of İstanbul and İzmir, described the conditions of the Armenian population as “miserable” as early as 1849. Clearly this word mostly refers to the rural Armenian population. James Etmekjian writes that: “Those who went to France were fully acquainted with the Armenian problems at home, namely, a stiflingly authoritarian administration and a state of semi-servitude characterized, among other things, by exploitation, insecurity, unequal justice, heavy taxation, and illiteracy. The social, political, literary, and intellectual ferment they saw in

France contrasted sharply with realities at home.”³² However, one should note that the general socio-economic conditions of the various ethnic groups living in the regions where Armenians lived were not very different. The above provides a notion of the awareness within the Armenian intelligentsia regarding the question of the Armenian people prior to the internationalization of the “Armenian Question” at the Treaty of Berlin in 1878.

Indeed, the pages of the Armenian weekly *Jamanak Hantes Hairenanver* (Time Journal Devoted to the Motherland), which was founded by young Armenians in İstanbul in 1863 in order to spread liberal and constitutionalist ideas, is full of news of unrest among the Armenian rural population in Muş, Bitlis or Van. In its first issue the paper published the petition of a group of Muş migrant workers in İstanbul, addressed to the Patriarch and the Mixed Council of the Patriarchate, describing the conditions in the rural areas:

Although the appointment of patriot Mgrdich Khrimian Vartabed to Muş as the religious leader is a great joy, the sufferings of the people of Muş in the hands of unlawful and bandit Kurds have become unbearable and have led us to desperation. Until this day, with the efforts of the esteemed *kaymakam paşa* it has been possible, to a certain extent, to find a cure to Kurdish attacks. However, the fact that the *kaymakamlık* has been moved from Muş to Bitlis has led to our utmost desperation. Now we apply to you, our exalted Patriarch and our respected council members; please take a look at the miserable condition of your brethren. We, the people of Muş, are all peasants, sow the land with great effort and try to earn the daily bread of our children. Throughout the year we stand up against snow, rain and sun and work hard; yet, unlawful Kurds come and seize our crops. (While our hands are tied, who can resist them?) During these confiscations, do you think abduction of girls decreases? The tithe given to the state has got out of control and has become twenty-, thirty-fold more. According to the law, it is necessary to pay one-tenth of the total harvest. Now, they ask for money from us. Money! And we do not know where to find this money. The first signs of this poverty are starting to be seen. In recent times five to six hundred people from Muş have left their homes for İstanbul. And to become what? A porter, if he can manage to! Each day more and more people disperse their family among other households and go to İstanbul. There is even emigration to Russia.³³ If it continues like this, one day you will find no Armenians in Muş... .

14 November 1862, İstanbul, Suffering emigrant people of Muş³⁴

In another issue the paper gave a list of illegal acts that Armenians faced in Muş:

21 April: Karaçoban village. The son of Shedo was shot in the field while talking to Kurds. / 23 April: Haramik village. The son of Sarkis, while putting sheep out to pasture, was wounded by Kurds, and his clothes were also taken. / 27 April: Kaghnik village. The son of Minas was stabbed by Kurds of his own village. The guilty were arrested by the police but released in two to three days. / 1 May: Burnaz village. The son of Reis Bade was wounded by Kurds as he was ploughing the land. / 6 May: Yeniköy village. The son of Reis Amrga was shot with a rifle as accompanied his sheep, near to their village. / 8 May: Duman village. They shot and wounded the son of Reis Simon in the mill, stole four bushels [kile] of flour and ran away. / 22 May: At three o'clock on Monday morning, on the eastern side of Surp Garabed Monastery, outside the city walls, two gunshots were heard. Fortunately, the bullets passed over the roof and did not hurt anybody. The same event was repeated on Sunday night around half past four. All panicked, and we called the police.³⁵

Such instances clearly show that the rural Armenian population looked to their brethren living in the urban centers of the Empire for help to address their problems. But, as Hratch Dasnabedian points out, the *amiras* of İstanbul and the conservative higher strata of Armenians had, “voluntarily or involuntarily, no power to improve the unbearable conditions of the Armenians of the eastern provinces of Turkey.”³⁶

However, this European populist idealism brought in by the nationalist-reformist ideology of the liberals, who were looking for a solution to the sufferings of the rural Armenian population, was confronted by the conservative elements who were mostly related to the state. This confrontation prevented them from addressing the lawlessness in the Armenian *vilayets*. Very inexperienced, the liberals failed to remove the invisible barriers between the capital and the rural areas.

The Young Armenians stepped back politically due to the opposition of the *amiras*, but hit back by actively getting involved in the educational system of the community. In 1853, they first entered one of the executive committees of the Patriarchate and took over all the seats of the *Usumnagan Khorhurt* (Educational Committee), which was based on the *Academie Française* model. However, they were more seriously challenged by the *amiras* when they initiated modernization of the classical Armenian language, the *krapar*, which was very different from the Armenian spoken in everyday life. In 1853, when Krikor Odian, who later became a consultant of Mithat Paşa (the father of Ottoman constitutionalist movement), published a grammar book named *Ughghakhosutiun Arti Hay Lezouin* (The Orthology of Contemporary Armenian) with the consent of the Educational Committee, the Young Armenians were harshly criticized

by the *amiras* and the intellectuals who supported them. The book was seized and banned by a decision of the Patriarchate. The central administration of the Patriarchate, whose members were mostly *amiras*, judged the author and proclaimed him guilty; with the help of the Patriarch, Hagopos Seropian, Odian barely escaped excommunication.³⁷ The struggle between conservatives and liberals on education and language issues reflected the difference in the political conceptualization of the future of both the Armenian and the Ottoman states. The words of Odian about Nahabed Rusinian, one of the prominent liberals of the time, must be understood in this context: “In those days, the Nation had a semblance of an administration, a semblance of a language, and a semblance of schools. They [Rusinian and Krikor Odian - R.K.] undertook to give form to these three things, which are the three things essential to national progress. From these undertakings the Constitution, Orthology, and the Educational Council were born.”³⁸

d) The Armenian National Constitution and the Rural Armenian Population

In 1860, after long negotiations and examinations, the *Azkayeen Sahmanatroutiun Hayots*³⁹ (*Nizamname-i Millet-i Ermeniyen*, Armenian National Constitution) was approved by the *Azkayeen Joghov* (National Council) of the Patriarchate. The Constitution, the first of its kind, was a victory for the Young Armenians, who called themselves *lusavorial* (enlightened) and their rivals *khavarial* (living in darkness). These were the most popular terms against the *amira* class in the Armenian papers of the time. However, the Ottoman state did not ratify the text, despite the fact that it was the Sublime Porte at the first instance who had encouraged the non-Muslim *millets* to prepare *nizamnames* (constitutions) after the Reform Edict (*Islahat Fermani*) of 1856.⁴⁰ As a result, in 1863, a “revised” edition of the Constitution was ratified by the Sublime Porte. But, as Arshag Alboyadjian’s detailed comparative analysis of the two texts shows, the revised constitution was insufficient to respond to the demands and needs of the Armenian community:

All the amendments, which had a purpose, were enforced by the nature of the Sublime Porte, which cannot be reconciled with the constitutional regulations due to its monarchical foundations. Therefore, the 1860 Constitution, a pure document of law in language, organization and legal perfection, when rewritten as the 1863 Constitution, had lost much of its original perfection. In general, the 1860 National Constitution was an example of a constitution based on democratic principles. On these grounds, the basic principles, national executive structure, sphere of jurisdiction of each institution, and mutual relations were constructed. However, in the 1863 Constitution, these were no longer the main

sections of the text; instead of a clear description, they were only implied implicitly.

(...) [the 1863 Constitution as a] document of law, which can only implicitly express its spirit, will eventually carry the signs of this forced effort, and will be a victim of these shortcomings.⁴¹

An analysis of the 1863 Constitution shows that the inclusion of the rural Armenian community was very limited. Out of the 140 members of the Armenian National Council only 40 representatives (two-seventh of the total) were to be elected from the Anatolian *vilayets*. 80 would come from the various suburbs of the capital, and another 20 would be elected from among the higher echelons of the clerical hierarchy. Article 66 granted eligibility to vote to males who were above 25⁴² and paid at least 75 *kuruş* per year as “national tax.”⁴³ Moreover, according to Article 70 those elected as representatives of the cities of the *kavars* (provinces), did not have to live in those cities. Consequently, the majority of the representatives was elected from among the Armenian notables of İstanbul.⁴⁴

The majority of the Armenian population living in the villages or small towns of Anatolia could not make their voice heard in the Council or put their problems onto its agenda and bring them to the attention of the Patriarchate. This created many problems, especially at a time when the Armenians in Anatolia had pending and unresolved security concerns. It was a “dialog of the deaf” between İstanbul and the Anatolia Armenians. It is noteworthy that, even as late as 1908, the party formed under the name of *Ermeni Meşrutiyet ve Hukuk-ı Avam Taraftararı* (The Armenian Party of Supporters of Constitutional Rule and Rights of the Commons) expressed the need (in the second article of the “National Purpose” section of its program), to “modify the Armenian National Constitution (...) to current needs”⁴⁵ in order to resolve the problems in the representation scheme. Resolutions of the Seventh Congress of the ARF held in August 1913 said: “Due to the deficiencies of the Armenian National Constitution, various strata of the Armenian community were not represented in the National Central Council according to their real numbers and power. The voices of İstanbul Armenians overwhelm the millions of Armenians in provinces, thus depriving most of the social classes.”⁴⁶

The Young Armenians gained significant success against their rivals, the *amira* class, with the help of their allies, the *esnaf*s. Nevertheless, they could not put an end to the dominance of the Armenian notables in the affairs of the *millet*. More importantly, however, the Young Armenians succeeded in drawing attention to the hardships their compatriots suffered in Anatolia. Yet, in the final analysis, they lost the opportunity to guarantee

the representation of the Armenian masses in Armenian national institutions. Their belief in reform as a method to change society and their elitism prevented them from creating extensive, radical programs to address the “national question.” Their failure in addressing the problems of the Armenian rural population became increasingly obvious at a time when the conditions of the Armenians were worsening in the second half of the 19th century. Although the liberals in the capital or other urban centers aimed at national progress through education, in most cases the problems rural communities faced were beyond the capacity of such a perspective. In 1886, a writer from Muş, Kegham D. G. Daronian,⁴⁷ criticized this perspective in an article published in *Masis*: “Bread first and education second! ...The village schools today ...are a real danger to agriculture, depleting its forces by producing more and more vagrants and unemployed every year.”⁴⁸

Nevertheless, one of the most important outcomes of the liberal movement was “cultural revival”. After the 1850s, impressive numbers of cultural and educational institutions as well as printing and publication houses, were founded. The growth of the Armenian press was astonishing. The journals published news and articles about Armenian communities, especially about those in Eastern Anatolia, in order to establish a bond with them.⁴⁹ A large number of educational, cultural, patriotic and national-social organizations flourished, along with student, graduate and educational unions. Alongside the nationalist literary works of authors such as Khachatur Abovian (1804/1809-1848), Father Mgrdich Khrimian (1820-1907), Raphael Patkianian (1830-1892), Father Leon Alishan (1820-1901) and Raffi (Hagop Melik Hagopian, 1835-1888), which influenced successive generations, this cultural base generated an appropriate environment for the development of Armenian political parties.⁵⁰

e) Politics Among Western and Caucasian Armenians

The failure of the Armenian middle class and the intelligentsia in western Anatolia and the capital to resolve the “national problem” was a factor in generating political organizations which more openly defended the rights of the Armenians of Anatolia. In line with the Bulgarian nationalist and Russian/Caucasian socialist movements, the methods of these Armenian organizations were not reformist but revolutionary, especially as a reaction to the Armenian libertarian movement developed by the Armenian intellectuals in mid-century İstanbul. Indeed, “The Armenian intelligentsia in Turkey studied in Italy and France. They were aroused by the French revolutions, the unification of Italy, and pre-Marxian socialism. The Armenian intelligentsia in Russia studied in Moscow, Saint

Petersburg, Dorpat, Leipzig, and Berlin. They went through the same phases as the Russian intelligentsia and discovered Marxism.”⁵¹

The differences between the political movements developed in Istanbul and in the Caucasus were clearly diagnosed by Ronald Gregor Suny. He notes that the Young Armenians of the Ottoman Empire were educated in Western countries, influenced by Western literary movements, and developed a liberal streak stronger than the Russian Armenians. This movement was developed by a reformist intelligentsia “that largely avoided the more violent revolutionary influences of the Caucasians.” The Armenian bourgeoisie was not happy with revolutionary ideas and “did not, for the most part, see itself as responsible for the welfare of the Armenian masses, the peasant majority and the new, emerging working class. Rather than developing a sense of national leadership, or placing themselves at the head of a national movement, the Armenian bourgeoisie tended to attach its fortunes to the fate of the imperial powers.” Under these conditions Armenian revolutionary parties, particularly the most influential ones, the Hnchags and Tashnaks, wanted to “shake down” the Armenian bourgeoisie “by threatening it with terrorism.”⁵²

The problem of the Armenians in the Anatolian *vilayets* was often described as agrarian. Ter Minassian notes the conditions the Armenian peasants experienced in the 19th century and highlights some of the crucial problems they suffered. There was a new system of taxes, but the modes of collection remained archaic. As a result, fiscal pressure increased. An additional problem was “double taxation” in the rural areas, one paid to the state and the other generally to the Kurdish tribes. Other related issues, such as the “feudal rent,” abuses, corruption, and anarchy, extortions by tax farmers and usurers (often Armenian *ağas*), and Muslim landowners caused distress. Famines, the dispossession of the Armenian peasantry with the appearance of the Circassians or other Caucasian or European Muslims and the settling of the nomadic Kurds; the pressure of Kurdish tribes forcing them to purchase protection (*hafir* in Kurdish) and the pillaging and carrying off of women and flocks added to the hardships of the rural Armenians.⁵³

To sum up, although the Armenian middle class and the intelligentsia, who initiated the cultural-political movement, were the first to underline the problems of the rural Armenians in the 19th century, under the relatively liberal winds of the *Tanzimat* period, they were unable to transform their gains, especially the Armenian National Constitution and the Armenian National Assembly, into means of talking about the problems in the provinces. Their elitism and the limitations of the Ottoman political environment prevented them from helping the rural population by making their voices heard more.

The activities of the Armenian National Assembly of the Patriarchate ceased on 4 September 1891 due to an imperial decision.⁵⁴ This was one of the acts of suppression of the Hamidian regime. One can assume that the closure of the only legal forum for the expression of Armenian political demands resulted in the strengthening of the Armenian revolutionary parties, which were proclaimed illegal by the regime. Until 1908, the Armenian National Assembly convened three times, but solely to elect the new Patriarch or the committee sent for the election of a new Catholicos in Etchmiadzin. Only after the Proclamation of Liberty in July 1908 did the Armenian National Assembly resume its activities.

On the other hand, after the establishment of various local self-defense organizations in eastern Anatolia and their relatively quick fall, revolutionary organizations were established by Caucasian Armenians, who assumed a position as representatives of the Armenian sufferings in Anatolia. The Armenian bourgeoisie in Tiflis, Baku or Constantinople accepted the disparity between them and rural communities as natural, and they more easily tended to favor an evolutionary transformation of their countries. On the other hand, "...to a small minority of young and sensitive Armenians, this disparity was intolerable and was justified neither by nature nor history."⁵⁵

As Ter Minassian points out, these revolutionary organizations had "a messianic revolutionary and national vocation: to drag the Armenian people out of its 'Asiatic darkness' and economic backwardness, give it back its dignity lost during centuries of subjection, and inculcate it with national consciousness and political will."⁵⁶ In the beginning, Armenian revolutionary circles, being nationalist more than socialist, were far from criticizing Russian autocracy and aiming for Russian help in the resolution of their national question:

The peculiar position of the Armenians as a people divided between two empires imposed a stark political choice on radical Armenians: as radical opponents of political oppression they might join with their comrades of other nationalities and work toward the elimination of Russian autocracy, or they might go their own way, organize autonomously, and work against the Ottoman oppressors of the Armenian peasants in Anatolia. Paradoxically, the Armenians' contact with Russian populism helped to shape their consciousness of the conditions in which their brethren in Turkey lived, and, therefore, impelled Caucasian Armenians to turn from the struggle against Russian autocracy toward the national struggle in Turkey.⁵⁷

Although they remained a minority, there were also some groups or factions opposing the trend concentrating only on Anatolia. Such groups argued the importance of addressing Caucasian Armenian hardships as

well. Especially after the 1880s the Russification policies of the Russian autocracy in the Caucasus in particular created unrest. Indeed, in 1881 the Tsarist government closed down Armenian schools in Baku, Tiflis, Batum and Yerevan. These policies instigated Armenian revolutionaries to start searching for co-operation with revolutionary organizations of other nationalities in the Caucasus.

Consequently, the claim that Armenian political movements, especially the revolutionary ones, emerged as a result of imperialist projects is unfounded. It is justified to say that, especially after the Berlin Congress, Armenian revolutionaries tried to attract foreign attention to the Armenian *vilayets*. They took to the streets and claimed that imperialist power politics often took advantage of the Armenian revolutionary activities in order to control the area - especially at a time when western public opinion was prepared to condemn the “Muslims” because of the “Christian” sufferings in the “Orient.”⁵⁸ Nonetheless, Armenian political activities, in essence, were responses and reactions to the sufferings experienced. They emerged mostly because of the new economic regulations of the Tanzimat era.⁵⁹ Moreover, the Armenian upper class of İstanbul and İzmir, who dealt with trade or occupied high ranking of state offices, were mostly opposed to Armenian revolutionary activities. The tension and split between higher and lower Armenian classes became obvious in the last quarter of the 19th century. They are realistically reflected even in literary short stories and novels of the time.⁶⁰

One may argue that the Ottoman government approached the Armenian issue having in mind the likelihood of Russian occupation of the area, especially after the changes in international politics, particularly the British-Russian rapprochement in the last decade of the century. Various sources, like the diary of Saadettin Paşa, the Van area inspector in 1896, show how the state’s main concerns were focused on the prevention of foreign intervention.⁶¹ It is equally obvious, however, especially after the Berlin Congress, where the Ottoman state agreed to introduce “improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians,” that Abdülhamid II aimed at gaining time in order to dilute the application of the reforms.⁶² This defensive attitude, in fact, was one of the main reasons for the increase in Armenian revolutionary activity to attract Western attention. Thus, historical analyses show that claims that the emergence of Armenian revolutionary activities was directly and solely the result of imperialist intervention are groundless.

f) Armenian Political Organizations in Anatolia

The first Armenian national organizations in the Anatolian provinces, such as *Azadoutian Miutiun* (The Union of Salvation) in Van (1872), *Sev*

Khach Engeroutiun (Black Cross Society) in Van (1878), *Bashdban Hayreniats* (The Defender of the Motherland) in Erzurum (1881), *Yergrakordzagan Engeroutiun* (Agricultural Society) in Erzurum (1882)⁶³ and the *Armenagan* (The Followers of Armenia Newspaper) in Van (1885),⁶⁴ were local organizations. They “were unable to transform genuine feelings of patriotism and devotion to the people into a viable movement with an adequate strategy.” They remained local and failed to become national organizations “because their articulation of grievances did not encompass a conceptual framework.”⁶⁵

We know little about *Azadoutian Miutiun*, *Sev Khaç Engeroutiun* and *Bashdban Hayreniats*, but according to the program of the *Armenagan*, the party was to “win for the Armenians the right to rule over themselves through revolution.”⁶⁶ The party, the first Armenian political party in the Ottoman Empire, planned to accomplish its objectives “By uniting all patriotic Armenians⁶⁷ who believed in the same ideal... by disseminating revolutionary ideas through literature and oral propaganda, by proper education, by the cultivation of regular and continual relationships... By inculcating in the people the spirit of self-defense - training them in the use of arms and military discipline, supplying them with arms and money, and organizing guerrilla forces... By preparing the people for a general movement, especially when the external circumstances - the disposition of the foreign powers and the neighboring races - seem to favor the Armenian cause... .”⁶⁸ Thus, the party planned armed resistance. According to Louise Nalbandian, “Most of the military equipment was acquired from Turkish officials through bribery, and although the transportation of arms from Persia was difficult and hazardous work, some came from that source.”⁶⁹

In 1896, at a time when political tension was high in Van due to political and ethnic unrest, the *Armenagan* Party reached its peak of popularity. The *Hnchags* and *Tashnaks* also participated in the armed movement, but the *Armenagan* - as the local force - led the “defense of Van” during the massacres of 1896. When the Ottoman military suppressed the “defense,” the party members were driven to the East, to Persia and were massacred on the way. After the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, the *Armenagan* Party joined two other small Armenian groups - a faction from the *Veragazmial Hnchag* Party, and the *Miutiunagan* (Unity Society) - in establishing the *Ramgavar* (Democrat) Party.⁷⁰

Three Armenian educational institutions played an important role in the development of Armenian political movements. The *Nercesian Academy* in Tbilisi, the *Kevorkian Seminary* in Etchmiadzin, and the *Lazarian* (or *Lazarev*) *Academy* in Moscow were the most important Armenian educational institutions in the shaping of the young and dedicated Armenian intelligentsia. Most of the graduates of these schools

joined Armenian schools in western and eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus as teachers, and played important roles in the formation and development of different political movements.⁷¹

g) The Hnchag Party

The Hnchag Party⁷² was founded in August 1887 in Geneva by seven Caucasian Armenians. These were European university students in their twenties and came from bourgeois families.⁷³ The political considerations of the Party were strongly influenced by Russian Narodnik and other populist movements, and by the views of G. V. Plekhanov and Vera Zasulich. Their methods and political formulations strongly resembled the Russian *Narodnaya Volya* (people's will).⁷⁴ Even the party's name, Hnchag (which means "bell" in Armenian) was an imitation of Alexander Herzen's newspaper *Kolokol*.

The Party ideology included both nationalist and Marxist elements. Nalbandian underlines that the Hnchags were the only Armenian political party in the 19th century whose program demanded an independent and united Armenian state and a socialist order for all the people.⁷⁵ It cooperated with revolutionary movements of other peoples in the Caucasus against Russian suppression of Armenian cultural and religious foundations and struggled against Tsarist policies. According to Ter Minassian, the Caucasian Hnchags were the first to introduce socialism into the Armenian Question. They were the first to concern themselves with problems of propaganda. "In its early days, Hnchag political thought, literally bogged down in sentiment, was reduced to a turgid and incantatory revolutionary verbiage in which words like 'revolution,' 'revolutionary,' 'freedom,' 'despotism,' 'barbarism,' 'misery,' 'humiliation,' 'sacrifices,' and 'socialism' recurred with regularity."⁷⁶

The Party program drafted in 1886 by the founders had two major aims: a) criticism of the "oppression" and "exploitation" of the existing system and suggestions for the foundation of a new system on the basis of humanitarian and socialist principles through revolution. The Program, divided society into two: "the exploiters" and "the exploited";⁷⁷ b) the political and national freedom of Turkish Armenia as the end result of their nationalism and patriotism. Additionally, the program enumerated the principles that were to be followed after the realization of the immediate objectives mentioned above.⁷⁸ These were: "Extensive provisional autonomy," "extensive communal autonomy," "complete freedom of press, speech, conscience, assembly, and electoral agitation," and "universal military service."⁷⁹

The Hnchags received considerable support, especially from educated Armenian circles. According to a contemporary account, in the first few

months, seven hundred people became members of the party in İstanbul, which is hard to believe keeping in mind the political environment of İstanbul under Hamidian rule.⁸⁰ Until 1896 the leading force in the Armenian revolutionary movement was the Hnchag Party.⁸¹ Although the Party mostly stressed Marxist and socialist principles in articles appearing in its paper *Hnchag* - which was distributed secretly in İstanbul and in other parts of the Empire - the supporters of the Party knew little about socialism. “Many party members were not socialists by persuasion, but rather joined the Hnchags because of their immediate objective of winning the freedom of Turkish Armenia.”⁸²

To better understand the mottos that inspired the Armenian youth or intelligentsia in the early years of the Hnchag movement, the memoirs of an Armenian revolutionary, Vahan Papazian, give us some important clues. Papazian, a native of Van, joined the Hnchag branch in Rostov in 1896 when he was nineteen. Later he changed his allegiance and became one of the most important figures of the Tashnag Party. According to him, heroism and nationalist ideas mattered greatly for the young.

We were all searching; looking for big, dangerous, important adventures fitting our age. ...Then, in Spring 1896, Father Khrimian⁸³ came to Nor Nakhichevan. ...In church, with his great simplicity, with exciting pictures, he described the sufferings of the Armenians of Turkey, the uprisings of Sasun and Cilicia, the massacres, and the miserable life that our brothers were living and called us to help them.

(...) When Ms. Sirmakeshian introduced me to a pleasant person who was a merchant, Arshag Hodjaian...; he encouraged me to enter a more active movement. The meaning of “the active movement” was not so clear to me; understanding the meaning of my questioning eyes, he gave me an appointment for a simpler and more detailed conversation. When I went to his place, in the beginning he was very reserved, but then gradually relaxed and told me about the uprisings of Sasun and Cilicia and the Hnchagian Party. I had heard about the demonstrations that were organized by the Hnchags, and also about its famous leaders; but from Hodjaian I learned its history with admiration. As a result of all this, after a few days he introduced me to the administrators of the Hnchagian chapter. ...As a first undertaking they wanted me to organize the students of Nor Nakhichevan. They gave me the Program of the Hnchagian, the paper *Hnchag*, and let me out through a hidden door.⁸⁴

Obviously, the main concern of most of the members of the Hnchag Party was the liberation of Armenia and its people and the struggle against Tsarism. The Party’s emphasis on socialism continued - perhaps to acquire the support of European and Russian socialists for the Armenian Question. At the London Hnchag Conference of 1896, due to core disagreements on

the socialist principles of the Party, the Party Center was criticized harshly by the nationalist elements of the Party. They argued that the Party's emphasis on socialism in the resolution of the Armenian Question alienated the Armenian middle class and bourgeoisie, and thus, limited the Party's power. They insisted on abandoning socialism and adopting a more reformist, democratic, liberal ideology. The Congress ended with the division of the Party. Consequently, in 1898, a liberal-democrat wing of the Party, called *Veragazmial Hnchagian Gousagtsoutiun* (the Reformed Hnchag Party), was founded. The Party's struggle against Tsarism became more violent, especially after 1903, when the Tsarist government confiscated all Armenian national property. Although the situation changed in June 1905 through the imperial decision that ordered the return of the confiscated properties,⁸⁵ the attitude of the Party towards the Russian authorities remained unchanged: "It is apparent from the news of the last days that the Tsarist government is approaching Armenians with a meaningful smile on its face. But, it must know that we are not the kind to believe such smiles any more!"⁸⁶

After the Young Turk revolution, the Hnchag Party, like other Armenian parties, adopted a legal course, declared its respect for Ottoman territorial integrity, and aimed at the democratization of constitutional rule. Although it supported the CUP (Committee of Union and Progress) during the March 31 counter-revolutionary attempt in Istanbul, the Party remained in opposition, especially after the Adana massacres, and co-operated with the non-Armenian parties opposing CUP policies. In the first electoral period in 1908 a representative of the Hnchag Party, Hampartzum Boyadjian (known by the *nome de guerre* "Murad" before the revolution) was elected from Kozan (Adana region), to the Ottoman Parliament.

The personality of Boyadjian clearly symbolizes the transformation the Hnchag Party underwent during the constitutional period. Boyadjian was one of the best known Armenian *fedais*. He had fought against the Ottoman forces, but thanks to the constitutional shift, he became a respected member of parliament and political circles.

h) The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF)

In the summer of 1890, three years after the foundation of the Hnchag Party, *Hay Heghapokhagan Tashnagtsutyun* (The Armenian Revolutionary Federation) was founded in Tbilisi by three Caucasian Armenians. Prior to its foundation, several small revolutionary groups in Tbilisi - socialists, nationalists, liberals, democrats - concerned with lack of power, discussed the necessity of a new, combined party. The new party aimed at coordinating the activities of various student and radical groups for the purpose of "mounting a unified struggle for the political and economic

liberation of Turkish Armenia.”⁸⁷ The name, *Tashnagtsutyun* (Federation) symbolized the unity of these divided groups.

Influenced mostly by the Russian Narodnik movement, and Caucasian and Balkan revolutionary groups, the ARF was politically and sociologically not very different from the Hnchag. In fact, the main aim when founding the ARF was to create a unity, especially with the Hnchag as the most important party in the political arena: “The Hnchagian and Tashnagtsutyun parties were sociologically identical, had identical objectives (the defense and emancipation of Turkish Armenians), and saw ‘Armenian revolution’ as a means to activate European diplomacy and advance the political solution of the Armenian Question.”⁸⁸ After some attempts, however, “it had also become clear that the ARF had failed in its efforts to include within the federation the largest and most important ...group, the Hnchag Party.”⁸⁹ According to Suny, “What ultimately divided them (the two parties - R.K.) appeared in 1890 to be a mere difference of emphasis on the relative weight to be given to the socialist program of the Geneva revolutionaries and the nationalist sentiments of the Armenians in the Caucasus and in Turkey.”⁹⁰

Since the formation of the Party was a result of the coalition of various groups, its earliest document was a “naive and patriotic Manifesto calling on all Armenians - including the young, the old, the rich, women, priests - to support the ‘people’s war’ and the ‘Secret Task’ against the Turkish government.”⁹¹ In the founding meetings in Tbilisi in 1890 one of the most important decisions of the participants was “to set the organizational goal to bring about the political and economic freedom of Turkish Armenia.”⁹² In its Second Congress in 1892 the Party declared that “the aim of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation is to gain the economic and political freedom of Turkish Armenians through rebellion.”⁹³ However, the aims of the 1907 Program of the party reflected the transformation of its political discourse: “Political-economic freedom, based on local autonomy and federative ties, within the boundaries of a democratic Ottoman state...”⁹⁴

The Party aimed at rekindling the nationalist feelings of the Armenian populace especially in order to create a broader range of activities. In most cases, “the glorious days of Armenian historical kingdoms and nobility” were the most important means to secure this. A letter written by Khrimian to the people of Van noted:

The appearance of political parties among you is an example of the rebirth of the historical houses of our nobility, while the Tashnagtsutyun Party is the new Armenian Knighthood. Its pioneers have shown themselves to be true knights in Van or elsewhere. Rise, rise Armenians, join this new Armenian knighthood, be heartened.⁹⁵

In the beginning, the ARF regarded socialist propaganda as unfit for the Ottoman Empire since there was neither a working class nor factories and the application of socialist principles in the Ottoman Empire was regarded as “utopian”. Instead, the ARF promoted “the real equality of all nations and religions on the basis of law.”⁹⁶ But in the course of time, it incorporated socialist terminology into its activities. The 1907 Program stated that the party was “a revolutionary and socialist party.”⁹⁷ Especially during the six years separating the party’s first congress (1892) from the second (1898), the ARF became “a growing organization with roots not only in the Caucasus, Persia and Armenia Major,⁹⁸ but it had also become quite a force in Constantinople, Egypt, the Balkans, the United States, etc.”⁹⁹

Especially during deliberations in the second congress, the Party actively discussed spreading revolutionary activity and propaganda among non-Armenian circles. A letter sent to the Party Varna committee from *Troshag* editorial board in Geneva confirms this: “...The matters [in the Congress] concerned our whole organization - tactics, where forces have to be concentrated, strengthening revolutionary organizations, *propaganda among non-Armenians* and Turkish-Armenian circles, the question of cooperation and union, etc.” (emphases are mine).¹⁰⁰

At the second congress the party decided first, “to fashion ties with the Macedonians, Greeks and others,” and second, “to continue to work harmoniously with the Young Turks, to have their newspapers and ours explain to the Turkish government our goals, and to have them create a new revolutionary force.”¹⁰¹ On the other hand, “the Congress unanimously endorsed the principle that without European intervention it would be impossible to bring to a successful conclusion the struggle to free our people and that, therefore, before choosing the methods and times of operations, efforts must be funneled into the task of bringing about such intervention by all means.”¹⁰² Moreover, the Party proclaimed that, ending despotism was only possible through “a violent revolution” by which “consensus of nations, security of work, freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, and freedom of opinion” would be gained.¹⁰³ As a result of these decisions, the party entered into a dialog with Ottoman opposition movements in Europe and in Anatolia whenever possible. An article published in the *Troshag* called all opposition groups to co-operate in order to overthrow Hamidian rule.

The first Congress of Ottoman Opposition Parties was convened in Paris in 1902. The Hnchags and the Tashnaks attended the Congress along with several opposition groups, mainly the Young Turks.¹⁰⁴ Although Armenian revolutionaries and the group of Prince Sabaheddin insisted on violent revolutionary activity as the sole solution to overthrow despotism,

Ahmed Rıza in particular, an *évolutionniste convaincu*, rejected this principle and defended the view that the struggle against despotism must not deviate from legal means and called for the restoration of the Constitution of 1876.¹⁰⁵

In its third congress of 1904, the ARF decided to continue to seek cooperation with other revolutionary elements in the Empire:

It is necessary to remain loyal to the principle of the ARF, which was current until today: to cooperate with other subject peoples of Turkey (Kurds, Turks, Assyrians, Lebanese, Macedonians, etc.). With this aim, all local responsible organs, bureaus, and central committees are informed that they should accomplish this rapprochement in an effective way. ... concerning the Kurdish and Turkish people, it is suggested that from time to time the Western Bureau make publications in Kurdish and Turkish, in which our attitude towards the other ethnic minorities in the country and towards their interests should be explained as well as our mission.¹⁰⁶

In its fourth congress of 1907, the party decided to continue “to hold the cases of Turkish Armenians and Russian Armenians, and additionally, to establish real cooperation and consensus with Kurdish and Turkish elements against the common enemy - the dishonorable regime.”¹⁰⁷ At the same time, *Troshag* started to increase publication of articles under the titles of “Armenian-Turkish Consensus”.¹⁰⁸

On 27-29 December 1907, only seven months before the Young Turk Revolution, the Second Congress of the Ottoman Opposition Parties was convened in Paris by a joint initiative of the ARF and CUP. The SDHP did not participate in the Congress. In January 1908 an article published in *Hnchag*, the official organ of the Party in Paris, listed the reasons that prevented the Party from participating in the Congress. The Party regarded as crucial searches for a legislative program in order to draw a detailed picture of the future revolution, and since there was no mention of this issue, the Party had doubts about the sincerity of the Congress and the Young Turks. The Party also demanded a new Constitution instead of the “Mithadian Constitution of 1876”, which the participants of the Congress regarded as the basis for all legislative activity.¹⁰⁹

At the Congress, the ARF intended to create a coalition in order to overthrow Abdülhamid II. In fact, just before the Congress, the representatives of the parties agreed on some basic principles, including the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The negotiations revolved around methods to be followed for the overthrow of the regime. The ARF proposed urging people to resist the government, not to pay their taxes, to resist conscription, and to organize guerrilla groups. Prince Sabaheddin and his supporters agreed to the proposal of the ARF, but the CUP objected to

certain points, like resisting conscription, on patriotic grounds. They also called for strict regulation of the guerrilla groups so that they would not degenerate into brigands. Moreover, they insisted that terrorism be limited to individual assassinations and not collective acts.¹¹⁰

After the closure of the convention a declaration was issued. It was announced that the groups had agreed to force the Sultan to abdicate, to radically change the existing administration, and to establish a constitutional government.¹¹¹ Amongst the tactics to be adopted were armed resistance against the government, strikes, non-payment of taxes, propaganda within the army, general rebellion, etc.¹¹² Capitalizing on the cooperation among the different elements of the Empire - as pointed out in the text accepted by the Congress: Turks, Armenians, Bulgarians, Wallachs, Albanians, Arabs, Jews, Druzes, Kurds - *Troshag* saluted the congress as “tangible evidence, standing in front of us, that will usher in a new century of work to overthrow Ottoman despotism.”¹¹³ Although Hanioglu rightly points out the reservations of the participants towards each other, and the vulnerability of the cooperation, their common stance on Ottoman territorial integrity is very important for us to show the transformation in ARF objectives. Lima assesses the most important consequences of the Congress as follows: “[After the Congress] the Young Turks had come to the conclusion that brute force might in fact be necessary, while the Dashnaks had decided to try the route of internally driven reforms without European intervention and guarantees.”¹¹⁴ Concerning the Armenian Question, it is also important to note that the participants admitted the sufferings of the Armenians were due to the non-application of the reforms suggested by the Congress of Berlin, and that the opposition movements were a result of these sufferings.¹¹⁵

On the Caucasian front, in 1903, at a time when Tsarist Russia decided to confiscate Armenian church and school properties, the ARF organized general popular uprisings. These acts made Armenian revolutionaries one of the main targets of the anti-revolutionary campaign of the Tsarist regime. The Party decided to cooperate with Russian revolutionary movements in its third congress in 1904, especially with the Social-Revolutionary Party and the Sagardvelo Party of Georgia.¹¹⁶

The Armenian Revolutionary Federation, though accepting that its founding and current aim is to materialize the historical mission of Ottoman Armenia, which is recognized by international treaties, cannot deny the fact that recently human rights have also been violated outside Turkey. The Party has the principle of taking its decisions concerning the protection of these rights and self-defense. Currently, the ARF takes the responsibility of defending the Caucasian Armenians and suggests the Responsible Council of the Caucasus to also take the name of “Self-

Defense Central Committee” and thereupon take action in the name of the ARF. The Congress, adopts the tactics of oral and written propaganda, terror, public demonstration, and armed resistance, on the basis of self-defense.¹¹⁷

The ARF played an important role in the Constitutional Revolution in Russia in 1905. In 1906 *Troshag* wrote about “The scanty policies of Tsarism” which meant “Creating anti-revolutionary handcuffs through the Caucasian Turks movement [raised] against Armenian reform demands.”¹¹⁸ After the realization of the Young Turk revolution, the center of gravity of ARF activity became the Ottoman territory where an important number of revolutionaries from the Caucasus fleeing from Tsarist oppression had found refuge.¹¹⁹ “The roles were reversed - Turkey was now the free environment where the ARF operated as a legal-parliamentary political party, while the Caucasus was an arena for underground operations.”¹²⁰ In 1909, the Armenian revolutionary movement was under great pressure in the Caucasus and “a policy of brutal torture [had] started against the Armenian social movement.”¹²¹ Even so in its 1909 party program the ARF declared the struggle against Tsarist despotism would continue.¹²² In 1912 *Troshag* wrote that: “There is nothing new in the ‘New Course.’ Russian winter is continuing. It is a winter especially for the Russian-Armenians. The dungeons are still chock-full. There are new arrests and punishments.”¹²³

It is usually believed that the cooperation of Armenians and other revolutionary groups was limited to the struggle against Hamidian rule, symbolized by the Yıldız Palace, “the ‘Ottoman Bastille’ as one of the Turkish participants of the 1907 congress labelled it.¹²⁴ Nonetheless, collaboration and sometimes coalitions of different Armenian groups and their Turkish counterparts continued after the Young Turk revolution, notwithstanding a number of important problems regarding certain issues, which overshadowed the cooperation. As pointed out above, the ARF saw a strong modernist and progressive trend in the CUP, which was the main reason for cooperation. The Hnchag Party, which never approached the CUP sympathetically, co-operated with its rivals, Prince Sabaheddin’s *Teşebbüs-i Şahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti* (The Society for Private Enterprise and Decentralization), and then *Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası* (Liberal Coalition Party, LCP). All in all, these alliances, reconciliations and cooperation with other parties show that Armenian revolutionary movements became legal actors in the Ottoman party system after the 1908 revolution.

ARMENIAN POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE SECOND CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD

Although the roots of Armenian political organizations go as far back as 1870, and their activities reached their apex in the 1890s, such activities remained illegal, and Armenian political organizations stayed underground, as did the Russian-Caucasian or the Balkan organizations strategically akin to them. The Young Turk revolution and the proclamation of liberty in 10/23 July 1908 generated, for the first time in Ottoman history, free political activity for the political parties, as well as other important liberal particularistic attributes in the Ottoman political arena.

As early as 1907, especially after the 1906-1907 taxpayers' revolts in the different Anatolian cities of Erzurum, Kastamonu, Trabzon, Sivas, Diyarbakır, Van, Mamüretülaziz, Aleppo, Muğla, Aydın, Konya, etc., Armenian revolutionary organizations welcomed the "Turkish revolutionary movement."¹²⁵ The ARF, which complained about the huge economic burden to the Armenian peasants brought on by drought and shortages in Anatolia that year, was hopeful vis-à-vis Turkish revolutionary activity and called on the Armenians to support that movement:

The horrible nightmare of Turkish movement knocking on the doors of Yıldız has led the Red Savage to put new plans into force. Suffering Armenian people look at the Turkish rebels with admiring eyes and begin to hope for the future. Yet at the same time they are aware that the smallest action of the Turkish movement puts a lot of responsibility on their shoulders. Turks of Erzurum refuse to pay the individual tax [*şahsi vergi*], and the authorities, being aware of the kind of discontent lying behind this, do not take any action. Instead, they increase the taxes of the Armenians of the district by 60% and collect it by using military force.¹²⁶

As most scholars point out, the Armenians strongly supported the new political developments that they hoped would come through the Constitution and the Parliament. Even today, the most popular photographs from İstanbul, Marzvan, Erzurum, Kharpert, İzmir or any other place that experienced the vigils related to the Young Turk revolution in July-August 1908 show the celebrations of the local Armenians with their placards and flags displaying the revolutionary mottos of "liberty, equality, fraternity and justice" both in Armenian and Ottoman Turkish. This participation in the celebrations and vigils was a natural result of the Armenians' sufferings from despotic Hamidian rule, and their hopes for the "constitutional life" (*hayat-ı meşrutiyet*) that the constitutional regime was expected to bring.

Troshag, saluted the Young Turk Revolution as follows:

History has witnessed only a few such happy surprises. Enlightened and freedom-loving humanity salutes this beautiful step taken by the Young Turks. We are happy due to this new and powerful expansion of the idea

of struggle. After the mass movements of Erzurum, Kastamonu and Bitlis,¹²⁷ we are glad due to the victorious awakening of our neighbors, citizens. It reflects their revolutionary maturity. Therefore, it is happily declared that starting from today Turkey and all its population have entered a new era.¹²⁸

Hnchag greeted the end of despotism but was more cautious about the future of the Revolution:

The present events show that we can consider that Hamidian despotism has collapsed. The *Yildiz camarilla*,¹²⁹ and its head, the Sultan himself, who suppressed, tortured, and tormented the multi-language nations of the Empire, have lost the helm of power. That part of old Turkey - which adopted the mottos of reaction and brigandry, set the races against each other, and played the role of gravedigger of the nations - no longer exists. No longer exists the official power that wanted to resolve the Armenian Question through annihilating the Armenian nation. The structure of the old state has been shaken, but it has not collapsed. The old is shocked, and the new is in the process of coming into existence. All things are in the initial era of budding seeds, fruits, and producing. The productivity of all of these depends on the determination of the effective factors.¹³⁰

The Declaration of Liberty was welcomed not only in the Ottoman territories but also among Armenian circles in the Caucasus. *Yergri Tzayne* (Voice of the Motherland), an Armenian revolutionary journal in Tbilisi, declared: "Turkish-Armenian comrades! It is the doors of a new era that are opening in front of you! The despotism of Abdülhamid's monarchy is shaken to its foundation, it's about to collapse. The dream of yesterday, comes true today."¹³¹

The spirit of freedom displayed its effects quickly due to the activities of political parties, and four Armenian parties, the ARF, the *Heghapokhagan Hnchagian Gusagtsutiun* (Revolutionary ["Social-Democrat" after 1909] Party), the *Sahmanatragan Ramgavar Gusagtsutiun* (Constitutional People's Party), and the *Veragazmial Hnchagian Gusagtsutiun* started functioning freely.

Although some historians in Turkey consider these political parties as terrorist organizations, in the period of 1908-1914 the political activities of Ottoman-Armenians were mostly limited to the legal space. All the Armenian political parties mentioned above declared their respect for and support of constitutional rule, and perhaps most importantly, their respect for the territorial integrity of the Ottoman state. Vis-à-vis the conservative movements loyal to Sultan Abdülhamid, which aimed at weakening the constitutionalist principles and maybe closing the parliament, they collaborated with the modernist, progressive political groups. Armed struggle was a political language that the Armenian revolutionary groups

had adopted before 1908. After the Young Turk revolution, however, although problems between Armenians and Muslims still persisted in the provinces and were differently perceived by the Armenian revolutionaries of the urban centers and those in the provinces, the Armenians put their arms down.

When, for instance, the ARF branch of Van demanded money in order to buy arms for self-defense, the İstanbul Party Bureau reacted firmly. Bedros Agnoui of the İstanbul Bureau accused Meloyan, one of the directors of the ARF Van branch, of being “naive,” and wrote: “We are living in a time when Turkish police will defend the honor of Armenian women.”¹³² Indeed, there is no record of any important armed incident during the period of 1908-1914 in the Armenian *vilayets*.¹³³ Even after the Adana massacres in April 1909, when over 20,000 Armenians were killed, Armenian revolutionaries did not react by taking up arms. The Armenian political parties integrated into the Ottoman party system through their alliances, cooperation, and agreements with other legal parties active in the country.

a) Armenian Parties in the Legal Political Space

Obviously, most of the prominent Armenian political figures were not aware of the Revolution on 10/23 July 1908 when it happened. For instance, Papazian, who later became deputy of Van, was in the mountains, fighting against an army unit, and was suspicious but ceased the struggle when letters came from his comrades proclaiming the Declaration of the Liberties.¹³⁴ Famous Armenian writer, lawyer and then parliamentarian Krikor Zohrab had fled from the Hamidian persecution to Paris. Like Papazian, Rupen Der-Minassian and his group were fighting near Muş when Ottoman soldiers told them the good news with their white flags.¹³⁵ Aram Manukian, who was a *fedai* leader in Van, had been in prison since January 1908.¹³⁶

One may argue that, although Armenian revolutionaries did not participate directly in the Macedonian uprising, which precipitated the 1908 revolution, years of Armenian armed struggle and then cooperation with the Young Turks played an important role in the lead-up to the overthrow of the Hamidian regime. Although the “moment” of the Revolution had no direct relation with the above-mentioned Paris congress of December 1907, Tashnags succeeded in promoting the common and general feeling of enthusiasm and acted as one of the owners of the Revolution.¹³⁷

In September 1909, the ARF Fifth Congress discussed its new policies under constitutional rule and set aside the secretive methods by which it had struggled against the despotic regime as a revolutionary and fighting

party. As a supporter of the constitutional regime, which was the most appropriate regime for the development and practice of its program and principles, the Party naturally came out with all its fighting forces against reaction, when these threatened the constitutional instruments and attempted to re-establish the conditions which were the causes of the recession and under-development of this country.¹³⁸

The most influential Hnchag Party, although it was entitled to act freely,¹³⁹ was regarded with definite suspicion by the constitutional government as it had not participated in the 1907 congress. In a nutshell, just after the 1908 revolution, the CUP regarded the ARF as an associate, but the other Armenian parties - especially the SDHP - as potential rivals that would be tolerated in the name of the virtues of the Constitutional regime.

After the 1908 revolution the SDHP issued a "Program for Turkey", aiming at gaining the trust of the Young Turks. The foreword of the program claimed the "Hnchag Party had never been a nationalist party aiming at absolute separation... We wanted separation only from Turkish absolutism, Turkish despotism. ...And since the regime is not despotic or absolutist today, ...consequently, the idea of separation completely loses its reasons for existence."¹⁴⁰ On January 26, 1910 the Ministry of Internal Affairs ratified the program of the Hnchag Party.¹⁴¹

The opposition of the SDHP to CUP policies brought the Hnchags closer to other opposition parties. Even before the Young Turk revolution, the SDHP collaborated with Prince Sabaheddin's "Society of Private Entrepreneurship and Decentralization". During the Constitutional period the LCP became the most important political associate of the SDHP. After its foundation the LCP and SDHP became the two anti-CUP parties and signed an agreement of cooperation in 1912. Although there is no mention of this agreement in Turkish historiography, the memoirs of Sabah-Gulian reveal the concerns of the SDHP on this issue: "The Central Committee of the Party, after a meeting where all the details were discussed from all sides, took the decision to start negotiations with the Central Committee of the LCP. An agreement was signed, which was one of the historical achievements of the SDHP and which occupies a respectable place in the pages of the war of freedom of the Armenian nation."¹⁴²

The Ramgavar Party, which was a union of three small Armenian parties, was founded on 31 October, 1908 in Alexandria, Egypt. A continuation of the Armenagans,¹⁴³ the Party, as a product of the constitutional political circumstances, adopted a legal course. It proclaimed: "Our demands and tasks, which are perfectly in line with reason and rationality and beneficial from the point of view of the general interests of the country, serving for the production and confirmation of

harmonious relations between our party and the political parties of other Ottoman elements, the presence of which was desired from the beginning and which is necessary from the point of view of assuring, in a relatively short period of time, the essential interests and the general prosperity of the country... .”¹⁴⁴ Declaring that their main principle would be “Being Armenian alongside being Ottoman,”¹⁴⁵ the Ramgavar Party abandoned the revolutionary track of political struggle and joined those who would fight against the “enemies of the Constitution,”¹⁴⁶ aiming at the democratization of the Constitution, the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and the decentralization of the Ottoman administrative system.¹⁴⁷

The Party tried to transform itself into a popular movement among the Armenians and founded branches in İstanbul and Anatolia. But these efforts failed. Darbinian explains that, “Founding a few clubs in the neighborhoods of the capital was hardly possible in two years.”¹⁴⁸ As a result, the Ramgavars remained an elite movement (especially among the religious hierarchy and intellectuals), and although they had a significant impact on the Armenian National Assembly as the “central group,” they were unable to gain any noteworthy support from the populace.¹⁴⁹ This is why the CUP often ignored them while establishing relations with Armenian parties.

Likewise, the Veragazmial Hnchag Party was unable to make a strong impact in the political arena. It fit itself within the Ottoman party system, declared the end of its revolutionary activities and claimed it had stopped seeking the separation of the Armenian *vilayets*. In September 1908 the party’s İstanbul bureau published an announcement and saluted the Constitution, referring to it as the only way to have a peaceful, liberal, and participatory political environment. Like the Ramgavar Party it remained under the shadow of the two, the ARF and the SDHP. In 1912 the number of party members was not more than 100.¹⁵⁰

b) Armenians as the “Mortar” or the “Salt” of the Constitutional Regime

Since the Armenian parties played the role of defenders of constitutional rule against the counter-revolutionary attempt of 31 March 1909,¹⁵¹ most of the public regarded the Armenian community as the provider of longevity to the constitutional regime. To repeat, the expectations of the Armenians from constitutional rule were a direct result of their sufferings during the Hamidian era. The ideas of a Unionist leader reflect this general expectation: “The Armenians side with the Constitution as a whole. They are like the salt of the state, and they pull the other elements with them.”¹⁵² Asdvadzadurian underlines a statement of a *molla* exalting the efforts of the Armenians in defending constitutional rule: “All the revolutionary movements in other countries started through shedding

blood, but in our country the revolution started with blood shed by Armenians.”¹⁵³

Papazian writes in his memoirs that Rıza, one of the CUP leaders and the chairman of the Parliament of the time, known for his antagonism to revolutionary methods, welcomed Papazian and Vartkes Serengulian, the ARF deputy of Erzurum in parliament. Serengulian introduced Papazian to Rıza as “a *fedai* come down from the mountains”, he replied warmly “How nice! Our trustworthy friends are coming down from the mountains in order to defend constitutional institutions.”¹⁵⁴

Another similar event occurred in the parliamentary debates concerning the Adana massacres, which coincided with the counter-revolutionary attempt in İstanbul, and caused great tension between Armenian and Muslim communities.¹⁵⁵ Rıza Tevfik, the Edirne deputy, defended Armenian *fedais* against the accusations of organizing an uprising in Adana: “...today, we cannot accuse Armenians of being *fedais* or of other things of the same sort. There are *fedais* among the Armenians; I saw them; they really sacrificed their lives for freedom and worked for our martyrs in the hospital. I do not know another sort of *fedai*. We cannot accuse a nation who served for freedom together with us with a great crime. A nation who after facing all these oppressions and insults... still competes with several non-Muslim elements that are not from us...”¹⁵⁶

c) Alliances: CUP and ARF, LCP and SDHP

The Young Turk revolution was a revolution from above and lacked the crucial support of society. Thus the CUP felt powerless to take government and authority in their hands in the beginning. According to the CUP, the anti-revolutionary and anti-CUP forces were waiting for the appropriate opportunity to defeat them. Under such circumstances, the CUP was in need of powerful political allies. The Armenian community, sharing the CUP worries of a counter-revolutionary attack from Hamidian despotism, was a convenient ally for the CUP. Gaidz Minassian pinpoints four important resemblances between the CUP and ARF which made their cooperation more comfortable. Both had revolutionary partisan attributes and the desire to overcome the old regime. Both aimed at creating a renaissance for the state organization and aimed at giving sovereignty to the people¹⁵⁷ (at least on the basis of their doctrines and discourses).

These political similarities of the two powerful political organizations played an important role in their cooperation. Thanks to such cooperation co-existence was made possible in the political arena. The CUP benefited by providing backing to the constitutional regime through the support of Armenian political circles and its population, which was one of the most active and influential masses in the Ottoman state. On the other hand, the

ARF and intellectuals in the same sphere were open to collaboration with the Turks, propagating the qualities of the constitutional regime and the advantages of supporting the CUP. The Armenians expressed their problems more freely, and held political power through political parties, the press and the Patriarchate, which had been impossible in the Hamidian era. On the other hand, the CUP also benefited from the loyalty of the Armenians to the constitution. They relied on the Armenian community and felt a guarantee against the “obscurantist”, “reactionary” or “religious” elements’ threats to the constitution. This mode of co-existence brought a political climate of cooperation.

In the second constitutional period, the ARF was the most powerful and influential Armenian political party in the Ottoman Empire. In the first parliamentary elections the Armenians won eleven seats, four of them held by ARF members who had participated in armed revolutionary activity before the Young Turk revolution: Vahan Papazian (aka ‘Koms’), Karekin Pastmajian (aka ‘Armen Garo’), and Vartkes Serengulian (aka ‘Kissag’ and ‘Hovhannes’) from Erzurum, and Kegham Der Garabedian (aka ‘Dadrag’ and ‘Asoghig’) from Muş. One may assume their presence was the result of: a) the widespread branches of the ARF in Anatolia, b) the ARF’s cooperation with the CUP. The latter had special importance. Thanks to this cooperation the ARF felt comfortable claiming a significant role of their own in the Young Turk revolution. Thus, the ARF gained clear superiority over other Armenian parties, and especially its most important rival the SDHP, which remained an opposition party and could not benefit from the advantages of cooperation with a governmental party, except for its alliance with the LCP in 1912.

Between 1907 and WWI the ARF and the CUP signed four agreements. The first agreement, signed in December 27-29, 1907, was a practical mutual contract to overthrow Hamidian despotism. The second was signed in 1908 just after the Young Turk revolution, when the two parties negotiated on the basis of an election alliance, and after the compromise, although the ARF could not obtain the number of seats sought,¹⁵⁸ the Tashnak candidates were elected from the CUP lists. The third, and perhaps the most important agreement, was signed after the Adana massacres in 1909 (in which the Armenians believed there had been considerable CUP involvement). The ARF took a serious risk and declared the continuation of cooperation with the CUP at its Fifth Congress of August 1909. Just a few days after this declaration, the Western bureau of the ARF and the Central Committee of the CUP prepared a contract in Salonica, and in September the two parties signed the agreement in Istanbul.

The September 1909 agreement focused mainly on strengthening Constitutional rule, the restoration of the good relationship between the Ottoman nations, and the unity and independence of the motherland. The agreement formulated ARF and CUP cooperation under five headings:

1. Uninterrupted application of democratic-constitutional rule.
2. United struggle against anti-constitutionalist elements.
3. Re-organization of the administrative institutions on the basis of de-centralization principles.
4. Equality and removal of discrimination against non-Muslim communities.
5. Foundation of a special body by the two parties in order to guard the application of the decisions of this agreement.¹⁵⁹

Armenian circles, like the SDHP and the Patriarchate, reacted to the September Agreement.¹⁶⁰ It is interesting to note, however, that this reaction was not anti-constitutionalist in essence. Rather, it was the result of power politics in the Armenian community.¹⁶¹ The SDHP and the Patriarchate were anxious as they saw that, thanks to the compromise with the CUP, the ARF was gaining a strong foothold in the Armenian community.

The last agreement between the ARF and CUP was signed in 1912, as an electoral alliance. The alliance was a response to the agreement between the SDHP and LCP, which was aimed at creating a strong alternative to the CUP's power. SDHP cooperation with LCP was an attempt to gain power against the rival alliance.

In 1962, 50 years after these political movements, *Zartonk* (Awakening), the official organ of the Ramgavar Party in Beirut, noted that, "Some factions among the radical Armenians united with the *Hürriyet ve İtilaf*, the opponent of the *İttihat ve Terakki*, only to remain in a position contradictory to the Tashnaktsutun..."¹⁶²

After the 1912 agreement, relations between the ARF and the CUP deteriorated. During the 1912 elections the CUP used many illegal, suppressive methods, such as violence or hiding ballot boxes to win a parliamentary majority. Accordingly, the 1912 parliamentary elections were called *sopalı seçimler* (elections with a beating). Although both parties worked together in the election campaign, promises given to the ARF for the elections were not respected by the CUP. Out of the 19 Armenian candidates, only ten were elected,¹⁶³ which was lower than the number of Armenian deputies in the 1908 parliament. On the other hand, because of the unresolved land question and the rising demands for reforms in the Armenian *vilayets*, the relations between the two parties became

tense.¹⁶⁴ The coup d'état that brought in absolute domination by the CUP in January 1913 accelerated this deterioration.

Interestingly, although tension between the CUP and the ARF and more generally between the CUP and the Armenian community increased after 1912, the relationship between the two parties never came to a full breaking point. In the second half of 1913, when the CUP felt the need to negotiate a reform program with the Ottoman Armenians, it accepted the ARF as its counterpart, aimed at reaching Armenian public opinion through the ARF, and even attempted to use the ARF press. Moreover, in August 1914, the CUP sent Bahaeddin Şakir, Ömer Naci and Hilmi Bey to the 8th ARF Congress in Erzurum in order to ask the position of the party, and more generally the Armenian attitude, towards the World War, in which the Ottoman state would possibly get involved.

In parallel, contact between the SDHP and the Young Turks goes back as far as the 1890s. Both Rıza and Mizancı Murad, the leaders of the Young Turk movement in Europe sought an alliance with the party in 1895-96.¹⁶⁵ But their differences on the issue of methods of revolutionary activity (terrorism, foreign intervention) prevented real cooperation. The SDHP found an appropriate ally in the person of Prince Sabaheddin and his *Teşebbüs-i Cemiyeti*. Sabaheddin's ideas on decentralization and cosmopolitanism made such cooperation possible. Just a few days after the revolution, in August 1908, SDHP leaders Hampartzum Boyadjian (Murad) and Sdepan Sabah-Gulian met with the prince to discuss the political developments.¹⁶⁶ The ARF was strengthening its position in Ottoman political circles thanks to its cooperation with the CUP, and the SDHP felt obliged to create an effective bloc against them. After the foundation of *Osmanlı Ahrar Fırkası* (Ottoman Liberals Party, OLP) on 14 September, 1908, in which Sabaheddin appeared as secret honorary president, the SDHP remained close to the policies of that party and against the CUP. However, as the OLP supported the March 31 events (which coincided with the Adana massacres), the party was dissolved when the CUP took political control.¹⁶⁷ Unlike their allies, the SDHP remained loyal to constitutionalism and supported the CUP against the rebels on March 31. The SDHP even offered to form volunteer SDHP brigades, and established a unit of doctors for the injured.¹⁶⁸ But particularly after the Adana massacres, SDHP-CUP relations deteriorated. In November 1911, when "the biggest and strongest"¹⁶⁹ opposition party against the CUP, the LCP, was established, the SDHP supported the latter with the hope of changing the political balance dominated by the CUP and detrimental to its own interests. In fact, the LCP was "a lake in which all rivers of opposition against the CUP were pooled."¹⁷⁰ The agreement between the SDHP and the LCP, signed on 3 February 1912 must be interpreted under these

circumstances. Though it promised some land and security reforms,¹⁷¹ which were the most important actual political issues for the SDHP, this agreement created little change in existing conditions even when the LCP formed a government in July 1912.¹⁷² The coup d'état in January 1913 that brought in an authoritarian CUP administration until 1918 put an end to the SDHP search for political alliances in the Ottoman political arena.

To sum up, in the period of 1908-1914, the ARF and the CUP regarded themselves as allies in the political arena, while the opposing parties, such as the SDHP and the LCP, formed their policies on the basis of this alliance. In the first period until 1912, the relationship was more hopeful, but afterwards, with the disappointments and tension mentioned above, the alliance dissolved. Though the CUP and the ARF continued political talks and discussions on some issues during 1913 and 1914, which showed the possibility of political cooperation, or at least mutual political existence, such talks stopped later. In fact, the most instructive experience of the relationship between the ARF and the CUP in the constitutional period is this “possibility” of common political ground, the “sharing” of the same political language (both as political parties and secret organizations) although there were huge problems regarding the conflicting nationalisms of the Armenians and the Turks. Finally, without ignoring the problems arising from ethnic distress or without idealizing the relationship between the ARF and the CUP or the SDHP and the LCP, one can argue that the constitutional period - at least until WWI - was a “lost opportunity” for common political activities between the Armenians and the Turks.

ENDNOTES

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- ¹ This is the first part of my thesis entitled “The Armenian Political Thinking in the Second Constitutional Period: The Case of Krikor Zohrab” submitted to the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, Boğaziçi University 2005.
 - ² Stefanos Yerasimos, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı ve Ermeni Sorunu* (WWI and the Armenian Question), Ankara: Türkiye Bilimler Akademisi Forumu, 2002, p. 6.
 - ³ Vincent Lima, “The Evolving Goals and Strategies of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, 1890-1925,” *Armenian Review*, 1991, vol. 44, no 2/174, p. vii. See for instance, “*Kaghvadzknér Hay. Hegh. Tashnaktsutian Yerrort Enthanur Joghovi Adenakrutiunneren* (Excerpts from the third general congress of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation), Geneva: 1905, pp. 8-9, 13-18. Especially under the heading of “Propaganda in Europe” the Party discussed publishing English and German journals in Britain, Germany, and Austria.
 - ⁴ Hratch Dasnabedian, “The A.R.F. Record: The Balance Sheet of Ninety Years,” *Armenian Review*, vol. 34, June 1981, p. 117.
 - ⁵ Madeleine Reberieux, “Jean Jaures and the Armenians,” *Armenian Review*, 1991, vol. 44, pp. 1-11. In its Third Congress the ARF expressed its gratitude to the editorship of *Pro-Armenia*; see, “*Kaghvadzknér*”, pp. 5-6.

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- ⁶ *Rapport Présenté au Congrès Socialiste International de Copenhage par le Parti Arménien Daschnaktzoutioun, Turquie-Caucase-Perse*, Geneve, 1910, p. 12; M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 191-197; Lima, p. viii; Dikran Mesrob Kaligian, “The Armenian Revolutionary Federation Under Ottoman Constitutional Rule, 1908-1914,” (PhD dissertation presented to Boston College, the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of History, 2003), p. 2; Arsen Avagyan, “İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ile Ermeni Siyasi Partileri Arasındaki İlişkiler” (Relations between the İttihat Ve Terakki Party and the Armenian political parties) in *Ermeniler ve İttihat ve Terakki* (Armenians and the İttihat Ve Terakki Party), İstanbul, Aras, 2005, p. 15.
- ⁷ Haidakir 1907 (Program 1907), Geneva: Publication of *Troshag*, 1907, p. 17.
- ⁸ Esat Uras, *Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi* (Armenians and the Armenian Question in history), Ankara, Türkiye Matbaacılık, 1950, pp. 581-582; “23 Temmuz 1908 meşrutiyetinin ilânından sonra [Ermeni] komite faaliyetlerinde bir müddet zahiri bir sükûn görüldü. Komite rüesası, beyannameler, nutuklarla faaliyetlerini sırf kanunî ve meşru bir şekilde çevirerek meşrutiyetin müdafasına çalışacaklarını ilân ettiler. (...) Hükümete böyle samimi bir cephe gösteren komiteler, ilk günlerin heyecanı geçerken bir taraftan da hükümetin zâfından, vaziyetin müsadelerinden istifade ederek yavaş yavaş eski faaliyetlerine geçtiler.”
- ⁹ Kâmuran Gürün, *Ermeni Dosyası* (the Armenian file), Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1983, pp. 176-192.
- ¹⁰ The 61st article of the Treaty of Berlin forced the Ottoman Empire to make reforms in the “Armenian vilayets”; this article later became the basis for the internationalization of the reform issue. “Article 61: The Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and Kurds. It will periodically make known the steps taken to this effect to the powers, who will superintend their application” (Ali Karaca, *Anadolu Islahâtı ve Ahmet Şâkir Paşa (1839-1899)* (The Anatolian reforms and Ahmet Shakir Pasha), İstanbul, Eren, 1993, p. 37).
- ¹¹ Yılmaz Öztuna, “Ermeni Sorununun Oluştığı Siyasal Ortam (The Political atmosphere for the development of the Armenian Question),” in Türkkaya Ataöv (ed.), *Osmanlı'nın Son Döneminde Ermeniler* (Օսմանլիւն Դարաշրջանի վերջին շրջանի հայերը), Ankara, TBMM Kültür, Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu Başkanlığı, 2002, pp. 47-48; “Böylesine geniş, seyrek nüfusla iskân edilmiş, halkın aşiret halinde ve köylerde yaşadığı, önemli şehirlerin az bulunduğu bir coğrafyada, bir azınlık lehine reforma kalkışmak, Osmanlı istese bile mümkün değildi. Ermeniler’le Müslümanları karşı karşıya getirmekle sonuçlanırdı, nitekim öyle oldu. O zamana kadar diğer gayri-Müslim azınlıklar gibi Ermeniler de, mutlaka, çoğunluktaki Müslümanlar’la iyi ilişkiler halinde yaşadıkları halde, aralarına kin ve münafere girecekti. O halde, böylesine bir reform için direnen Batı devletleri ne istiyorlardı?”
- ¹² Öztuna, p. 57; “Bütün yasaklar kalkmış gibiydi. Öyle ki, Ermeni terör örgütleri olan Hınçak ve Taşnak cemiyetleri, imparatorluğun pek çok şehrinde resmen tabelaları ile şubeler açtılar. Binalarını silah ve cephane deposu haline getirdiler.”
- ¹³ Hans-Lukas Kieser, *İskalanmış Barış, Doğu Vilayetlerinde Misyonerlik, Etnik Kimlik ve Devlet 1839-1938* (The Missed peace. Missionaries, ethnic identity and state in the Eastern Provinces), İstanbul: İletişim, 2005, pp. 25-40.

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- ¹⁴ Tefik Fikret, *Rûbab-i Şikeste* (Broken lyre), İstanbul, Tanin Matbaası, 1327/1911, pp. 433-435. “Ey darbe-i mübeccele, ey dud-ı müntekim / Kimsin, nesin? Bu savlete saik, sebeb ne, kim? / Arkanda bin nigâh-ı teccüs, ve sen nihan / Bir dest-i gaybı andırıyor sun, rehâfeşah! // ... Ey şanlı avcı, dâmını beyhude kurmadın! / Attın fakat yazık ki, yazıklar ki vuremadın. // ... Bir kavmi çiğnemle bugün eğlenen denî / Bir lahza-i teehhüre medyun bu keyfîni.”
- ¹⁵ The thesis mainly focuses on Krikor Zohrab. In a forthcoming article for *Haigazian Armenological Review*, Vol. 36, I will discuss his political activity in details.
- ¹⁶ “Sbanutian Portz Sultani Tem” (Assassination attempt against the sultan), *Troshag*, August 1905 (8), p. 1.
- ¹⁷ *Arevelian Mamul*, 20 July 1905, no. 30, pp. 773-775.
- ¹⁸ The *millet* system has strong resemblances to the system of *polojenie* of Tsarist Russia, which separated the Orthodox-Russian population from the non-Orthodox/non-Russians.
- ¹⁹ Anaide Ter Minassian, “Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian Revolutionary Movement (1887-1912),” in *Transcaucasia, Nationalism, and Social Change: Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia*, Ronald Grigor Suny (ed.), Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1996, pp. 143-144; in Turkish, Anaide Ter Minassian, *Ermeni Devrimci Hareketi'nde Milliyetçilik ve Sosyalizm 1887-1912* (Nationalism and Socialism in Armenian revolutionary movement), translated by Mete Tunçay, İstanbul, İletişim, 1992, pp. 11-12.
- ²⁰ Ronald Grigor Suny, *Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1993, p. 18.
- ²¹ Ibid.
- ²² *Dzrakir Hai Heghapokhagan Tashnaksutian Gazmvadz 1892i Enthanur Joghovin* (The Program of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation formed in the general congress of 1892), Geneva, 1906, 4th edition, p. 5. In the Program, there are complaints about the offences of “semi-savage, nomadic Kurds”.
- ²³ Suny, *Looking Toward Ararat*, p. 19.
- ²⁴ The roots of the concept *zimmi* go as far as the first centuries of Islamic Law. It can be considered as a status given to non-muslim people (but only the ones who are “people of the Book”) who accepted to live under Islamic rule, *Şeriat* and to pay the capitation tax, *haraç* (or *cizye*). In the traditional Ottoman system *zimmis* were exempted from military conscription and were forbidden to carry guns, etc.
- ²⁵ Vartan Artinian, “A Study of the Historical Development of the Constitutional System in the Ottoman Empire 1839-1863,” Brandeis University: unpublished PhD Dissertation, 1970, p. 22; in Turkish, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Ermeni Anayasasının Doğuşu 1839-1863* (The Birth of Armenian constitution in the Ottoman State), trans. Zülal Kılıç, İstanbul, Aras, 2004, p. 27.
- ²⁶ Garabed Utudjian, “Mangutian Hishadagner” (Memoirs of Childhood), *Masis*, March 20, 1893, p. 163.
- ²⁷ A word derived from Arabic *emir* meaning “prince” or “commander” (Hrachya Adjarian, *Hayots Antznanunneri Pararan* (The Dictionary of Armenian Proper Names), vol. I, Beirut, Sevan Press, 1972, p. 120.
- ²⁸ For details, see Hagop Barsoumian, “Economic Role of the Armenian Amira Class in the Ottoman Empire,” *Armenian Review*, 1979, 3, pp. 310-316.
- ²⁹ For instance see Patriarch Maghakia Ormanian’s *Azkabadoum* (National History), İstanbul-Jerusalem: 3 vol., 1913-1927; Hagop Siruni, *Bolis Yev Ir Tere* (Istanbul and Its Role), Beirut, 2 vols., Imp. Mesrob, 1965-1970.

- ³⁰ Artinian used this term first in order to emphasize their resemblances to Young Ottomans in terms of “purposes” and “methods.” Artinian, *Osmanlı*, p. 73.
- ³¹ Arshag Alboyadjian, “Azkayen Sahmanatrutiun: Ir Dzakume yev Girarutiune” (The National Constitution: Its Emergence and Application), *Entartzag Oratsuyts Surp Prgich Hivantanotsi Hayots* (The Large almanac of Surp Prgich Armenian Hospital), İstanbul, 1910, pp. 244-246; English translation, Artinian, pp. 63-64; Turkish translation, Artinian, *Osmanlı* (emphases are mine).
- ³² James Etmekjian, “The Utilitarian Nature of the Western Armenian Renaissance,” *Armenian Review*, 1979, vol. 31, p. 304.
- ³³ Interestingly, Anatolian peasants who migrated to Russia for economic and security reasons after the 1860s became the first bearers of the nationalist and revolutionary ideology of the Caucasian political groups in Anatolia: “In the mid-1880s a group of Armenian students in Tiflis made contact with the poorest stratum of Armenian workers, porters who had emigrated from Mush in Turkey... in order to create educated cadres which would then be sent back into Turkey to agitate among the Armenian peasants” (Ronald Grigor Suny, “Populism, Nationalism and Marxism: The Origins of Revolutionary Parties Among the Armenians of the Caucasus,” *Armenian Review*, June 1979, vol. 32, no. 2-126, p. 139); even the Fifth Congress convened in 1909 underlined the importance of emigrants in order to prepare its supporters for political activity (*Haidararakir yev Voroshumner HH Tashnaksutian Hinkerort Enthanur Joghovi-1909* (The Declaration and Decisions of the Fifth General Congress of AR Federation-1909), Geneva, 1910, pp. 24-25).
- ³⁴ “Muş yev Khrimian Mgrdich Vartabed” (Muş and Father Mgrdich Khrimian), *Jamanak Hantes Hairenanver* (Time journal devoted to the Motherland), 2 January 1863, no 1, p. 5.
- ³⁵ “Muşen Tsavali Lurer” (News of agony from Muş), *Jamanak Hantes Hairenanver*, 22 June 1863, no. 13, p. 104.
- ³⁶ Dasnabedian, “The A.R.F. Record,” pp. 116-117.
- ³⁷ Ormanian, column 2634, 2640; Artinian, *Osmanlı*, pp. 79-86.
- ³⁸ Krikor Odian, “Rusian,” in *Tasakirk Pilisopayutian* (Textbook of Philosophy), İstanbul, 1879, pp. VIII-IX; in English, Etmekjian, p. 304.
- ³⁹ In Turkish, *Nizamname-i Millet-i Ermeniyen* (The “Charter” or “Regulations” of the Armenian Millet).
- ⁴⁰ It is usually believed that the Sublime Porte’s attitude towards the Constitution of 1860 was a consequence of requests of the *amira* class.
- ⁴¹ Alboyadjian, pp. 411-412.
- ⁴² *Azkayeen Sahmanatrutiun Hayots / Nizamname-i Millet-i Ermeniyen* (Armenian National Constitution), İstanbul, H. Muhendisian, 1863, p. 42; “Lâ-akall yirmi yaşını teknil edenler hakk-ı intihaba nail olup, ancak tebaa-ı Devlet-i Aliyye’den olmak şartdır.”
- ⁴³ Ibid., p. 42; “İane-i milliye, hakk-ı intihaba mucip olmak için iane-i umumiye olarak lâ-akall senevî yetmiş beş kuruş iane verilmelidir.”
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 44-45; “Yetmişinci madde: Gerek Dersaadet’te ve gerek taşralarda intihabı matlub olan vekillerin kendilerini intihap eden kilise cemaatinden ve marhasalık dairesinden olup olmamalarında bir beis olmayıp, şu kadar ki Dersaadette bulunmaları ve mezkûr cemaatlerin milletçe mesâlihine vâkıf ve intihap edenler indinde hubb-i millet ve refet ve istikametleri cihetiyle meri ve muteber bulunmaları lazımedendir.”
- ⁴⁵ “Meşrutiyet ve Hukuk-u Avam Taraftarını Ermeni Fırkasının Beyanname ve Programıdır,” (translated by Mete Tunçay) in Ter Minassian, p. 95.

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- ⁴⁶ “HH Tashnaksutiun Yoterort Enthanur Joghovi Voroshunnere” (The Decisions of the Seventh General Congress of ARF), *Troshag*, September-October 1913 (9-10), p. 148.
- ⁴⁷ It is most likely that he was Kegham Der Garabedian, a prominent Tashnak leader, and later deputy from Muş in the Ottoman Parliament; “Daronian” means “a man from Muş” in Armenian.
- ⁴⁸ Kegham D. G. Daronian, “Mer Tbrotsnere” (Our schools), *Masis*, December 1886, p. 291; cited in Etmekjian, p. 302.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 306.
- ⁵⁰ Dasnabedian, p. 118.
- ⁵¹ Anaide Ter Minassian, “Le Movement Révolutionnaire Arménien, 1890-1903,” *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique*, October-December 1973 (4), p. 554.
- ⁵² Suny, *Ararat*, pp. 19-20.
- ⁵³ Ter Minassian, “Nationalism,” pp. 145-146; for an account of a foremost researcher see Dasnabedian, p. 116.
- ⁵⁴ Alboyadjian, pp. 421-430.
- ⁵⁵ Suny, “Populism,” p. 136.
- ⁵⁶ Ter Minassian, “Nationalism,” p. 148; the author underlines the fact that the expression “Asiatic darkness” was found in the writings of Hnchags, Tashnaks, and Social-Democrats alike.
- ⁵⁷ Suny, “Populism,” p. 138.
- ⁵⁸ Jeremy Salt, *Imperialism, Evangelism and the Ottoman Armenians 1878-1896*, London and Portland, F. Cass, 1993.
- ⁵⁹ Kieser, p. 33.
- ⁶⁰ Arus Yumul-Rıfat N. Bali, “Ermeni ve Yahudi Cemaatlerinde Siyasal Düşünceler” (Political thinking in Armenian and Jewish communities) in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasal Düşünce: Cumhuriyete Devreden Düşünce Mirası Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet’in Birikimi* (Political thinking in Modern Turkey: The Tanzimat legacy and the constitutional aggregates transferred to the political thinking of Republican Turkey), *Vol. I*, İstanbul, İletişim, 2001, p. 363. Krikor Zohrab was one of the most important members of this realist Armenian literature. Other prominent writers were: Arpiar Arpiarian (1852-1901), Melkon Gurdjian (1859-1915), Hrant Asadur (1862-1928), Sibil (Zabel Asadur, 1863-1934), Dikran Gamsaragan (1866-1941), Levon Pashalian (1868-1943), Yerukhan (1870-1915).
- ⁶¹ Sami Önal (ed.), *Sadettin Paşa’nın Anıları, Ermeni-Kürt Olayları (Van, 1896)* (The memoirs of Sadettin Pasha concerning Kurdish-Armenian problems (Van 1896), İstanbul: Remzi, 2nd edition 2004).
- ⁶² Ali Karaca, *Anadolu İslahâtı ve Ahmet Şâkir Paşa (1839-1899)* (The Anatolian reforms and Ahmet Shakir Pasha, 1839-1899), İstanbul, Eren, 1993, pp. 37-54.
- ⁶³ According to an Armenian historian, Saroukhan, the founders of the Society had chosen this “innocuous” name, first, to hide their clandestine aims (“self defense against heavily armed Kurdish element”), and second, because “a substantial number of the initial members were farmers” (Saroukhan, “The Agricultural Society: The First Popular Movement in Western Armenia,” *Armenian Review*, vol. 36, Summer, 1982, p. 156).
- ⁶⁴ This name was inspired by the *Armenia* magazine which was published by an intellectual, Mgrdich Portukalian, in Marseille.
- ⁶⁵ Gerard J. Libaridian, “Revolution and Liberation in the 1892 and 1907 Programs of the Dashnaksutiun,” in *Transcaucasia, Nationalism, and Social Change: Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia*, Ronald Grigor Suny (ed.), Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1996, p. 189.

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- ⁶⁶ A summary of the Party's program was published in Louise Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement, the Development of the Armenian Political Parties Throughout the Nineteenth Century*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1963, p. 97.
- ⁶⁷ According to Nalbandian, the phrase "all patriotic Armenians" symbolizes that the Party expected to unite three Armenian denominations: Armenian Orthodox Apostolics, Catholics, and Protestants (Nalbandian, p. 98).
- ⁶⁸ Artak Darbinian, *Hay Azadakragan Sharjman Oreren* (From the Days of the Armenian Liberation Movement), Published by the Hay Azgayin Himnatram # 8, Paris, Arax, 1947, pp. 125-128; Nalbandian, pp. 97-98.
- ⁶⁹ Nalbandian, p. 100.
- ⁷⁰ As will be seen in the next section, later on the Ramgavar Party adopted a legal course, and worked to strengthen constitutional rule.
- ⁷¹ Ter Minassian, "Nationalism," p. 148
- ⁷² In 1890 the Party was named *Hnchagian Heghapokhagan Gusagtsutiun* (Hnchagian Revolutionary Party), in 1905 *Hnchagian Sotsial Democrat Gusagtsutiun* (Hnchagian Social Democrat Party) and in 1909 *Sotsial Democrat Hnchagian Gusagtsutiun* (Social Democrat Hnchagian Party)
- ⁷³ Nalbandian, p. 104.
- ⁷⁴ Ibid., pp. 113-114; Ter Minassian, "Nationalism," p. 149.
- ⁷⁵ Nalbandian, p. 113.
- ⁷⁶ Ter Minassian, "Nationalism," p. 150.
- ⁷⁷ *Dzrakir Hnchagian Gusagtsutiun* (Program of Hnchagian Party), London, 1897, p. 3.
- ⁷⁸ Ibid.; Nalbandian, p. 108.
- ⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 109.
- ⁸⁰ Aderbed [Sarkis Mubahajian], *50 Amyak 1878-1928 Voskya Hopelian Hai Heghapokhoutian* (Fiftieth Year, 1878-1928 The Golden Jubilee of the Armenian Revolution), (Leninagan - today Gyumri: 1927); cited in Nalbandian, p. 117.
- ⁸¹ Lima, xvi.
- ⁸² Nalbandian, p. 117.
- ⁸³ Mgrdich Khrimian: The Armenian Patriarch of Istanbul (1869-1873), later Catholicos of all Armenians (1876-1882). During his mission in Van he published a patriotic-religious paper called *Ardzvi Vaspurakani* (The Eagle of Van). He was also a member of the committee that represented the Armenians in the Congress of Berlin in 1878. The Armenian population in the eastern *vilayets* labeled him *Hayrig* (Father) and *Ardziv* (Eagle) because of his nationalist-humanitarian activity in the region.
- ⁸⁴ Vahan Papazian, *Im Houshere* (My Memoirs), Vol. 1, Boston, Hairenik, 1950, pp. 7-9.
- ⁸⁵ "Ludzum Tbrotsagan yev Galvadzagan Khntrots Rusahayots" (Resolving the school and property problems of the Russian-Armenians), *Arevelian Mamul* (Eastern Press), 10 August 1905, p. 848.
- ⁸⁶ *Hnchag*, January 1908 (1), p. 2.
- ⁸⁷ "Manifesto" (1890) in *Tivan Hay Heghapokhagan Tashnaktsutian* (The Archives of [Documents] on the Armenian Revolutionary Federation), Simon Vratzian (ed.), Boston, published by the Amerigayi Getr. Gomide, 1934, p. 36; Lima, p. vii; A. Sevian, "The Founding of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation," *Armenian Review*, vol. 34, June 1981, p. 126.
- ⁸⁸ Ter Minassian, "Nationalism...", p. 150.
- ⁸⁹ Libaridian, p. 187.
- ⁹⁰ Suny, "Populism," p. 143.

- ⁹¹ Ter Minassian, “Nationalism...”, p. 151.
- ⁹² *Tivan Hay Heghapokhagan Tashnaktsutian* (The Archives of [documents] of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation), p. 36
- ⁹³ *Dzrakir Hai Heghapokhagan Tashnaktsutian Gazmvdz 1892i*, p. 11.
- ⁹⁴ *Dzrakir* (Program), Geneva, 1907, p. 17.
- ⁹⁵ Cited in Dasnabedian, p. 121.
- ⁹⁶ *Dzrakir Hai Heghapokhagan Tashnaktsutian Gazmvdz 1892i*, pp. 3-5.
- ⁹⁷ *Dzrakir* (Program), p. 17.
- ⁹⁸ Geographically “Armenia Major” was bounded on the north by the River Cyrus (Kour), Iberia, Colchis, and the Moschici Mountains; on the west by Asia Minor and the Euphrates; on the south by Mesopotamia and Assyria; on the east by the Caspian Sea and Media (*Haygagan Sovedagan Hanrakidaran* (Armenian-Soviet Encyclopedia), Yerevan: 13 vol. 1974-1982; *International Standard Bible Encyclopedia*, <http://www.biblicalarcheology.net/OlderWorks/Armenia.html>).
- ⁹⁹ Simon Vratzian, “Hai Heghapokhagan Tashnaktsutian Yergrotr Enthanoor Kongrese” (The Second general congress of the ARF), *Hairenik* (Motherland), vol. xvi (1938), no. 12, p. 68; in English, “The Second World (Unthanoor) Congress of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation,” *Armenian Review*, September 1979, vol. 32.
- ¹⁰⁰ Vratzian, p. 70.
- ¹⁰¹ “Hagirdj yev Grdjadvadz Hushakir Kongresin” (Condensed and abbreviated report of the Congress), in *Tivan Hay Heghapokhagan Tashnaktsutian* (The Archives of [Documents] On Armenian Revolutionary Federation), # 1522; Vratzian, p. 250.
- ¹⁰² Ibid.
- ¹⁰³ *Dzrakir Hai Heghapokhagan Tashnaktsutian Gazmvdz 1892i*, p. 7.
- ¹⁰⁴ Avagyan, p. 17.
- ¹⁰⁵ *Rapport Présenté au Congrès Socialiste International de Copenhage*, p. 12; A. Asdvadzadurian, “İttihad-Tashnaktsagan Haraperutiunnere” (Unionist and Tashnak Relationships), *Hairenik*, vol. XLII, no 12 (1964), p. 69.
- ¹⁰⁶ *Kaghvadzknner Hay Hegh. Tashnaktsutian Yerrort Enthanur Joghovi Adenakrutiunneren* (Excerpts from the Third ARF General Congress), pp. 25-26.
- ¹⁰⁷ “Sultanagan Tsasumn” (Rage of the Sultan), *Troshag*, June-July 1907 (6-7), p. 1.
- ¹⁰⁸ “Hai-Trkagan Hamerashkhutiun” (Armenian-Turkish Consensus), *Troshag*, June-July 1907 (6-7), p. 2.
- ¹⁰⁹ Sdepan Sapah-Gulian, “Turk Prnabedutiune yev Yeridasart Turkere” (Turkish dictatorship and Young Turks), *Hnchag*, January 1908 (1), pp. 2-11.
- ¹¹⁰ Hanioglu, *Preparation*, pp. 192-197; for an interpretation of the decisions the Congress made see “Turk Prnabedutiune yev”, *Hnchag*, 1908 January (1), p. 2.
- ¹¹¹ *Haidararakir Osmanian Gaisrutian Enttimatir Darreru Gonkrein, Kumarvdz Yevrobayi Mech* (Declaration of the Congress of Ottoman Opposing Elements, Convened in Europe), Geneva, 1907, p. 7.
- ¹¹² Ibid., p. 10; Hanioglu, *Preparation*, p. 203-205; Kaligian, pp. 2-3.
- ¹¹³ “Michgusagtsayin Gonkren,” (Interparty Congress), *Troshag*, January 1908 (1), p. 1.
- ¹¹⁴ Lima, p. x.
- ¹¹⁵ *Haidararakir Osmanian Gaisrutian Enttimatir*, p. 6.
- ¹¹⁶ *Kaghvadzknner Hay. Hegh. Tashnaktsutian Yerrort*, p. 26.
- ¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 27.
- ¹¹⁸ “Sultanagan Yerazner” (Dreams of the Sultan), *Troshag*, January 1906 (2), p. 1.
- ¹¹⁹ Among the Caucasian revolutionaries who came to İstanbul after the constitutional revolution were: Agnuni (Khachadur Malumian), Simon Zavian, Rosdom, Avedis

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- Aharonian, Khajak, Avedik İshagian, Dr. Der-Tavitian, Rupen Tarpinian, Nazarian (Asdvadzadurian, p. 76).
- ¹²⁰ Dasnabedian, p. 123.
- ¹²¹ “Stolypin-Vorontsovan Regime Yev” (The Regime of Stolypin-Vorontsov and), *Troshag*, 1909 February-March (2-3), p. 17; *Rapport présenté au Congrès*, pp. 4-11.
- ¹²² *Haidararakir yev Voroshumner*, pp. 21-22,
- ¹²³ “Rusasdan: Stolypinits Hedö” (Russia: after Stolypin), *Troshag*, 1911 July-December (7-12), p. 90.
- ¹²⁴ “Michgusagtsayin Gonkren,” p. 2.
- ¹²⁵ “Nor Daknabe” (The New crisis), *Troshag*, March 1907 (3), p. 1.
- ¹²⁶ Ibid. See also, *Rapport Présenté au Congrès Socialiste*, p. 13. This report gave some information about their cooperation with a socialist “Young Turk” organization, *Sabah’ül-Hayr* (Good morning), formed in Van in 1906, p. 14.
- ¹²⁷ These were the most important (tax) revolts of the 1905-1907 period, in which Young Turk reconciliation played an important role; for details see Aykut Kansu, 1908 Devrimi (1908ի լեղափոխությունը), İstanbul, İletişim, 2001, pp. 35-95.
- ¹²⁸ *Troshag* (Flag), 31 July 1908.
- ¹²⁹ Camarilla: *Spanish*. A group of unofficial or private advisers to a person of authority, especially a group much given to intrigues and secret plots; cabal; clique.
- ¹³⁰ “Sahmanatragan Turkia yev Haygagan Khntir” (Constitutional Turkey and the Armenian Question), *Hnchag*, July 1908 (6-7), p. 49.
- ¹³¹ “Sahmanatrutiun Turkiayum,” (The Constitution in Turkey) *Yergri Tzayne* (Voice of the Motherland), 18/31 July 1908 (26), p. 1.
- ¹³² Vahan Papazian, *Im Houshere* (My Memoirs), Vol. 2, Beirut, Hamazkayin, 1952, p. 36.
- ¹³³ In the First Balkan War, Antranig Ozanian (aka Baruyr), one of the most prominent Armenian *fedai* leaders tied to the ARF, commanded an Armenian voluntary unit in the Bulgarian Army. After the ARF alliance with the CUP in 1908 Antranig resigned from the party, on a personal initiative. In the Balkan Wars, the Ottoman Army counted a number of Ottoman Armenians within its ranks (Kaligian, p. 374; Leon Troçki [Trotsky], *Balkan Savaşları* (Balkan wars), İstanbul, Arba, 1995, pp. 283-295).
- ¹³⁴ Papazian, Vol. 2, p. 480; Gaidz F. Minassian, “Birinci Dünya Savaşı Öncesinde Ermeni Devrimci Federasyonu ile İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti Arasındaki İlişkiler” (Relations between ARF and İttihat Ver Terakki during WWI), in *Ermeniler ve İttihat*, p. 153.
- ¹³⁵ Rupen, *Hai Heghapokhagani me Hushere* (The Memoirs of an Armenian Revolutionary), Beirut, Hamazkain, 1977, vol. V, p. 354; Minassian, p. 154.
- ¹³⁶ Vahe Tashdjian, *Ishkhane* (Iskhan [Nikol Mikaelian-Boghosian], Yerevan, Varantian, 1994, p. 126; interestingly, after his release from prison in June thanks to the general amnesty, the Muslim population of Van also called him “Aram Paşa”.
- ¹³⁷ “Inchu yev Inchbes Dzakets Heghapokhagan Sharjume,” (Why and how the revolutionary movement emerged) *Yergri Tzayne*, 18/31 July 1908 (26), p. 5.
- ¹³⁸ *Haidararakir yev Voroshumner*, pp. 1-2, and “Haidararakir HH Tashnaksutian Hinkerort Enthanur Joghovi” (The Declaration of the Fifth General Congress of the AR Federation), *Troshag*, September 1909 (9), p. 113.
- ¹³⁹ One of the leaders of the Revolutionary Hnchagian Party, Suren Bartevian, met with Ahmed Rıza in order to get some guarantees from the CUP. Only after this meeting could Hnchags start to work legally in the Ottoman Empire (Manuk G. Çizmeciyen, *Badmutiun Amerigahai Kaghakagan Gusagtsutants 1890-1925* (The History of American-Armenian political parties 1890-1925), Fresno, 1930, p. 141, cited in Avagyan, pp. 40-42.

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- ¹⁴⁰ Sdepan Sapah-Gulian and Murad (Hampartzum Boyadjian), “Harachapan” (Foreword), in *Dzrakir Hnchagian Gusagtsutian (Dacgasdani Hamar)* (The Program of the Hnchagian Party / For Turkey), İstanbul, 1908, pp. 3-4; the refusal of separatism was also declared in the Fifth Chapter of the Program “[The Party] refuses all kinds of separatism from constitutional Turkey”, p. 13; the same sentence was also in the 1910 Program of the Hnchagian Party, *Dzrakir Social-Democrat Hnchagian Gusagtsutian (Dacgasdani Hamar)* (Program of Social-Democrat Hnchagian Party/For Turkey), İstanbul, 1910, p. 15. Also Tashnaks declared their refusal of separatism in their Fifth Congress in 1909 with a reference to the Adana event, *Haidararakir yev Voroshumner*, pp. 3 and 6.
- ¹⁴¹ *Dzrakir Social-Democrat Hnchagian Gusagtsutian (Dacgasdani Hamar)*, p. 3.
- ¹⁴² S. Sapah-Gülyan, *Badaskhanaduneri* (The responsible officials), Beirut, Doniguiyan Press, 1974, p. 312, (cited in Avagyan, p. 94).
- ¹⁴³ These were: a) the Armenagan Party, b) a faction in the Veragazmial Hnchag Party, and c) Miutiunagan (Unity) Society.
- ¹⁴⁴ “Meşrutiyet ve Hukuk-u Avam Taraftarı Ermeni Fırkasının Beyanname ve Programıdır,” (the pro-constitution and peoples’ rights Armenian party’s declaration and political platform) in Ter Minassian, *Ermeni Devrimci*, p. 88; “Akıl ve mantığa tamamiyle muvafık ve memleketin menafı-i umumiyesi nokta-i nazarından müfid olan işbu metalib ve âmalin fırkamızla diğer anasır-i Osmaniyeye mensup siyasi fırkalar arasında vücudu ez-ser nev arzu olunan ve memleketin menafı-i esasiye ve saadet-i umumiyesinin bi’n-nesibe az bir müddette temini nokta-i nazarından elzem bulunan revabıt-i vıfakın istihsal ve teyidine hizmet...”.
- ¹⁴⁵ “Ermenilik Osmanlılıkla beraber ibaresi fırkamızın üss-ü mesleğidir,” Ibid., p. 93.
- ¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 92.
- ¹⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 93-105.
- ¹⁴⁸ Darbinian, p. 205 in Avagyan, p. 47.
- ¹⁴⁹ Avagyan, p. 47.
- ¹⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 48-49.
- ¹⁵¹ *Troshag* welcomed the suppression of the counter-revolutionary attempts as a “Second Revolution”, in April 1909 (4), p. 41.
- ¹⁵² Taner Akçam, *İnsan Hakları ve Ermeni Sorunu* (Human rights and the Armenian Question), Ankara, İmge, 1999, p. 248; “Ermeniler tek vücut olarak Anayasa’nın yanındalar. Devletin tuzu gibiler, bütün öteki unsurları peşlerinden çekiyorlar.”
- ¹⁵³ Asdvadzadurian, p. 71.
- ¹⁵⁴ Papazian, Vol. 2, p. 89.
- ¹⁵⁵ Armenian public opinion of the time connected the Adana massacres with the mutiny in İstanbul: “The beginning of the massacre on Thursday 1/14 April was not a coincidence. Naturally, Yıldız [the Sultan] played an important role in the Adana massacre.” “Giligian Sarsapner,” (The Horrors of Cilicia), *Troshag*, May 1909 (5), p. 54.
- ¹⁵⁶ *Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi: Devre: I, İctima Senesi: 1, Cilt: 3: 28 Mart 1325 Tarihli Elli Beşinci İnikattan-14 Mayıs 1325 Tarihli Seksen Birinci İnikada Kadar* (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1982), p. 116; “(...) bugün Ermenileri fedaidir, yok bilmem nedir diye itham edemeyiz. Ermenilerde fedai vardır, ben gördüm onları, hakikaten hürriyet için canlarını feda ettiler ve hastanede bizim şühedamız için hizmet ettiler. Başka türlü bir fedai bilmiyorum. Hürriyete, bu kadar bizimle beraber hizmet eden bir milleti ve bunca zulüm ve hakaret gördükten sonra ...büyük bir kabahatle itham edemeyiz.”
- ¹⁵⁷ Minassian, p. 149.

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- ¹⁵⁸ Papazian, Vol. 2, p. 89.
- ¹⁵⁹ *Troshag*, October-November 1909 (10-11); Papazian, Vol. 2, pp. 128-129; Avagyan, pp. 71-72.
- ¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 72.
- ¹⁶¹ Avagyan, pp. 70-71.
- ¹⁶² *Zartonk Patsarig. Nvirvadz Ramgavar Azadagan Gusagtsutian Karasnamiagin yev Zartonk Oraterti Ksanhingamiagin 1885-1962* (Zartonk Special issue. Dedicated to the 40th Anniversary of the Ramgavar Liberal Party and 25th Anniversary of the *Zartonk Daily* 1885-1962), Beirut, 1962, p. 76; Avagyan, p. 95.
- ¹⁶³ Avagyan, p. 99; Avagyan mentions the number nine for the Armenian deputies in the 1912 elections, which is wrong. There were ten Armenian deputies in all: two from İstanbul: Bedros Haladjian (CUP), and Krikor Zohrab (Independent); one from Aydın: Vahan Bardizbanian; one from Sivas: Dr. Paşayan; one from Aleppo: Artin Boshgezenian; one from Ergani: Isdepan Cheradjian; two from Erzurum: Karekin Pastmajian, and Vartkes Serengulian; one from Bitlis: Kegham Der Garabedian; one from Van: Onnig Tertsagian Vramian.
- ¹⁶⁴ “Four-years’ experience of the New Turkey shows that the differentiation between ‘new’ and ‘old’ is only window dressing,” Vaghinag, “Ankhusapelin” (The Unavoidable), *Troshag*, November-December 1912 (11-12), p. 290; for a detailed list of the reasons for this policy transformation see “HH Tashnaksutian Yoterort Enthanur,” p. 147.
- ¹⁶⁵ M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türklük (1889-1902)* (The Ottoman CUP as a political organization and the Jeune Turkism 1889-1902), İstanbul, İletişim, 1986, p. 191.
- ¹⁶⁶ Avagyan, p. 41.
- ¹⁶⁷ Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi* (Political parties in Turkey5 the second constitutional period), İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı, 1984, vol. II, p. 154.
- ¹⁶⁸ *Azadarar Sharjoum Panagi Haghtagan Mudke i Gonsdantnubolis* (The Victorious Entrance of the Action Army into Constantinople), İstanbul: 1909, p. 164.
- ¹⁶⁹ Tunaya, 264.
- ¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 265.
- ¹⁷¹ Avagyan, p. 95
- ¹⁷² ARF’s opposition to the cooperation between SDHP and LEP: “The anti-İttihadist government came on the scene with slogans of decentralization and real equality of the nations. There are lots of stupid people – even in our national circles – who believed them, and applauded the fall of İttihat. ... The miserable slogan, ‘The İttihat has fallen; it is necessary to overthrow its Armenian partner’ is spreading from İstanbul to Tiflis.” “Grkere Lur” (The ambitions are quiet), *Troshag*, July-August 1912 (7-8), p. 177.

ՀԱՅ ՔԱՂԱՔԱԿԱՆ ՄԻՏՔԸ
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Ուսումնասիրությունը կը ներկայացնէ թուրք ազգայնական պատմագրութեան տեսակետերը արեւմտեան տէրութիւններուն հետ արեւմտահայութեան գործակցութեան մասին, ինչպէս եւ՝ հայերու հանդէպ հնչող «անջատողականութեան», «դաւաճանութեան» մեղադրանքները, որոնք կը նկատուին տրամաբանական հակադարձութիւն, Երիտթուրք կառավարութեան կողմէ հայոց նկատմամբ կատարուածները արդարացնելու միտող:

Հեղինակը կը հերքէ վերոյշեալ տեսակետերը, առարկելով նախեւառաջ թէ օսմանահայութիւնը միատարր գանգուած չէր. կային այլեւայլ խաւեր ու խմբաւորումներ, ինչպէս՝ գաւառահայութիւնը, պոլսահայութիւնը, ամիրաները, էսնաֆները, արեւմտեան համալսարանաւարտ երիտասարդութիւնը, կուսակցութիւնները, պահպանողականները, կրօնական թելը, աշխարհիկ խմբաւորումը եւն.: Հեղինակը կը հաւաստէ որ այս շերտերն ու խմբաւորումները անուանական չէին. անոնք կը ջատագովէին հակադիր տեսակետեր՝ արեւմտահայութիւնը յուզող ընկերային, տնտեսական, մշակութային, քաղաքական, ապահովական թէ այլ հարցերու լուծման:

Հեղինակը համառօտակի կը նկարագրէ արեւմտահայ գեղջուկին կրած կրկնակի հալածանքը պետութենէն եւ քրտական կեղեքումներէն: Ան հայ կուսակցութիւնները կը ներկայացնէ այս ծիրին մէջ ու կ'անդրադառնայ անոնց զաղափարախօսութեան եւ ազգային-քաղաքական արեւելումին, շեշտելով որ անոնք նախեւառաջ ձգտեցան Արեւմտեան Հայաստանի մէջ բարեկարգումներ յառաջացնելու:

Հեղինակը կ'առարկէ որ հայ քաղաքական կուսակցութիւնները տարուբերեցան ինքնավարութիւն-անջատողականութիւն-բարեկարգութիւն այլընտրանքներուն միջեւ, ըստ օսմանեան ներքին քաղաքականութեան՝ սահմանադրութեան հոչակումէն առաջ եւ ետք: Ան վաւերական ապացոյցներով կը փաստէ որ հայ կուսակցութիւնները 1908ի Երիտթուրք Յեղափոխութենէն ետք վար դրին իրենց անջատողական ծրագրերը եւ ջանացին Բթթիհատ Վէ Թերաքքը ու Հիւրիէթ Վէ Բթիլաֆ Ֆիրքասի կուսակցութեանց քաղաքական գործակցութեամբ իրականցնել բարենորոգումներ: Այլ խօսքով, անոնք մտան յետ-սահմանադրական օսմանեան քաղաքական կուսակցութեանց օրինական համակարգին իրաւադաշտը:

Այսպիսով, կը հերքուին նաեւ թուրք պատմագրութեան մեղադրանքները հայերու դաւաճանութեան եւ արեւմուտքի հետ համագործակցութեան մասին: